Conclusions and recommendations
SNP Foreign, Security and Defence policy update
1. Our
scrutiny of the SNP's updated Foreign, Defence and Security policy
has revealed a large number of questions which remain to be answered
by the Scottish Government in advance of the referendum in 2014.
Much of the detail has still to be produced and we will await
the Scottish Government's forthcoming White Paper with keen interest.
This document, once published, needs to provide answers to the
unanswered questions for Scottish voters. They will wish to understand
better how the defence of an independent Scotland would be configured
should there be a "Yes" vote in September 2014. It will
be for the Scottish Government to make its case that an independent
Scotland can sustain an appropriate level of defence and security.
(Paragraph 22)
The role of a Scottish defence force
2. The
SNP appears to envisage an independent Scotland which is outward
looking, with a strong maritime focus given its geographic position.
It would be keen to collaborate closely with northern European
neighbours and expects to work with and through the UN, EU and
NATO. Beyond that, however, we have found it very difficult to
establish how the foreign and security policy of the SNP has informed
its vision for a Scottish defence force. We have seen little evidence
that the Scottish Government has reached any understanding with
Northern European nations regarding military co-operation. Claims
by the Scottish Government that its policy development has been
hampered by a lack of co-operation from the UK Government seem
to us to be somewhat overplayed. (Paragraph 29)
3. We will look to
the Scottish Government's forthcoming White Paper to provide additional
information about its foreign and security policy and the role
a Scottish defence force would be expected to fulfil. (Paragraph
30)
A Scottish navy
4. In
light of the evidence of the experience of other countries, we
have serious doubts about the SNP's stated intention to acquire
conventional submarines. This could only be achieved by procurement
from abroad at considerable cost and risk. (Paragraph 38)
5. As yet, the Scottish
Government has given only a preliminary indication of its plans
for a Scottish navy. When it publishes more detailed requirements,
it will be important to know the following: (Paragraph 45)
- What would be the size and configuration of its
surface fleet and associated rotary wing force?
- What personnel, vessels and helicopters would
it hope to inherit from the Royal Navy?
- What additional vessels would it procure?
- How many submarines would it procure, and from
where would they and the necessary qualified personnel be sourced?
- What role, size and configuration would any Marine
Infantry capability take? and
- How many naval bases would a Scottish navy operate
from, where would they be, and how many personnel would be expected
to be based at each?
- Finally, the Scottish Government should make
clear in its White Paper the anticipated cost of acquiring, staffing,
operating and maintaining these assets.
A Scottish army
6. The
proposed retention and reinstatement of historic Scottish Regiments
clearly has implications for the size and structure of a Scottish
army. It is not apparent from the SNP's published plans which
Scottish regiments "previously abolished" it intends
to restore or how that could be achieved within the overall numbers
of personnel proposed. (Paragraph 51)
7. In light of the
new British Army structures envisaged in the Army 2020 proposals,
the Scottish Government should consider publishing a new plan
for a Scottish army. (Paragraph 52)
8. Questions which
it might wish to address include: (Paragraph 53)
- What would be the size and structure of a Scottish
army, including the envisaged balance of regular and reserve troops?
- What would be the balance between combat (infantry
and armoured), combat support (artillery, aviation and engineers),
combat service support (logistics) and command support (communications)
troops?
- Which historic Scottish regiments would be reinstated?
- Where would Scottish army units be based?
- What equipment and infrastructure would a Scottish
army expect to inherit from the British Army?
- What would be the cost of recruitment, training
and retention measures? and
- How would a Scottish army attract and train the
necessary specialist troops such as engineers, signallers and
logistic personnel?
A Scottish air force
9. We
look forward to reading in the forthcoming White Paper the detailed
proposals the Scottish Government has for the procurement and
operation of a maritime patrol squadron and how this will be financed
within the overall aspirations for Scottish defence capability.
(Paragraph 64)
10. In view of the
costs associated with acquiring different air defence aircraft
from those the UK currently operates, we do not currently understand
how the Scottish Government expects, within the available budget,
to mount a credible air defence - let alone provide the additional
transport, rotary wing and other support aircraft an air force
would need. The Scottish Government will no doubt wish to set
out a detailed explanation of this in its White Paper. (Paragraph
66)
Associated costs
11. Without
receiving detailed answers to the questions posed elsewhere in
this report, it would be unrealistic to expect us to judge the
exact running costs of the proposed Scottish defence force. However,
given the information we have so far received from the Scottish
Government, we are unconvinced that there is sufficient funding
to support both the proposed Scottish defence force and to procure
new equipment. (Paragraph 71)
12. We note that the
process of negotiation on the division of military assets would
not be one sided, and that the remainder of the UK would be likely
to bring into the negotiations existing shared liabilities, such
as decommissioning of nuclear submarines, and the additional costs
it would incur by losing a proportion of the economies of scale
it enjoys at present. (Paragraph 76)
Training
13. We
consider it unlikely that the Ministry of Defence would make available
sufficient training places for Scottish personnel at facilities
such as Sandhurst, Dartmouth and Cranwell. The Scottish Government
should therefore include in its White Paper an assessment of alternative
options and cost estimates for delivery of this training. (Paragraph
85)
Conclusion on a Scottish defence force
14. Before
we can judge whether these ambitions could be met within a cost
envelope of £2.5 billion per annum, we require more details
from the Scottish Government in its White Paper about its plans
for a Scottish defence force. In particular, the plans must establish
a coherent model which reflects a realistic "tooth to tail"
ratio of combat troops to the personnel required to supply and
support them, and clarity over the training capacity to maintain
the appropriate professional standards. It is also incumbent upon
Scottish Ministers to set out how they propose to finance the
equipment, vessels, aircraft and associated support services a
Scottish defence force would require to deliver the objectives
set for it. (Paragraph 87)
Faslane and the nuclear deterrent
15. We
consider that, in the event of a 'Yes' vote, a safe transition
of the nuclear deterrent from HM Naval Base Clyde could not be
achieved quickly. Even with political will on both sides, the
replication of the facilities at Faslane and, crucially, Coulport,
at another site in the UK would take several years and many billions
of pounds to deliver. Options for basing the deterrent outside
the UK, in the USA or France, even in the short term, may prove
politically impossible or equally costly. (Paragraph 108)
16. The implications
of Scottish independence for the rUK's ability to provide the
necessary security for the nuclear deterrent during any transition
period will need very detailed and early consideration. (Paragraph
109)
17. If the nuclear
deterrent were moved from the Clyde the impact on levels of employment
at Faslane and Coulport would be significant. Evidence we have
received suggests that instead of an increase in people directly
employed at the base to around 8,200 by 2022, as projected by
the MoD, a conventional naval base and Joint Force Headquarters
would employ considerably fewer people than the current workforce
of 6,500. (Paragraph 110)
NATO membership
18. The
change to SNP policy regarding NATO membership in October 2012
was a significant development in the debate on the defence implications
of possible Scottish independence. We welcome the subsequent acknowledgement
by the Scottish Government that an independent Scotland would
need to apply to join NATO rather than inheriting membership.
We note the contrast between the Scottish Government's position
on this and its position on membership of the European Union.
Scottish Ministers will need to make clear their rationale for
this difference, and, if they wish the Scottish people to give
it credence, should consider making publicly available the legal
advice on which it is based. (Paragraph 121)
19. The process of
securing NATO membership is complex and time-consuming and the
response to an application from an independent Scotland would
be influenced by the Scottish Government's stance on nuclear weapons.
NATO is a nuclear alliance and we believe that any action likely
to disrupt the operation of the UK's strategic deterrent would
undoubtedly influence NATO Member countries' attitudes towards
an application from Scotland. (Paragraph 122)
20. We note the reported
recent engagement between NATO and Scottish Government officials,
facilitated by the UK Joint Delegation to NATO. We welcome this
co-operation between the two Governments and invite the UK Government
to provide us with an update on the outcome of these and any subsequent
discussions. Nonetheless, we conclude that the Scottish Government's
view that NATO membership could be negotiated in a period of 18
to 24 months is optimistic unless issues surrounding the nuclear
deterrent were resolved through negotiation. (Paragraph 123)
European Union procurement law
21. The
UK Government states that defence suppliers in an independent
Scotland would no longer benefit from the application of an exemption
from EU procurement law for UK MoD orders. If the Scottish Government
has legal advice to the contrary it should consider making it
public. (Paragraph 134)
Shipbuilding and maintenance
22. In
the event of independence, shipbuilding in Scotland could not
be sustained by domestic orders alone at anything close to current
levels. It is our view that the requirements of a Scottish Government
for construction and maintenance of warships would barely provide
enough work for a single yard. Even the addition of Scottish Government
contracts for commercial ships could not compensate for the loss
of future UK MoD contracts for ships such as the Type 26 Global
Combat Ship. The future of Scottish shipyards would therefore
rest upon whether they could diversify the type of ships they
produce and reduce their cost base in order to secure orders in
open competition with international competitors. (Paragraph 141)
The implications for the defence industry in Scotland
23. In
the event of independence, we consider that the defence industry
in Scotland would face a difficult future. This impact would be
felt most immediately by those companies engaged in shipbuilding,
maintenance, and high end technology. The requirements of a Scottish
defence force would not generate sufficient domestic demand to
compensate for the loss of lucrative contracts from the UK MoD,
and additional security and bureaucracy hurdles would be likely
to reduce competitiveness with rUK based companies. (Paragraph
144)
24. Although we recognise
the commercial risks associated with the potential loss of some
highly skilled employees, we believe defence companies in Scotland
would be forced to rapidly reassess their business strategies,
with the result that relocation of operations to the remainder
of the UK would be an unwelcome but necessary decision. (Paragraph
145)
25. From the evidence
we have received and our own background knowledge of defence industrial
issues raised frequently with us we consider that the Scottish
Government will wish to provide industry with more information
with regard to the following matters: (Paragraph 146)
- Defence and Security relationship with the rUK,
including the anticipated level of integration and collaboration;
- Transition arrangements for existing UK contracts
during the process of separation;
- Procurement policy, including co-investment in
research and development;
- Export posture and potential in terms of legislation
plus consular and broader government support;
- Specific expectations of the current "special
relationship" with the US over trade, intelligence and technology
sharing; and
- Future relationship with cooperative initiatives
such as NATO "Smart Defence" and European Defence Agency
"Pooling and Sharing".
Government planning for Scottish independence
26. We
recognise that the process of negotiation following a "Yes"
vote would be lengthy and complex. For those very reasons, it
would be remiss of the UK Government not to make preparations
in order to inform its negotiating position. We recommend that
the UK Government begin now to prepare for the impact of possible
Scottish independence. It would not be wise to begin contingency
planning only after the referendum. This does not imply that we
believe there should be negotiations with the Scottish Government
prior to the referendum, but rather that it would be prudent for
the MoD to scenario plan. (Paragraph 150)
27. We consider it
to be highly probable that defence assets would form an integral
part of wider independence negotiations rather than a discrete
strand. The UK Government should begin work to assess what its
priorities would be in relation to defence assets in the event
of a "Yes" vote. (Paragraph 153)
Implications for the security of the remainder
of the United Kingdom
28. We
consider that the level of security and defence presently afforded
to the people of the United Kingdom is higher than that which
could be provided by the Governments of a separate Scotland and
the remainder of the UK. (Paragraph 156)
29. In respect of
the interests of the remainder of the UK, we invite the MoD to
explain how it would manage the loss of personnel, equipment,
bases, training facilities and industrial capacity ceded to an
independent Scotland. (Paragraph 157)
Intelligence sharing
30. We
consider that it is unlikely that an independent Scotland with
fledgling intelligence capabilities would be given access to the
Five Eyes intelligence sharing community. A high degree of co-operation
with rUK would therefore be crucial for Scotland especially in
the early years of independence. However, such co-operation would
rely on goodwill and Scotland could find itself more vulnerable
to threats than it is at present. (Paragraph 163)
Shared facilities
31. We
recommend that the Ministry of Defence explain whether the concept
of sharing facilities, including operational bases and training
areas, by Scotland and the rUK could work in practice and to identify
any significant risks arising from this proposal. (Paragraph 166)
Joint procurement
32. The
desire of the Scottish Government to pursue joint procurement
with rUK for defence materiel and services makes absolute sense:
a small country with a limited defence budget would gain access
to larger contracts offering better value for money. Whether the
rUK would benefit sufficiently to enter into such an arrangement
is less clear cut and would need to be examined carefully before
a commitment was given. (Paragraph 168)
Interests of serving UK military personnel
33. We
welcome the evidence we received from the Secretary of State for
Defence that Scots serving in the UK Armed Forces would be able
to transfer to a Scottish defence force should Scotland become
a separate state. We recommend that the Ministry of Defence should
provide a clear statement, prior to the referendum, that serving
personnel would be able to choose whether to remain in the UK
Armed Forces or to transfer to a Scottish defence force. (Paragraph
173)
34. Scottish independence
would have a significant impact on the critical mass of rUK Armed
Forces and the financial resources available to support them.
We recommend that the MoD set out, in its response to this report,
whether it would seek to recruit personnel to replace the numbers
lost through transfers to a Scottish defence force. Would personnel
numbers be maintained at current projections or would rUK Armed
Forces reduce further in size? (Paragraph 174)
Future recruitment
35. Many
thousands of Scots have served with distinction in UK Armed Forces
over many years. In the event of Scottish independence that long
history may be brought to an end should the rUK government decide
that it did not wish to recruit from Scotland. We invite the UK
Government in its response to this report to make clear whether
it would continue to welcome recruits from an independent Scotland.
(Paragraph 179)
Participation in the referendum
36. We
invite the Ministry of Defence to set out what action it will
take, in conjunction with the Electoral Commission, to ensure
that serving personnel are aware of their rights regarding registration
and participation in the referendum. (Paragraph 181)
The nuclear deterrent
37. The
possibility of Scottish independence represents a serious threat
to the future operational viability of the UK's nuclear deterrent.
The UK Government must now give urgent consideration to contingency
options in the event of a "Yes" vote. (Paragraph 183)
Conclusion
38. The
people of Scotland and the rest of the UK deserve to be presented
with as full a picture as possible of the implications of Scottish
independence for their future defence and security. To date, the
information published by both the Scottish Government and UK Government
falls far short of requirements. (Paragraph 184)
39. In its forthcoming
White Paper, in addition to the specific questions asked earlier
in this report, we believe the Scottish Government should provide
direct answers to the following questions:
- How would a sovereign Scottish Government ensure
the defence and security of an independent Scotland?
- For what purposes would Scottish armed forces
be used?
- How would Scottish armed forces be structured
and trained, and where would they be based?
- How much would it cost to equip, support and
train an independent Scotland's armed forces and how much of this
could be procured and delivered domestically? and
- How many jobs in the defence sector would be
placed at risk? (Paragraph 185)
40. Similarly, the
UK Government must set out more clearly the implications for the
security of the remainder of the United Kingdom should the people
of Scotland choose the path of separation. This should include
greater detail about the options for relocation of the strategic
nuclear deterrent and an estimate of the associated costs. The
UK Government should also outline its options for making good
any defence deficit, caused by loss of personnel, equipment and
bases, which might be created by Scottish independence. (Paragraph
186)
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