Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. At the beginning
of our Report, we wish to pay tribute to Army personnel, including
those who have left the Services, for their bravery, dedication
to duty and their contribution to the nation's security. This
has been an uncertain and worrying time for the Armed Forces as
they undergo major changes to their structure and role while continuing
to undertake operations in Afghanistan and other parts of the
world. We also recognise the valuable role that their families
play in supporting them as they carry out their duties. (Paragraph
6)
The Army 2020 plan
2. We are surprised
that such a radical change to the Army's structure, reflecting
a reduction of 12,000 personnel from that announced in SDSR 2010,
was not discussed at the National Security Council (NSC). Even
if the overall strategic vision had not changed, as the Government
claims, the military ways and means of that strategy were considerably
altered under Army 2020. We are firmly of the view that the NSC
should have considered the Army 2020 plan. We recommend that the
NSC should be involved in the evolution and development of Future
Force 2020 in the run-up to the next SDSR in 2015. (Paragraph
15)
3. We have received
no definitive evidence of an active experimentation programme
in the development and implementation of Army 2020. Furthermore
we note with concern that the Chief of the General Staff's update
on the implementation of Army 2020, published in July 2013, provided
no detail on experimentation. The MoD should set out in more detail,
with specific examples, how the plans for Army 2020 were, and
are, being tested and challenged. (Paragraph 26)
4. We note that the
Secretary of State for Defence accepts that Army 2020 was designed
to fit a financial envelope. We are concerned that this consideration
took primacy over the country's abilities to respond to the threats,
risks and uncertainties contained in the National Security Strategy.
We were also concerned to hear that it was the Ministry of Defence's
Permanent Secretary who told the Chief of the General Staff the
future size of the Army under the Army 2020 plan. We call on the
MoD to explain the apparent lack of consultation and involvement
of the Chief of the General Staff in the decision-making process
that has affected his Service so fundamentally. (Paragraph 32)
5. In its response
to this Report, we recommend that the MoD provide us with an assessment
of how the Army 2020 plans will affect the "Fighting Power"
of the Army providing comparable assessments of both current fighting
power and projected fighting power following the completion of
the Army 2020 plans. (Paragraph 34)
6. We agree with the
Chief of the General Staff's assessment that the security threats
that the UK will face in future are uncertain. We remain to be
convinced that the Army 2020 plan represents a fully thought-through
and tested concept which will allow the Army to counter emerging
and uncertain threats and develop a contingent capability to deal
with unforeseen circumstances. The MoD needs to justify how the
conclusion was reached that the Army 2020 plan of 82,000 Regulars
and 30,000 Reserves represented the best way of countering these
threats. We ask the MoD to clarify if the proposals were fully
considered by the Defence Board before the decision was made.
(Paragraph 41)
7. We repeat our previous
recommendation that the Government should further develop a concept
of "critical mass" for the Armed Forces. We note that
this is a concept not only used by the Army General Staff, but
also one that the new Chief of the Defence Staff used in a recent
speech. The development of a concept of "critical mass"
for the Armed Forces, coupled with an assessment of the Army 2020
plan against the MoD's "Fighting Power" doctrine, would
enable a much better informed understanding of whether Army 2020
will enable the Army to fulfil its obligations and how it will
contribute to Future Force 2020. (Paragraph 42)
8. We note the acknowledgement
by senior Army officers that the continuing operation in Afghanistan
and the current high level of change in the Army will compromise
its ability to respond to unexpected events to some degree. We
also note that one of the drivers for the Army 2020 plan was the
recognition that the Army could not match in resource-terms the
five Multi-Role Brigade enduring operation envisaged in the Defence
Planning Assumptions. In an ever changing world, with uncertain
and ever changing threats, and continuing uncertainty about the
resources available, we are concerned that the Defence Planning
Assumptions are adequate to ensure the UK's national security.
In its response to our Report, the MoD should explain what account
was taken of the possibility of changes to the Defence Planning
Assumptions during the development of Army 2020 and how it has
ensured that there is sufficient flexibility in the plan and resources
available to meet any such changes. The MoD must ensure that this
is taken into account as part of the work on the 2015 SDSR and
that contingency plans are in place to deal urgently with this
eventuality. (Paragraph 48)
9. Despite the current
lack of public appetite, we consider it to be a question of when,
not if, UK Armed Forces will have to undertake an expeditionary
operation in the future. In this context, it is essential that
the Army maintains its ability to undertake such operations at
short notice. Any loss of such capability would have serious implications
for the UK's national security. Given that, on most occasions,
these operations will be carried out in cooperation with the UK's
Allies, in its response to this Report we call on the Government
to set out the current status of the UK-France Combined Joint
Expeditionary Force. We also call on the MoD to provide us with
an update on progress on the development of the new UK Joint Expeditionary
Force (JEF), including how it will train and operate and the extent
to which appropriate multi-national partners have proved willing
to participate in JEF planning and activity. (Paragraph 52)
10. The smaller Army
envisaged under Army 2020 needs to be innovative in the ways it
works with the other Services. We call on the MoD to set out in
its response to our Report how Army 2020 will improve this joint
working and how it has tested, or intends to test, the proposals.
We also note Lieutenant General Bradshaw's evidence regarding
the Army's greater integrated activity with other Government Departments
and call on the Government to set out details of this in its response
to our Report. (Paragraph 54)
Implementation of Army 2020
11. It is disappointing
that there was a year's gap between the announcements of the Army
2020 plan and the outcome of the Reserves consultation and the
Reserves basing plan. This raised the potential for a lack of
coordination and hampered communications regarding the plans for
the Regular and Reserve Forces. Even though the generation of
Reserve Forces is complex, the number of Reservists required for
Army 2020 and the challenge to recruit them was well known. We
consider that the intervening time between announcements could
have been utilised in making progress in recruiting the required
number of Reservists. (Paragraph 59)
12. We note, but remain
to be convinced by, the Secretary of State's explanation as to
why the reduction in the Regular Army should not be dependent
on the recruitment of the necessary number of Reservists. The
financially driven reduction in the number of Regulars has the
potential to leave the Army short of personnel in key supporting
capabilities until sufficient Reserves are recruited and trained.
In its response to this Report, we call on the MoD to set out
in detail its planning assumptions for the transition, over the
next five years, to a new Army structure including specific examples
of the different types of capability which will fall within the
domain of the Reserves and Regulars in future. This would assist
with gaining support for the Army 2020 plan among the Regular
Army, the wider Armed Forces, Parliament and the public. The Government
must also set out its contingency plans for the rapid recruitment
of Regular Army personnel should there be a need for the rapid
expansion of UK Armed Forces. (Paragraph 63)
13. While a level
of 30,000 trained Reservists in the Army might not appear a large
number based on historic levels, the current recruitment drive
takes place against a backdrop of falling recruitment levels over
several years. We note the scepticism of some of our witnesses
that it will be possible to recruit the required number of Reservists
in the timescale envisaged. The urgent challenge for the MoD is
to ensure that it now employs effective measures and sufficient
incentives to recruit and maintain 30,000 trained Reservists by
2018. Otherwise there is a danger of a gap emerging in the Army's
required capabilities and real fighting power. In its response
to this Report, we also call on the MoD to outline the different
approaches it envisages if the data shows that the plan is not
on course to be delivered. (Paragraph 69)
14. We welcome the
Secretary of State for Defence's commitment to publish, through
the Defence Analytical Services Agency, data on the trained strength
and recruitment levels of Reservists. We also welcome the recruitment
targets that the Secretary of State has published. We look forward
to seeing the additional data that the National Statistician has
agreed to publish. This information is vital to reassure all interested
parties, the Army itself, Parliament and the public, that the
plan is on schedule. We hope that each of these data sets will
develop over time to include performance against targets and such
information as gender, age and place of recruitment. We will continue
to monitor this data to assess whether it provides sufficient
information. It is important that Parliament is provided with
regular updates on progress towards recruitment targets. (Paragraph
72)
15. Despite the assurances
we received from the Army commanders and Capita executives responsible
for the Army recruitment process, we remain concerned that the
targets for recruiting both Regular and Reserve soldiers may not
be met. We are not convinced that the MoD's contract with Capita
was properly and thoroughly considered before its implementation.
For example, we were given no evidence that any trialling of it
had taken place. There would appear to have been a serious break-down
in the supervision of the contract process, for which no one has
been held accountable. (Paragraph 78)
16. We are concerned
at the IT problems encountered at this early stage in the recruitment
campaign. We call on the MoD and Capita to take urgent steps to
rectify these problems and the MoD should give a detailed account
of the measures taken, including detailing the number of servicemen
and women diverted from their normal duties in order to sustain
the recruiting effort, in its response to our Report. (Paragraph
79)
17. We note the difficulties
encountered by the Army in obtaining the medical data of potential
Reservists due to their failure to comply with data protection
regulations. Although this difficulty has at last been resolved,
the Army and the MoD should have foreseen this problem and must
learn lessons for the future. (Paragraph 80)
18. We commend the
MoD for employing a range of media to attract and recruit both
Regulars and Reserves but it is no help when the technology does
not work or applications are lost in the system. Lessons need
to be learned from the initial failure of the contract with Capita,
and the respective accountabilities and responsibilities of both
the contractor and the Army clearly established. (Paragraph 81)
19. We welcome the
measures in the Reserves White Paper and the related clauses in
the Defence Reform Bill. We particularly welcome the Secretary
of State for Defence's agreement during the passage of the Bill
to the principle of making it a statutory requirement for the
Reserve Forces and Cadet Association to report annually on the
state of the Reserves. We will continue to pay close attention
to progress on this and look forward to receiving more details
on how this will be implemented and what the report will cover.
(Paragraph 94)
20. We recognise the
support many employers have given to the Reserve Forces over many
years. We commend the Government's intention to give greater recognition,
building on the current SaBRE scheme and the new Corporate Covenant,
to leading supportive employers of Reservists and look forward
to receiving more information on this proposal. We recommend that
as part of the recognition scheme the Government should publish
additional information about supportive employers, building on
the information already published by SaBRE on its website, highlighting
good practice, and providing examples of the ways individual employers
support Reservists. (Paragraph 95)
21. It is too early
to say whether the measures in the White Paper and the Defence
Reform Bill will prove sufficient and be effective in encouraging
the recruitment of Reservists and ensuring the support of businesses
of all sizes to achieve Army 2020. We welcome the Secretary of
State for Defence's commitment to review these measures if recruitment
falls behind target. In response to this Report, the MoD should
set out how it will assess the effectiveness of the measures and
the timescale for making a decision on whether further action
and incentives are necessary. (Paragraph 96)
22. We welcome the
Government's intention that in future Reservists, where appropriate,
will be able to undertake the same tasks as Regulars. However
we note the concerns expressed by some employers regarding the
potential for negative effects on their businesses arising from
the increased use of Reservists. The MoD should continue to engage
with the business community to address employers' concerns as
failure to do so will impact on the Army's ability to generate
and sustain the necessary capabilities. The MoD should include
in its reports to Parliament on Reserves recruitment details of
how many are employed by SMEs (small and medium enterprises employing
under 250 employees) and any difficulties encountered in recruiting
from this sector. (Paragraph 103)
23. We note the Army's
intention to deploy formed units and sub-units of Reserves. We
ask the MoD to provide greater detail on how this will be implemented,
particularly given the differing timescales for the reduction
in Regular strength and the increase in the size of the Reserves,
and how it will ensure that these changes deliver the required
level of capability. (Paragraph 108)
24. We welcome the
increase in the number of training days for Reservists as this
is vital to their greater integration with Regulars. In its response
to this Report, we call on the MoD to set out what further practical
measures will be implemented to enable Regulars and Reservists
to train together. We are concerned that this should not involve
closing well-recruited units, or those with a large number of
potential new recruits to the Reserves, to match Regular basing
and welcome the Secretary of State's commitment in the House of
Commons on 14 January 2014 to be flexible on the closure of such
units. (Paragraph 109)
25. The role of specialist
Reserves is invaluable to the Army and the UK's Armed Forces as
a whole: we welcome the commitment to them in the Reserves White
Paper. We welcome the establishment of the Joint Cyber Reserve
which is of particular interest to us given our previous inquiry
work on Defence and cyber-security. The potential recruits, with
the required skills, may not be those who would usually consider
a career in the Armed Forces. This represents both a challenge
and an opportunity for the MoD which will require a flexible approach
if they are to be integrated effectively. We ask the MoD to report
to the Committee in six months on progress on the establishment
and the recruitment of the Joint Cyber Reserve. (Paragraph 112)
26. We support the
Government's intention to recruit more ex-Regulars into the volunteer
Army Reserve as part of the recruitment of 30,000 trained Reservists
under the Army 2020 plan. We note the £5,000 commitment bonus,
payable over four years, offered by the Army to Service leavers
and ex-Regulars to incentivise their transfer to the volunteer
Army Reserve. We call on the Government to review effectiveness
of its efforts and the measures introduced to attract more ex-Regulars
into the volunteer Army Reserve in six months and to share its
findings with us. We also note the Army's work on the Regular
Reserve and call for an update on this work in the Government's
response to our Report. (Paragraph 116)
27. We support the
Army 2020 plan for an enhanced role for the Army in civil engagement.
Although there is great admiration and respect for UK Armed Forces,
we recognise that there is currently a disconnect between the
Armed Forces and public understanding of the operations they have
been asked to undertake. This must be addressed. We call on the
Government to take steps to ensure that the Armed Forces, particularly
Reservists, play a more active role in public engagement. In response
to our Report, we recommend that the Government outline the communication
strategy and practical steps it will implement to take forward
its plans for public engagement. (Paragraph 119)
28. We welcome the
£1.8bn additional investment in the Reserves, but call upon
the Government to provide us with a breakdown of how it plans
to spend this money. We note the concerns expressed as to whether
this funding will be sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes
for the Reserves Forces. We note that Reservists are cheaper to
employ so long as they are not called up. This will only prove
to be a cost saving so long as future governments are not required
to undertake operations. This will need to be closely monitored.
It would be unacceptable if the UK decided not to take part in
any action because of the cost of deploying Reservists. We recommend
that the Government set out in detail how it will assess and report
on the cost effectiveness of, and the value for money achieved
by, its plans and how these outcomes will be independently examined
and verified. We would welcome the involvement of the National
Audit Office in this evaluation. (Paragraph 125)
29. We note the evidence
we have received on the recruitment age for the Armed Forces.
We commented on this in our Report on the education of Armed Forces
personnel and in response the Government agreed that the Armed
Forces would undertake a cost benefit analysis of the recruitment
of under-18s. We note that the Army is undertaking this analysis
on a tri-service basis and that the work is continuing. However,
we are disappointed by the lack of clarity regarding the study's
terms of reference and the slow progress with the study. We call
on the Government to provide us with the terms of reference for
the study and an estimation of when it will be completed. We expect
the Army and MoD's cost benefit analysis to be thorough and robust
and call on the Government to set out how it might be independently
scrutinised and verified. This would ensure confidence in the
outcomes of the analysis. We also call on the Government to respond
in detail to the argument that the Army could phase out the recruitment
of minors without detriment to the Army 2020 plans. (Paragraph
130)
30. The plans resulting
from the basing review and the return from Germany are intricate
and interdependent and affect all three Services. The MoD must
ensure this process is managed appropriately so that it does not
unravel. We call on the MoD to keep us informed on its negotiations
regarding training opportunities in Germany, Canada and Kenya,
and how the historically close working relations with the German
authorities are going to be maintained during the drawdown period.
(Paragraph 137)
31. We are concerned
that the Army 2020 plan would unravel in the face of any further
MoD budget reductions or further reductions in Army personnel.
It is essential that the MoD's budget settlement allows for the
delivery of Army 2020. If this is not the case, it must be accepted
that the Army will be capable of doing less than envisaged under
Army 2020 and the UK's vision of its place in the world and the
Defence Planning Assumptions will have to be revised accordingly.
We are also concerned about the Army's capability to expand its
numbers rapidly, both Regulars and Reserves, should a national
emergency require it to do so. Any plans for the structure of
the Armed Forces must be flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing
circumstances. For the reasons already set out in this Report
we have little confidence in the Government's capacity to rapidly
expand Army numbers should the need arise. The Government must
set out its contingency plan for doing so. (Paragraph 142)
Conclusion
32. Army 2020 represents
a radical vision for the future role and structure of the British
Army. It departs significantly from the announcements made in
SDSR 2010 and we have considerable doubts about how the plan was
developed and tested, and whether it will meet the needs of the
UK's national security. The evidence presented to date has been
far from convincing. Our principal concerns are twofold:
· First, the MoD has failed to communicate
the rationale and strategy behind the plan to the Army, the wider
Armed Forces, Parliament or the public.
· Second, we remain concerned that the financially
driven reduction in the numbers of Regulars has the potential
to leave the Army short of personnel particularly in key supporting
capabilities until sufficient additional Reserves are recruited
and trained. (Paragraph 143)
33. The Government
has said Army 2020 has to work and that there is no Plan B. The
Government owe it to the Army to ensure it does work, but, crucially,
if the situation changes, then the Government must be prepared
to respond decisively by providing additional resources in order
to guarantee the nation's security. Although we have concerns
about the Army 2020 plan, we recognise that it also provides opportunities,
for example in addressing the role of Reservists and developing
the public defence engagement role of UK Armed Forces which will
help to resolve the current disconnect between the Armed Forces
and the public. (Paragraph 144)
34. While we welcome
the Government's commitment to publish more data on the Reserves
and to put into statute a requirement on the Reserves Forces and
Cadets Association to produce an annual report on the state of
the Reserve Forces, we believe the Government should go further
and give a commitment to provide regular updates to Parliament
on progress on all aspects of the Army 2020 plan. Oral and written
statements while helpful are not sufficient; a detailed annual
report on the Army's Fighting Power should be laid before Parliament
setting out progress and setbacks in implementing the Army 2020
plan. The first of these reports should be laid before Parliament
in January 2015 to allow consideration and debate before the 2015
General Election and to inform the 2015 SDSR. (Paragraph 145)
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