3 Implementation of Army 2020
55. The Army 2020 plan envisaged
that the changes to the Regular Army structure would be in place
by 2015.[104] At the
time of publication of the Army 2020 plan, Rt Hon Philip Hammond
MP, Secretary of State for Defence, pledged an additional £1.8
billion in spending on the Reserves over the next ten years and
announced an ambitious plan to grow the trained strength of the
Reserves to 30,000 by 2018.[105]
However there was still work to be undertaken
to implement the Army 2020 plan and further announcements to be
made, particularly on the role, use and recruitment of Reservists
and both the Regular and Reserve basing plans (see paragraph 2
(timeline of announcements) and paragraphs 7-10).
56. The MoD published its proposals for the Reserve
Forces, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued,
in July 2013.[106]
Its central theme was the new relationship Defence would seek
to build with Reservists and their families, employers and society.
Specifically, the MoD is seeking to make serving as, and employing,
a Reservist more appealing, challenging and financially rewarding.
At the same time as publication of the White Paper, the MoD announced
its Reserve basing plan,[107]
the Regular Army basing plan having been announced in March 2013.[108]
Recruitment of Reserves
57. Given that the Reservists element, particularly
recruitment of the required numbers, of Army 2020 has been the
biggest area of contention on the Army 2020 plan, we explored
whether the delays between the announcements on Regulars and Reserves,
had impacted on the implementation of the plan. In July 2013,
Major General David Cullen, Assistant Chief of the General Staff,
told us that there were two reasons for the delays between the
announcements:
The first and most fundamental was that, following
the production of the Future Reserve 2020 proposition, which was
done separately, the Secretary of State agreed that there was
a need for consultation and the production of the Green Paper
to map a journey; that was inevitably going to take a certain
amount of time longer than the Regular component's proposition,
which was easier in many ways to come to, not least because the
manner of the generation of our Reserves over time is complex,
so the detail required was very much greater to go through. All
of which came together, as you well understand, with the White
Paper announcement on the Reserves last week.[109]
58. In July 2013, we asked Lieutenant General Bradshaw,
Commander Land Forces, what progress had been made on the recruitment
of Reservists since the announcement of Army 2020. He pointed
out that the announcements on Reserves, including measures to
encourage Reservist recruitment, had only just been made and that
the recruitment campaign was in its early stages:
The announcement has only just happened [July
2013], so we are only just embarking on the process of energising
that recruiting effort. We are not in a position to map out exactly
what the progress will be like. My own expectation is that recruiting
figures will start to lift more gently in the early days and as
people see the reality of the new integrated army, they will find
the Reserves a more attractive proposition and numbers will grow.
I would expect something of a curve.[110]
59. It is disappointing that there was a year's
gap between the announcements of the Army 2020 plan and the outcome
of the Reserves consultation and the Reserves basing plan. This
raised the potential for a lack of coordination and hampered communications
regarding the plans for the Regular and Reserve Forces. Even though
the generation of Reserve Forces is complex, the number of Reservists
required for Army 2020 and the challenge to recruit them was well
known. We consider that the intervening time between announcements
could have been utilised in making progress in recruiting the
required number of Reservists.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REDUCTION
IN REGULARS AND THE INCREASE IN RESERVISTS
60. It has been suggested by the former Secretary
of State for Defence, Rt Hon Liam Fox MP,[111]
and others, including those contributing to our forum on the Army
Rumour Service website, that the reduction in the Army's Regular
strength should be contingent on the recruitment of the required
number of Reserves by 2018.[112]
In the House on 10 October 2011, the then Secretary of State,
Rt Hon Liam Fox MP, said:
Perhaps the biggest challenge is the fact that
we are pouring £400 million into the reserves over this Parliament
[...]. There will be challenges in absorbing that amount of money
and, of course, the rate at which we are able to build up the
Reserves will determine the rate at which we are able to change
the ratio with the Regulars.[113]
61. When the Army 2020 plan was announced in July
2012, the link between the Regular reductions and the increase
in Reserves had been removed. The reductions in Regular Forces
were to be completed by 2015 while the target date for the recruitment
of the Reservists was 2018. Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, Secretary
of State for Defence, told us why:
We have available to us a fixed envelope of resources,
and making the decision to proceed with the draw-down of Regular
force numbers to the target of about 82,000 and to build the Reserve
over a period of five years allows us to take the dividend from
the reduced size of the Regular force and invest in the recruitment,
training and equipment provision of the Reserve forces. Within
the Army's budget [...] it simply would not have been deliverable
or sustainable to propose retaining a larger Regular force and
investing in the build-up of Reserve forces in the way we are
now doing.[114]
Asked whether it would not be better to retain a
contingent link between the increase in the Reserves and the reduction
in the Regular Army, the Secretary of State replied:
I recognise the line of questioning, but I am
afraid that I do not see the logic of suggesting that we should
hold the Regular forces that we have decided to draw down and
restructure in their old configuration at their old numbers, rather
than getting on with the job of reconfiguring them for their future
rolea contingent posture, post 2014.[115]
62. The Secretary of State argued that it was critical
to understand that the Army was "not simply replacing Regulars
with Reservists".[116]
Army 2020 was about changing the structure of the Army so that
"more of the supporting capabilities are held in the Reserves".
In future the Army would have different types of capability in
the Reserve and Regulars.[117]
63. We note, but remain to be convinced by, the
Secretary of State's explanation as to why the reduction in the
Regular Army should not be dependent on the recruitment of the
necessary number of Reservists. The financially driven reduction
in the number of Regulars has the potential to leave the Army
short of personnel in key supporting capabilities until sufficient
Reserves are recruited and trained. In its response to this Report,
we call on the MoD to set out in detail its planning assumptions
for the transition, over the next five years, to a new Army structure
including specific examples of the different types of capability
which will fall within the domain of the Reserves and Regulars
in future. This would assist with gaining support for the Army
2020 plan among the Regular Army, the wider Armed Forces, Parliament
and the public. The Government must also set out its contingency
plans for the rapid recruitment of Regular Army personnel should
there be a need for the rapid expansion of UK Armed Forces.
RESERVIST RECRUITMENT CHALLENGE
64. Historically the size of the Territorial Army
has been larger than that envisaged by Army 2020, as illustrated
in the graph below:
Source: Ministry of Defence: Future Reserves
2020: Delivering the Nation's Security Together: A Consultation
Paper, Cm 8475 Annex B, p 45
Notes: (1) Trained and untrained (2) Total
strength of trained and untrained Reserves (3) Reservists who
have completed their Phase 1 (initial) and Phase 2 (specialist)
training
65. However, although a trained Territorial Army
of 30,000 would not appear large in historic terms, the biggest
challenge identified during our inquiry was the recruitment of
the required number of Reservists to fulfil the Army 2020 plan.
Several witnesses expressed doubts as to whether this could be
achieved. Professor Theo Farrell identified it as the one flaw
in the plan:
the whole thing is predicated on the ability
to raise 30,000 Reserves and then progressively integrate them
in a deployable force, starting from individual augmentees to
whole units. And while, for instance, the Americans have been
able to use Reserve forces in this way, in recent history the
British have not been able to deploy whole units into the field.
More to the point, as we know they are encountering
very significant problems with Operation Fortifythe operation
to raise the Reserve force. So that's the flaw: if you cannot
raise the size of the Reserve force that you require and you cannot
get the flexible contracts you need to use them in a certain way,
the whole of Army 2020 is crashing.[118]
66. When they gave evidence, Rt Hon Phillip Hammond
MP, Secretary of State for Defence, and General Sir Peter Wall,
Chief of the General Staff, expressed confidence that the required
number of Reservists could be achieved, highlighting that the
number of trained Reservists envisaged was significantly lower
compared with historic and many international comparisons. The
Secretary of State said:
The number of trained Reserves that we are targeting
is significantly smaller than the number we have traditionally
held in this country. We will have 30,000 trained Army Reservists
by 2018, which compares with around 72,000 trained Army Reservists
as recently as 1990. It is a significantly lower proportion of
our Armed Forces than our English-speaking allies typically expect
to hold as Reservists in their mix, and we are confident that
we will be able to deliver it.[119]
General Wall told us:
[...] in recent memory we have had a much more
significant Reserve force than we aspire to grow in this period.
[...] I am not suggesting it is like for like. In terms of the
sheer size of it, we have been there before [...].[120]
67. Lieutenant General (retired) Brims, Chair, Future
Reserves 2020 External Scrutiny Group, agreed that the target
was achievable but said that it would be helpful to have metrics
for the plan that allowed progress to be measured and if necessary
mitigating action to be taken if recruitment fell behind schedule:
In view of the timescale challenge, we said in
our report that there was a need to be more metric, so that you
could measure how the build-up was going. If you have some way
points, you can take mitigating action to get things to a better
end. I have no doubt that this is an achievable plan. The question
is whether it is achievable in the timescale given.[121]
68. The Secretary of State acknowledged that if the
measures did not deliver the required number of Reservists then
the plan would need to be revisited:
If there is a persistent significant discrepancy
[between targets and delivery], clearly the plan will have to
be revised. The plan will not be delivering. However, I would
not like the Committee to get the impression that there is a single
set of possibilities for delivering this target output. There
are many strands to the recruiting programme. The CGS and I have
discussed with each other and with many other people the things
that we might introduce if we find that elements of the current
plan are not delivering what we expect them to deliver.
There will be pilots of different approaches
to see what works and what does not work. The introduction of
Capita as our recruiting partner will deliver us far more analysis
of the process. Because of the commercial environment in which
it operates, it is used to analysing the results delivered by
different approaches. We do not have, in the Department at the
moment, what I would call "proper data" showing what
the response to difference types of marketing approach and pitch
to potential recruits is. We do not know what we are good at doing,
or what we are not good at doing.[122]
69. While a level of 30,000 trained Reservists
in the Army might not appear a large number based on historic
levels, the current recruitment drive takes place against a backdrop
of falling recruitment levels over several years. We note the
scepticism of some of our witnesses that it will be possible to
recruit the required number of Reservists in the timescale envisaged.
The urgent challenge for the MoD is to ensure that it now employs
effective measures and sufficient incentives to recruit and maintain
30,000 trained Reservists by 2018. Otherwise there is a danger
of a gap emerging in the Army's required capabilities and real
fighting power. In its response to this Report, we also call on
the MoD to outline the different approaches it envisages if the
data shows that the plan is not on course to be delivered.
RECRUITMENT AND TARGET DATA
70. The MoD acknowledges that the recruitment of
the required number of Reservists is a challenge.[123]
Since the Army 2020 announcement there have been calls for the
MoD to publish recruitment figures and its recruitment targets
for Reserves to assess progress of the Army plan. The Secretary
of State for Defence has committed to publish statistical data
on Reservists.[124]
The first data set was published by the Defence Analytical Services
Agency on 14 November 2013.[125]
During the debate on the Defence Reform Bill on 20 November 2013,
the Secretary of State committed to make more data available including
the MoD's targets:
The statistics that were published last week
were on trained strength and on recruitment into the Reserves.
Those are the statistics for which the National Statistician is
responsible. She has indicated on her website that she intends
to publish further data series once she is confident of their
robustness. Separately, I have undertaken to publish for the House
the targets to which we are working and I will do so before the
end of the year.[126]
71. On 19 December 2013, the Secretary of State published
the target recruitment figures for Reservists and the target strength
of Reservists for each Service.[127]
The Army targets were as follows:
Table 1: Trained strength targets for the Army
Reserve up to end of Financial Year 2018
| Target
| End
Financial Year
2012-13
| End
Financial Year
2013-14
| End
Financial Year
2014-15
| End
Financial Year
2015-16
| End
Financial Year
2016-17
| End
Financial Year
2017-18
|
Army
Reserve
|
Trained
Strength
|
18,800
|
19,900
|
20,200
|
22,900
|
26,100
|
30,100
|
Table 2: Recruitment targets for the Army Reserve
up to end of Financial Year 2018[128]
| Target
| Financial
Year
2013-14
| Financial Year
2014-15
| Financial Year
2015-16
| Financial Year
2016-17
| Financial Year
2017-18
|
Army
Reserve
|
Trained Entrants
|
1,300 |
1,270 |
1,270
|
940 |
910
|
|
New Recruits
|
3,600 |
6,000 |
8,000
|
8,000 |
7,000 |
|
Total
|
4,900 |
7,270 |
9,270
|
8,940 |
7,910 |
72. We welcome the Secretary of State for Defence's
commitment to publish, through the Defence Analytical Services
Agency, data on the trained strength and recruitment levels of
Reservists. We also welcome the recruitment targets that the Secretary
of State has published. We look forward to seeing the additional
data that the National Statistician has agreed to publish. This
information is vital to reassure all interested parties, the Army
itself, Parliament and the public, that the plan is on schedule.
We hope that each of these data sets will develop over time to
include performance against targets and such information as gender,
age and place of recruitment. We will continue to monitor this
data to assess whether it provides sufficient information. It
is important that Parliament is provided with regular updates
on progress towards recruitment targets.
Army recruitment contract
73. As part of our examination of the Reserves recruitment
challenge, in December 2013 we visited the Army National Recruiting
Centre at Upavon in Wiltshire. The purpose of the visit was to
examine concerns surrounding the system of recruitment to both
the Regular and Territorial Army since the signing in March 2012
of a 10 year contract with Capita plc to work in a partnering
arrangement to deliver recruitment services for the Army. We had
received reports that monthly recruitment targets for Reserves
were being missed by a considerable margin. The MoD confirmed
this when it published its target data in December 2013. It said:
As anticipated, recruitment in FY2013 has been
well below historic levels. We currently expect 2,500 enlistments
this year made up of circa 1,750 untrained recruits and 750 former
Regulars. Our estimates for this year are informed by the difficulties
experienced in the recruiting organisation as the Army moves to
a new recruiting structure in partnership with Capita and, in
particular, the problems with the IT system supporting the application
and enlistment process. These issues are being addressed with
a range of initiatives that will make it progressively easier
and quicker for an applicant to enlist. In 2014 these include:
· the introduction in January 2014 of a
new Army recruitment web application;
· a simplified on-line application form;
· more streamlined medical clearance processes;
and
· greater mentoring of recruits by local
Reserve units through the application, enlistment and training
process.
From early 2015, the management of the recruitment
process will be further improved with the introduction of the
advanced IT system currently being developed in partnership with
Capita.[129]
74. Throughout our inquiry we have heard concerns
regarding the performance of Capita and the Army Recruiting Group
while operating the contract. These have centred around IT problems,
difficulties with medical data and data protection compliance,
time delays, loss of paperwork, opening hours of recruiting centres
and reports of the redeployment of Regular personnel into recruiting
posts.
75. During our visit, Senior Army leaders and Capita
executives admitted that neither party was content with contract
performance since it became operational in March 2013. An IT system
which had not proved fit for purpose was the principal reason
given for the difficulties which had been experienced with the
processing of applications. We were told that Capita was now going
to take responsibility for the IT infrastructure with a view to
introducing a fully capable system in April 2015. In the meantime,
a plan was in place to improve the performance of existing systems
through process changes and an increase in staffing. However concerns
have continued to be raised about the IT systems since our visit.
In response to an Urgent Question regarding problems with the
IT system in the House on 14 January 2014, the Secretary of State
for Defence informed the House:
As we move forward, we are looking at further
ways of improving the management of the recruiting process in
the intervening period before the introduction of the advanced
IT system now being developed in partnership with Capita, which
is expected to be deployed in February 2015. We have just launched
a new recruitment drive for the Army, both Regular and Reserve,
which will remind the House and the public that the Army is always
recruiting and continues to offer exciting and rewarding careers
in both the Regular and Reserve forces.[130]
76. In terms of other contact methods for potential
applicants, the Army National Recruiting Centre also handles telephone
inquiries, email and web chat. We were told that as recently as
October 2013, of the 5,000 telephone calls made to the Centre
each week, 40 per cent were not answered by staff. By December
this situation had improved with close to 90 per cent of calls
answered.
77. Unfortunately, we were not provided with detailed
figures for the number of applications received in recent months,
but we were told that recruitment is still below target. We were
told that a multi-channel marketing campaign will run from January
to March 2014 in an effort to drive up applications.
78. Despite the assurances we received from the
Army commanders and Capita executives responsible for the Army
recruitment process, we remain concerned that the targets for
recruiting both Regular and Reserve soldiers may not be met. We
are not convinced that the MoD's contract with Capita was properly
and thoroughly considered before its implementation. For example,
we were given no evidence that any trialling of it had taken place.
There would appear to have been a serious break-down in the supervision
of the contract process, for which no one has been held accountable.
79. We are concerned at the IT problems encountered
at this early stage in the recruitment campaign. We call on the
MoD and Capita to take urgent steps to rectify these problems
and the MoD should give a detailed account of the measures taken,
including detailing the number of servicemen and women diverted
from their normal duties in order to sustain the recruiting effort,
in its response to our Report.
80. We note the difficulties encountered by the
Army in obtaining the medical data of potential Reservists due
to their failure to comply with data protection regulations. Although
this difficulty has at last been resolved, the Army and the MoD
should have foreseen this problem and must learn lessons for the
future.
81. We commend the MoD for employing a range of
media to attract and recruit both Regulars and Reserves but it
is no help when the technology does not work or applications are
lost in the system. Lessons need to be learned from the initial
failure of the contract with Capita, and the respective accountabilities
and responsibilities of both the contractor and the Army clearly
established.
Reserves White Paper
82. The July 2013 Reserves White Paper acknowledged
that the institutional integrity of the Reserves, particularly
in the Army, had been damaged due to the focusing of resources
on individuals about to deploy to augment Regular Forces on operations
primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq.[131]
The White Paper said this needed to change. The Reserves needed
to have a meaningful role as in future Reservists would be involved
in almost all military operations, sometimes as formed sub-units
or units. However to achieve this new role, the MoD accepted that
further measures would be required to achieve the Reserves element
of Army 2020, particularly the required number of Reservists for
Army 2020. The White Paper set out the measures and incentives
to be implemented.[132]
These included:
· better collective training;
· access to similar equipment to that used
by their Regular counterparts;
· the introduction of MoD paid annual leave
when undertaking Army training as well as when on operations;
· for the first time, generous Armed Forces
pension entitlements, when training and on operations, under the
Armed Forces Pension Scheme, are to be introduced in April 2015;
· access to key defence health services
when training and on operations;
· transferable skills and academic qualifications;
· an Army Reserve training commitment of
around 40 days per year, up from a current average of 35; and
· legislation to ensure access to employment
tribunals in unfair dismissal cases against Reservists, without
a qualifying employment period.
83. In addition to these measures, the White Paper
also included incentives for employers to allow their employees
to be Reservists:
· a £500 per month, per Reservist,
financial award targeted at small and medium enterprises on top
of the allowances that are already available when their Reservist
employees are mobilised [i.e. preparing for, or on, operations]
;
· more notice so employers are able to plan
for the absences of their Reservist employees;
· greater recognition for leading supportive
employers; and
· a national relationship management scheme
to strengthen the MoD's relationships with larger employers.[133]
84. Lieutenant General Bradshaw, giving evidence
shortly after the publication of the White Paper, said that the
chain of command's reaction to it had been positive, but thought
it was too early to gauge reaction from employers. Giving evidence
a few months after its publication, Lieutenant General (retired)
Brims, Chair of the Future Reserves 2020 External Scrutiny Group,
thought the White Paper set out a model which could be commonly
adopted across all Services:
One of the things that we majored on in [the
Future Reserves 2020 External Scrutiny Group annual] report was
the need for a narrative as to what the Government's plan is.
We have seen that narrative on the day that the White Paper was
announced, within the White Paper and within the announcements
of the Army on its pairing and basing. Pull those together and
there is the start of a narrative. That is beginning to seep out.
It has to get to today's Reservist, today's Regular, tomorrow's
Reservist, tomorrow's Regular, employers and commentators.[134]
DEFENCE REFORM BILL
85. A few of the Reserves White Paper's measures
require legislation. These were included in the Defence Reform
Bill introduced in the House of Commons in July 2013. The four
measures included in the Bill were:
· Changing the name of the Territorial Army
to the Army Reserve and the name of the Army's ex-Regular Reserve
Force from the Army Reserve to the Regular Reserve;
· Expanding the powers in the 1996 Reserve
Forces Act so that members of the Reserve Forces may be called
out for any purpose for which Regular Forces may be used (although
the Bill provides for current Reservists to opt to remain under
the call out obligations of the 1996 Act);
· Introducing new financial incentives to
the employers of Reservists; and
· Exempting Reservists from the statutory
two-year qualifying period required to bring an unfair dismissal
case to an Employment Tribunal.
The Bill's measures would affect the Reserve Forces
of each of the Services, although the greatest impact is expected
to be on the Territorial Army due to the plans for greater integration
with the Regular Army announced under the MoD's plans for Army
2020.
86. The passage of the Bill in the House of Commons
saw a variety of views expressed on the viability and cost-effectiveness
of the plan to increase the size of the Reserves. The Government
did accept the principle of an amendment that the Reserve Forces
and Cadets Association (RFCA) should report annually to the House
on the state of the Reserves and the Secretary of State for Defence,
Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, confirmed his intention that this obligation
should be placed on a statutory basis:
We have already made arrangements to receive
independent reports from the RFCAs on an annual basis; my hon.
Friend [Julian Brazier] is suggesting placing that requirement
in statute. On reflection, we consider that to be a sensible idea
that will strengthen the programme for the growth and reinvigoration
of our Reserves.[135]
87. The MoD noted that the Armed Forces Bill in 2015
would provide an opportunity to legislate further if required,
particularly in respect of discrimination against Reservists in
their workplace.[136]
RECOGNITION FOR EMPLOYERS
88. In the Secretary of State for Defence's introduction
to the Reserves White Paper, he said that the results of the November
2012 Reserves consultation "showed a lack of awareness about
Reservists among many employers or of the potential benefits Reserve
service can offer them" and that "feedback showed that
Defence needs to articulate a more balanced business case on the
impact of Reserve service on employers".[137]
While the Government acknowledged the historic contribution of
employers in supporting Reservists, the White Paper outlined steps
to achieve a better relationship and understanding between Government,
employers, employers' organisations and trade unions in respect
of Reservists. As part of this, the Government plan, by March
2014, to develop a system to give greater recognition to supportive
employers which would build on the existing recognition given
by the SaBRE organisation.[138]
Employers are currently recognised by the award of a SaBRE certificate
with additional material available to support in house publications
and websites. Information is also published on the SaBRE website
about the ways individual employers have supported Reservists.[139]
89. The Government's proposed approach will use the
new Corporate Covenant[140]
as an initial step for employers to indicate their support for
Reservists. The second step will be to give proper recognition
to employers who demonstrate levels of commitment which will "reinforce
the established SaBRE approach in order to provide proper and
appropriate recognition for employers at the organisational level".[141]
This would include the continuation of the issuing of certificates
to employers and updated material for employers to use on their
websites and company letterheads. A third level of recognition
will be for employers "who are able and willing to take a
more proactive approach to encourage Reserve service amongst their
employees".[142]
RESPONSE FROM EMPLOYERS
90. Employers' organisations were keen to emphasise
their historic and continuing support for the Reserve Forces.
Mike Cherry, National Policy Chairman, Federation of Small Businesses
did not see the Government's plans as radical. He told us:
I do not personally feel that it is radical in
terms of employers supporting their Reserves. I think it needs
to be recognised that they need adequate training, adequate kit
and everything else to make this work. In that respect, we have
gone through these feast and famine cycles over time with the
Reserve forces, and there needs to be a strong recognition that
the support has to be there, and the right kit and everything
else has to be in place to make this happen.[143]
91. However Mr Cherry emphasised the importance of
the connection between the MoD and wider society which was crucial
"if we are to get this underpinned by society at large and
to get most employers to support it as the MoD would wish".[144]
92. Alexander Ehmann, Head of Government, Parliamentary
and Regulatory Affairs at the Institute of Directors, thought
that the plans were radical in respect of the expectations on
employers and on workplaces in general. He pointed to the changing
nature of employment habits, for example working for more than
one employer and the possible impact this might have:
if you are working two or three jobs, you probably
have two or three employers. That means that there are more employers
now who, in the instance of one individual, are effectively employers
of Reservists, or will be employers of Reservists. That does mean
that the ramifications of the policy as set out here will be greater
than they have been in the past.[145]
93. Mike Cherry acknowledged that the £500 per
month, per reservist, financial award to small and medium enterprises
was higher than expected by employers.[146]
Although Mr Cherry welcomed this, he pointed out another concern:
It is the support that the business needs to
find and recruit a replacement that is pretty critical to our
members, particularly the smallest micro-businesses.
[...] Part of the parcel that is offered to employers
is the benefits that the Reservist brings back into civilian employment
as a result of the service they undertake. We have to make absolutely
certain that whatever accreditation is given to skills in the
military is well understood and equal to what is needed in civilian
employment. I think that is not the case at this moment in time,
but it has to happen if you are to have that general overall package.
That is fundamental to how we see things helping and benefiting
small businesses going forwards.[147]
94. We welcome the measures in the Reserves White
Paper and the related clauses in the Defence Reform Bill. We particularly
welcome the Secretary of State for Defence's agreement during
the passage of the Bill to the principle of making it a statutory
requirement for the Reserve Forces and Cadet Association to report
annually on the state of the Reserves. We will continue to pay
close attention to progress on this and look forward to receiving
more details on how this will be implemented and what the report
will cover.
95. We recognise the support many employers have
given to the Reserve Forces over many years. We commend the Government's
intention to give greater recognition, building on the current
SaBRE scheme and the new Corporate Covenant, to leading supportive
employers of Reservists and look forward to receiving more information
on this proposal. We recommend that as part of the recognition
scheme the Government should publish additional information about
supportive employers, building on the information already published
by SaBRE on its website, highlighting good practice, and providing
examples of the ways individual employers support Reservists.
96. It is too early to say whether the measures
in the White Paper and the Defence Reform Bill will prove sufficient
and be effective in encouraging the recruitment of Reservists
and ensuring the support of businesses of all sizes to achieve
Army 2020. We welcome the Secretary of State for Defence's commitment
to review these measures if recruitment falls behind target. In
response to this Report, the MoD should set out how it will assess
the effectiveness of the measures and the timescale for making
a decision on whether further action and incentives are necessary.
Role of Reservists
97. The Reserve Forces Act 1996 limits the reasons
for which Reservists can be mobilised, for example in response
to imminent national danger, if warlike operations are in preparation
or progress, or for the protection of life and property outside
the UK.[148] The Defence
Reform Bill provides that in future Reservists would be able to
be used for any purpose for which the Regular Armed Forces are
used.
98. The greater use of the Reserve Forces was one
of the Future Reserves 2020 Independent Commission's main recommendations.
According to the Reserves White Paper, over the last decade, resources
have been focused on those Reservists about to deploy to augment
Regular Forces on operations, primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The White Paper argued that "while this ensured that the
right numbers of Reservists were available to support current
operations, it [had] damaged the institutional integrity of the
Reserves, particularly in the Army".[149]
The MoD's intention is that this will change. Reservists will
be required for almost all military operations, often as small
numbers of individuals but also, principally in the Army's case
and as the situation demands, as formed sub-units or units. Reservists
will now be deployed on a far wider range of military operations,
including homeland resilience and standing commitments abroad.
Table 3 below summarises the range of roles that the White Paper
says Reservists could be expected to fulfil.
Table 3: Tasks that the Reserves will be required
to undertake
Abroad:
· Short term operations such as the evacuation of UK citizens from Lebanon in 2006 and the 2011 Libya operation.
· Longer term stabilisation operations such as in the Balkans, UN missions, Iraq and Afghanistan.
· Standing commitments abroad such as the Cyprus garrison and the defence of the Falkland Islands.
· Deployments overseas aimed at Defence engagement, conflict prevention, security sector reform and capability building in priority countries, such as the British Peace Support mission in East Africa and the EU operation in Mali.
| At Home in the UK:
· Playing a general role in homeland security, including activities such as support to the Olympics and Paralympics, or specialist roles such as cyber.
· Delivering national resilience such as responding to the foot and mouth crisis, flood relief, and communications support to crisis management.
· Standing national commitments, such as defence of the UK's airspace.
|
Source: Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the
Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, Box
3, p 17
99. The three Services use Reservists differently
and the mobilisation changes will have less of an effect on the
RAF and the Royal Navy than for the Army. Army Reservists can
expect one six month deployment in any five year period. This
could amount to a maximum of 12 months when pre- and post-deployment
training and leave are taken into account.[150]
Army Reserves will move through a training and readiness cycle
to try and give both Reservists and their employers greater clarity
on when these mobilisation periods are likely to occur.[151]
The MoD's intention would be to give at least a year's notice
of when an Army Reservist was entering their minimum warning period
(when they are liable for mobilisation).[152]
100. For an enduring operation the White Paper commits
to giving nine months' notice for Army Reservists and three months
notice for Maritime and Royal Air Force Reservists. 28 days' notice
will be given for unplanned contingency operations, if possible.[153]
101. Prior to the publication of the White Paper
and the Defence Reform Bill, ADS expressed some concerns to us
about the greater use of Reservists:
2.1. The proposal would oblige employers to be
prepared to release employees who are members of the Reserve Forces
for one year in every five. Any negative incentive for employers
to employ Reservists can be mitigated by improving the communication
links between Government employer and civilian employer. The emphasis
must be on building a transparent and mutually beneficial relationship
between the two stakeholders.
2.2. Under the proposals, Reservists will continue
to back-fill Regular units on a planned basis. There must be a
robust, transparent and rapid appeal process in place for employers
faced with losing an employee to Reserve mobilisation at a time
when the employee is critical to the company.[154]
102. After publication of the White Paper, the Federation
of Small Businesses told us:
The FSB has had concerns regarding the intention
to extend the call-out powers in the Reserve Forces Act 1996 so
that members of the Reserve forces may be called out for any purpose
for which Regular forces may be used. On average FSB members employ
approximately 7 employees, so if one is a member of the Reserve
forces and called out, instantly a significant proportion of the
workforce becomes absent. There are mixed views from the small
business community with regard to the likely impact on businesses
of the proposed changes to increase the commitment of Reserve
forces; two in five of those open to employing Reservists believe
the proposed changes will negatively impact on their business
and reasons for this focus upon the difficulties in planning and
arranging suitable cover for the extended training periods or
deployments, whereas 43 per cent claim there will be no impact.[155]
103. We welcome the Government's intention that
in future Reservists, where appropriate, will be able to undertake
the same tasks as Regulars. However we note the concerns expressed
by some employers regarding the potential for negative effects
on their businesses arising from the increased use of Reservists.
The MoD should continue to engage with the business community
to address employers' concerns as failure to do so will impact
on the Army's ability to generate and sustain the necessary capabilities.
The MoD should include in its reports to Parliament on Reserves
recruitment details of how many are employed by SMEs (small and
medium enterprises employing under 250 employees) and any difficulties
encountered in recruiting from this sector.
FORMED UNITS AND SUB-UNITS OF RESERVISTS
AND PARTNERING WITH REGULAR UNITS
104. As an integral part of the Armed Forces, Reservists
could be required for almost all military operations, often as
small numbers of individuals but also, principally in the Army's
case and as the situation demands, as formed sub-units or units.[156]
The Future Reserves 2020 Independent Commission Report was in
favour of the idea of the deployment of formed units or sub-units
of Reserves.[157] Lieutenant
General Bradshaw expanded on how this might work:
[...] I will give you an example of one of the
combat arms that will very definitely be employing people in formed
sub-units: the support squadrons for the Army Air Corps. [...]
They will deploy and be employed collectively, and that is absolutely
our intent.[158]
Lieutenant General Bradshaw pointed out that the
plan for the future deployment of Reservists remained to be tested
in order to prove that it was deliverable.[159]
105. Professor Theo Farrell, Kings College London,
supported the deployment of formed units or sub-units of Reservists
which, under Army 2020, would be on a sliding scale dependent
on the risk and complexity of the operation. He cited the experience
of the US which had deployed National Guard units to replace Regular
units in Iraq and Afghanistan. He told us their performance varied
depending on a number of factors:
Sometimes they perform better, actually, than
the Regular unit, although it depends on how permissive the environment
is. If there is a lot of combat, sometimes they do not perform
so well. So it is certainly possible to imagine whole units going
in, depending on the complexity and how much combat is involved,
and Army 2020 allows the time for the Army to prepare a Reserve
unit for such a tour. It is in the designs. It is a perfectly
reasonable, clever design, actually.[160]
106. The Army's intention is that "Reserves
will be paired with Regular units for training during peacetime
in order to prepare to form an integral element of the paired
Regular unit when required to deploy on operations. To enable
this integrated capability, Reserve units will undertake training
which is aligned with the three-year operational readiness mechanism
of their Regular counterparts".[161]
The training requirement for Army Reservists will increase from
around 35 to 40 days per year, while the training commitment for
the maritime and RAF Reserves will largely stay the same.[162]
Army Reserves will be required to attend certain core training
events to help achieve the collective capabilities for Regulars
and Reservists envisaged under the Army 2020 plan.[163]
To assist with the realisation of better integration between Regulars
and Reservists, as part of the July 2013 announcements on the
Reserves structure and basing, the MoD said:
This restructuring will require changes to the
current basing laydown of the Army Reserve. The Army has taken
the opportunity to review the laydown not only to reflect the
structural changes, but also to address the need to optimise recruitment
and to facilitate effective training in the future.[164]
107. Concerns have been expressed to the Secretary
of State for Defence that this restructuring could potentially
damage units in areas with a good potential level of recruits
for the Reserves.[165]
In response to these concerns, the Secretary of State told the
House of Commons on 14 January 2014 that although the plans for
Reserve basing had been announced, he acknowledged the need for
flexibility in the plan to assist with recruitment.[166]
108. We note the Army's intention to deploy formed
units and sub-units of Reserves. We ask the MoD to provide greater
detail on how this will be implemented, particularly given the
differing timescales for the reduction in Regular strength and
the increase in the size of the Reserves, and how it will ensure
that these changes deliver the required level of capability.
109. We welcome the increase in the number of
training days for Reservists as this is vital to their greater
integration with Regulars. In its response to this Report, we
call on the MoD to set out what further practical measures will
be implemented to enable Regulars and Reservists to train together.
We are concerned that this should not involve closing well-recruited
units, or those with a large number of potential new recruits
to the Reserves, to match Regular basing and welcome the Secretary
of State's commitment in the House of Commons on 14 January 2014
to be flexible on the closure of such units.
SPECIALIST RESERVES
110. The 2010 SDSR stated that the Reserve Forces
should be an integral part of Future Force 2020, providing additional
capacity as well as certain specialisms which it would not be
practical or cost effective to maintain as Regular capability.[167]
The Reserves White Paper reflected on specialist Reserves capabilities,
especially medical and cyber. Medical Reservists are an essential
and fully integrated component of the Defence Medical Services
(DMS), representing 38% (5,170) of the total 13,530 DMS manpower
requirement.[168] The
White Paper set out the future operations on which medical Reserves
might be deployed: humanitarian relief response, health sector
reform in fragile states, UK resilience response, hazardous area
response teams, public and environmental health, and medical command
and control.[169]
111. The Future Reserves 2020 Independent Commission
Report said that better use should be made within the Reserve
Forces of individuals' skills gained from their civilian experience,
with cyber named as one area where this might be achieved.[170]
The White Paper also highlighted Cyber Reserves as a key requirement.[171]
In September 2013, the Secretary of State for Defence announced
the creation of a Joint Cyber Reserve which would be a combined
unit across the Services with Reservists working with Regulars.
He said
In response to the growing cyber threat, we are
developing a full-spectrum military cyber capability, including
a strike capability, to enhance the UK's range of military capabilities.
Increasingly, our defence budget is being invested in high-end
capabilities such as cyber and intelligence and surveillance assets
to ensure we can keep the country safe.
The Cyber Reserves will be an essential part
of ensuring we defend our national security in cyberspace. This
is an exciting opportunity for internet experts in industry to
put their skills to good use for the nation, protecting our vital
computer systems and capabilities.[172]
In evidence to us in November 2013, the Secretary
of State told us 800 expressions of interest in working for the
unit had already been received.[173]
112. The role of specialist Reserves is invaluable
to the Army and the UK's Armed Forces as a whole: we welcome the
commitment to them in the Reserves White Paper. We welcome the
establishment of the Joint Cyber Reserve which is of particular
interest to us given our previous inquiry work on Defence and
cyber-security. The potential recruits, with the required skills,
may not be those who would usually consider a career in the Armed
Forces. This represents both a challenge and an opportunity for
the MoD which will require a flexible approach if they are to
be integrated effectively. We ask the MoD to report to the Committee
in six months on progress on the establishment and the recruitment
of the Joint Cyber Reserve.
EX-REGULAR RESERVES
113. In its written evidence, the MoD told us that
"in line with the requirement to increase the trained strength
of the Reserve, policy and processes have been reviewed to make
it easier for Regular Army personnel to join the Reserves".
Early indications of the level of take-up were encouraging. The
MoD added that as part of this review, those transferring from
the Regular Army into the Reserves may choose between two incentive
schemes that potentially impact on TA mobilisation liability:
a Reduced Commitment Scheme where individuals are offered
a reduced call out liability, which remains extant for three years
following their last day of Regular Service and a Commitment
Bonus Scheme which is a financial incentive. Personnel choosing
this option are subject to the usual call out liability, stipulated
under Reserve Forces Act 1996.[174]
114. The July 2013 Reserves White Paper noted that
former Regular service personnel in the volunteer Reserve brought
their experience and training to improve and sustain the capability
of the Reserve Forces. They also improved the institutional robustness
of the Reserves and contribute directly to capability. The transfer
of service leavers and ex-Regulars also reduced the initial training
cost of the volunteer reserves. The White Paper stated that:
The Army is therefore incentivising the transfer
of service leavers and ex-Regular soldiers and officers by offering
a £5,000 taxable commitment bonus on top of their other pay
and allowances, payable over a four year period of service in
the Army Reserve.
115. Although the White Paper focussed mainly on
the volunteer Reserve, it did outline some plans for the ex-Regular
Reserve. Ex-Regular Reserves are former members of the Regular
Forces who retain a liability to be called up for service.[175]
The Reserves White Paper acknowledged the value, contribution,
skills and utility of ex-Regular Reserves and noted that they
have been used, and continue to be used, on operations, principally
for specific operational requirements. The consultation process
prior to the White Paper indicated the need for "Defence
better to explain the requirement and role for ex-Regular reservists
as part of the Whole Force". In addition, with the move towards
an integrated force, the MoD would consider the arrangements that
would enable its maintenance and the conditions under which ex-Regular
Reservists would be called out in support of operations. In respect
of the Army, given the reduction in its overall size and the transfer
of capacity and some capabilities from the Regular to the Reserve
components, the White Paper highlighted that "assured access
to ex-Regulars in certain areas to support front-line services
has become more important. This is particularly true for a range
of complex military systems and equipment (such as armoured infantry
crews)".[176]
The White Paper identified a requirement to retain the Regular
Reserve as a distinct Reserve Force.[177]
Work is under way in the Army to determine how to facilitate better
access to ex-Regular Reservists.[178]
As part of this work, given the MoD's aspiration to increase the
number of ex-Regulars in the volunteer Reserves, the MoD is considering
"removing further liability for recall for an ex-Regular
Reservist who undertakes a fixed length of limited liability service
in the Army Reserve".[179]
In a further piece of work, to assist with the rebalancing of
the Army as an integrated force of Regular and Reservist, the
Army is:
scoping how better to secure Regular service
leavers in pinch-point trades, niche capabilities or operating
complex equipment. This work is considering how to recruit, train
and equip ex-Regular officers and soldiers into a discrete and
active element of the Regular Reserve, enabled by appropriate
legislation and terms and conditions of service.[180]
116. We support the Government's intention to
recruit more ex-Regulars into the volunteer Army Reserve as part
of the recruitment of 30,000 trained Reservists under the Army
2020 plan. We note the £5,000 commitment bonus, payable over
four years, offered by the Army to Service leavers and ex-Regulars
to incentivise their transfer to the volunteer Army Reserve. We
call on the Government to review effectiveness of its efforts
and the measures introduced to attract more ex-Regulars into the
volunteer Army Reserve in six months and to share its findings
with us. We also note the Army's work on the Regular Reserve and
call for an update on this work in the Government's response to
our Report.
Role of Reservists in reconnecting
the Armed Forces and the public
117. During our inquiry, Towards the Next Defence
and Security Review: Part One, we examined public support
for defence spending and for expeditionary operations.[181]
While we recognised great public respect for Armed Forces, we
concluded that there was a disconnect between the Armed Forces
and the public "caused by a lack of understanding of the
utility of military force in the contemporary strategic environment"
and that "without a proactive communications strategy, there
was a serious risk of a lack of support for defence amongst the
public".[182]
The future role of Reservists is seen by the MoD as part of meeting
this challenge. In evidence to our inquiry, Towards the Next
Defence and Security Review: Part One, the Secretary of State
for Defence told us:
Our Reserves agenda is partlynot primarily,
but partlyabout building the links between the military
and civil society in a way that perhaps has been lost to some
extent since the end of the cold war.[183]
118. The July 2013 Army 2020 update outlined a "firm
base"[184] concept
and one of the main parts in delivering this is civil engagement.
The update said:
This includes all activities with the wider public
that generate mutual understanding, focus support to the Army
community (current, future and past) and by which the Army community
fulfils its responsibilities to society. Civil engagement activities
provide the critical link between the Army community and society,
and includes the Army Cadet movement. The outcome of successful
Civil Engagement is public support, better recruitment for both
Regulars and Reserves, and the contribution to National Resilience
by providing support to the nation in times of need.[185]
119. We support the Army 2020 plan for an enhanced
role for the Army in civil engagement. Although there is great
admiration and respect for UK Armed Forces, we recognise that
there is currently a disconnect between the Armed Forces and public
understanding of the operations they have been asked to undertake.
This must be addressed. We call on the Government to take steps
to ensure that the Armed Forces, particularly Reservists, play
a more active role in public engagement. In response to our Report,
we recommend that the Government outline the communication strategy
and practical steps it will implement to take forward its plans
for public engagement.
Cost and budget for Reservists
120. When announcing the outcome of the Reserves
consultation in July 2013, the Secretary of State for Defence
confirmed the additional £1.8bn investment in Reserve Forces
announced in 2011:
In 2011, the Future Reserves 2020 Commission
reported that our Reserves were in serious decline. This Government
responded by committing to revitalise our Reserve Forces as part
of Future Force 2020 [...] growing their trained strength to 35,000
by 2018 and investing an additional £1.8bn in them over 10
years.[186]
121. A central part of the debate on Army 2020 has
been on the cost effectiveness and value for money of the plan
centred particularly around the comparative costs of Regulars
and Reservists. The MoD does not produce statistical data on the
whole life costs of Service personnel and pointed out to us that
this, coupled with the differing terms and conditions of Regulars
and Reservists plus different training regimes, made cost comparisons
complex.[187] With
these caveats, the MoD told us the following cost information
was available:
· Annual
Cost. The
difference in per diem cost for Regular and Reserves differs only
in the X Factor element[188]
of the military salary which is currently 14.5% for Regulars and
5% for Reserves;[189]
· Recruitment.
The cost per recruit is broadly similar for the recruitment of
Regular Officer, Reserve Officers and other ranks (both Regular
and Reserve).
· Basic
Training.
Training for commissioning in the Regulars and Reserves differs
in delivery, intensity and duration. The same is the case for
soldiers basic (Phase 1) and subsequent (Phase 2) training. For
these reasons, and as Regular training is residential, comparison
of cost is of limited meaning.
· Collective
Training. The
Army has assessed the cost of training both Regular and Reserve
infantry company and, if manpower is excluded, the costs are broadly
the same for a like for like comparison of training activity levels
to achieve the established Collective Training Competence Levels
1, 2 and 3.[190]
122. Comparison is complicated; Reserves get paid
only for the days they train, or are recovering from injuries
sustained on operations or training, plus in future a 10% leave
allowance, whereas Regulars get paid 365 days a year including
weekends, on leave and during periods of sickness and injury (whether
related to their duties or not). In addition, most Regulars receive
subsidised accommodation, all accumulate an entitlement to terminal
payments and pensions. Reservists qualify for a bounty subject
to attendance and passing various annual tests. A new pension
scheme is planned for Reservists related to actual days spent
training.
123. In oral evidence to us, Lieutenant General Bradshaw
commented on the costs of employing Reserves:
They are cheaper to employ on a long-term basis.
They are more expensive to employ for particular requirements.
If we call them up, we end up paying for their man training days
and for their employment. So, overall, the restructuring of the
Army represents a considerable saving, but in order to realise
that saving it is very important to understand that we must be
prepared to resource the employment of Reservists in circumstances
where we would not normally have employed them in the past.[191]
He added that "overall, of course, the reduction
in the regular manpower represents a very significant saving for
defence".[192]
124. Some of our witnesses have expressed doubt as
to the cost effectiveness of Reserves against Regulars. In a detailed
submission, John Baron MP commented that "the extent of the
financial savings generated by the proposals [was] also unclear".
While he accepted that there would be an overall cost reduction,
he argued it was unlikely to be as great as the Government expected.
He stated that "if the savings prove marginal, then the subsequent
loss of capability may beg serious questions about value for money".[193]
125. We welcome the £1.8bn additional investment
in the Reserves, but call upon the Government to provide us with
a breakdown of how it plans to spend this money. We note the concerns
expressed as to whether this funding will be sufficient to achieve
the desired outcomes for the Reserves Forces. We note that Reservists
are cheaper to employ so long as they are not called up. This
will only prove to be a cost saving so long as future governments
are not required to undertake operations. This will need to be
closely monitored. It would be unacceptable if the UK decided
not to take part in any action because of the cost of deploying
Reservists. We recommend that the Government set out in detail
how it will assess and report on the cost effectiveness of, and
the value for money achieved by, its plans and how these outcomes
will be independently examined and verified. We would welcome
the involvement of the National Audit Office in this evaluation.
Recruitment age
126. As part of our inquiry, we received evidence
from Child Soldiers International and others regarding the recruitment
of persons under the age of 18 into the Armed Forces and its cost
effectiveness.[194]
Child Soldiers International argued that the phasing out of the
recruitment of minors would:
· Save approximately £94 million per
year on training and recruitment;
· Increase operational effectiveness, including
improving the ratio of deployable personnel;
· Have a positive effect on recruits' education
and long-term career prospects;
· Reduce incidence of mental health problems
amongst soldiers and veterans; and
· Ensure "the best interests of the
child" are prioritised, in line with international legal
obligations.[195]
127. Child Soldiers International argued that the
recruitment of minors could be phased out without a detrimental
effect on the Army 2020 plan.[196]
First, they said that as Reserve Forces became more integrated
with Regular Forces, the difficulties of ensuring effective age
screening in units deploying under time pressure would be alleviated
as Reserves already have a minimum recruitment age of 18 years.
Secondly, they contested that the Army 2020 plans would see a
large number of Regular personnel replaced with Reservists and
that assuming the rates of adult recruitment remained at current
levels, Army 2020 would eliminate the need to recruit minors.[197]
128. In our Report on the education of Armed Forces
personnel we asked the Government for "further information
on why the Army is so dependent on recruiting personnel under
the age of 18 years compared to the other two Services, and whether
steps are being taken to reduce this dependency". We recommended
that the Government should "carry out a thorough cost-benefit
analysis of the policy of recruiting Armed Forces personnel under
the age of 18 years old" and provide us with this cost-benefit
analysis. In response to these parts of our Report the Government
said:
In offering challenging and constructive education
and employment opportunities to those who have reached the school
leaving age (16), the Armed Forces are mindful of the requirement
to provide a supportive environment which takes account of the
care and welfare needs of young people whilst offering them the
opportunity to discharge up to the age of 18 years. Intake into
the Armed Forces is spread across the eligible age range, however
the Government agrees that the Armed Forces should undertake a
cost-benefit analysis of the recruitment of U18s and work has
been set in hand with the Army to look at this.
129. In November 2013, in answer to a parliamentary
question, the MoD told the House of Commons that the Army had
been tasked to carry out the cost-benefit analysis study on a
tri-service basis and to provide an interim report early in 2014.[198]
In a further answer in December 2013, the MoD gave more information
about the study. Anna Soubry MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State, said:
As recruitment is an activity where the cost
of recruiting junior entrant (JE) or standard entrant (SE) individuals
is the same, the scope of the study is focused on the costs of
additional training provided to under-18s on the JE scheme.
As a result of scoping carried out by the Army,
the timetable for this study is now becoming clearer but it is
too soon to set a publication date for the report. It is also
apparent that the detailed terms of reference will require more
development and a decision has yet to be taken on publication.[199]
130. We note the evidence we have received on
the recruitment age for the Armed Forces. We commented on this
in our Report on the education of Armed Forces personnel and in
response the Government agreed that the Armed Forces would undertake
a cost benefit analysis of the recruitment of under-18s. We note
that the Army is undertaking this analysis on a tri-service basis
and that the work is continuing. However, we are disappointed
by the lack of clarity regarding the study's terms of reference
and the slow progress with the study. We call on the Government
to provide us with the terms of reference for the study and an
estimation of when it will be completed. We expect the Army and
MoD's cost benefit analysis to be thorough and robust and call
on the Government to set out how it might be independently scrutinised
and verified. This would ensure confidence in the outcomes of
the analysis. We also call on the Government to respond in detail
to the argument that the Army could phase out the recruitment
of minors without detriment to the Army 2020 plans.
Basing and Germany
131. As well as announcing decisions on the structure
and manning of the Army, SDSR 2010 also included a commitment
to an Armed Forces basing review and the redeployment of British
forces personnel from Germany to the UK.[200]
The MoD announced the outcome of an initial Basing Review in July
2011, based on the decisions made in the SDSR.[201]
Its decisions included the transfer of a number of RAF stations
to the Army, the locations of the five Multi-Role Brigades and
the expectation that approximately 6,500-7,000 personnel returning
from Germany would be based in Scotland. This announcement also
included further reductions in personnel numbers. The Army 2020
announcement in July 2012 identified the units that were to
be disbanded or merged to establish the Army 2020 configuration
based on three distinct elements: a Reaction Force, an Adaptable
Force and Force Troops.[202]
132. The outcomes of the Army Basing Review were
announced on 5 March 2013.[203]
Two key principles guided the Review: that the armoured infantry
brigades should be centred round a single location, and the Army
should retain a UK-wide presence. The Basing Review envisages
an Army increasingly consolidated around seven centres in the
UK with the closure of a number of bases, a faster withdrawal
from Germany and an end to the culture of routine rotation in
the UK. The Government has committed £1.8 billion to the
new basing plan, of which £1 billion would be spent on new
accommodation. The seven centres around which the Army will be
consolidated will be:
· Salisbury Plain Training Area (Tidworth,
Bulford, Larkhill, Warminster, Perham Down and Upavon) - 15,000
personnel.
· North East - centred on Catterick but
also including York, Dishforth, Topcliffe and Harlow Hill. 7,500
personnel.
· Aldershot - 4,200 personnel.
· Edinburgh and Leuchars - 4,000 personnel.
· East of England - Colchester and Swanton
Morley - 3,500 personnel.
· West Midlands - Stafford and Donnington
- 3,200 personnel
· East Midlands - Cottesmore and North
Luffenham - 5,800 personnel.
133. A presence will also be maintained in other
parts of the UK, including Wales and Northern Ireland where overall
personnel numbers are expected to reduce by 400.[204]
It is intended that consolidation around a small number of locations
will end the culture of routine rotation in the UK and provide
greater stability to Service personnel and their families, with
benefits for children's education, spousal employment and increased
home ownership.
134. In July 2013 alongside publication of the Reserves
White Paper, the MoD announced the outcomes of the Reserves basing
review which it said would result in the net vacation of 26 Army
Reserve sites across the UK and that there would be an overall
reduction of three major units in the future structure.[205]
WITHDRAWAL FROM GERMANY
135. Central to the basing review is the withdrawal
of UK Armed Forces from Germany. UK Armed Forces have been stationed
in Germany since 1945. Consideration has been given to withdrawing
UK Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War and the process
has been underway for several years. For example 4th Armoured
Brigade moved from Osnabrück to Catterick in 2008. Project
Borona, commissioned by the previous Government in 2006, resulted
in the move of Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps to Innsworth,
Gloucestershire in 2010. In the 2010 SDSR, the new Government
announced that all 20,000 personnel remaining in Germany would
be withdrawn by 2020 with half returning by 2015.[206]
The Government argued that "there is no longer any operational
requirement for UK forces to be based there, and the current arrangements
impose financial costs on the UK, disruption on personnel and
their families and opportunity costs in terms of wider Army coherence."[207]
This also meant that the Army would be almost completely UK-based
for the first time in many years. The Regular Army basing review
of March 2013 announced that the withdrawal of UK Armed Forces
from Germany would be accelerated. It is now intended that only
4,400 personnel will remain in Germany by 2016, with the withdrawal
being completed by 2018-19.[208]
136. The implementation of the basing review and
the completion of the withdrawal of UK Armed Forces from Germany
are a vital and complex part of the implementation of Army 2020
and will require a high level of planning and coordination between
all of the Services. Lieutenant General Bradshaw acknowledged
that financial considerations were the rationale behind the withdrawal
from Germany.[209]
The MoD would have to spend £1.8 billion on infrastructure
to facilitate the returning forces. However, the MoD asserted
that alongside the costs of rebasing from Germany, there were
savings to be gained. In respect of Army Basing Programme Savings,
the Department estimated that "operating savings of £100m
per year would be generated by 2015-16 and this would rise to
£240m net benefit per annum by 2022-23".[210]
Lieutenant General Bradshaw also saw other benefits from the plan
such as having the "three combat brigades of the reaction
force around their main training area on Salisbury Plain"
which would enable "a very cohesive arrangement in terms
of command and control and [which would be] much easier to administer
than having a large part of the Army in Germany." However
he also acknowledged that the training estate in the UK would
be "stretched".[211]
In an attempt to alleviate this shortage, the MoD was studying
the continued use of training sites in Germany, Canada and Kenya.[212]
At our final evidence session General Wall confirmed that the
dialogue with the German and Canadian authorities was continuing.[213]
137. The plans resulting from the basing review
and the return from Germany are intricate and interdependent and
affect all three Services. The MoD must ensure this process is
managed appropriately so that it does not unravel. We call on
the MoD to keep us informed on its negotiations regarding training
opportunities in Germany, Canada and Kenya, and how the historically
close working relations with the German authorities are going
to be maintained during the drawdown period.
SDSR 2015 and beyond
138. During our inquiry, we heard concerns regarding
the impact of the 2015 SDSR on the realisation of Army 2020, for
example concerns were expressed by Professor Theo Farrell and
contributors to our Army Rumour Service forum regarding the possibility
of further reductions in the size of the Regular Army.[214]
Some media reports suggested reductions to a level of 60,000 personnel.
General Wall told us that a reduction to 60,000 Regular Army personnel
"would not have been a feasible way of achieving the defence
planning assumptions that underpin the work we had done".[215]
139. Another area of concern was the potential impact
of any possible changes to the MoD budget. The Secretary of State
for Defence told us during our inquiry, Towards the Next Defence
and Security Review: Part One, that:
Based on SDSR 2010 and based on the budget that
we have at the moment, and on the assumption we have made of flat
real [terms increases] into the futurethat is our budgeting
assumption inside the Departmentplus 1% real-terms increase
per annum on the equipment plan from 2015 through to 2020, we
are confident and the Armed Forces Chiefs are confident that we
can deliver the required output.[216]
However the Secretary of State did acknowledge that,
if funding decreased in the next Parliament, post-2015, serious
questions would need to be addressed regarding the type of force
that could be maintained:
In my judgment, if the amount of money available
for the defence budget decreased significantly, we would reach
the end of the process by which we can simply take salami slices
off. We would have to ask some serious structural questions about
the type of forces that we were able to maintain.[217]
140. A further impact on the MoD's budget would be
the movement of Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) commitments,
funded by the Treasury, into the MoD core budget after the withdrawal
from Afghanistan. The Secretary of State was confident that this
would not impact on the Army 2020 plan:
UORs provide support for equipment that is delivered
for a specific operation. They do not provide us funding to hold
that equipment in core, so where we are bringing equipment that
was delivered as a UOR into Afghanistan back into core at the
end of the campaign, we have to provide from within our core budget
a funding line to support that equipment once it is returned to
core. Our planning assumptions absolutely do not include provision
of UOR equipment for our standing capability in the future.[218]
141. We also explored with senior Army officers what
might happen to the Army after 2020. Lieutenant General Bradshaw
told us:
The answer is that we always need to be thinking
ahead. There are people who are engaged in blue skies thinking
about where the whole business of combat goes in future decades.
However, there are so many unknowns there that we need to go forward
on the basis of being able to morph flexibly into new approaches.
The construct that we have, particularly with the adaptable force
which we can tailor to the precise requirements, is the right
way to go forward.[219]
In terms of expansion of the Army after 2020 he added:
The very important thing to remember is that
the 2020 construct allows for expansion. We have a construct which
has part of the collective capability based on the Reserves which
could, with the right resourcing, be shifted back to rely on regular
forces. So we have the command and control structure and the right
neural network for expansion. Positive choice was made to go for
an organisation with the right number of points of command to
allow for expansion, rather than blobbing things up into larger
collective organisations, which gives us less flexibility.
It is also part of the thinking that this shift,
as we have stated, was driven for very real economic reasons.
We all recognise that defence had to take a hit along with everybody
else, in view of what the nation is facing. Equally, if we get
into different territory economically when the next defence review
comes along, there are areas where we have taken a bit of a capability
holiday, and areas of risk and perhaps there will be a good case
for a bit of add-back.[220]
142. We are concerned that the Army 2020 plan
would unravel in the face of any further MoD budget reductions
or further reductions in Army personnel. It is essential that
the MoD's budget settlement allows for the delivery of Army 2020.
If this is not the case, it must be accepted that the Army will
be capable of doing less than envisaged under Army 2020 and the
UK's vision of its place in the world and the Defence Planning
Assumptions will have to be revised accordingly. We are also concerned
about the Army's capability to expand its numbers rapidly, both
Regulars and Reserves, should a national emergency require it
to do so. Any plans for the structure of the Armed Forces must
be flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances.
For the reasons already set out in this Report we have little
confidence in the Government's capacity to rapidly expand Army
numbers should the need arise. The Government must set out its
contingency plan for doing so.
104 Q 200, Q271 and Ev w4 Back
105
Ministry of Defence Announcement, Future Reserve Forces 2020,
5 July 2012 Back
106
Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable
and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013 Back
107
HC Deb, 3 July 2013, cols 49-53WS Back
108
HC Deb, 5 March 2013, cols 845-848 Back
109
Q 97 Back
110
Q 150 Back
111
BBC News website, Liam Fox raises doubts over regular Army
cuts, 25 October 2013 Back
112
For example see HC Deb, 20 November 2013,col 1273 [John Baron
MP] and Lord Bramall, The Telegraph, We're fighting bean counters
now, says man who helped beat Nazis, 26 October 2013 Back
113
HC Deb, 10 October 2011, col 9 Back
114
Q 270 Back
115
Qq 270-271 Back
116
Q 278 Back
117
Q278 Back
118
Q 200 Back
119
Q 271 Back
120
Q 312 Back
121
Q 230 Back
122
Q 309 Back
123
Q 152 Back
124
HC Deb, 3 July 2013, col 934 and HC Deb, 16 July 2013, col 958 Back
125
Defence Analytical Services Agency, Ministry of Defence UK
Armed Forces Quarterly Personnel Report 1 October 2013, 14
November 2013 Back
126
HC Deb, 20 November 2013, col 1286 Back
127
HC Deb, 19 December 2013, col 124WS; Paper deposited in the House
of Commons Library by the Ministry of Defence Future Reserves
2020, 19 December 2013 (Ref: DEP2013-2063), available at:
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/business-papers/commons/deposited-papers/
Back
128
It also provides a breakdown between trained entrants (who immediately
count against the trained strength-largely former Regulars) and
new recruits. Back
129
HC Deb, 19 December 2013, col 124WS; Paper deposited in the House
of Commons Library by the Ministry of Defence Future Reserves
2020, 19 December 2013 (Ref: DEP2013-2063), available at:
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/business-papers/commons/deposited-papers/ Back
130
HC Deb 14 January 2014, col 715 Back
131
Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable
and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 17 Back
132
Ministry of Defence Announcement, Plans for future Reserve
Forces unveiled, 3 July 2013 Back
133
Ibid Back
134
Q 251 Back
135
HC Deb 20 November 2013, col 1263 Back
136
HC Deb, 16 July 2013, col 966 Back
137
Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable
and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 7 Back
138
Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable
and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, pp 47-48. Supporting Britain's
Reservists and Employers (SaBRE) is an organisation that aims
to build support for members of the Reserve Forces from employers.
It seeks to explain to employers the benefits, rights and obligations
associated with the employment of a Reservist, as well as promoting
the transferable skills that Reservists receive through their
military training and take back to their workplace. SaBRE is funded
by the Ministry of Defence and acts as a means for relaying employers'
views to the Department on the employment of Reservists. Back
139
SaBRE list employers' support under the following categories:
HR Policy (employers who have a written HR policy on the employment
of Reservists); Time off policy: additional time off (paid, unpaid,
or considered on a case by case basis for Reservists to attend
2-week annual training session); Employee mobilised (employers
who have previously released a Reservist for mobilisation). Available
at: http://www.sabre.mod.uk/Employers/Supportive-Employers/Employers-who-have-publicly-pledged-their-support
. Back
140
Announced by the Government in June 2013, the Corporate Covenant
is a written and publicised voluntary pledge from businesses and
charitable organisations who wish to demonstrate their concrete
support for the armed forces community. Back
141
Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable
and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 48 Back
142
Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable
and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, pp 47-48 Back
143
Q 224 Back
144
Q 224 Back
145
Q 234 Back
146
Q 260 Back
147
Q 260 Back
148
Reserve Forces Act 1996, sections 52, 54 and 56. Section 56 was
amended by the Armed Forces Act 2011 to enable Reservists to be
mobilised in the UK in circumstances short of a great emergency
or an actual or apprehended attack to allow mobilisation in the
event of "work national importance.". Back
149
Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable
and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 17 Back
150
These periods may be exceeded in times of national emergency or
outbreak of war. Back
151
Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable
and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 19, p 21 and p 51 Back
152
Ibid, p 51 Back
153
Ibid, p 51 Back
154
Ev w18 Back
155
Ev w39 Back
156
Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable
and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 17 Back
157
The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve
Forces, Future Reserves 2020, July 2011, p 7 Back
158
Q 159 Back
159
Q 159 Back
160
Q 221 Back
161
Ev w4 Back
162
An increase from approximately 35 to 40 days per year for Army
Reserves; Training commitments for the Royal Navy Reserve are
24 days , 34 days for the Royal Marines Reserve and 35 for the
Royal Auxiliary Air Force (Ministry of Defence, Reserves in
the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013.
P 11). Back
163
Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable
and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013,p 11 Back
164
HC Deb, 3 July 2013, col 52WS Back
165
For example, see Parliamentary Question from Sarah Newton MP to
the Secretary of State for Defence, HC Deb, 14 January 2014, col
721. Back
166
HC Deb, 14 January 2014, col 721 Back
167
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010,
p 20; see also Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future
Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 11. Back
168
Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable
and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 73 Back
169
Ibid, pp 75-76 Back
170
Ibid, p 76 Back
171
Ibid p 76 Back
172
Ministry of Defence Announcement, New cyber Reserve unit created,
29 September 2013 Back
173
Q 303 Back
174
Ev w5 Back
175
Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable
and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 65; On completion of the
period of liability for recall, all become members of the Long-Term
Reserve up to the age of 55, or on completion of 18 years in the
Regular Reserve. The Long-Term reserve may only be recalled for
national danger, great emergency or attack in the UK. Back
176
Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable
and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 65 Back
177
Ibid Back
178
Ibid Back
179
Ibid Back
180
Ibid Back
181
Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards
the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, paras
19-24 Back
182
Ibid, para 24 Back
183 Defence
Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards the next
Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, Q 158 Back
184
The Army 2020 July 2013 update defines "Firm Base" as
"A secure home front that sustains the Army, enables training
for and deployment on operations, and ensures the support of the
public" (British Army, Transforming the British Army:
an update, July 2013, p 22) Back
185
British Army, Transforming the British Army: an update,
July 2013, p 22 Back
186
HC Deb, 3 July 2013, col 921 Back
187
Ev w6 Back
188
The pay section of the British Army website explains the X Factor
as: "The main reward package is called the X Factor. It's
an adjustment to your pay that makes sure you're getting a fair
deal .It compares your Army job to a similar civilian job and
weighs up the extra challenges you face as a soldier, such as
time away from your family and working under pressure. It also
considers the perks of Army life, such as job security and 38
days' paid leave every year. The X Factor normally means soldiers
take home an extra 14.5% compared to the closest civilian job". Back
189
The MoD provided the following additional information: Presently
only Regular pay attracts a Superannuation Charge Attributable
to Experience (SCAPE - the cost of pension) which is 42.8% for
officers and 30.8% for soldiers. The FR20 proposition will see
Reserve salary becoming pensionable leading to a SCAPE levy in
the order of 25% while the application of Working Time Directives
will see an additional payment, in the order of 10.2%, to Reserves.
That said, not all Reserve attendance based pay will attract Employers
National Insurance Contributions. Back
190
Ev w6 Back
191
Q 176 Back
192
Q 176 Back
193
Ev w38 Back
194
Ev w24; see also Ev w20 [Peace Pledge Union] and Ev w34 [Forces
Watch] Back
195
Ev w24 Back
196
Ev w24 Back
197
Ev w28 Back
198
HC Deb, 18 November 2013, col 696W Back
199
HC Deb, 18 December 2013, col 633-634W Back
200
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010,
p 28 and pp 32-33 Back
201
HC Deb, 18 July 2011, cols 645-646 Back
202
HC Deb, 5 July 2012, cols 1085-1088 Back
203
HC Deb, 5 March 2013, cols 845-848 Back
204
A significant proportion of those reductions in Wales and Northern
Ireland will be the result, however, of the civilianisation of
search and rescue from 2015-2016 onwards. Back
205
HC Deb, 3 July 2013, cols 922-925, HC Deb, 3 July 2013, cols 49-53WS
and HC Deb, 4 July 2013, cols 61-62WS Back
206
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010,
p 28 and p 32 Back
207
Ibid Back
208
HC Deb, 5 March 2013, cols 845-848 Back
209
Q 185 Back
210
Ev w10 Back
211
Q 185 Back
212
Qq 185-189 Back
213
Q 338 and Q 341 Back
214
Q 221 Back
215
Q 300 Back
216
Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards
the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, Q
183 Back
217
Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards
the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, Q
185 Back
218
Q 329 Back
219
Q 194 Back
220
Q 195 Back
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