



House of Commons
Defence Committee

Future Army 2020

Ninth Report of Session 2013–14

Volume II

Written evidence

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The Defence Committee

The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies.

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The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume. Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are James Rhys (Clerk), Dougie Wands (Second Clerk), Karen Jackson (Audit Adviser), Ian Thomson (Committee Specialist), Christine Randall (Senior Committee Assistant), Rowena Macdonald and Carolyn Bowes (Committee Assistants), and Sumati Sowamber (Committee Support Assistant).

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Written evidence

Written evidence from General Sir Peter Wall, Chief of the General Staff, Ministry of Defence

At the evidence session on Army 2020, undertaken on 5 December 2012, the Chief of the General Staff undertook to provide further clarification on three points. The information requested is as follows.

Question 38—*an explanation of what a unit is*

A unit is the generic term for a military organisation that is the basic building block of a specific operational capability. It includes service personnel predominately from a single cap-badge but with small detachments of other cap-badged personnel that provide specialist capability. A unit may be called a Regiment or a Battalion, dependent on the capability it provides and will generally consist of a Headquarters, a support sub-unit and 3 other sub-units called companies, squadrons or batteries, dependent on the unit type. The size and structure of each unit varies considerably (408 up to 729) and is dependent on its role and specialisation.

In the A2020 structure, combat units will be grouped into either the Reaction Force or the Adaptable Force. Regiments or battalions in the Reaction Force are normally larger as they comprise mainly full-time service personnel able to deploy on operations at minimal notice. The combat units in the Adaptable Force are slightly smaller as their full-time manpower is planned to be augmented by reservists who will require additional training and preparation before the unit can be deployed.

Within the Infantry the standard unit is the battalion and consists of a battalion headquarters, a headquarter company, a support company and 3 rifle companies; the size is dependent on role. The Reaction Force infantry battalions are 729 or 709 strong, dependent on capability, each rifle company consisting of 3 rifle platoons. Within the Adaptable Force, infantry battalions are slightly smaller at 581 or 561 personnel.

The Royal Armoured Corps (RAC) unit is termed a Regiment and consists of a regimental headquarters, a headquarter squadron, a support squadron and 3 reconnaissance or sabre squadrons dependent on the unit role. Within the Reaction Force, an RAC Regiment is 587 or 528 strong and within the Adaptable Force it is 404 strong.

This terminology is applied across the British Army, so for example a Royal Engineer unit is called a regiment and its sub units are termed squadrons. Those Royal Engineer units supporting the Reaction Forces are c.600 strong and those supporting the Adaptable Force are c.500 strong. Similarly the Royal Artillery has Regiments but its sub units are termed batteries; its units in the Reaction Forces are c.600 strong and those supporting the Adaptable Force are c.400 strong.

Question 44—*why some battalions which are being abolished appear well manned*

The logic behind the Army's decisions on which combat units to withdraw has been made public on a number of occasions, but it is worth repeating.

There were a number of criteria applied. These were: maintaining a regimental system which is largely regionally aligned; demographic sustainability of regiments according to projected regional supply of recruits in the 2020 timeframe; proportionality of outcome, with no cap badge deletions and no regiment losing more than one battalion in a re-organisation; balancing the whole infantry structure to maintain variety of roles and parity of opportunity of experience for officers and soldiers; taking account of previous decisions on mergers and deletions; historical manning performance; and ensuring a solution that the Army would see as fair and equitable.

Drawing on demographic data from the Office of National Statistics for the age cohort across the UK from which infantry recruits are drawn (15–29 age group), and taking account of historical trends in terms of the percentage of that cohort likely to join the Army, an assessment was made of which regiments were likely to be the least sustainable in the future if they retained their current structure. This work also included a comparison of each regiment's historical outflow so the likely recruiting requirement could be determined.

This analysis showed that those regiments likely to be the least sustainable in future were the Royal Regiment of Scotland (predicted to be 1.75 battalions short), The Yorkshire Regiment (predicted to be 0.8 battalions short), The Mercian Regiment (predicted to be 0.56 battalions short) and the Royal Welsh Regiment (predicted to be 0.55 battalions short). It was therefore decided to remove one battalion from each of these regiments.

After the removal of these four battalions, and taking account of the criterion that there should be no cap badge deletions and no regiment losing more than one battalion, the method for predicting future sustainability became less statistically discerning. Therefore to determine the fifth battalion to be withdrawn required the application of criteria that went wider than future demographics.

Having discounted those regiments that were already losing a battalion, and those which were single battalion regiments, the choice came down to a battalion from one of the following: The Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment; The Duke of Lancaster's Regiment; The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (RRF); The Royal Anglian Regiment; and The Rifles. The Parachute Regiment having been excluded on the grounds of its specific role. Taking account of the need to maintain equity of opportunity across the Infantry Divisions, the Army decided

that it should be the Queen's Division (comprised of Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment, The Royal Anglian Regiment and the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers) that lost a battalion; this was because it had six battalions in comparison to other Divisions that would be left with only four or five. From within the Queen's Division, and taking account of historical manning performance, the RRF, with average historical undermanning of 13.3% since the previous reorganisation of the infantry in 2007, and being a regiment with two battalions, was therefore determined as the next appropriate regiment from which to withdraw a battalion.

The units withdrawn were therefore those which were judged to be the least sustainable in the 2020 timeframe and/or with the poorest historical recruiting performance. We recognise that some of those units were well manned at the time the decision was made. This is not surprising as recruits are allocated to regiments where there is a need ie those which are undermanned or which are due to deploy in the near future. In the case of the RRF, their manning improved as a result of Divisional manning priorities—the Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment and the Royal Anglian Regiment's battalions were already fully manned.

Question 77—a translation of Figure 1 Force Development Deductions of Transforming the British Army

Figure 1 in the Army 2020 brochure “Transforming the British Army, July 2012” was a list of high level factors, based on recent operational experience and the work of those areas of the MOD who look at how those lessons might apply in the future, that are likely to be relevant in future operations. In the order they appeared in the table, they are:

- We need to treat operational command and control as a capability in its own right and correct a tendency to treat it as an administrative overhead on an operation. This is especially so at *formation* level, that is at brigade headquarters and higher levels. In particular, we must take care in the future to allow brigade headquarters to concentrate on planning and executing local *tactical* actions, for that is what they are designed, organized and trained for. We should not burden them with complex integration tasks or long-term planning, which are more efficiently delivered by divisional headquarters, or indeed at an even higher level. We need to redefine the tasks and organisation of our brigade and divisional headquarters in the A2020 structure accordingly, so that all have a well-founded understanding and expectation of what brigade and divisional level headquarters will respectively be required to do in the future.
- Armoured infantry (ie infantry equipped with tracked armoured vehicles, known as Warriors) will be the core capability around which manoeuvre is built in the future (manoeuvre being the coordinated fire and movement of numerous capabilities to defeat an enemy). The default setting for the use of armour (ie Challenger 2 tanks) will be in more direct support of infantry than has been the case historically.
- “Soft Effect” (ie computer network action, psychological methods, deception, engaging with key leaders, and media communication) will need to be institutionalised into the Army's structures and training as clever use of these effects is fundamental in achieving an advantage over our opponents in the information age.
- The current predominance of suppressive fire capability (area weapon systems for engaging/neutralising large targets) needs to be brought into balance with an increasing ratio of precision fires (extremely accurate guided munitions for engaging specific targets).
- Information and communication services, particularly broadband connectivity, must be delivered to more elements of the deployed force, not just the larger headquarters.
- Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities collect and provide different sorts of data and information. This comes in many different forms and no one system will yield a wholly comprehensive “picture” of what is happening or what has happened. To get as full a “picture” as possible it is necessary to organize, train and operate these systems to complement one another. In Army 2020, we will re-organize our ISR assets to complement one another better on operations. The information provided by ISR assets is assimilated (processed) and duly assessed for its significance, at which point it is treated as intelligence. It is used, for example, to make short term decisions and as a basis to determine future plans. But given the increasing operational trend of conducting military and security operations *among* populations (whether friendly, hostile or indifferent), and where there are invariably complex political, social, economic and religious factors at play, commanders and staff need to *understand* the relevance and significance of their intelligence assessments in those contexts: often called the human domain. In particular they need to understand the consequences of their actions and interventions upon the people among whom they are operating. In Army 2020, in addition to re-organizing our ISR assets better to complement one another on operations, we will invest more so as better to understand the societies among whom we may be called to operate.
- Rarely will we fight alone outside of coalitions and partnerships, and thus our structures need to be built with multi-national integration in mind.

- We require an end-to-end approach (ie factory to foxhole) to supply and distribution that opens up possibilities for the involvement of the commercial sector. In effect, we need to look more imaginatively at where the boundaries should sit between industry and the military in providing this service.

September 2013

Written evidence from the Ministry of Defence

INTRODUCTION

1. *Origins.* The strategic rationale for Army 2020 came from the October 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the associated National Security Strategy, which laid out what the Army would be required to deliver in terms of types, frequency and concurrency of tasking. The funding envelope was set by the Ministry of Defence as a result of the so-called Three Month Exercise. The outcome was that the future Army would consist of around 82,000 Regular personnel and around 30,000 trained Reservists—ie an integrated Army of around 112,000.

2. *Context.* Against this background, the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Peter Wall, asked Lieutenant General Nick Carter to conduct a study into the future structure and role of the Army in the context of the strategic imperatives for the Army to change. These included an end to the assumption that the Army would be permanently engaged on an enduring stabilisation operation (ie Afghanistan); a move from the Army's current structure and capabilities optimised for Afghanistan to a more adaptable posture to meet likely future threats; an Army equally able to react to an enduring stabilisation operation and engaging with partner nations overseas to develop military capability to address causes of instability; changing the nature of the Reserves to ensure routine use as part of an integrated Army; an almost completely UK-based Army to engage civil society in a new manner; and ensuring cost and efficiency remain a driver in the force design and optimisation of capability.

THE ARMY 2020 DESIGN

3. On 5 July 2012, the Secretary of State for Defence announced the outcome of the study, which redefined the core purposes of the Army and determined that it should be capable of providing:

- a. Contingent capability for deterrence and defence;
- b. Defence engagement and overseas capacity building.
- c. UK engagement and the military contribution to homeland resilience;

4. In order to meet these demands with the reduced manpower available, the study designed a new structure for the Army. Within the Generated Force—those units that deliver Defence Final Outputs—forces will be divided into:

- a. *A Reaction Force (RF)* that will be a higher readiness force undertaking short notice contingency tasks and providing the Army's conventional deterrence for Defence. It will be trained and equipped to undertake the full spectrum of intervention tasks and will provide the initial basis for any future enduring operation.
- b. *An Adaptable Force (AF)* comprising a pool of Regular and Reserve forces that will consist of 7 infantry brigades and a logistics brigade. This will be used for a wide range of tasks, including providing headquarters and units for enduring operations, acting as the primary source of capability for Defence Engagement at home and overseas, as well as meeting standing tasks in UK and abroad (eg Cyprus, Falkland Islands, Brunei and Public Duties).
- c. *Force Troops* will brigade Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Command Support in 'functional' formations, under a 2* HQ, to maximise efficiency and sustainability.

5. *Annex A* details the units in each organisation. These tables show which units are going to be in which brigades; future roles; the pairing arrangements between Regular and Reserve units; and planned final locations. A small number of unit titles are still subject to endorsement by the relevant Army authorities.

6. *Integration.* The need to achieve the tasks and capabilities laid out in the SDSR with a smaller Regular Army and a very different mix of Regular and Reservist manpower drove the need to redefine the role of the Army Reserve (in line with the recommendations made by the Independent Commission on Reserves). In this model, Reserves will have realistic roles that can be delivered at prescribed states of readiness and, as a result, the previously envisaged five Multi Role Brigade (MRB) structure was no longer feasible as it supposed all brigades would, in rotation, occupy a state of highest readiness. Delivering a truly integrated Army is therefore at the heart of the Army 2020 proposition. It will be challenging to deliver, but it is essential to future success on deployed operations at home and overseas. Reserves can be employed routinely to deliver military tasks together with Regular colleagues if they are trained, equipped and prepared in a similar way; given tasks and opportunities that have genuine merit; and have the terms and conditions of service to ensure their recruitment and retention. There are plans and resources in place to achieve this.

7. *Pairing.* Reserves will be paired with Regular units for training during peacetime in order to prepare to form an integral element of the paired Regular unit when required to deploy on operations. To enable this integrated capability, Reserve units will undertake training which is aligned with the three-year operational readiness mechanism of their Regular counterparts. Details of pairing arrangements are shown in the tables at Annex A.

8. *Adaptability.* Adaptability is at the heart of the Army 2020 plan as demonstrated by the Adaptable Force which will be flexible by design to undertake a wide range of tasks. Adapting to strategic threats (eg if Britain faced a national emergency) and to tactical threats (such as adapting to an enemy's tactics during an operation) will therefore be a key attribute of the Army of 2020. Clearly the extent to which the plan could be adapted will be constrained by issues such as resource availability. Reductions to Army manpower have required a change to the way in which the Army conducts its business. Some of these are novel and, as yet, untested. Significant changes in strategic direction or further reductions in resources could only be met by accepting a greater level of risk to the Army's ability to meet changing demands. As the Army reduces in size, the scope for making further changes narrows. Army 2020 structures do, however, allow for an expansion of the Army, should future circumstances require it.

9. *Research.* In undertaking the Army 2020 study, academics and historians were consulted, and comparisons were made with the US, Australia and Canada. Recent operational experience was also considered, as well as the work of those areas of the MOD who look at how those lessons might apply in the future where they are likely to be relevant for future operations.

IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMY 2020

10. *Governance.* The Senior Responsible Owner for the Army 2020 Programme is the Assistant Chief of the General Staff, Major General David Cullen, supported by the Director of Army Plans in the role of Programme Director. They are supported by a Core Programme Team (including a Programme Management Office) in the Army Headquarters. Due to the scale of the programme, most areas of the Army are involved in implementation in one way or another. A number of separate projects have been established within the overall Army 2020 Programme to deliver the restructuring and the necessary supporting conditions to transform the Army to its required size and posture. This will involve re-rolling or merging of units and regiments; delivering an integrated force that is equipped and trained to support demand; changes to ways of working and process to deliver a more efficient Army; and the transformation of functional areas, such as career development and collective training, to establish and maintain the conditions required to underpin the structural transformation.

11. *Structures.* The early focus of the Army 2020 Programme has been necessarily on the restructuring of Regular units and command structures to ensure that these keep in step with the manpower reductions resulting from the Army Redundancy Programme, thereby minimising the gapping of posts. These structural changes are due to be completed by mid-2015.

12. *Dependencies.* Given its significance, Army 2020 also forms part of what is known as the Defence Nexus Group of programmes that have significant inter-dependencies. This group comprises Future Reserves 2020, the Army Basing Programme, the New Employment Model and the Army's withdrawal from Germany. This group of programmes is working closely together to manage these interdependencies.

PEOPLE

13. *Strengths.* The tables below show the figures for Regular and Reserve Army strength over the last five years. Data on deployability is shown for the years where it has been formally collected.

<i>Regular</i>	<i>01-Apr-09</i>	<i>01-Apr-10</i>	<i>01-Apr-11</i>	<i>01-Apr-12</i>	<i>01-Apr-13</i>
Regular Army Strength ¹	99,190	102,260	101,340	98,600	93,940
Personnel Categorised as Medically Fully Deployable (MFD)	N/K	80,650	79,130	76,800	73,680
<i>Reserves</i>	<i>01-Apr-09</i>	<i>01-Apr-10</i>	<i>01-Apr-11</i>	<i>01-Apr-12</i>	<i>01-Apr-13</i>
TA Group A Strength (a)	28,610	27,270	25,700	25,460	24,690
TA Group A Trained (b) ²	N/K	N/K	N/K	19,410	19,230
TA Group A Untrained (c)	N/K	N/K	N/K	6,050	5,460
Sponsored Reserves (d)	N/K	N/K	90	100	80

(Source: Defence Statistics (Army))

14. *Recruitment.* Figures showing regular Army recruitment over the last three years are at Annex B. Personnel are not recruited into specific units or battalions, and the figures are therefore shown at 'cap-badge' level. Figures for Reserves recruiting are not held on this basis but Annex B contains the figures that are

¹ The Full Time Trained Strength (FTTS) comprises UKTAP, GURTAM, FTRS FC and LC; Officers and Soldiers.

² Subject to SoFS agreement, the categories of reserve manpower to be counted against the FR20 Target are Volunteer Reserve Group A (including those serving on FTRS), and Sponsored Reserves.

available. The figures in Annex B define recruitment as inflow into Phase 1 training ie intake into the untrained strength. It should be noted that the figures for both Regular and Reserve personnel provided in Annex B are not formally published Defence Statistics.

15. *Regular Personnel.* The reduction in the size of the Regular Army will be achieved by 2018. Whilst reduced recruiting and fewer extensions of service will enable some of the reductions, Army Redundancy is the primary means of ensuring the right balance of skills is maintained for the future across the rank structures. Around 3,800 personnel were made redundant in Redundancy Tranches 1 and 2, and some 4,500 personnel are being made redundant in Tranche 3 (announced on 18 June 2013), with the majority of those selected for redundancy being applicants. Although the final decision is yet to be taken, it is likely there will be one further round of redundancy to bring the Regular Army strength down to the required level.

16. *The effect of Army 2020* restructuring is that a number of Regular personnel will need to be redistributed across the Army. Transfers will be prioritised to units nominated to deploy on operations and to high readiness elements, including the Parachute Regiment, with personnel transferred to other regiments where vacancies exist. Specific manning panels have been established to effect the transfers in a rigorous and auditable selection process, overseen by the Army Personnel Centre.

17. *Reserve Personnel.* An initiative (Operation FORTIFY) was launched in December 12 to deliver a sustainable Army Reserve of 30,000 (trained strength) by 2018. It focuses the Army on the immediate work to grow the Volunteer Reserve (VR) from its current trained strength of about 19,000. It seeks not only to deliver an increase in capability commensurate with increased numbers, but also to sustain a credible, usable and relevant Army Reserve as an enduring component of the whole force beyond 2018.

18. *Recruitment.* There have been national marketing campaigns conducted since August 11 in order to meet the significant increase in the Reserve recruiting targets and it is clear that the 2013–2016 targets are challenging. To help address this, the White Paper on the future of the Reserves explains how we intend to develop the role of our Reserve Forces, with a balance of challenge and reward that is properly resourced, supported by the appropriate Terms and Conditions of Service, and able to deliver real capability. The new offer is designed to be attractive to both new entrants and ex-Regulars. Complementary improvements in the quality and coherence of the Reserve training pipeline has been a high priority, with a blend of training packages now available to better suit individuals' work, home and Reserve balance.

19. *Retention.* Historically, retention in the trained strength of the TA has been good at 88% (12% outflow). Retention in the untrained strength has been poor due to the length of time it has taken to complete this training, with 70% leaving the Reserves prior to completing Phase 2 training. Work is being carried out to improve the retention of Reserve personnel through the TA training pipeline. Future Reserves 2020 'Betterment' Measures and the publication of the Reserves White Paper should both improve retention through training with specific 'retention incentives'. Improving retention through the Phase 2 component of the pipeline is the highest priority, and Phase 2 training has accordingly been completely restructured to ensure rapid completion of training and transfer to the trained strength.

20. *Regular to Reserve.* In line with the requirement to increase the trained strength of the Reserve, policy and processes have been reviewed to make it easier for Regular Army personnel to join the Reserves. Evidence from the Chain of Command suggests an encouraging early uptake. As part of this review, those transferring from the Regular Army into the Reserves may choose between two incentive schemes that potentially impact TA mobilisation liability:

- a. *Reduced Commitment Scheme.* Individuals are offered a reduced call out liability, which remains extant for three years following their last day of Regular Service. Ex-Regular personnel joining the Reserves will not be obliged to fulfil their call-out liability unless there is national danger, great emergency or imminent attack on UK. After the 3 year concession period, an individual remaining in the TA would continue with the normal TA liability in lieu of any remaining Reserve liability. On leaving the TA, an individual will resume the balance of any Regular Reserve/Regular Army Reserve Officer liability that may remain. If an individual chooses not to take up the concession initially, but volunteers for deployed service or takes up an FTRS post, the concession period will not be extended beyond 3 years.
- b. *Commitment Bonus Scheme.* This is a financial incentive. Personnel choosing this option are subject to the usual call out liability, stipulated under RFA 96.

21. *Recruiting Mechanisms.* There has been significant development within Army Recruiting in the period 2010–2013 under two initiatives; Common Selection (1 Apr 12) and the Recruiting Partnering Project (26 Mar 13):

- a. *Common Selection.* Prior to 1 Apr 12, the management of potential Reserve recruits was conducted on a regional basis, with varying degrees of assurance and consistency. In order to generate a high level of confidence that all personnel in the future integrated Army meet the same standards in terms of health, fitness, literacy and numeracy, a common selection process for potential Regular and Reserve recruits has been introduced.
- b. *Recruiting Partnering Project (RPP).* RPP is an Army Recruiting and Training Division (ARTD) initiative to improve the efficiency, flexibility and effectiveness of the Army recruiting pipeline for

both Regular and Reserve, officer and soldier recruits. It provides a 10-year, performance incentivised contract, with Capita Business Services Ltd, to deliver recruiting for the Army under a partnering arrangement, and the underpinning digital Information and Communications Technology (ICT) system to support Tri-Service recruiting operations. In addition, RPP is planned to deliver the following tangible benefits:

- (1) Reduce the cost of Army recruiting (by c£310m over 10 years from 1 Apr 13);
- (2) Release military manpower from recruiting (c1100); and
- (3) Reduce wastage in initial training and improve Return of Service rates; consequently reducing inflow requirements.

22. *Progress.* The project achieved Initial Operating Capability on 26 Mar 13; development of the new ICT solution continues and interim processes using the legacy ICT are in place. There have been a number of key results from these changes, notably;

- a. The role of Military manpower in Army recruiting has been refocused on the core business of dealing directly with potential recruits (less HQ planning/command functions).
- b. The recruitment process has been redesigned to become more streamlined, being administered and coordinated centrally and increasingly managed on-line. There have been some associated changes to the processes between Army recruiting and customer organisations, in particular Army Phase 1 training establishments.
- c. Administrative functions have been civilianised and centralised in a National Recruiting Centre (NRC); in so doing, the relationship between candidate and recruiter has moved from high street offices to a Candidate Support Manager in the NRC.
- d. Command of Army Recruiting Group is now exercised centrally from Upavon in Wiltshire, through five Regional Operations Managers across the UK.

23. *Performance.* The performance of Capita will be assessed against set Key Performance Indicators (KPIs); quantity³ of recruits, quality⁴ of recruits, positive recruiting experience and availability/functionality of ICT. This assessment will be monthly and numerical, and is subject to trend analysis. Capita is incentivised against these KPIs to meet banded targets. Failure to meet these targets will result in a reduction in the payments made to Capita. Conversely, if the Army fails to meet contractual obligations, Capita will be allowed appropriate relief against the KPI targets.

24. *Costs.* The Ministry of Defence doesn't produce statistical data on the whole life costs of Service personnel. This, when coupled with the differing Regular and Reserve Terms and Conditions of Service makes capturing payments challenging. Furthermore, the different output standards in individual and collective training makes drawing a simple equivalence between Regular and Reserve personnel training costs liable to misleading deductions. Against this background, the following cost information is available:

- a. *Annual Cost.* The difference in per diem cost for Regular and Reserves differs only in the X Factor element of the military salary which is currently 14.5% for Regulars and 5% for Reserves. Presently only Regular pay attracts a Superannuation Charge Attributable to Experience (SCAPE—the cost of pension) which is 42.8% for officers and 30.8% for soldiers. The FR20 proposition will see Reserve salary becoming pensionable leading to a SCAPE levy in the order of 25% while the application of Working Time Directives will see an additional payment, in the order of 10.2%, to Reserves. That said, not all Reserve attendance based pay will attract Employers National Insurance Contributions.
- b. *Recruitment.* While the Recruiting Partnering Project contract makes separate provision for discrete charging mechanisms for the recruitment of Regular Officer, Reserve Officers and other ranks (both Regular and Reserve), in all 3 cases the cost per recruit is broadly similar.
- c. *Basic Training.* Training for commissioning in the Regulars and Reserves differs in delivery, intensity and duration. The same is the case for soldiers basic (Phase 1) and subsequent (Phase 2) training. For these reasons, and as Regular training is residential, comparison of cost is of limited meaning.
- d. *Collective Training.* The Army has assessed the cost of training both Regular and Reserve infantry company and if manpower is excluded, the costs are broadly the same for a like for like comparison of training activity levels to achieve the established Collective Training Competence Levels 1, 2 and 3.

TRAINING

25. *A-FORM.* The Army will enter a new readiness mechanism in 2015 known as the Army 2020 Formation Operational Readiness Mechanism (A-FORM). This will have a force preparation cycle based on three years, aligned to the calendar year and covering Training, Contingency or Committed, and Other Tasks respectively. The activities within the cycle will vary between the Reaction Force and the Adaptable Force, and 16 Air

³ Defined in the RPP Benefits Realisation Plan as: "the right number of candidates to meet career and trade requirements, loaded onto training courses".

⁴ Defined in the RPP Benefits Realisation Plan as: "each candidate matches the Army's selection criteria, qualities, values and standards and therefore completes Phase 2 training".

Assault Brigade units and some Force Troops capabilities will be on subtly different cycles owing to their specialised nature.

26. *Training.* All units within the Reaction Force and the Adaptable Force will conduct combined arms training once every three years. This includes those deployed on standing tasks in Cyprus, Brunei or on State Ceremonial and Public Duties who rotate between those roles and the Adaptable Force and therefore must prepare accordingly. Training for combat operations will be the priority for all force elements to enable the Army to remain flexible, adaptable and to maintain resilience. However, stabilisation and other military activities will be included once combined arms manoeuvre has been mastered, and the Adaptable Force will conduct more stabilisation training than the Reaction Force in line with their likely roles.

27. During the *Training Year*, combat units will follow a progression from individual training through to battlegroup combined arms live exercises. For the Reaction Force, this will be to CT4⁵ and for the Adaptable Force to the lower level of CT3⁶. Combat Support and Combat Service Support units will conduct ‘special to arm’ training before integrating within Combat battlegroups and taking part in collective training events. Training will be a blend of live, virtual and constructive activity with increasing use of simulation to complement field exercises. Under current plans, battlegroup training will take place at the British Army Training Unit Suffield (BATUS) in Canada for the Reaction Force units and at the British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK) and on Salisbury Plain for the Adaptable Force.

28. *The Contingency Year* for the Reaction Force, or Committed Year for the Adaptable Force, will see Reaction Force units held at readiness and the Adaptable Force deployed, or ready to deploy according to the level of operational deployments at the time. Training currency will be maintained by sub-unit field training and simulated at the Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (CATT) and Command and Staff Trainer (CAST). Units from across the Army will also deploy in support on Overseas Training Exercises, some of which support Defence Engagement tasks with the host nation concerned.

29. *The Other Tasks Year* will provide the foundations required for the other years of the force preparation cycle, but the primary task will be to support the training of those units that are in their Training Year. Units in the Other Tasks Year will therefore train to CT1⁷ only, although some may conduct higher level training through training support to other formations. Training Support tasks includes those previously undertaken by the Land Warfare Centre Battlegroup, as well as playing the role of the opposing force for BATUS and BATUK exercises.

30. *Reserves.* There will be greater emphasis on Reserves’ collective training, with increased training at platoon/troop and sub-unit level as the Army resets for contingency. Collective competencies will develop through a new programme of sub-unit exercises in the UK and abroad, which has already seen Reserves training in Cyprus, Denmark and Italy. Reserves’ training cycles will align and synchronise with paired Regular units, and Reserves’ collective training will culminate by integrating with the capstone Regular battlegroup training event in the Training Year. The detail of how integration will work will be developed through a series of pilots in 2013/14.

31. *Defence Engagement.* Overseas training will form a key element of Army 2020 training and will contribute directly to Defence Engagement outputs, with in the region of 50 sub-unit level exercises each year. These may involve combined training with host nation forces and will practise the expeditionary nature of operations in challenging environments and climates. These activities are all resourced within the Army Future Training Plan, though are subject to the Annual Budget Cycle (ABC) process. There will also be training events where foreign armies take part in exercises in the UK. This could be live field training, or constructive training at the Command and Staff Trainer (CAST). The current multinational training programme will endure, although it will be continually developed and refined through bilateral annual Army Staff Talks, established agreements and Treaties, such as; the Five Powers Defence Agreement (FPDA); the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies (ABCA) Program; and the Anglo French Treaty on Defence and Security Co-operation. Our membership of NATO will remain central in this area, as will our links with the United States of America, with whom Combined Joint training remains a key means of maintaining and developing the Army.

32. *Joint Training.* Joint training will continue through Exercise Joint Warrior in Scotland, which is planned to remain as the annual validation exercise for the Air Assault Task Force. With the return to contingency and reset following completion of operations in Afghanistan, Joint training will play as important a role as ever in preparing our soldiers and officers for contingent tasks and commitments.

33. *Experimentation.* Experimentation will be an important aspect of Army 2020, with a shift of emphasis from mission exploitation to training exploitation as the primary means of identifying lessons. The Contingency or Committed Year of the cycle will be when experimentation is most likely to occur, due to the level of training that units will be at, and this is factored into the operational readiness mechanism. Funds have been earmarked within the Army Future Training Plan.

⁵ CT4 is defined as task organised unit or battlegroup training conducted in a combined arms formation context.

⁶ CT3 is defined as sub-unit training in a task organised or combined arms battlegroup context.

⁷ CT1 is defined as Collective skills training at up to troop / platoon level

34. *Study Days.* The Army runs a number of study days and seminars to discuss and develop its training. There is no centralised policy on whom to invite to study days and seminars as these are generally conducted and controlled by the organising headquarters and therefore subject to the commander's discretion. However, as the Army faces operations in environments that are not only Joint, but also involve civilian organisations, there has been an increasing trend for headquarters to invite other Government Departments, think tanks, academia and sometimes industry to attend study days and seminars. This varies according to each event and is subject to the normal clearance processes. In terms of the internal audience, good use is made of the Army Knowledge Exchange on the intranet to ensure a wider audience is able to gain benefit from these events.

35. *Future Developments.* In the Army 2020 era, a 'Soldier First' ethos, underpinned by the core components of professional soldiering such as Skill at Arms, Physical Fitness and Fieldcraft, will remain essential elements of individual training and will ensure there is a firm foundation upon which to build operational effectiveness. Individual Foundation Training continues to evolve as the Army resets for contingency; Military Annual Training Tests (MATTs) will be an important element of progressive unit owned low level core skills training. The 'how to train' will be very much the responsibility of unit commanders. Individual Mission Specific Training courses that are currently delivered as part of the Operation HERRICK training pipeline are being brought into core, where appropriate, to ensure that the hard won lessons from Afghanistan are not forgotten as the Army resets for contingency. For Defence Engagement tasks, such as Short Term Training Team (STTT) deployments overseas, individual pre-deployment and pre-employment training is defined and delivered so that individuals are suitably prepared for the mission. In addition, and in support of all training, individuals will be able to develop team spirit, leadership qualities, self reliance and determination by embracing the increased number of Fitness, Sport and Adventurous Training opportunities, including whilst on Overseas Training Exercises.

36. *Education and Training.* The Command Leadership and Management programme that provides the pan-Army baseline for the professional development of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), from Potential Junior NCO to Warrant Officer, will also cater for the Army Reserve, including accreditation through a number of professional institutes and awarding bodies. The Review of Officer Career Courses 2 is already delivering improvements in how the Army will 'sharpen the agile edge' through the new Captains' Warfare Course, revision of the Intermediate Command and Staff Course (Land) and to the joint Advanced Command and Staff Course. Continuous improvement is occurring across the pan-Army officer education continuum from the Commissioning Course, at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, to the Advanced Command and Staff Course. In each case, the training progression is being tailored for both Regular and Reserves, integrating the two where practical. There is an increased emphasis on 'self-paced' learning and a balance between residential and distance learning courses. Research and investment is being made in appropriate learning technologies.

BASING

37. *Background.* The SDSR of October announced that the Army would return to the UK from Germany by 2020. This will achieve significant long term savings through the release of major unit locations, reduce costs (for example through health, education and allowances), and make better use of the estate in the UK. In tandem, the changes to Army structures under Army 2020 necessitate a number of other location changes.

38. *Principles.* The Regular Army basing plan was put together on a number of principles:

- a. *Coherence.* A suitable balance must be struck between the requirements of the Single Services, functional coherence, and the needs of our people. Where possible, Defence Communities are to be enhanced on a joint basis, identifying synergies in some of the enabling functions, such as training, logistics and communications.
- b. *Access to Training.* Where possible, facilities must be available locally to enable appropriate training (up to Collective Training Level 1 for the Land Component, including small arms ranges, dry training areas, and special to arm facilities).
- c. *Efficiency and sustainability.* The core principle behind the establishment of Defence Communities is to rationalise sites into modern, efficient and multi-occupancy shared locations in order to reduce running and maintenance costs and to improve coherence at either the functional or formation level. Equally important will be the delivery of flexible infrastructure solutions that permit future proofing and flexibility of use, rather than bespoke designs for specific units and functions.
- d. *Regular and Reserve Partnership.* As we move towards a Whole Force, significant efficiencies will be available through the integration of Regular and Reserve infrastructure, training facilities and equipment pools. The Defence Basing Plan will take account of the outcome of the Reserves Review.
- e. *Integration with Civil Communities.* This is to be encouraged for a number of reasons, not least to reduce the requirement for bespoke Service Families Accommodation. There is a balance to be struck: where employment opportunities are greatest, it will be more challenging for our people to afford reasonable private sector housing; but, at the same time, we will not retain our people if we ask them to settle, at their own expense, where there is limited private sector housing, insufficient employment opportunities for spouses, and a lack of appropriate schools and social infrastructure.
- f. *Regional Representation.* Whilst the establishment of Defence Communities will reduce the geographic spread of the Armed Forces across the UK, the Defence Basing Plan seeks to establish

a balanced spread of the Armed Forces across the UK. This will help to encourage recruitment into the Armed Forces, will offer choice to Service Families, and will minimise the Armed Forces having to rely in a disproportionate way on any one local community.

39. *Implementation.* Different basing factors were then applied to each element of the Army 2020 force structure:

- a. *Reaction Force, including HQs.* Priorities were placed on unit, equipment, and then formation cohesion. For example, units with tracked vehicles will be located around Salisbury Plain.
- b. *Adaptable Force HQs.* Utilisation of current locations has been maintained where relevant, although some HQs will have to relocate in order to discharge UK engagement and resilience (Regional Point of Command) responsibilities more effectively.
- c. *Adaptable Force Units.* No change unless there is a compelling reason (such as pairing with Reserve units or closer proximity to Adaptable Force formations).
- d. *Force Troops Command HQs.* With one set of enablers to meet the needs of both the Reaction Force and Adaptable Force, ensuring geographic proximity to operational command units was a factor in some cases.
- e. *Force Troops Command Units.* As for Adaptable Force Units (sub-para c. above).
- f. *Reserves.* The integrated basing operating model is influenced by pairing by geography and demography, and maximising the usage of current sites.

40. *Implementation.* The plan will be challenging to deliver, and it will be complicated by the requirement for unit moves to be staged carefully to minimise disruption to soldiers' lives and the lives of their families, including operational tours and the school year. The staging also affords the time to secure the planning approval and conduct the necessary local authority engagement where required.

WITHDRAWAL FROM GERMANY

41. *Background.* Careful sequencing of unit moves from Germany is needed to align them with the availability of real estate in the UK. The intention is to reduce the military population into a smaller geographic area and to close garrison and station locations, providing essential support services, at the point that the final military units depart. This will allow efficiencies to be made in support services, without degradation of service provision, and will also maximise operating cost savings by closing entire sites. Any new contracts will be agreed with enough flexibility to take the rebasing process into account.

42. *Military Personnel.* The total military population is just under 16,000. These personnel are employed in Brigade and Divisional units, in supporting Headquarters, and in military specialist posts in support organisations (including British Forces Germany Health Service, Defence Dental Service (Germany), Army Education Centres, Royal Military Police, welfare organisations). The main units in Germany are:

- a. *7 Armoured Brigade* based in Bergen-Hohne Garrison and made up of some 4,750 personnel in the Brigade and affiliated units in Germany.
- b. *20 Armoured Brigade* based in Paderborn Garrison and made up of some 4,750 military personnel in the Brigade and affiliated units in Germany.
- c. *102 Logistic Brigade* based in Gütersloh Garrison and made up of some 1,500 military personnel in Germany.
- d. The balance of military manpower is made up of *Headquarters staffs* (HQ British Forces Germany, HQ 1 (UK) Armoured Division), Divisional Troops, Garrison Headquarters and Firm Base providers, plus staff in support areas (including BFG Health Services, Defence Dental Services, Education Centres, RMP SIB).

43. *Civilian Staff.* There are some 6,800 civilian staff employed in Germany, made up of a number of separate groups:

- a. United Kingdom Based Civilian (UKBC) civil servants employed in support functions in Headquarters, on Brigade staffs, and across a range of supporting organisations; United Kingdom Based Teachers (UKBT) employed in Service Children's Education schools in Germany; and United Kingdom contractors' staff (for example for NAAFI, British Forces Germany Health Service, and ICS providers); this group in total amounts to 1,870.
- b. Locally Employed Civilians (LEC) staff amount to 4,960 made up of 2,100 Dependants and 2,860 German (and other) Nationals from the local economy. This group ranges from subject matter experts (for example, in German employment law), clerical support in Headquarters including translators and technical staff, to mechanics, drivers, and labourers employed in support functions in units and Garrisons.

44. *Locally Employed Civilians.* The management of Locally Employed Civilians is a key issue and inevitably there will be job losses as we rebase. British Forces Germany will continue to mitigate the effects by applying to the Federal Ministry of Finance for the provision of Tariff Agreement Social Security measures,

as well as complying with other Collective Tariff Agreements. The provision of retraining opportunities for our staff will continue to be offered and these are being taken up readily by affected staff.

45. *Dependants.* In addition, there are currently some 16,900 service dependants in Germany, comprising 7,100 adults, and 9,800 children under the age of 25 who are permanently residing with parents.

46. *Future Requirements.* In the future we expect to retain military representation on NATO and liaison staffs (Germany/Netherlands Corps HQ in Münster, and HQ NATO Signal Battalion in Wesel). Beyond that, it is difficult at this stage to provide a firm picture of the position post 2020. We expect to retain elements to take advantage of the Adventure Training facilities that we currently use in Germany (specifically in the Alpine Trg Centre), and we are considering whether there might be other requirements that can be met by retaining a very small permanent presence in Germany (no more than around 100 personnel).

47. *Costs and Savings.* The return of the Army from Germany is being delivered under two separate Programmes; the BORONA Programme which was set up in 2006 to commence the partial withdrawal from Germany and the Army Basing Programme, which was established following the 5 Mar 13 announcement and will deliver the remaining elements by 2020. Costs and savings relating to the withdrawal from Germany are as follows:

- a. *BORONA.* The BORONA programme is responsible for the closure of Rhine Garrison, Münster Station and Celle Station. The investment cost of the BORONA programme is some £521M with net benefit at steady state (ie Germany operating costs less UK operating costs) estimated at some £100M per year.
- b. *Army Basing Programme Costs.* This programme will rebase units to UK and close all remaining estate not already in the scope of the BORONA programme. The capital investment cost of this is some £1.6Bn and the MOD has set aside funding to enable the withdrawal. There are also expected to be some costs incurred by the requirement for decontamination of military sites. The cost of this work has not been separately identified, but has been included within Germany extrication costs. Work is ongoing to gain greater confidence and granularity of this cost driver through timely identification and remediation of issues on a rolling basis; similar activity at BORONA locations has, to date, mitigated risk and cost.
- c. *Army Basing Programme Savings.* Alongside the costs of rebasing from Germany, there are savings to be scored. It is estimated that operating savings of £100m per year will be generated by 2015/16 and that this will rise to £240m net benefit per annum by 2022/23.

48. *German Authorities.* Although there is no legal requirement to notify the German authorities of our plans to drawdown the Army from Germany, Defence Ministers have written to the German Defence Ministers on each announcement, (BORONA, SDSR, and Army 2020) to explain the decisions and to give as much detail as is available to the German authorities. This information is then distributed to all interested levels of the German authorities. The Ministry of Defence has continued to liaise closely with the German Government, the Federal Ministry of Defence and regional and local authorities as our plans have developed. In addition, we work closely with Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) staff in the British Embassy in Berlin.

49. The General Officer Commanding British Forces Germany holds the responsibility for liaising with the immediate local and national authorities in Germany. He discharges this responsibility through Deputy Garrison Commanders and Garrison Liaison Officers at local level, with the support of the Brigade and Divisional Commanders. He discharges this authority at national and regional level through Liaison Officers and other Staff Officers within Headquarters British Forces Germany, as well as through personal contact at senior level with those military and civilian authorities. Specifically in terms of the complex areas of estate and infrastructure, the Defence Infrastructure Organisation has a forward located HQ in Germany that has responsibility for engagement with their counterparts in the German authorities at local, regional and national level.

Reaction Force

3 rd (United Kingdom) Division (Bulford)			
All locations shown are planned final locations, Reserve units are in black, hybrid units are in yellow, pairing is shown by shaded boxes			
	1 st Armoured Infantry Brigade (Tidworth)	12 th Armoured Infantry Brigade (Bulford)	20 th Armoured Infantry Brigade ¹ (Bulford)
Role			
Armoured Cavalry	Household Cavalry Regiment (Windsor)	The Royal Lancers (Catterick)	The Royal Dragoon Guards (Catterick)
Armour	The Royal Tank Regiment (Tidworth)	The King's Royal Hussars (Tidworth)	The Queen's Royal Hussars (The Queen's Own & Royal Irish) (Tidworth)
Reserve	Royal Wessex Yeomanry (Bovington)		
Armoured Infantry	1st Battalion The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (Tidworth)	1st Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment (Warminster)	5th Battalion The Rifles (Bulford)
Armoured Infantry	1st Battalion The Mercian Regiment (Bulford)	1st Battalion The Royal Welsh (Tidworth)	1st Battalion The Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment
Heavy Protected Mobility	4 th Battalion The Rifles (Aldershot)	1st Battalion Scots Guards (Aldershot)	The Highlanders, 4th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (Catterick)
101 Logistic Brigade (Aldershot)			
Close Support Logistic Regiment	3 Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Aldershot)	4 Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Abingdon)	1 Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Bicester)
Theatre Logistic Regiment	10 The Queen's Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment (Aldershot)	27 Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Abingdon)	9 Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Hullavington)
Reserve Transport Regiment	151 Transport Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Croydon)	154 (Scottish) Transport Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Dunfermline)	157 (Welsh) Transport Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Cardiff)
Reserve Supply Regiment	156 Supply Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Liverpool)		
Armoured Medical Regiment ²	1 Armoured Medical Regiment (Tidworth)	4 Armoured Medical Regiment (Aldershot)	5 Armoured Medical Regiment (Tidworth)
Armoured Close Support	6 Armoured Close Support Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers ³ (Tidworth)	4 Armoured Close Support Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (Tidworth)	3 Armoured Close Support Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (Tidworth)
Reserve Equipment Support	103 Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (Crawley)		105 Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (Bristol)
Force Support	5 Force Support Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers ⁴ (Cottesmore)		
16 Air Assault Brigade (Colchester)			
Role			
Parachute	2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment (Colchester)	3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment (Colchester)	
Reserve Parachute Battalion	4th Battalion The Parachute Regiment (Pudsey)		
Attack Helicopter	3 Regiment Army Air Corps (Wattisham)	4 Regiment Army Air Corps (Wattisham)	
Reserve Aviation Support	6 Regiment Army Air Corps ⁵ (Bury St Edmunds)		
Close Support Artillery Regiment	7th Parachute Regiment Royal Horse Artillery (Colchester)		
Close Support Engineer Regiment	23 Engineer Regiment (Air Assault) (Woodbridge)		
Air Assault Communication and Information Systems	216 (Parachute) Signal Squadron (Colchester)		
Close Support Logistic Regiment	13 (Air Assault) Support Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Colchester)		
Medical Regiment	16 Medical Regiment (Colchester)		
Air Assault Support	7 (Air Assault) Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (Wattisham)		

1. Remaining Paderborn Garrison based 20 Armoured Infantry Brigade units will move to their UK locations from 2017.

2. Units are paired with Reserve Medical Regiments in the Adaptable Force - 102 Logistic Brigade.

3. Paired with 101 Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers in the Adaptable Force - 102 Logistic Brigade.

4. Paired with 104 Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers in the Adaptable Force - 102 Logistic Brigade.

5. 6 Army Air Corps Regiment is not commanded by 16 Air Assault Brigade but is affiliated with 3 and 4 Regiment Army Air Corps (as well as the Aviation Reconnaissance Force and 7 Regiment Army Air Corps).

All titles are subject to endorsement.

Adaptable Force

UNIT ROTATION AS AT 1 SEPT 16		1 st (United Kingdom) Division (York)					
All locations shown are planned final locations, Reserve units are in black, hybrid units are in yellow, pairing is shown by shaded boxes							
	HQ 51 st Infantry Brigade & HQ Scotland (Edinburgh)	HQ 7 th Infantry Brigade & HQ East (Chilwell)	HQ 4 th Infantry Brigade & HQ North East (Catterick)	HQ 11 th Infantry Brigade & HQ South East (Aldershot)	HQ 38 th (Irish) Brigade (Lisburn)	HQ 42 nd Infantry Brigade & HQ North West (Preston)	HQ 160 th Infantry Brigade & HQ Wales (Brecon)
Role							
Light Cavalry	The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers and Greys) (Leuchars)	1 st The Queen's Dragoon Guards (Swanton Morley)	The Light Dragoons (Catterick)				
Reserve Light Cavalry	The Royal Mercian and Lancastrian Yeomanry ¹ (Edinburgh)	The Royal Yeomanry (London)	The Queen's Own Yeomanry (Newcastle)				
Light Protected Mobility	3 rd Battalion The Rifles (Edinburgh)	2 nd Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment (Cottesmore)	2 nd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment (Catterick)	1 st Battalion Welsh Guards (Pirbright)			
Reserve Light Role Infantry	5 th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (Newcastle)	3 rd Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment (Bury St Edmunds)	4 th Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment (York)	3 rd Battalion The Royal Welsh (Cardiff)			
Light Protected Mobility	The Black Watch 3 rd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (Fort George)	1 st Battalion The Royal Irish Regiment (Tern Hill)					
Reserve Light Role Infantry	51 st Highland, 7 th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (Perth)	2 nd Battalion The Royal Irish Regiment (Lisburn)					
Light Role Infantry	The Royal Highland Fusiliers 2 nd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (Edinburgh)	1 st Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment (Woolwich)		1 st Battalion Grenadier Guards (Aldershot)	The Royal Scots Borderers 1 st Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (Belfast)	2 nd Battalion The Mercian Regiment (Chester)	1 st Battalion The Rifles (Chepstow)
Reserve Light Role Infantry	52 nd Lowland, 6 th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (Glasgow)	3 rd Battalion The Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment (Canterbury)		The London Regiment (Westminster)	UNPAIRED	4 th Battalion The Mercian Regiment (Wolverhampton)	6 th Battalion The Rifles (Exeter)
Light Role Infantry				1 st Battalion The Royal Gurkha Rifles (Shorncliffe)	2 nd Battalion The Rifles (Ballykinler)	2 nd Battalion The Duke of Lancaster's Regiment (Weeton)	
Reserve Light Role Infantry				UNPAIRED	7 th Battalion The Rifles (Reading)	4 th Battalion The Duke of Lancaster's Regiment (Preston)	
102 Logistic Brigade (Grantham)							
Force Logistic Regiment	6 Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Dishforth)			7 Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Cottesmore)			
Reserve Transport Regiment	150 Transport Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Hull)			158 Transport Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Peterborough)			
Reserve Supply Regiment	159 Supply Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Coventry)						
Medical Regiment	2 Medical Regiment (North Luffenham)			3 Medical Regiment (Preston)			
Reserve Medical Regiment ²	225 (Scottish) Medical Regiment (Dundee)		253 (North Irish) Medical Regiment (Belfast)		254 (East of England) Medical Regiment (Cambridge)		
Close Support	1 Close Support Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (Catterick)		2 Close Support Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (Leuchars)				
Reserve Equipment Support	102 Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (Newton Aycliffe)	104 Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers ³ (Northampton)	106 Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (Glasgow)	101 Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers ⁴ (Wrexham)			
Cyprus	1 st Battalion The Duke of Lancaster's Regiment (Episkopi)	2 nd Battalion The Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment (Dhekalia)					
Brunei	2 nd Battalion The Royal Gurkha Rifles (Brunei)						
State Ceremonial and Public Duties	Balaklava Company, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 5 th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (Edinburgh)						
HQ London District (Whitehall)							
State Ceremonial and Public Duties	Household Cavalry Mounted Regiment (Knightsbridge)	The King's Troop Royal Horse Artillery (Woolwich)	1 st Battalion Coldstream Guards (Windsor)	1 st Battalion Irish Guards (Hounslow)	Public Duties Incremental Companies (London)		

1. A replacement title is being staffed for endorsement.
 2. Paired with the Armoured Medical Regiments in the Reaction Force - 101 Logistic Brigade.
 3. Paired with 5 Force Support Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers in the Reaction Force - 101 Logistic Brigade.
 4. Paired with 6 Armad Close Support Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers in the Reaction Force - 101 Logistic Brigade.

All titles are subject to endorsement.

Force Troops Command

Force Troops Command (Upavon)							
All locations shown are planned final locations, Reserve units are in black, hybrid units are in yellow, pairing is shown by shaded boxes							
1 st Artillery Brigade and HQ South West (Tidworth)	Close Support	1 st Regiment Royal Horse Artillery (Larkhill)	19 th Regiment Royal Artillery (Larkhill)	26 th Regiment Royal Artillery (Larkhill)	3 rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery (Harlow Hill)	4 th Regiment Royal Artillery (Topcliffe)	
	Reserves Artillery	101 st (Northumbrian) Regiment Royal Artillery ¹ (Gateshead)			105 th Regiment Royal Artillery (Edinburgh)	103 rd (Lancashire Artillery Volunteers) Regiment Royal Artillery (St Helens)	
8 Engineer Brigade (Minley)	Close Support	25 (Close Support) Engineer Group (Minley)					
		22 Engineer Regiment (Perham Down)		26 Engineer Regiment (Perham Down)		35 Engineer Regiment (Perham Down)	
		21 Engineer Regiment (Catterick)			32 Engineer Regiment (Catterick)		
	Force Support	12 (Force Support) Engineer Group (Wittering)					
		36 Engineer Regiment (Maidstone)		39 Engineer Regiment (Kinloss)		20 Works Group Royal Engineers (Air Support) (Wittering)	
	75 Engineer Regiment (Warrington)		71 Engineer Regiment (Leuchars)				
	Infrastructure Support	170 (Infrastructure Support) Engineer Group (Chilwell)					
		62 Works Group Royal Engineers (Chilwell)		63 Works Group Royal Engineers (Chilwell)		64 Works Group Royal Engineers (Chilwell)	
		65 Works Group Royal Engineers (Chilwell)		66 Works Group Royal Engineers (Chilwell)		The Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers (Militia) (Monmouth)	
	Explosive Ordnance Disposal & Search	29 Explosive Ordnance Disposal & Search Group (Aldershot)					
33 Engineer Regiment (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) (Wimbish)			101 (City of London) Engineer Regiment (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) (Wimbish)				
11 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Didcot)			1 Military Working Dogs Regiment (North Luffenham)				
1st Signal Brigade (Innsworth)	ARRC & JRRF Support	22nd Signal Regiment (Stafford)	30th Signal Regiment (Bramcote)		ARRC Support Battalion (Innsworth)		
	Special Communications	299 Signal Squadron (Special Communications) (Bletchley)					
11th Signal Brigade and HQ West Midlands (Donnington)	7th Signal Group (Stafford)						
	Close Support	1 st Signal Regiment (Stafford)	16 th Signal Regiment (Stafford)		21 st Signal Regiment (Colerne)		
	General Support	2 nd Signal Regiment (York)		3 rd Signal Regiment (Bulford)			
	Reserve Signal Regiment	2 nd Signal Group (Donnington)					
		32 nd Signal Regiment (Glasgow)		37 th Signal Regiment ² (Redditch)		39 th Signal Regiment (Bristol)	
	Specialist Technical Support Regiment	71 st (City of London) Yeomanry Signal Regiment ³ (Bexleyheath)					
	10 th Signal Regiment (Corsham)	15 th Signal Regiment (Information Support) (Blandford)					

1. Paired with 39th Regiment Royal Artillery until 31 Mar 15, then 3rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery from 1 Apr 15.

2. Paired with 1st Signal Regiment and 16th Signal Regiment.

3. Paired with 3rd Signal Regiment.

All titles are subject to endorsement.

Force Troops Command

104 Logistic Support Brigade (South Cerney)	Port & Maritime Regiment	17 Port & Maritime Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Marchwood)	165 (Wessex) Port and Enabling Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Plymouth)	
	Postal, Courier & Movement Regiment	29 Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (South Cerney)		162 Postal Courier and Movement Control Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Nottingham)
	Reserve ⁴	152 Fuel Support Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Belfast)	167 Catering Support Regiment The Royal Logistic Corps (Grantham)	2 Operational Support Group (Grantham)
2 nd Medical Brigade (Strensall)	Field Hospital	22 Field Hospital (Aldershot)	33 Field Hospital (Gosport)	34 Field Hospital (Strensall)
	Reserve Field Hospital	202 (Midlands) Field Hospital (Birmingham)	203 (Welsh) Field Hospital (Cardiff)	201 (Northern) Field Hospital (Newcastle-upon-Tyne)
		207 (Manchester) Field Hospital (Manchester)	243 (Wessex) Field Hospital (Bristol)	204 (North Irish) Field Hospital (Belfast)
		208 (Liverpool) Field Hospital (Liverpool)	256 (City of London) Field Hospital (Walworth)	205 (Scottish) Field Hospital (Glasgow)
	Reserve Support ⁵	306 Hospital Support Regiment (Strensall)	335 Medical Evacuation Regiment (Strensall)	Operational HQ Support Group (Strensall)
1 Intelligence and Surveillance Brigade (Upavon)	Surveillance & Target Acquisition	5 th Regiment Royal Artillery (Catterick)	The Honourable Artillery Company (City of London)	
	Unmanned Aerial System	32 nd Regiment Royal Artillery (Larkhill)	47 th Regiment Royal Artillery (Larkhill)	104 th Regiment Royal Artillery (MUAS) (Newport)
	Electronic Warfare	14 th Signal Regiment (Electronic Warfare) (St Athan)		
	Military Intelligence	1 Military Intelligence Battalion (Catterick)	2 Military Intelligence Battalion (Upavon)	4 Military Intelligence Battalion (Bulford)
		3 Military Intelligence Battalion (Hackney)	6 Military Intelligence Battalion (Manchester)	7 Military Intelligence Battalion (Bristol)
		5 Military Intelligence Battalion (Edinburgh)		
	Land Intelligence Fusion Centre (Hermitage)	Defence Cultural Specialist Unit (Hermitage)	Specialist Group Military Intelligence (Hermitage)	
Security Assistance Group (Hermitage)	Specialist Support	Military Stabilisation Support Group (Hermitage)	15 Psychological Operations Group (Hermitage)	Media Operations Group (London)
1 st Military Police Brigade ⁶ (Andover)	Military Police Regiment	1 st Regiment Royal Military Police (Catterick)	3 rd Regiment Royal Military Police (Bulford)	4 th Regiment Royal Military Police (Aldershot)
	Specialist Units	Special Investigation Branch Regiment Royal Military Police (Bulford)	Special Operations Unit Royal Military Police (Longmoor)	Military Corrective Training Centre (Colchester)

4. Units are not directly paired, they each provide bespoke logistic capability across the Reaction Force, Adaptable Force and Force Troop Command Brigades.

5. Units are paired with Headquarters 2nd Medical Brigade.

6. Command status of 1st Military Police Brigade is awaiting confirmation.

All titles are subject to endorsement.

Annex B

Regular Army Intake

Annex B to
Army Sec 12/2
Dated xx June 2013

2012/13	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	TOTAL
AAC		4	15			10	15	5		13		28	90
AGC (RMP)		48	8	24		32		31		30	13		186
AGC (SPS)	20		17	9	9	15	19	10		30		23	152
CA Mus	6	5	5	6	4	9	6	5	2	2	5	5	60
HCAV	10	10	3	10	10	16	6	8		23	14	19	129
Inf	450	366	32	69	138	931	348	193	5	359	355	559	3,805
INT CORPS		32	7		2	3	22				26		92
QARANC	8	7					18	5					38
RA	40	36	19	35	16	135	45	50	43	39	38	57	553
RAC	52	36	17	37	31	72	42	76		85	43	78	569
RADC							9						9
RAMC	27	35	35	34	15	23	53	2		46		20	290
RAVC	14	6	10			13							43
RE	87	23	43	99	34	122	134	45	26	46	63	64	786
REME	79	38	49		34	83	127	53	7	35	24	180	709
RLC	216	95	97	83	22	187	93	50	22	118	83	163	1,229
R SIGS	59	42	53	42	2	95	73	28	4	70	39	111	618
Unknown													-
2012/13	1,068	783	410	448	317	1,746	1,010	561	109	896	703	1,307	9,358

2011/12	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	TOTAL
AAC	4	15	12			18	17	5		5		12	88
AGC (RMP)	34	24	32	18	18	12	22	38		12	12	12	234
AGC (SPS)	7	66		22	7	29					10	40	181
CA Mus		4	4	4	2	7	3	5		1	6	2	38
HCAV	20		6	22		30	19			7		13	117
Inf	338	606		105	384	859	596	188		726	365	372	4,539
INT CORPS	11	5	41	2	2	14	27	46			8	41	197
QARANC	4	13				9		6	2			5	39
RA			71	61	99	111	42	43		172	34	40	673
RAC	30	40	19	30	62	84	16	38		134	32	46	531
RADC							1	9					10
RAMC	36	24		38		22	27	15		35	31	35	263
RAVC							10	8					18
RE	58	61	13	78	43	130	117	107		39	21	137	804
REME	88	100		17	72	113	96	83		70	28	127	794
RLC	97	83	87	114	42	181	68	165		119	80	68	1,104
R SIGS	62	48	38	27	32	60	45	47		16	40	98	513
Unknown													-
2011/12	789	1,089	323	538	756	1,657	1,135	803	2	1,336	667	1,048	10,143

2010/11	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	TOTAL
AAC		1		12	3							25	41
AGC (RMP)			17	22	30	11	12	40					132
AGC (SPS)			4	3	1	21	25	20		10			84
CA Mus	2	3		5	6	4		7		3		1	31
HCAV	1				10	8	2	17		2			40
Inf	2	120	1	16	68	850	565	200		703	339	383	3,247
INT CORPS	6	29	7	7	40		50	4		38	8	22	211
QARANC	15		2	1	2	5	1	12					38
RA	4	1	5	2	2	151	84	150		123	50		572
RAC				1	53	95	47	89		30			315
RADC					1	4						13	18
RAMC	10		24	14	36	19	7	19		38	11	70	248
RAVC					10	2					9	9	30
RE	23	41	38	91	30	109	128	145		28	34	117	784
REME	36	32	21	63	26	11	40	79		52	47	88	495
RLC	16	9	16	87	141	150	167	158		97	4	36	881
R SIGS	21	9	50	37	64	56	63	54		33	69	67	523
Unknown				1	2	3	1			1			8
2010/11	136	245	185	362	525	1,499	1,192	994	-	1,158	571	831	7,698

Territorial Army Intake

2010/11	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	TOTAL
Monthly breakdown not available													2782

2011/12	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	TOTAL
	184	341	396	216	203	292	274	449	276	306	327	359	3623

2012/13	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	TOTAL
	338	339	273	220	138	156	279	213	164	207	201	252	2780

Note: The figures in these tables are not formally published Defence Statistics.

July 2013

Further written evidence from the Ministry of Defence

INFORMATION ON THE SIZE OF THE ARMY REGULAR RESERVE; COST OF EXECUTING THE
GERMANY REBASING PLAN AND
THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH FORCES LIAISON ORGANISATION IN GERMANY

At the oral evidence session on Army 2020 on 10 July 2013, Lt General Bradshaw agreed to provide the Committee with some supplementary information on: the size of the Regular Reserve; the cost of Germany re-basing; the future of the British Force Liaison Group in Germany and a schematic of the Army 2020 programme.

SIZE OF ARMY REGULAR RESERVE:

The latest figures on the size of the Army Regular Reserve are in the table below:

	<i>June 13</i>
Officers	8,842
Other Ranks	22,020
Army Regular Reserve Total	30,862

COST OF EXECUTING GERMANY REBASING PLAN:

The programme will rebase units and close all remaining estate not already in the scope of the BORONA and WINFRA programmes. The capital investment costs of £1.8Bn are funded through the budget of the Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO). The Army budget has made funding provision for other withdrawal costs, such as movement allowances. Estate remediation costs in Germany will be more than offset by credits due to the British Government from the German Government.


FUTURE OF BRITISH FORCES LIAISON ORGANISATION IN GERMANY:

Liaison with the German civilian and military authorities in support of the activities of British Forces Germany is carried out by mainly civilian liaison officers under command of Headquarters British Forces Germany (HQ BFG), either based in the HQ itself or in forward based Garrisons. Other staff branches and Germany-based organisations, such as the Defence Infrastructure Organisation, also carry out liaison on specific topics.

The organisation which was known latterly as the British Forces Liaison Organisation (Germany) was subsumed into Headquarters British Forces Germany when that Headquarters was created in January 2012. This has resulted in a more integrated and therefore efficient way of working compared to having a liaison organisation working separately to the HQ staff branches and ensures that liaison and strategic communication and engagement is maintained with key partners in Germany during the rebasing programme.

The military element of the British Liaison Organisation facilitates the relationship between the two armies, with the aim of enhancing bilateral cooperation in order to improve operational effectiveness. It is under the command of the Chief of the General Staff, and will be kept under review to ensure that the military liaison officer structure, which is in the main co-located with German military headquarters, remains at the appropriate level and is able to support individuals beyond the drawdown of troops from Germany.

November 2013



Written evidence from ADS

ABOUT ADS

ADS is the trade organisation advancing the UK Aerospace, Defence, Security and Space industries. Farnborough International Limited (FIL), which runs the Farnborough International Airshow, is a wholly-owned subsidiary. ADS has offices in England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, France, and India. ADS comprises over 900 member companies within the industries it represents, of which over 850 are small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Together with its regional partners, ADS represents over 2,600 companies across the UK supply chain.

ADS also supports SC21, Sustainable Aviation and RISC, and hosts the Aerospace & Defence Knowledge Transfer Network.

The Defence Industry employs over 300,000 people in the UK—directly and through the supply chain. The industry is highly skilled, with 59% of workers holding a university degree or equivalent. The industry invests 8% of annual sales revenue in research and development—amongst the highest in industrial sectors.

SUMMARY

- We welcome the opportunity to respond to the Committee's inquiry into Future Army 2020. This submission focuses on the personnel challenges posed by Army 2020, given that this aspect of the inquiry is of most relevance to the UK defence industry.
- Companies within the UK defence industry have a close relationship with the UK Armed Forces. In light of reductions to the Regular Forces, industry recognises the increased role that Reserve Forces have to play within UK Armed Forces.
- This submission highlights ways in which industry can both support the initiative and gain mutual benefit. A number of areas are highlighted which may be problematic to industry. Some are applicable to wider industry, whilst others are specific to the defence sector.
- The Ministry of Defence's (MoD) focus on developing the Total Support Force (TSF) concept is welcome. Its successful implementation will depend on the development of long-term collaborative arrangements between industry and Front Line Command, underpinned by contract but ultimately dependent on trust, shared responsibility and information.
- Defence contractors are seeking an assurance that encouragement offered by industry to employees taking up Reserve service is matched by a completely transparent process of deployment. Such an arrangement should correspond with the ambition for the TSF to avoid any potential shortfall in individuals with the necessary expertise and capacity.

1. *Increased reliance by MoD on Reserve Forces*

1.1. The Future Army 2020 concept explicitly leads to greater dependence on the Reserves and the associated necessity to enforce existing statutory obligations on Reservists and their employers. The MoD should therefore recognise that the commercial and financial risk to employers posed by employing Reservists will increase. This will be most keenly felt by small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which traditionally have employed a large proportion of Reservists.

1.2. However, disclosure of Reserve membership by an employee remains a controversial issue. Legislation is unlikely to resolve the matter; instead, a step-change is required in the understanding of mutual benefit among the three stakeholders involved (MoD, employer and employee):

- 1.2.1. There is currently no legal obligation for an employee to declare their membership of the Reserve Forces. Anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that, when presented with two equal candidates, the employer is more likely to select the candidate not subject to Reserve mobilisation.
- 1.2.2. The proposed increase in obligations on Reserve Forces and obvious implications for employers means that employers are likely to require employees and potential employees to declare their commitment. Any such obligation must be matched by a requirement for employers to not discourage, or discriminate against, Reservists.

1.3. In certain cases, it would prove possible to guarantee the robustness of the support to deployed capability through the TSF framework which embraces Sponsored Reserves (see paragraph 6) rather than placing reliance on Volunteer Reserves. Clearly, for the Army with significantly reduced regular manpower some aspects of support both at home base and in any deployed theatre need to be unpinned by contractual arrangements with Industry.

2. *Impact of increased Reserve activity*

2.1. The proposal would oblige employers to be prepared to release employees who are members of the Reserve Forces for one year in every five. Any negative incentive for employers to employ Reservists can be mitigated by improving the communication links between Government employer and civilian employer. The emphasis must be on building a transparent and mutually beneficial relationship between the two stakeholders.

2.2. Under the proposals, Reservists will continue to back-fill Regular units on a planned basis. There must be a robust, transparent and rapid appeal process in place for employers faced with losing an employee to Reserve mobilisation at a time when the employee is critical to the company.

3. *Impact on SMEs*

3.1. Government funding for the salary of a temporary replacement for a deployed Reservist does not cover recruitment costs. Furthermore, it is not always possible for employers to identify a suitable replacement in the time available. More work must be done to identify the appropriate level of compensation for SMEs, in terms of both recruitment and temporary replacement of employees.

3.2. The proposals would increase the pressures felt by SMEs who employ Reservists. Additional time taken off for training and the possibility of losing an employee for one year in five could have catastrophic consequences for SMEs unless managed very carefully. Clear channels of communication and comprehensive support must be available to SMEs to ensure that they are not disproportionately impacted through their employment of Reservists.

4. *'Moral' pressure on employers*

4.1. A moral obligation exists for Defence companies to be as supportive to Reservists as possible without inflicting damage on their business. The proposed 'kitemark' would intentionally apply further pressure on Defence companies to employ Reservists. The green paper does not rule out consideration of the kitemark as a criterion for doing business with the MoD and other Government departments. Including 'support for reserve service' as a category for Investors in People accreditation may be a more practical alternative.

4.2. Industry and the MoD should jointly define 'good behaviour' with regards to support for the Reserves. Aspects to consider include: demonstrating non-discrimination when employing Reservists; paid leave provision; recognition of accreditation; issuing only genuine appeals against release of personnel; and how Reservists are reintegrated into the company after a lengthy absence. Such a definition will be of benefit to both employer and employee and encourage greater communication and integration between Reserve Forces and employers.

5. *Paradox of Reservists in the defence industry*

5.1. Reservists are likely to be deployed in times of conflict when, due to the nature of its business, the UK defence industry is likely to be at its busiest. Consequently, it is possible that the industry's ability to fulfil orders such as Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) could be undermined when demand is high. An efficient appeals process against call-ups must be in place to mitigate this.

6. *Sponsored Reserves*

6.1. The role of Sponsored Reserves (SRs) is not dealt with in depth in the Green Paper. There is an opportunity to forge a clear link between the Reserve Force and the Whole Force concept which aims to offer a more integrated and efficient method of providing defence capability. ADS proposes that greater prominence is given in Future Army 2020 to the benefits of employing SRs and the role that the SR concept can play in increasing defence capability.

6.2. The SR model meets a number of key criteria in the green paper, and it is industry's view that it does so more effectively than the Volunteer Reserve (VR) model in several respects:

- 6.2.1. The SR model provides a naturally strong link between the MoD, employer and employee as it is based on contractual relationships between the three actors.
- 6.2.2. The skills of a Reservist are directly transferable and deployable between his 'day job' and his role as a Reserve. The employer, through his contract with the MoD, is obligated to ensure that trade and military skills are appropriately maintained.
- 6.2.3. The SR model is designed to deliver technical capability, not merely increased manpower. This capability can be matched to MoD operational requirements, and can be delivered at the individual, sub-unit or even unit level.
- 6.2.4. It is generally accepted that the call-out system for VRs is unsatisfactory. There is an inherent conflict between the needs of the MoD and those of the employer. No such conflict exists in the context of SRs as assurance is guaranteed by the taut contract between the three parties.
- 6.2.5. Recent work by ACDS Log Ops and ADS through the Total Support Force/Contractor Support to Operations steering group indicates that the SR model offers a less costly alternative to the public purse, especially when considered on a through-life basis.
- 6.2.6. The SR model has a proven track record of success on deployed operations. On the Heavy Equipment Transporter project, where a third of the deployed capability is provided by the contractor, the SR have demonstrated their utility by delivering the required service whilst providing their own force protection.
- 6.2.7. Contracts based on SR have demonstrated an ability to recruit recently retired members of the Armed Forces who are keen to develop their civilian careers in continued close association with the military. Without the SR model, these individuals might otherwise be lost to the Reserve Forces.
- 6.2.8. The current SR policy, underpinned by the Reserve Forces Act 1996, has now been in place for over 15 years. Recent revisions mean that the SR model is well-placed to offer both the MoD and industry the opportunity to develop a number of agile SR capability options.

May 2013

Written evidence from Professor Andrew Dorman, King's College London

FUTURE ARMY 2020⁸

1. In October 2010 the coalition government published a new National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) which proposed to reduce the army to 95,000 regular personnel by 2015 and 90,000 by 2020. At this point the army planned to develop a force of five multi-role brigades plus 16 Air Assault Brigade. Shortly after the publication of the SDSR the current Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards, stated that the force was only affordable if the defence budget was increased by some 2% per annum in year terms from 2015 onwards. This was subsequently collaborated by ministers appearing before the Defence Committee.

2. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) then undertook what become known as the 'Three Month Review' which had as its core aim the reconciliation of the future defence programme with the envisaged level of defence spending. As a result the Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond, announced a series of further defence adjustments in May 2012 including the decision to return to revert to the F-35B variant of the Joint Strike Fighter.

3. In July 2012 the army's Future Force 2020 was announced. It included a further reduction in the planned size of the regular component to be offset by an increase in the reserve component. The army's new Future Force 2020 structure was significantly different from the previous proposed structure involving two force elements—Reaction Forces and the Adaptive Force. The former is to be based around 16 Air Assault Brigade and three armoured infantry brigades whilst the latter comprises some 7 infantry brigades of varying composition.

⁸ The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Services Command & Staff College, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence or any other government agency.

4. The implementation of the new proposed structure is deeply problematic. As part of the ‘Three Month Review’ the Secretary of State for Defence confirmed that the Treasury had agreed that the equipment budget would increase by 1% per annum from 2015. The problem with this is that it was:

- a. Less than the amount CDS indicated the SDSR was based on.
- b. Only applied to the equipment budget, there was no guarantee that the overall defence budget would be increased at all.

5. Subsequently, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced further reductions to the defence budget as part of the autumn 2012 budget statement. Moreover, defence remains one of the department’s still to agree its budget for the next Spending Review due for publication this month. It therefore seems highly unlikely that the overall spending plans for defence are likely to be met and that the MoD will have to manage with less resources than envisaged in the 2010 SDSR or the 2012 Defence Equipment Plan.

6. With reduced resources within the MoD existing programmes and capabilities will inevitably compete for the remaining resources. Here the Future Army 2020 faces further challenges. It is clear that some areas are either protected because of successive government policy (ie nuclear replacement) or are ring-fenced for contractual reasons (eg historically the Eurofighter programme and more recently the Aircraft Carrier programme). Therefore the scope for savings and reductions in other areas of the defence budget are increasingly limited.

7. Furthermore, the 2010 SDSR has already been strongly criticized for some capability gaps, reductions or lack of investment (eg Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability). It therefore seems likely that there will be a requirement in the 2015 SDSR to move some resources to other areas.

8. For the above reasons the Future Army 2020 programme will be repeatedly reviewed in the years to 2020. The problem Future Army 2020 has is that the proposed structure is hard to protect as the minimum requirements. For example, why does the army need to have 82,000 regulars and not 80,000? Thus the army in many ways finds itself in the navy’s position in 1981 when defending the surface fleet became problematic. By way of contrast in 1981 the army’s position was easier to justify based on its’ deployment to Northern Ireland and treaty commitments to Germany. The air force and navy have a far easier task in justifying their force numbers in terms of generating force elements and peacetime commitments.

9. This raises the question of what elements of Future Army 2020 is most likely to be protected and which is most vulnerable? The answer to this question is that the Reaction Force has a far clearer strategic rationale. In contrast the Adaptive Force of seven brigades looks particularly vulnerable with the following basic questions likely to be raised:

- i. Why do you need 7 brigades? If it is about stabilisation operations with a 6 month deployment every three years (ie the Iraq/Afghanistan model) then only 6 are needed.
- ii. Can any of these brigades be substituted with other units? It could be argued that with time elements of the Reaction Force and/or 3 Commando Brigade could be substituted.
- iii. Can any of these brigades be moved to the reserve force, ie have less regular reserve headquarters?
- iv. Could the forces of London district replace one of the brigades if necessary?

10. In terms of the Reaction Forces the main threat to these will be in accompanying equipment programme. In addition to the financial challenges noted above there is also the question of whether the MoD can, for the first time, maintain control of the costs within its planned equipment programme. The existing planned defence programme contains some provision for potential cost overruns but, as the National Audit Office noted, this provision is based on the assumption that costs increases are generally matched by decreases, an assumption that runs counter to the MoD’s historical experience.

11. Thus the likelihood of the army achieving its’ proposed 2020 force structure appear quite remote and the sensible way forward would be to plan an alternative force mix based on far less resources.

June 2013

Written evidence from the Peace Pledge Union

INTRODUCTION

1. The Peace Pledge Union (PPU) is an independent secular pacifist organisation, founded in 1934.

2. This submission is directed specifically at the 6th and final topic for the inquiry set out in the Committee’s announcement dated 25 April 2013, “Personnel challenges, including recruitment, retention, and training”, and particularly at the recruitment and retention of persons below the age of 18 and therefore below the age of majority. The PPU has taken up this issue over the past fifty years, holding that minors have no place in war, whether as victims, trainees or participants, and therefore no place in the armed forces of the Crown.

 MINIMUM AGE FOR RECRUITMENT

3. When the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child was agreed in 1989 there was one exception to the general rule that protection for minors continued until age 18 was reached. That exception was in Article 38, which uniquely provided that minors could be recruited into armed forces from age 15. The reason for the exception was the insistence of the UK (and a few other states), which still recruited below age 16 when school leaving regulations permitted it in the case of certain individuals. In the early 1990s the three UK armed forces, each separately from the others, raised the minimum recruiting age to 16 for boys. The Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill 1991 had commented on the disparity with girls, whose minimum recruiting age had previously been lowered from 18 to 17; the opportunity could have been taken to raise the minimum age for boys further, to match that for girls, at 17, but the MoD chose, against the normal expectation that in removing anomalies the best standard is settled upon, to lower the age for girls from 17 to 16. The new across-the-board minimum age of 16 remained, however, no more than a ‘house rule’, without any sanction in domestic or international law.

4. As a result of long campaigning by many groups (including the PPU) in Britain and abroad, an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict was agreed, and came into force in 2002; it was ratified by the UK in 2003. However, again because of intransigence by the UK and a few other states, the minimum recruiting age was set at 16 instead of a near world-wide consensus on age 18 (signatory states recruiting under age 18 have to make a special declaration to that effect). The UK’s formal ratification of the Protocol effectively gave the minimum recruiting of 16 legal status, but it was not brought into British domestic law until the promulgation of the Armed Forces (Enlistment) Regulations 2009 as a statutory instrument. Decades after the establishment of a legal minimum age for the paid part-time delivery of newspapers to households there was now a legal minimum age, 16, for recruitment and training to kill and be killed; in contrast, the minimum age for joining the police or fire service is 18.

5. Whereas several states took the Optional Protocol as a nudge to raise their minimum recruiting age, the UK now has the lowest minimum recruitment age among members of the European Union, members of the Council of Europe and permanent members of the UN Security Council; there are some twenty states elsewhere (out of over 180) which recruit at 16.

6. Even within the concession allowed by Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights to Child to recruit persons under the age of 18, there is an important caveat: “In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of [16, taking account of effective modification by the Optional Protocol] years, but have not attained the age of 18 years, States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to the oldest” [Article 38 (3)]. UK governments have consistently ignored this provision, leading to adverse criticism by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: “The Committee is deeply concerned that about one-third of the annual intake of recruits into the armed forces are below the age of 18 years and that the armed forces target young people ... The Committee recommends the State party ... while it recruits people who have attained the age 16 years but have not attained the age of 18 years, shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest, in light of Article 38, para 3, of the Convention and strengthen and increase its efforts to recruit person of 18 years and older [UN CRC, Concluding Observations on the UK’s second periodic report, paras 51, 52, 2002]. A similar criticism and recommendation were made in the Committee’s Concluding Observations on the UK’s initial report under the Optional Protocol, 2008.

7. The policy of focussing on under-18s for recruitment was supported by the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill 2001: “We believe it continues to be important to recruit young people straight from school, including at the age of 16. If they are not caught at this point, they are likely to take up other careers and be permanently lost to the armed forces [Select Committee Report, para 63]. A disturbing implication of this argument, especially the use of the word ‘caught’, is that the personal, educational and career development of individual young people is less important than the demand of the armed forces for new recruits—a curious inversion of humanitarian values and human rights.

8. To its credit, the Select Committee on Defence, in its Duty of Care Report, drew attention to the issue: “Concerns have been expressed about the appropriateness of recruiting under-18s into the Armed Forces. We recommend that MoD examine the potential impact of raising the recruitment age for all three Services to 18 [Select Committee on Defence, Third Report, 2005, paras 61, 62]. The government’s response was negative, arguing that, “the Armed Forces must recruit school leavers if they are to be able to compete for the better candidates and meet current recruiting needs. Once people attain the age of 18 years they are more difficult to attract as recruits ... we wish to attract recruits before they have made other lifestyle choices” [Government Response to the Report on Duty of Care, July 2005, para 14]. In other words, catch them young before they know any better.

9. To its credit, also, the Joint Committee of the House of Lords and House of Commons on Human Rights has called on the government to raise the minimum recruitment age to 18 [Children’s Rights, 25th Report, Session 2009–10, pp 47–48]. In the next session, the succeeding Committee reported, “We share the view of our predecessor Committee that the Government should publish an action plan for responding to the recommendations on the Committee on the Rights of the Child on UK compliance with the UN Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict” [Legislative Scrutiny: Armed Forces Bill, 12th Report of Session 2010–12].

10. Despite so many recommendations, the opportunity of the Armed Forces Bill 2011 was not seized to ameliorate the minimum age. The opportunity of the present inquiry must be taken, so that, at the very latest, by the chosen target date of 2020 all recruitment of under-18s to the UK armed forces has been completely and permanently discontinued and the UK is no longer a pariah state in terms of this element of young persons' rights.

MINIMUM TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT AND RIGHTS OF DISCHARGE

11. From the point of view of an under-18 recruit, the Army, by far the largest recruiter, has the harshest terms of enlistment of the three armed forces. All Army recruits are required to enter on a Versatile Engagement, but with a right to give 12 months notice to resign at any time after completing the first three years, making a four-year minimum engagement. However, in the case of recruits enlisting under the age of 18, the period between the date of enlistment and the 18th birthday does not count towards the stipulated four years minimum, so that a recruit entering on or soon after his/her 16th birthday is liable for a minimum six-year term up to the 22nd birthday, as against only four years for an adult entrant. This is described by critics as the 'six-year trap'. The Royal Navy used to have a similar six-year trap, and the Royal Air Force a five-year trap, but they were both abolished in 2001, so that their minimum terms of engagement for under-18s are the same as those for over-18s.

12. The Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill 1996 found "the justification for the difference in length of service for under-18s and adults unconvincing", and recommended the giving of "careful consideration to the desirability of requiring minors to commit themselves to a period of service longer than that of adults" [Select Committee Report, paras, 41,42]. The same Select Committee also reported, "The 1991 Committee expressed dissatisfaction with the conditions of enlistment for under-18-year-olds and recommended that the MoD bring forward proposals for change. No such proposals have materialised." In its second report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in 1999 the government referred to the 1996 Select Committee's report: "It again [referring back also to the 1991 Select Committee] recommended that careful consideration be given to requiring minors to commit themselves to a period of service no longer than that of adults. As a result a Working Group was set up to examine how this anomaly might be removed, and to see whether common terms of service might be introduced across the three Services ... Work is now under way to draft terms of service for personnel under 18" [UK Second Report to the UN CRC, 1999, para 10.65]. Whether the Working Group ever reported, and, if so, what, has never been published. What is apparent is that the Royal Navy and the RAF responded positively in 2001, as mentioned in paragraph 11 above, but the Army's response in 1999 was to increase its former five-year trap to the present six-year trap, and the 2001 Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill refrained from comment.

13. The UN CRC unsurprisingly commented adversely in 2002: "The Committee is deeply concerned ... that those recruited are required to serve for a minimum period of four years, rising to six years in the case of very young recruits" [Concluding Observations on UK's second periodic report, para 51]. This was supported by the House of Lords and House Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights: "We do not believe that the Minister has provided a clear explanation of the Government's justification for maintaining a differential period of commitment for under-18s joining the Armed Forces. We recommend that this [Armed Forces] Bill [2011] be amended to equalise the initial period of service for people joining the Armed Forces" [Legislative Scrutiny, 12th Report, Session 210-12]. The bill was not amended.

14. Following the radically revising Armed Forces Act 2006, and the introduction of the Versatile Engagement, a new set of Army (Terms of Service) Regulations was promulgated in 2007, coming into force on 1 January 2008. Interested observers were surprised to notice that, without any prior hint, the six-year trap had quietly been abolished, by excision of the previous requirement that an under-18's minimum four years' service did not formally begin until the 18th birthday, any period from the enlistment date until that birthday being in addition. Nobody among the public, parliament or the press complained, but the sighs of relief, at an arduous campaign at last justly concluded, had barely died away, when the MoD announced that the abolition of the 'trap' was an accidental drafting error, and amending Terms of Service were rushed through the secondary legislative process to come into effect on 6 August (Hiroshima Day) 2008, restoring the six-year trap in all its rigour, regardless of recommendation after recommendation by Armed Forces Bills Select Committees, the Defence Select Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. It was clearly impossible for the restoration to be retrospective, so under-18s enlisted 1 January to 5 August 2008 had a fortuitous advantage over their predecessors and successors.

15. In the meantime the UN CRC had already congratulated the UK on supposedly having accepted its longstanding recommendations to abolish the trap and bring the Army into line with the other armed forces, and recommended retrospective extension to cover recruits already in the Army and still subject to the trap [Concluding Observations, 2008]. The MoD could have made the best of its claimed error and accepted credit for doing the right thing, however inadvertently; the restoration of the trap was strong evidence of the MoD's determination to ignore human rights opinion, parliamentary committees' opinion and UN opinion. The need to abolish the trap immediately, in advance of the inevitable raising of the minimum recruitment age, is more urgent than ever.

16. For under-18 recruits to all three armed forces the period from the 29th day after joining to the end of the sixth month after joining is available for what is known as 'discharge as of right' (DAOR), meaning that

the recruit simply has to give 14 days written notice of a wish to leave, and a discharge is automatically put into effect. However, as cited by the Duty of Care report, the Directorate of Operational Capability found that “staff and instructors applied pressure to recruits to dissuade them from leaving, as this reflected on success rates and wastage targets” [Select Committee on Defence, Third Report, 2005, para 102]. In any case this arbitrary period does not necessarily reflect the reality of the rapidly changing and developing attitudes of 16- or 17-year old.

17. The MoD claimed in its report to the UN CRC 2008 to have supplemented DAOR by extending what is known as the “Unhappy Minors” provision, whereby under-18s who have “registered ... clear unhappiness about their choice of career” and whose period for DAOR has expired can nevertheless request a discharge, and the CRC was given to understand that in response to continual pressure by the various bodies mentioned no “Unhappy Minor” would be retained against his will, and that “young Servicemen or women under the age of 18 years may, if they wish, leave the Armed Forces before committing to adult service, and that any commitment to adult service is both considered and voluntary”.

18. There are serious grounds for scepticism about these claims, apart from anecdotal evidence from human rights groups about young recruits repeatedly being brought back and punished for running away—evidence in itself, one would have thought, of deep unhappiness and disinclination to settle. The main difference between DAOR and the Unhappy Minors provision is that the former is enshrined in the four (including the Royal Marines) separate Terms of Service Regulations, but the latter is a discretionary system not a statutory right. If the intention seriously was to extend the ability to claim discharge at will up to the 18th birthday, then the simplest and most straightforward way of doing this would be to amend the period of DAOR defined in the Terms of Service Regulations, and, ideally, to define DAOR for under-18s as expiring on the 18th birthday or six months after enlisting, whichever is the later. Another ground for scepticism is that in the UK report, DAOR was misdescribed in two respects, indicating that the system is sufficiently complex that the officers and civil servants writing reports for an international authority such as the CRC do not fully understand it, so how can an average partially literate recruit (as noted by the Duty of Care report) be expected to understand it? Moreover, there has never been any separate “commitment to adult service” for an under-18 recruit—it is part of the package on signing up at age 16 or 17, and there is no fresh procedure of signing again at 18 or special opportunity to leave at that age.

DEPLOYMENT

19. In the First World War the UK announced a policy of not sending soldiers under the age of 19 to fight overseas; a similar policy was exercised in the Second World War. By the time of the Falklands War in 1982 standards had so far fallen that numbers of under-18s were sent out, leading to two being killed and a third on his 18th birthday. Two more were killed in the first Gulf War in 1991. It was commensurate with this practice that the UK accepted Article 38 (2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, requiring only that “States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age 15 years do not take a direct part in hostilities”. Further years of campaigning ensured that the 2002 Optional Protocol, even if it failed to establish a universal minimum age of 18 for military recruitment, did set a universal minimum age of 18 for deployment in hostilities. It was frustrating and disappointing, therefore, that on signature and ratification of the Optional Protocol, the UK insisted upon being the only state to deposit a declaration that, although it recognised the Protocol’s commitment not to send under-18s to take a direct part in hostilities, it would not exclude the ultimate possibility of such deployment where “there is a genuine military need” or “it is not practicable to withdraw such persons before deployment”, or to do so would undermine the operational effectiveness of their ship or unit”. In fact, a small number of under-18s have been deployed to war areas since ratification, but it has been claimed that all cases were due to administrative errors, and the under-18s were returned to the UK as soon as the mistakes were discovered.

20. There is no real reason why the UK’s additional declaration should not be immediately rescinded, and if there are administrative difficulties in strict compliance with the Protocol, that is all the greater reason for raising the minimum recruiting age—even a minimum recruiting age of 17 would mean that under-18 recruits would not complete both their (extended) basic training and their secondary training before reaching 18, so that they would not enter the available pool of trained personnel until they were legally old enough by the Protocol standards.

21. A minor related difficulty is the Army policy in creating the category of ‘junior soldiers’, but confining it to recruits up to the age of 17 years six months. If, so long as there are still under-18s in the Army, the category referred to all under-18s, it would be a constant reminder that not simply the existing ‘juniors’ are subject to the provisions of the Optional Protocol .

May 2013

Written evidence from Child Soldiers International

SUMMARY

1. Child Soldiers International¹ welcomes the call for evidence issued by the Select Committee in relation to its inquiry into Future Army 2020. Child Soldiers International calls on the Committee to examine the Army's current policy of actively recruiting minors and make recommendations for a full, independent review of the minimum recruitment age for Army 2020, as part of its focus on "Personnel challenges including recruitment, retention and training".

2. This memorandum summarises and expands on material previously published by Child Soldiers International which highlights the benefits to the Army and young people of phasing out the recruitment of minors (defined as individuals below the age of 18 years). Full details, statistics and analysis of the issues raised in this memorandum are contained in the documents listed in Appendix I, which lists recent reports and briefing papers by Child Soldiers International related to the recruitment, retention and training of minors in the British Army. Copies are enclosed with this submission and available to download at the hyperlinks provided.

3. The evidence presented in this submission contends that phasing out the recruitment of minors would:

- Save approximately £94 million per year on training and recruitment;
- Increase operational effectiveness, including improving the ratio of deployable personnel;
- Have a positive effect on recruits' education and long-term career prospects;
- Reduce incidence of mental health problems amongst soldiers and veterans; and
- Ensure "the best interests of the child" are prioritised, in line with international legal obligations.

4. This memorandum also contains a brief examination of how the recruitment of minors could be phased out without detriment to Army 2020's projected staffing requirement.

5. Throughout the past decade, UK parliamentary and UN committees have repeatedly called on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to reconsider its policy of recruiting minors, but it has so far failed to do so. Child Soldiers International urges the Committee to recommend the MoD undertake a full, independent review of the minimum recruitment age without further delay, including a feasibility study for phasing out the recruitment of minors by 2020, with a deadline for reporting back on its findings.

I. The Financial Case

6. The report "One Step Forward", published jointly in April 2013 by Child Soldiers International and ForcesWatch, calculated in detail the relative costs of recruiting and successfully training adults and minors for identical Army roles in a nominal ten year career. Based on data from the financial year 2010–11, the calculations indicate that the cost of recruiting at age 16–17½ is 75–98% higher than that of recruiting from 17½.² On this basis, the Army would save between £81.5 million and £94 million per annum by recruiting adults only.³ The full details of these calculations are included in Appendix II of this memorandum.

7. The calculations account for the longer period of initial training for minors, at 23 or 50 weeks' duration (depending on the recruit's trade), compared with 14 weeks for adults;⁴ the higher drop-out rate amongst trainees who enlisted as minors, at 36.6%, compared with 28.3% for adult recruits;⁵ and the longer average service amongst minors who successfully complete training, at 10 years, compared with 7.6 years for adult recruits (based on data from the Infantry).⁶

8. Although minors tend to serve for slightly longer if they complete training, the prolonged duration of training for minors and higher drop-out rate amongst trainees makes recruitment from age 16 and 17 cost-ineffective when all three factors are accounted for.

9. A significant part of the additional expenditure on training minors is spent on delivering basic literacy and numeracy programmes for those who enlisted before finishing their secondary education. A 2012 study on "Armed Forces Basic Skills" by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills ("the BIS study") noted that "delivering literacy and numeracy education to recruits with Entry Level skills represents a large claim on resources, including funding for provision and military training time for literacy and numeracy programmes".⁷ The study recommended that the MoD "reduce the Services' literacy and numeracy skills training liability for recruits by adjusting minimum literacy and numeracy standards for joining".⁸ Raising the minimum recruitment age to ensure that all recruits have completed their basic secondary level education before joining the Army would facilitate implementation of this recommendation and the associated resource savings.

10. Finally, whilst the large majority of recruits under 18 are still in training, approximately 150 minors at any time have completed training but are too young to be deployed (see below).⁹ It costs around £2.65 million per annum to pay the salaries of these soldiers, as well as leaving their unit short-staffed.¹⁰

Conclusion

11. Raising the minimum recruitment age to 18 years would save approximately £94 million per annum and decrease trainee drop-out rates.

II. THE OPERATIONAL CASE

12. The UK government interprets its obligations under Article 1¹¹ of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC) by barring minors from deployment ‘on operations where hostile forces are involved’,¹² whilst reserving the right to deploy them in a range of circumstances.¹³

13. As minors constitute a significant percentage of personnel in regiments with front-line responsibilities, this can entail last-minute switching of personnel in units about to be deployed.¹⁴ This causes considerable inconvenience¹⁵ and jeopardises the unit’s effectiveness.

14. Furthermore, the MoD has admitted that its measures to prevent underage recruits from being deployed are “not infallible”.¹⁶ Since 2003, at least 20 minors were accidentally deployed to operational theatres in Afghanistan and Iraq in violation of international law.¹⁷ One was in Helmand for six weeks and took part in armed combat. The MoD attributes these mistakes to “the pressures on units prior to deployment”.¹⁸

15. The difficulties of ensuring effective age screening in units deploying under time pressure are likely to increase when the Reserve forces become more integrated with the Regulars, as per the Army 2020 plans, as the Reserves already have a minimum recruitment age of 18 years. This could lead to an inefficient, two-tier deployment process.

16. In addition to the extra financial costs involved (see above), supporting young recruits with poor literacy and numeracy skills has an operational cost for the Army. The BIS study noted that providing the necessary support was “likely to corrode...operational efficiency”,¹⁹ particularly on active service, and questioned to what extent junior personnel requiring such support could be considered “operationally effective”.²⁰ In contrast, the BIS study noted that “Trainees with sound literacy and numeracy skills are more flexible in the roles they can undertake and are able to work more effectively without supervision”.²¹

Conclusions

17. Raising the minimum recruitment age to 18 years would ensure that all recruits are immediately deployable upon completion of training; the risk of accidental deployment of minors would be eliminated; individual recruits would be more operationally effective.

III. ENSURING RESPECT FOR THE “BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD”

18. As a State Party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the UK government has a legal obligation to ensure that, “In all actions concerning children [defined as individuals below the age of 18 years], whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”²² Consequently, there is a legal obligation for the MoD to ensure that its recruitment age policy serves the best interests of minors.

19. Article 38(3) of the CRC and Article 3 of OPAC provide a clear indication that the recruitment of minors is undesirable. The fact that these provisions fall short of a total prohibition on enlisting minors in the armed forces does not give states total discretion in their recruitment policies. Armed forces that recruit minors have a duty of care towards them, and must review regularly whether the rights of minor recruits, notably their right to education (CRC Article 28), physical and mental health (CRC Article 24), and freedom from physical or mental violence, abuse, or exploitation (CRC Article 19) are respected.

20. The MoD has repeatedly claimed that recruiting minors into the armed forces provides them with positive education and training opportunities. However, the evidence summarised below demonstrates that recruits enlisting as minors have significantly reduced education, training and employment options compared to those who remain in (civilian) education.

21. Additionally, despite the failure of the MoD to collect data on duty of care issues disaggregated by age, the available evidence demonstrates that recruits enlisting as minors are at significantly increased risk of serious mental health problems, injury, and death upon future deployment.

22. In light of the direct correlation between youth and heightened risks faced by minors in the armed forces, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has expressed concern at the high number of minors recruited by the UK armed forces and recommended the government increase efforts to recruit persons of 18 years and above.²³ With these international legal obligations in mind, Child Soldiers International calls on the Committee to consider whether current policy on recruitment age adequately respects the best interests of young people, or whether these would be better served by raising the enlistment age by two years.

Education and employment

23. The comparative provision of education and training, as well as future employment prospects for those recruited as minors, is examined in detail in Child Soldiers International’s report “Mind the Gap” and the memorandum to the Defence Committee inquiry on the education of Service personnel (see Appendix I).

24. Academic qualifications on offer at the Army Foundation College Harrogate (“AFC Harrogate”)—where approximately 80% of minors undertake Phase One training²⁴—do not include GCSEs, A- or AS-levels, BTECs, HNCs or HNDs.²⁵ Instead, recruits undertake Functional Skills qualifications in English and Maths (Level One) and an IT diploma (Level Two).

25. Functional Skills courses were criticised by a Department for Education commissioned review as ‘conceptually incoherent’ and ‘certainly not in themselves an adequate “maths and English” diet for the 16–19 cohort’.²⁶ The review concluded that Grade A*-C passes in GCSE English and Maths were the educational foundation essential for employability of young people from all backgrounds, regardless of their prior level of educational attainment.²⁷

26. The Army’s only formal target for the education of minors falls far short of this finding, leaving young recruits at a significant disadvantage compared to their peers in mainstream education. Recruits are only expected to achieve a Functional Skills qualification in literacy and numeracy at Level One, which is approximately equivalent to GCSE grade G.²⁸ Furthermore, the MoD does not collect data on how many recruits actually achieve this target.

27. Training at AFC Harrogate focuses predominantly on military skills training such as “weapon handling, fieldcraft, camouflage, survival...[how to] handle and shoot the SA80 rifle...drill...march and parade”.²⁹ This is particularly the case for recruits entering into “combat oriented roles” in the Infantry, Royal Armoured Corps, Royal Artillery and some Royal Logistic Corps.³⁰ Almost half of recruits enlisting as minors—46%—join the Infantry, which entails some of the most specialised combat-specific training of all.³¹

28. This specialised military training does not lead to civilian qualifications and has very little, if any, direct transferable value to future civilian employment. The typical Infantry recruit who joins as a minor will serve for about ten years before leaving to join the civilian employment market in his mid-twenties.³² There, he will be competing against his peers for work, 94% of whom will have continued in civilian education after age 16.³³ Former soldiers (recruited as minors) who were interviewed by Child Soldiers International reported that after leaving the Army they found it very difficult to find work, as their skills and training were considered irrelevant by civilian employers. When asked what advice he would give other young men considering enlisting at 16, one interviewee said, “Go to college. Go to uni. Get a proper education. Don’t go into the Army thinking you’ll get a certificate in mechanics. It’s the wrong way. I got nothing from the Army, nothing. You sign up for 8 years and when you come out you’ve got nothing. You’re in the same boat as when you went in.”³⁴

29. Recruitment materials for AFC Harrogate emphasise the possibility of undertaking an “apprenticeship”. However, the “apprenticeship” referred to is an “Army apprenticeship”, which is the name given to the package described above entailing Functional Skills, IT diploma and basic military training. It is not an apprenticeship in the commonly understood meaning of the term, ie transferable vocational training leading to a nationally recognised professional qualification in, for example, mechanics, plumbing, carpentry or electronics. This type of vocational training is not on offer at AFC Harrogate.³⁵

30. It is evident that the academic qualifications and vocational training on offer to minors in the Army are of greatly reduced range and level to those available to young people in the mainstream education system. In this context, it should be recalled that the Army actively target minors for recruitment, operating in *de facto* competition with the civilian education sector, rather than simply offering a “last resort” for those who have already left the education system. This policy is contrary to successive governments’ efforts to encourage young people—particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds—to stay on in education to at least age 18, and cannot be considered to be in “the best interests of the child”. One former young soldier interviewed by Child Soldiers International described his experience of Army recruitment as “a fishing net, not a safety net”.³⁶

Mental health and duty of care

31. Whilst minors are not routinely deployed by the British Army, they still face significant risks to their physical and mental well-being. In many cases, the risks faced by those enlisting as minors are significantly higher than for those recruited as adults. A recruitment policy which increases, rather than reduces the risks faced by minors, cannot be considered to be “in the best interests of the child”. Contrary to assertions that Army recruitment provides an escape route for the most disadvantaged and vulnerable young people, the studies listed below indicate that these recruits are precisely the ones most likely to suffer serious negative outcomes. The physical and mental health risks to young recruits are explored in detail in the reports “One Step Forward” and “Catch 16–22” (see Appendix I). The main concerns are summarised below.

32. Whilst military personnel in general have higher rates of common psychological disorders than the civilian population, younger recruits are particularly susceptible.³⁷ The particular vulnerability of adolescents in this respect is noted in the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General Comment on Adolescent Health and Development.³⁸ Numerous studies have shown that, compared with adult recruits, younger recruits face a higher risk of bullying,³⁹ sexual harassment (female recruits),⁴⁰ self-harm,^{41,42} and post-traumatic stress disorder (male recruits).⁴³ Compared with civilians of a similar age, younger recruits in the armed forces also face a substantially higher risk of serious alcohol problems⁴⁴ and, amongst male recruits, suicide.⁴⁵ Direct exposure to combat, especially to traumatic events, has been found to increase substantially the risk of committing violent offences; again, youngest recruits are the most susceptible.⁴⁶

33. Given the direct correlation between low age at recruitment and increased incidence of mental health or other duty of care problems, the current recruitment policy cannot be considered to be in the best interests of young people.

Increased risk of fatality

34. Soldiers who enlist as minors are disproportionately likely to join the Army's front-line roles, because these have the lowest age and qualification entry requirements. Consequently, they face the greatest risk of death or serious injury once they turn 18 and can be deployed. For example, the Infantry contains one third of all the Army's minors even though it comprises only one quarter of the Army overall;⁴⁷ Infantry fatality and casualty rates in Afghanistan are five times those faced by soldiers in the rest of the Army.⁴⁸

35. By allowing minors to enlist into Army frontline combat roles at an earlier age than they can enlist into the other, less hazardous roles (such as technical support or logistics) the MoD obliges minors—particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds with few qualifications—to shoulder a greater burden of risk than adult recruits throughout their entire Army career. This cannot be considered to be in their best interests.

Safeguards

36. Whilst written parental consent is compulsory for the enlistment of minors, this does not necessarily safeguard young recruits' best interests effectively. Contrary to OPAC's requirement that recruitment of minors should only take place with the "informed consent of the person's parents or legal guardians",⁴⁹ the MoD does not require recruiters to make any contact with parents/guardians. One senior recruiter said in 2007 that "most" recruits' parents never meet recruiting staff.⁵⁰ This statement is borne out by the experience of young recruits interviewed by Child Soldiers International, who confirmed that their parents did not speak to recruiters or visit the recruiting office until after the application process was complete, if at all.⁵¹ The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has expressed concern at this practice and called on the UK to "Ensure that parents are included from the outset and during the entire process of recruitment and enlistment."⁵²

37. Recruitment literature for recruits and their parents does not seriously attempt to explain the complex terms of service or increased risks faced by recruits enlisting as minors, and the guidance papers provided to applicants are complicated. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that parents granting consent are aware of the risks, difficulties and complex legal obligations of enlistment. Evidence from the independent information and advice services At Ease and BeforeYouSignUp.info indicates that many parents are confused about the terms of service and struggle to find simple and accurate information about their child's rights and obligations.⁵³

Conclusions

38. Current recruitment policy does not respect "the best interests of the child" and puts minors at significantly increased risk of serious long-term physical and psychological harm compared to adult recruits.

IV. FEASIBILITY

39. All European Union (EU) states field armed forces comparable in size, *per capita*, to those of the UK;⁵⁴ Appendix III tabulates military recruitment data for all EU countries. It shows that in 25 member states compulsory education ends at 16 or earlier, and that the minimum age for military recruitment is higher than this in every state except the UK. Indeed, 21 of the 27 EU states recruit from age 18, leaving a two-year gap during which time a young person can continue in education or look for civilian work.⁵⁵ This shows that linking the minimum age of military recruitment with the national school leaving age is unnecessary.

40. Traditionally, the armed forces have relied heavily on recruiting minors to meet the trained strength requirement. In the past, removing this age group from the pool of potential recruits might have left staffing shortages but this risk is rapidly diminishing. The proportion of minors entering the armed forces has fallen in the last decade, from over a third to under a quarter. Although 23% of Army recruits in fiscal year 2012–13 were minors,⁵⁶ the minimum age of enlistment could still be raised without detriment to the trained strength requirement, for at least two reasons.

41. First, the Army discharges a large number of personnel under the rubric of Service No Longer Required (SNLR). This is an administrative category used for various reasons including the discretionary discharge of personnel who wish to leave but have no legal right to do so, as well as discharges for minor offences. However, most such discharges are of personnel who have served for some years but not progressed up the ranks. Currently, the Army prefers to discharge these soldiers on the grounds that they are less fit and motivated than younger recruits. This contrasts with the Navy and RAF, which rarely discharge using SNLR.

42. The Army's policy on SNLR can be distressing for personnel who are laid off without the right of the redundancy process they would expect in civilian life. It is also extremely costly to the Army. In 2006, 2,775 soldiers were discharged for SNLR—more than the total number of 16 year-olds the Army recruited that year.⁵⁷ To replace these recruits with new enlistments at 16 would have cost in the order of £400 million at 2010–11 prices.⁵⁸ So, had the Army retained just half of the recruits discharged for SNLR, it could have saved up to £200 million that year.

43. Second, Government plans to restructure the Army through to 2020 will see a large number of regular troops replaced with Reservists. Assuming that rates of adult recruitment remain as they are now, the Army's overhaul will eliminate the need to recruit minors.⁵⁹ By 2020, the number of enlisted (ie not officers) personnel is forecast to fall from around 89,200 to 71,600.⁶⁰ If the Army relied entirely on adult recruits to meet this requirement it would need to enlist 11,476 per year (assuming the current adult in-training drop-out rate of 28.3%). This is around 900 more adults than the Army recruited in 2009–10.⁶¹ Since phasing out the recruitment of minors would result in an increase in the recruitment of adults (as minors who were genuinely dedicated to joining the Army would do so as they turned 18), the Army could comfortably expect to meet this target by relying solely on adult recruits.

44. As an initial step, recruitment of 16 year-olds could be phased out immediately. Since 2001–02, the proportion of 16-year-olds joining the Army has been falling and as of 2012–13 stood at 9.2% of the total intake (880 individuals).⁶² Replacing these with older recruits is readily feasible.

Conclusions

45. Phasing out the recruitment of minors is readily achievable in the space of a few years, without detriment to the Army 2020 trained strength requirement.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

46. Despite repeated calls on it to do so over the past decade, the MoD has never reviewed the minimum Army recruitment age. It therefore lacks a comprehensive evidence base on which to support maintaining the current policy. This policy is, moreover, called into question on financial, operational and child rights grounds by the data summarised in this memorandum and explored in detail in the documents listed in Appendix I.

47. Child Soldiers International urges the Committee to call on the MoD to undertake a full, independent review of the minimum recruitment age without further delay, including a feasibility study for phasing out the recruitment of minors by 2020, with a deadline for reporting back on its findings.

APPENDIX I

FURTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Recent reports and briefing papers published by Child Soldiers International containing material relevant to this inquiry include:

- Memorandum to the Defence Select Committee for the Armed Forces Bill
Published February 2011.
Available at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmarmed/779/779.pdf>
- Catch 16–22: Recruitment and retention of minors by the British armed forces.
Published March 2011.
Available at: http://www.child-soldiers.org/research_report_reader.php?id=290
- Mind the Gap: Education for minors in the British armed forces.
Published July 2012.
Available at: http://www.child-soldiers.org/research_report_reader.php?id=337
- Memorandum to the Defence Select Committee Inquiry: The Armed Forces Covenant in Action?
Part 4: Education of Service Personnel
Published January 2013.
Available at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/942/m1.htm>
- One Step Forward: The case for ending recruitment of minors by the British armed forces.
Published April 2013.
Available at: http://www.child-soldiers.org/research_report_reader.php?id=650

A hard copy of each of these documents is enclosed with this submission. Additional copies are available upon request.

APPENDIX II

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ENLISTING MINORS AND ADULTS INTO THE ARMY

The following analysis is extracted from the report "One Step Forward" (see Appendix I). Limitations of the data and calculations are detailed in full in the original report; the variation in all cases is small and does not materially affect the conclusions.

1. The Army enlists non-officer recruits as Junior Entrants or Standard Entrants, depending on the age and trade of the recruit.⁶³ Generally, Junior Entrants are soldiers beginning training aged between 16 and 17 years and five months, although there is some minimal variation.⁶⁴ In this analysis '17½' is used for convenience to refer to the upper age limit for Junior Entry. All soldiers older than this enlist as Standard Entrants.

2. Initial training for all recruits divides into two phases. Phase One is basic soldier training carried out at a few centres around the UK. On completion of Phase One, recruits join their regimental or corps units for Phase Two training, which is of variable length and specific to the recruit's assigned role.

3. Phase One training is conducted in separate institutions for Junior and Standard Entrants. In 2010–11 all Junior Entrants were enrolled into either the Army Foundation College in Harrogate ("AFC(H)") for 50 weeks or the Army Technical Foundation College in Winchester ("ATFC(W)") for 23 weeks.⁶⁵ Phase One courses for Standard Entrants are much shorter, at 14 weeks, and carried out at other centres.

JUNIOR AND STANDARD ENTRY: BREAKDOWN

4. In fiscal year 2010–11 the Army recruited 14,180 soldiers, of whom 2,390 were aged under 18 at enlistment.⁶⁶ Of these, 1,922 (80%) were Junior Entrants, with 1,315 attending AFC(H) and 607 attending ATFC(W).⁶⁷ This leaves 468 (20%) minors joining as Standard Entrants (ie they were aged at least 17 years and five months when they began training).⁶⁸

RECRUITMENT COSTS

5. In 2010–11 the cost of recruiting a soldier, including selection but excluding marketing and training, was £10,000. This cost does not vary between those who are under or over 18 years of age.⁶⁹

PHASE ONE TRAINING COSTS

6. Since the duration of Phase One training differs between Junior and Standard Entry, the training spend for each category of recruit and the amount of salary paid during the course also differ. Data from the MoD showing the extent of these differences in 2010–11 are shown in the table below:⁷⁰

PHASE ONE TRAINING COST (PER TRAINEE)

	<i>Training costs</i>	<i>Salary costs</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Junior Entry</i>			
at AFC(H)	£64,458	£29,000	£93,458
at AFTC(W)	£53,985	£25,000	£78,985
<i>Standard Entry</i>			
at ATC, Pirbright	£21,318	£11,000-£12,000	£32,818
at ATR, Bassingbourn	£26,992	£11,000-£12,000	£38,492
at ITC, Catterick	£26,543	£11,000-£12,000	£38,043

COSTS COMPARISON OF JUNIOR AND STANDARD ENTRY

<i>Cost</i>	<i>Per trainee</i>		<i>Cohort</i>
<i>Junior Entry costs, 2010–11</i>			
Estimated no. of Junior Entrants:	1,922		
of which joining AFC(H):	1,315		
of which joining ATFC(W):	607		
of recruitment	£10,000		£19,220,000 (n=1,922)
of training (Phase One)			
AFC(H):	£93,458		£122,897,270(n=1,315)
ATFC(W):	£78,985		£47,943,895 (n=607)
Total cost of recruitment and Phase One training	£88,985—£103,458		£190,061,165

STANDARD ENTRY COSTS, 2010–11

<i>Cost</i>	<i>Per trainee</i>		<i>Cohort</i>
<i>Estimated no. of Standard Entrants:</i>	12,258		
of recruitment	£10,000		£122,580,000 (n=12,258)
of training (Phase One)			
- minimum (at ATC, Pirbright)	£32,818		£402,283,044 (n=12,258)
- maximum (at ATR, Bassingbourn)	£38,492		£471,834,936 (n=12,258)
Total cost of recruitment and Phase One training	£42,818—£48,492		£524,863,044—£594,414,936

IN-TRAINING DROP-OUT AND POST-TRAINING CAREER LENGTH

7. Two further factors significantly affect the cost-effectiveness of recruiting Junior and Standard Entrants. The first is the drop-out rate amongst trainees, which is higher amongst minors, at 36.6%, compared with 28.3% amongst adults.⁷¹ The second is the average career length of those who successfully complete training,

which (based on data from the Infantry) is longer amongst those who enlisted as minors, at 10 years, compared with 7.6 years for adult recruits.⁷²

8. Given that 80% of minors enlisting in the Army join as Junior Entrants, this analysis assumes that enlistment age (under or over 18) may be used as a proxy for entry category (Junior or Standard) for the purposes of estimating drop-out rates and average career length in these groups. Furthermore, as the Infantry is the largest part of the Army, this paper also tentatively assumes that differences in Infantry career length according to age at enlistment are broadly similar throughout the rest of the Army.

9. With an in-training drop-out rate amongst minors of 36.6%, the 1,922 soldiers recruited as Junior Entrants in 2010–11 would result in 1,219 completing Phase Two and joining the trained strength.

10. To recruit and successfully train the same number of soldiers as Standard Entrants in 2010–11, the Army would have had to enlist 1,700, assuming a drop-out rate of 28.3% for adult trainees. Based on the per-trainee cost of Standard Entrants (£42,818—£48,492), the total cost of recruiting and training 1,700 new soldiers in this group is between £72,790,600 and £82,436,400.

11. As discussed, the cost-effectiveness of recruiting at Junior and Standard Entry depends further on the average career length for each group. Using data on Infantry career length based on age at enlistment as a proxy for Junior and Standard Entrants' career length in the Army as a whole, the equivalent cost of recruiting Standard Entrants for a nominal equivalent ten-year career may be calculated as follows.

A = Estimated total cost of recruiting 2010–11 Junior Entry cohort:	£190,061,165
B = Estimated cost of recruiting 2010–11 Junior Entry cohort as Standard Entrants:	£95,792,430 to £108,486,302
Cost before adjusting for career length:	£72,790,600 to £82,436,400
Adjustment factor for average career length of Standard Entrants who complete training:	x 1.316 (ie 10/7.6)
A-B = Potential annual saving from phasing out Junior Entry (based on FY 2010–11):	£81,574,863 to £94,268,735

CONCLUSION

12. The cost of recruiting and training minors is 75–98% higher, per successfully trained intake of soldiers completing a nominal ten-year Army career, than that of recruiting adults. The estimated annual saving from entirely replacing Junior Entry with Standard Entrants would be £81.5—£94 million.

APPENDIX III

ARMED FORCES RECRUITMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

EU states which recruit minors into their armed forces are ***bold italics***.

Member State	Age at which compulsory education ends (as of 2007) ⁷³	Minimum age for military recruitment (as of 2012) ⁷⁴	Conscription practised (as of 2011) ⁷⁵	Size of armed forces as percentage of population (as of 2005) ⁷⁶
<i>Austria</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>17 (low numbers)</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>0.42%</i>
Belgium	18	18	No	0.39%
Bulgaria	14	18	No	0.66%
<i>Cyprus</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>17 (low numbers)</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>1.33%</i>
Czech Republic	15	18	No	0.56%
Denmark	16	18	Yes	0.42%
Estonia	15	18	Yes	0.41%
Finland	16	18	Yes	0.52%
<i>France</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>17½</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>0.41%</i>
<i>Germany</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>17 (training only)</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>0.34%</i>
Greece	14	18	Yes	1.60%
Hungary	16	18	No	0.33%
Ireland	15	18	No	0.25%
Italy	15	18	No	0.34%
Latvia	15	18	No	0.21%
Lithuania	15	18	No	0.37%
Luxembourg	15	18	No	0.20%
Malta	15	18	No	0.53%
<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>17½ (training only)</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>0.33%</i>
Poland	15	18	No	0.43%
Portugal	14	18	No	0.43%
Romania	14	18	No	0.45%

<i>Member State</i>	<i>Age at which compulsory education ends (as of 2007)⁷³</i>	<i>Minimum age for military recruitment (as of 2012)⁷⁴</i>	<i>Conscription practised (as of 2011)⁷⁵</i>	<i>Size of armed forces as percentage of population (as of 2005)⁷⁶</i>
Slovakia	15	18	No	0.41%
Slovenia	14	18	No	0.33%
Spain	16	18	No	0.35%
Sweden	16	18	No	0.31%
United Kingdom	16	16	No	0.35%

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REFERENCES

1 Child Soldiers International is a human rights research and advocacy organization, formerly known as the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. Child Soldiers International seeks to end the military recruitment and use in hostilities of child soldiers (boys and girls below the age of 18) and other human rights abuses resulting from their association with armed forces or groups. We seek the release of child soldiers from armed forces or groups, promote their successful return to civilian life and accountability for those who recruit and use them. Child Soldiers International promotes global adherence to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.

2 Army recruitment is divided between “Junior” entry, for those enlisting below the age of 17 ½ years, and “Standard” entry for those enlisting age 17 ½ and above.

3 The analysis compares the cost of recruiting and training new soldiers to the end of Phase One training. Figures for the cost of Phase Two training are not available, although the MoD states they do not differ according to age at enlistment. Hansard: HC Deb, 15 December 2011, c865W.

4 Hansard: HC Deb, 15 December 2011, c865W.

5 Army data for 2010–11. Hansard: HC Deb, 25 November 2011, c595W.

6 Hansard: HC Deb, 12 September 2011, c1007W (based on age at enlistment of those leaving between 1 July 2009 and 31 July 2011).

7 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *BIS Research Paper Number 78: Armed Forces Basic Skills Longitudinal Study Part I*, June 2012, page 36 (hereinafter “*BIS Research Paper*”).

8 *ibid*, page 14.

9 Based on the position at 1 July 2012. Hansard: HC Deb, 10 September 2012 c74W.

10 (Trained recruit annual salary 2013/14 = £17,690) x 150 trained under-18s = £2,653,500 *per annum*. Armed Forces Pay Review Body, *2013–2014 United Kingdom Rank—Rating & Wage Chart*, online at <http://www.navyces.com/uk/2013-british-military-pay.html> (accessed 4 April 2013); and Hansard: HC Deb, 10 September 2012 c74W.

11 As a State Party to OPAC, the UK must “take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities”. OPAC Article 1.

12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (nd): *Practice Relating to Rule 137: Participation of Child Soldiers in Hostilities*, Section VI: Other National Practice, online at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_gb_rule137 (accessed 21 August 2012).

13 The UK reserves the right to deploy minors on operations where hostile forces are involved when the MoD deems that there is a genuine military need, the situation is urgent, it is otherwise not practicable to withdraw minors before deployment, or it would undermine operational effectiveness. Cited in Child Soldiers International, *Louder than words: An agenda for action to end state use of child soldiers* 2012, p. 47.

14 HC Deb, 19 January 2011, c824W. As of 1 April 2010, 2.7 per cent of army personnel were under 18 but in the three largest front-line regiments (Infantry, Artillery, Armoured Corps), the proportion of minors was higher than this average, at between 3.4 per cent and 3.6 per cent.

15 Army officer of senior rank, personal communication, November 2008.

16 Hansard: HC Deb, 1 February 2007, c508w.

17 Child Soldiers International, *Louder than words: An agenda for action to end state use of child soldiers*, 2012, p. 49; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, *Catch 16–22: Recruitment and retention of minors in the British Armed Forces*, 2011, p. 5.

18 Hansard: HC Deb, 18 October 2011, c868W.

19 *BIS Research Paper: Part 1*, page 10; *BIS Research Paper: Part 2*, page 207.

20 *BIS Research Paper: Part 1*, page 59.

21 *ibid*, page 60.

22 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 3.1.

23 UK, CRC/C/15/Add.188, paragraph 54, 2002.

24 HC Deb, 6 December 2010, c2W.

25 Hansard: HC Deb, 19 July 2011, c862W and HC Deb, 30 November 2011, c976W, in *Child Soldiers International Mind the Gap: Education for Minors in the British Armed Forces*, 2012.

26 Alison Wolf, *Review of Vocational Education—The Wolf Report*, Department for Education, 2011, p 84, 170.

27 *Ibid*. p. 8.

28 Hansard: HC Deb, 30 November 2011, c975W.

29 See “Army Colleges” brochure available at www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/ArmyJuniorE-LowRes.pdf.

30 The combat-focused nature of these roles is highlighted by the fact that the corps which Harrogate “Long Course” graduates enter have consistently had the highest death and injury rates throughout the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan—HC Deb, 6 December 2010, c2W.

31 HC Deb, 10 January 2012, c12W.

32 Hansard: HC Deb, 12 September 2011, c1007W (based on age at enlistment of those leaving between 1 July 2009 and 31 July 2011).

33 Alison Wolf, *op. cit.*, 2011, p.51.

34 Child Soldiers International telephone interview with former soldier “R”, 10 May 2011.

35 HC Deb, 13 September 2011, c1147W.

36 Child Soldiers International interview with former soldier “B”, 23 May 2011.

37 For example, see N Fear et al., ‘What are the consequences of deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan on the mental health of the UK armed forces? A cohort study’, *The Lancet*, 13 May 2010, online at [http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736\(10\)60672-1/fulltext](http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(10)60672-1/fulltext) (accessed 13 May 2010). For civilian comparators, see, for example, S McManus et al. [eds.], ‘Adult psychiatric morbidity in England, 2007: Results of a household survey’, *National Health Service*, 2009, online at <http://www.ic.nhs.uk/pubs/psychiatricmorbidity07> (accessed 13 May 2010). Note that the cohort age range for these studies varies and is not specific to minors in all cases. However, the heightened risks demonstrated for recruits at the youngest end of the studied age scale is consistent throughout and it is therefore reasonable to conclude that minors are included in the most at-risk group in each study.

38 CRC/GC/2003/4: General comment No. 4: Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

39 There is some evidence to indicate that bullying in armed forces training establishments is higher than amongst the trained strength. See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, *Catch 16–22: Recruitment and retention of minors in the British armed forces*, 2011, p. 9–10.

40 A report commissioned by the MoD from the Equal Opportunities Commission in 2006 found that 15 per cent of all female recruits surveyed and 20 per cent of female recruits aged 16–23 reported having experienced a ‘particularly upsetting’ experience of unwanted sexual behaviour directed at them in the previous 12 months. Rutherford, Sarah; Schneider, Robin; Walmsley, Alexis, ‘Quantitative & Qualitative Research into Sexual Harassment in the Armed Forces’, (Equal Opportunities Commission and the Ministry of Defence, 22 March 2006), p. 22.

41 Amongst male recruits, pre-enlistment vulnerability to a number of negative health outcomes including PTSD and previous self-harm is associated with ‘being single, of lower rank, having low educational attainment and serving in the Army’, all of which are typical of the profile of those who enlist in the armed forces as minors. Iversen, A et al., ‘Influence of childhood adversity on health among male UK military personnel’, *The British Journal of Psychiatry*, 2007, 191: p. 506–511.

42 Pinder, R et al., ‘Self-harm and attempted suicide among UK Armed Forces personnel: Results of a cross-sectional survey’, *International Journal of Social Psychiatry*, 21 June 2011, 58: p. 433–439

43 Iversen, A et al., *Influence of childhood adversity on health among male UK military personnel* *op. cit.*, 2007.

44 A 2010 *Lancet* study found that 26.1 per cent of armed forces personnel aged 18–24 were ‘drinking heavily’, compared with 8.8 per cent of civilian men in a similar age group (16–24); the rate of heavy drinking amongst this age group was the highest in the armed forces. ‘Drinking heavily’ is defined as ‘a high level of alcohol

problems' including 'feeling of guilt or remorse after drinking, blackouts, alcohol-related injury, other concern about alcohol consumption'. N Fear et al. (2010) op. cit.; S McManus et al. [eds.] (2009) op. cit.

45 Male recruits under 20 face a higher risk of suicide than the general population; for young male Army recruits, for example, the risk is 47% higher than for the general population. Defence Analytical Services and Advice (DASA) *Suicide and open verdict deaths in the UK Regular Armed Forces: numbers and standardised mortality ratios, 1984–2010, males only*, online at <http://www.dasa.mod.uk/modintranet/UKDS/UKDS2011/c3/table306.php> (accessed 22 August 2012).

46 D Macmanus et al., 'Violent offending by UK military personnel deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan: a data linkage cohort study', *The Lancet*, 16 March 2013, online at [http://www.lancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736\(13\)60354-2/fulltext](http://www.lancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(13)60354-2/fulltext) (accessed 16 March 2013).

47 Hansard: HC Deb, 19 January 2011, c824W.

48 Calculated from Ministry of Defence, British *Fatalities: Operations in Afghanistan* online at <https://www.gov.uk/government/fields-of-operation/afghanistan> (accessed 13 March 2013). The casualty:fatality ratio is assumed here to be constant for infantry and non-infantry soldiers. See Appendix IV.

49 OPAC Article 3.3: "States Parties that permit voluntary recruitment into their national armed forces under the age of 18 years shall maintain safeguards to ensure, as a minimum, that: ... (b) Such recruitment is carried out with the informed consent of the person's parents or legal guardians".

50 Senior recruiter, London, personal communication with David Gee, November 2007.

51 Child Soldiers International telephone interview with former soldier "D" (enlisted aged 16), 13 May 2013.

52 CRC/C/OPAC/GBR/CO/1.

53 At Ease, personal communication, 2007; www.BeforeYouSignUp.info, 2012. This weakness in the safeguarding regime may be compounded when the legal guardian is an appointed representative of a local authority who has limited personal knowledge of their ward and insufficient time to investigate the issues involved.

54 David Gee, 'Informed Choice? Armed Forces Recruitment Practice in the United Kingdom', 2008p. 24.

55 See Appendix III.

56 DASA UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel Report, 1 April 2013.

57 2006 is the most recent year for which SNLR statistics are available. Information obtained from the MoD by the author under the Freedom of Information Act, disclosed on 5 October 2007; also DASA, *TSP 19—UK Regular Forces Intake And Outflow By Age For Financial Year 2005/06: Tables 4 and 5*, [data tables], 18 May 2006, online at http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/tsp19/pdfs/tsp19_2005_2006.pdf, (accessed 5 September 2007).

58 SNLR = 2,775. (New enlistments: 4,377 [to account for 36.6% expected drop-out rate] = 2,755 recruits completing training) x (Cost of Junior Entry recruit = £93,458) = £409million. For breakdown of costs of recruiting for Junior Entry, see Appendix I.

59 Hansard: HC Deb, 5 July 2012, c1085–1088. According to the plans, by 2020 the Army will be formed of two components. The first will be a 'reaction force' comprising mainly well-trained regular troops to provide a rapid, agile force-projection capability. The second is envisaged to be an 'adaptable force' of regular and reserve personnel for long-term defence roles, ceremonial duties, and supplementing the reaction force as necessary. The Government plans to maintain the overall size of the Army at 110,000–120,000 but use the creation of the adaptable force as an opportunity to replace a large number of regular personnel with reservists aged 18 and above. Greater use will also be made of private contractors.

60 Given the current average career length of 8.7 years and assuming this attrition rate is constant, the Army currently needs to enlist and fully train 10,256 new recruits each year to replace those who leave. By 2020, this requirement will fall to 8,288, assuming that all other factors remain the same. Proportion of Officers to Other Ranks extrapolated from DASA, *Table 2.5b Full-time trained strength and requirement, at 1 April each year* at <http://www.dasa.mod.uk/modintranet/UKDS/UKDS2011/c2/table205b.php> (accessed 1 September 2012).

61 This is based on the current in-training drop-out rate for adults of 28.3 per cent.

62 DASA UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel Report, 1 April 2013.

63 Standard Entry is sometimes also called Senior Entry.

64 For example, soldiers joining the Royal Mechanical and Electrical Engineers may join as Standard Entrants once they reach 17 years and one month of age. Ministry of Defence (nd): '*REME soldier*' online at <http://www.army.mod.uk/remes/3203.aspx> (accessed 15 June 2012); Ministry of Defence (nd): '*AFC Harrogate*' online at http://www.army.mod.uk/training_education/training/7127.aspx (accessed 15 June 2012); Ministry of

Defence (nd): 'ATFC Winchester' online at http://www.army.mod.uk/training_education/training/7409.aspx (accessed 15 June 2012).

65 Hansard: HC Deb, 15 December 2011, c865W. As of 2012 ATFC(W) stopped providing Junior Entry training and all Junior Entrants now train at AFC(H).

66 Hansard: HC Deb, 30 November 2011, c977W; HL Deb, 19 October 2011, c67W.

67 During the 2010–11 academic year, 55 per cent of recruits who were under 18 at enlistment joined AFC(H) and 25.4 per cent joined ATFC(W) to begin their Phase One training (Hansard: HC Deb, 19 July 2011, c861W; HC Deb, 8 December 2011, c426W). Assuming that no Junior Entrants were trained in institutions other than AFC(H) and ATFC(W) and the proportions of AFC(H) and ATFC(W) entrants for the academic year are the same as for the fiscal year, this suggests that in fiscal year 2010–11 there were approximately 1,922 (80 per cent) Junior Entrants.

68 Although figures for minors who joined as Standard Entrants (i.e. aged 17½+ at enlistment) are not published, it is consistent with the data to assume that the remaining 19.6 per cent of those recruited as minors in 2010–11 were in this group. In 2010–11 the DASA stopped collecting age-related data for the armed forces' annual intake. However, over the three previous years, the proportion of minors recruited aged 16 and 17 has varied little, and stood at 47.7 per cent and 52.3 per cent respectively. This allows an estimate of the number of new army recruits aged 16–17½ in 2010–11, based on the known number of minors recruited that year. For historical data, see DASA, *UK Regular Forces Intake And Outflow By Age For Financial Year 2007/08, 2009; UK Regular Forces Intake And Outflow By Age For Financial Year 2008/09; UK Regular Forces Intake And Outflow By Age For Financial Year 2009–10*, online at <http://www.dasa.mod.uk> (accessed 11 June 2012).

69 Hansard: HC Deb, 15 December 2011, c865W (rounded in original source to nearest £1,000).

70 Hansard: HC Deb, 13 September 2011, c1146W; Hansard: HC Deb, 15 December 2011, c865W. Salary rates are rounded in original source to nearest £1,000; for the purpose of producing a total per-trainee cost for Standard Entrants' Phase One training, the average salary rate has been assumed at £11,500.

71 Hansard: HC Deb, 25 November 2011, c595W.

72 Hansard: HC Deb, 12 September 2011, c1007W (based on age at enlistment of those leaving between 1 July 2009 and 31 July 2011).

73 The data is from 2007 in most cases. United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture Institute for Statistics, *Education*, 2009, cited at ChartsBin, <http://chartsbin.com/view/qpp> (accessed 24 September 2009).

74 Child Soldiers International, 2012, p. 142–160. In Malta's case, the law allows for military recruitment from age 17 but this has not taken place since 1970.

75 European Bureau for Conscientious Objection, *Report To The Committee On Civil Liberties, Justice And Home Affairs Of The European Parliament*, 2011, online at <http://www.ebco-beoc.org/files/2011-EBCO-REPORT-EU.pdf> (accessed 23 August 2012).

76 Calculated from Eurostat: 'Total Population' [table—data for 1 January 2005], online at <http://tinyurl.com/zzasn> (accessed 5 June 2007); and Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, *Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004*, 17 November 2004, online at <http://www.child-soldiers.org/library/global-reports> (accessed 5 June 2007).

Written evidence from ForcesWatch

1. Among other objectives, ForcesWatch scrutinises how and whom the British armed forces recruit, with particular concerns arising from the recruitment of young people from disadvantaged backgrounds. With Child Soldiers International we co-authored a recent report, *'One Step Forward: the case for ending recruitment of minors by the British armed forces'*.

2. We welcome the Committee's Inquiry and hope Members will use this opportunity to evaluate the case for an independent review of the minimum age of recruitment into the Army with a view to recruiting only adults (aged 18 and above) in the future. We believe there are five reasons why the time is right for this:

- 2.1. Recruitment needs are changing. The reduction of the Regular Army proposed by Army 2020 would obviate its need to recruit minors.
- 2.2. Recruiting adults only is substantially more cost-effective than also enlisting minors. By ending the costly practice of recruiting minors into long training programmes which suffer a high drop-out rate, the Army would save a sum in the order of £90 million per annum.
- 2.3. Enlisting soldiers at age 16 or 17 puts minors at disproportionate risk. Younger soldiers from disadvantaged backgrounds are substantially more likely than older recruits to suffer from serious mental health problems as a result of deployment, including post-traumatic stress disorder and harmful alcohol use.

- 2.4. The best interests of minors are served more effectively in the civilian education/training system than in the Army. Civilian provision, where the opportunities are more diverse and of higher quality than those available in the Army, provides the best continuing prospects for young people post-16, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds.
 - 2.5. The practice of recruiting minors is increasingly anachronistic. As the only EU state to recruit 16-year-olds into the armed forces and one of only 20 in the world, the UK is increasingly out of step with a growing global consensus that the legal age of adult responsibility, at 18, is the appropriate point at which an individual can reasonably be expected to make an informed and responsible choice about enlistment.
3. We now set out evidence for each of these five points in turn.

RECRUITMENT NEEDS

4.1 Army 2020 proposals entail a reduction of the strength requirement of the Regular Army by around 18,000 personnel from 99,730 now to 82,000 by 2020 (British Army, 2012:9; DASA, 2013a:6). Assuming that the numbers of officers and enlisted soldiers fall in close proportion, the number of enlisted soldiers will drop from around 85,840 now to 70,579 in 2020, which is a reduction of 17.8%. The current annual recruitment rate of enlisted soldiers is 9,660 (for 2012–13); if this also falls by 17.8% by 2020 then the Army will be recruiting 7,941 soldiers *per annum*. If the Army relied entirely on adults to recruit this number of soldiers it would have to enlist just 531 more adults *per annum* than it did in 2012–13 (DASA, 2013a:14). This target is well within reach for two reasons: a) many minors no longer permitted join the Army would still enlist at 18; and b) adult recruits are much less likely than minors to drop out of training; between 2007–08 and 2011–12, 39.4% of minors dropped out of Army training, but just 24.1% of adult recruits did so (Hansard: 2013).

4.2 The Navy and RAF already recruit few minors; combined they recruited just 210 in 2012–13 (DASA, 2013a:14). Hence, both could end this practice immediately with the Army following as soon as is practicable.

4.3 There are several operational advantages of ending the recruitment of minors. Unlike a mixed minors/adults force, an all-adult Army is wholly and immediately deployable after training; complex differences in duty of care requirements for minors and adults are no longer an obstacle; and there is no longer a need for disruptive, last-minute switching of unit personnel in order to ensure minors are not sent to war zones.

4.4 Despite these factors, the current approach to Army 2020 implementation appears to consist of continuing to recruit minors in large numbers while making experienced personnel redundant.

RECRUITMENT COSTS

5.1 It is substantially more expensive to recruit minors into the Army than adults. Using Ministry of Defence figures, we worked with Child Soldiers International to calculate that the annual excess cost of recruiting minors into the Army is approximately between £81.5 million and £94 million per year.

5.2 Minors who pass out of training tend to stay in the Army for longer (average 10 years) than do adults (average 7.6 years) (Hansard, 2011a). However, in cost-effectiveness terms this factor is more than outweighed by the much longer duration of Phase 1 training for minors (typically 50 weeks) compared with that for adults (typically 14 weeks) (Hansard, 2011c) and the much higher drop-out rates among minors (see paragraph 4.1).

5.3 Our full costings analysis, which accounts for the different average career lengths and in-training drop-out of minors and adults, is set out in a separate memorandum from Child Soldiers International.

DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS FACED BY YOUNG PEOPLE VS. ADULT RECRUITS

6.1 Young people from disadvantaged backgrounds are substantially more likely than adult recruits to suffer from the effects of deployment.

6.2 Minors from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to be targeted for recruitment than those from other backgrounds (Gee, 2008; Gee & Goodman, 2010). Minors are also more likely than adults to enlist in the Infantry where the risk of fatality and injury in Afghanistan is more than five times that for the rest of the Army (Calculated from MoD, 2013). Between 2007–08 and 2011–12, 39.2% of the Army's enlisted minors joined the Infantry, which compares with 33.8% of adult recruits (Hansard, 2013; DASA, 2013b).

6.3 Young people from disadvantaged backgrounds are much more likely than adults to suffer serious mental health problems, including post-traumatic stress disorder and harmful alcohol use, as a result of their Army service (O'Brien & Hughes, 1991; Ismail *et al.*, 2000; Jones *et al.*, 2006); they are also more likely to behave violently on return from a war zone (Macmanus *et al.*, 2012 and 2013). For example, a large study found that the youngest age group assessed (18–24) showed the highest rate of alcohol misuse, with 26.1% drinking at harmful levels compared with 8.8% of men and 4.8% of women in a similar age group (16–24) in the general population (Fear *et al.*, 2010; McManus *et al.*, 2007). Another large study found that 27.2% of those from the most disadvantaged backgrounds were also found to be drinking at harmful levels (Iversen *et al.*, 2007). A large study also found that that 18.4% of British armed forces recruits who had joined without GCSE qualifications had probable PTSD (Iversen *et al.*, 2009:Table 2).

6.4 By ending the recruitment of minors into the armed forces the risk burden of fatality, injury and mental health problems would not disappear but this would be shared entirely by adults who had reached the legal age of responsibility; minors would not be bearing the brunt by enlisting disproportionately into the most dangerous Army roles.

THE SOCIAL MOBILITY OF YOUNG PEOPLE

7.1 The long-term social mobility of young people, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds, is better served by asking them remain within the civilian education and training system until aged 18, where the opportunities are more diverse and of higher quality than those available in the Army.

7.2 The cornerstone of the long-term social mobility of young people, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds, remains good pass grades in GCSE English and Maths (Wolf, 2011:8). 94% of young people now stay on in education after the age of 16 (Wolf, 2011:51). Those who choose to join the Army are not able to resit GCSEs if they need to, and instead are offered a limited range of low-grade opportunities. Phase 1 Army trainees, for example, are expected only to gain Functional Skills qualifications in English and Maths at Level 1, which is approximately equivalent to GCSE Grade D-G (Hansard, 2011b). These qualifications were characterised in the Department for Education's independent 'Review of Vocational Education' as 'conceptually incoherent' and 'certainly not in themselves an adequate "maths and English" diet for the 16–19 cohort' (Wolf, 2011:80;174).

7.3 Minors who join the Army leave, on average, in their mid- to late-twenties (Hansard, 2011a). If they have not had the opportunity to resit GCSEs or otherwise further their educational attainment after the age of 16, they will be rejoining the civilian jobs market with a poorer portfolio of qualifications than would have been available to them had they remained in the civilian system until the age of 18.

EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

8.1 The UK is the only state in the European Union to recruit from age 16 into the armed forces. Only five other EU states now recruit from age 17 and the remaining 21 recruit from 18 (Child Soldiers International, 2012:142–160). Only six EU states still practise conscription, with the remaining 21 now relying on voluntary enlistment (European Bureau for Conscientious Objection, 2011). The UK is also the only Permanent Member of the UN Security Council to recruit from age 16. In general, the EU and global trend in the minimum age for military recruitment is upwards and towards a 'straight 18' policy worldwide. The MoD's continuing defence of recruiting minors sends an unhelpful signal to other states and risks holding back a globally positive process.

8.2. In 2008 the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concern that the UK's 'active recruitment policy [of minors] may lead to the possibility of targeting those children who come from vulnerable groups' and called on the MoD to review the policy (UN CRC, 2008:3). In 2009, the House of Commons and House of Lords Joint Committee on Human Rights endorsed this recommendation (HC/HL HR Cttee: 2009:47–48), which followed a similar recommendation made by the House of Commons Defence Committee *Duty of Care* report in 2005 (HC Def Cttee, 2005:7). As of November 2011, no such review had taken place (MoD, 2011) and to our knowledge this remains the case.

8.3 CM opinion poll of British adults commissioned by Child Soldiers International carried out in March 2013 found that 70% of respondents who expressed a view believed the minimum age for Army recruitment should be at least 18 (Child Soldiers International and ForcesWatch, 2013:7).

CONCLUSION

An all-adult Army would be much more cost-effective and operationally more manageable than the current arrangements. Asking minors to wait until they are 18 before enlisting would help to ensure that they benefit from the now-superior education and training opportunities available in the civilian system. It would also ensure that minors are not put at disproportionate risk of injury and mental health problems, as is the case now due to the Army's tendency to recruit the youngest personnel into the most dangerous Army roles. The occasion of Army 2020, in reducing the Army's strength requirement, also eases the pressure on recruiters and makes a transition to all-adult armed forces entirely achievable in a short time-frame. Army 2020 provides a unique opportunity for the MoD to commission an independent review of the minimum recruitment age for the British armed forces and we hope that Committee members will pursue this possibility as part of their Inquiry.

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Written evidence from John Baron MP

1. In October 2010, the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) set out the strategic left behind the Government's proposals to reshape the Armed Forces and the Reserve Forces. However, it is widely acknowledged that the conclusions reached in the SDSR were motivated more by financial pressures and the imperative to save money than by raw strategy.

2. The application of the SDSR has resulted in the loss of key military capabilities. Harrier and Nimrod have been scrapped, as has HMS Ark Royal, the Royal Navy's former flagship. I observe the Committee's report of February 2012 noted that Operation ELLAMY took place before the SDSR conclusions were fully implemented, and that further such operations may be moot once they were fully applied.⁹

3. In July 2012, the Secretary of State for Defence announced to Parliament details of the 'Army 2020' programme. These proposals will see the regular Army shrink to some 82,000 personnel, and will necessitate the loss of 20,000 regular soldiers. Five infantry battalions are earmarked for disbandment. These losses will be offset by boosting reservist numbers by 11,000, to create a total strength of 30,000.

4. These plans are highly ambitious and carry an unacceptable degree of risk (in terms of lost capability) should the MoD be unable to recruit the requisite number of reservists. Though MoD Ministers have been bullish about the prospects for recruitment, the Department's own figures clearly show a marked drop-off in take-up. In fact, in recent years the Territorial Army has been losing soldiers.

5. The winding down of operations in Afghanistan, coupled with the expectation that reservists will be called up more often than at present, may well conspire to make the TA/Army Reserve a less appealing prospect for those who seek a balance between military and civilian life. Those more inclined to the military will be drawn to regular, not part-time, service.

6. In light of recruitment shortfalls, and bearing in mind the significant loss of capability once regular soldiers are dismissed, I would urge the Committee to consider calling upon the MoD to at least delay these cuts until such time as the reserves are able to prove they are up to the mark.

7. There are further concerns about the reserve forces. The nature of conflict is changing, and our Armed Forces need to meet the challenges ahead. In the future, reservists will be required to possess an ever-growing and higher skill-set than is currently the case. How is this to be achieved, given the relatively few training days on offer?

8. In addition, the current TA mobilisation rate stands around 40%—for every 100 TA soldiers, only 40 are eligible for deployment. These figures suggest we need a reserve force nearing 50,000, rather than the 30,000 the MoD is proposing.

9. The extent of the financial savings generated by the proposals is also unclear. Whilst there will be an overall cost reduction, it is unlikely to be as great as the Government expects. If the savings prove marginal, then the subsequent loss of capability may beg serious questions about value for money.

10. The £1.8bn earmarked for recruitment, training and equipment may well prove insufficient. The Secretary of State for Defence has already conceded that it costs more to train a reservist than a regular soldier. It is an open question from where the funding will be sourced to pay for reservists' training for the MoD's non-standing tasks; this could be an additional cost to the MoD budget.

11. Furthermore, after tax an ex-regular reservist receiving the £1,250 annual incentive (£5,000 in total) will be on a higher scale of pay for his/her 27 days' annual service than a serving brigadier. Moreover, the commitment upon deployment to match annual civilian salaries may compel—depending on those who volunteer—the MoD to pay some reservists up to £300,000. I am not convinced such considerations have been factored into the overall cost assessment.

12. The Defence Reform Bill contains provisions for the Secretary of State to make incentive payments to employers of c. £500 per month, per reservist, up to c. £6,000 in a twelve-month period. This is a cost which will be 'hidden' until deployment, and sums may be revised upwards should businesses (especially SMEs) believe them to be insufficient.

13. The accompanying Impact Assessment to the Defence Reform Bill estimates the MoD's reservist reforms to incur an additional cost of £29m. However, the Impact Assessment considers the reserve forces as they currently stand—and does not analyse the effects of increasing its size by 11,000 personnel. This will greatly increase costs.

14. The MoD's reforms are already having a distorting effect on the ground. Well-recruited battalions are being disbanded, whilst more poorly-recruited—and therefore more expensive—battalions are being preserved. Such a policy merely reinforces failure.

15. A case in point is 2nd Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (2RRF), one of the five infantry battalions earmarked for disbandment. As one of the best-recruited units in the Army, and one of the Army's few fully-manned units, 2RRF was not originally due for axing. However, it was caught by subsequent criteria

⁹ HC-950, p. 9, para. 26.

and will be removed from the Order of Battle within the next year. As you are aware, there is a vigorous campaign for this decision to be reversed.

16. In conclusion, there are serious holes in the MoD's proposals to reshape and reform our Armed Forces and Reserves. Concerns range across loss of capability; recruitment; mobilisation; and cost. I trust the Committee will assiduously address these issues over the course of the report, and I hope this submission aids you in your task.

August 2013

Written evidence from the Federation of Small Businesses

With around 200,000 members, the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) is the UK's leading business organisation representing the interests of the self-employed and those who run their own business. Small businesses make up 99.3% of all businesses in the UK, and make a huge contribution to the UK economy. They contribute 51% of the GDP and employ 58% of the private sector workforce.

We welcome the broad approach to the Reserve Force of Army 2020 and in particular the measures within the Defence Reform Bill to support and encourage businesses to employ a member of the reserve forces. The FSB has long recognised the potential value and benefits that members of the reserve forces can bring to a business. We have had a positive relationship with SaBRE for a number of years now and work together to give effective advice and support to small businesses employing Reservists. We think that this support can be continuously built on and improved. It is particularly important that the MoD appreciates the views of small and micro businesses and how the proposed changes to the reserve forces may impact on them.

The research findings in this submission are based on a snap poll made available to the FSB 'Voice of Small Business' Survey Panel during December 2012 and January 2013. 6,352 panel members were invited to take part in the poll designed and hosted by Research by Design. The fieldwork took place between Monday 17 December 2012 and Thursday 3 January 2013. One reminder email was sent to non-respondents and 1,836 responses were received representing a 29% response rate.

The main findings from the poll showed that:

- Almost 40% (38%) of small businesses would consider employing a Reservist in the future and 7% currently or have previously employed a Reservist.
- Of those who would consider employing a Reservist and those who currently or have previously employed a Reservist, there are mixed views with regard to the likely impact on businesses of the proposed changes to increase the commitment of reserve forces; two in five believe the proposed changes will negatively impact on their business, whereas 43% claim there will be no impact.
- Approximately half of small businesses (48%) said that they would ideally require two to three months notice if one of their employees were to be mobilised to minimise the impact on their business.
- There are a number of areas where businesses could be incentivised to take on a Reservist. Businesses would appreciate a financial incentive (39%), help in finding replacement staff (30%) and flexibility in training schedules (21%).
- FSB members are particularly keen on any Government support specifically targeting the needs of small and micro businesses rather than big business; it's clear for example that most small businesses (89%) have not heard of MoD employer awareness events.
- Businesses believe that potential employees should always be clear and upfront and inform the business if they are Reservists (95%).

Our comments on Army 2020 are very much focused on the increased role of the Reserve Force and the impact that this will have on businesses that employ reservists.

CALL OUT OF MEMBERS OF RESERVE FORCES

The FSB has had concerns regarding the intention to extend the call-out powers in the Reserve Forces Act 1996 so that members of the reserve forces may be called out for any purpose for which regular forces may be used. On average FSB members employ approximately 7 employees, so if one is a member of the reserve forces and called out, instantly a significant proportion of the workforce becomes absent. There are mixed views from the small business community with regard to the likely impact on businesses of the proposed changes to increase the commitment of reserve forces; two in five of those open to employing Reservists believe the proposed changes will negatively impact on their business and reasons for this focus upon the difficulties in planning and arranging suitable cover for the extended training periods or deployments, whereas 43% claim there will be no impact.

PAYMENTS TO EMPLOYERS OF MEMBERS OF THE RESERVE FORCES

Given the potential disruption to a business if a member of staff is called out, financial incentives are important to businesses looking to take on a member of the reserve forces with 39% citing this. We welcome proposals in the legislation to compensate employers a maximum of £500 per month and note that this should cover some of the cost of replacing an employee who has been mobilised. Whether £500 will be sufficient remains to be seen.

Other factors that have an impact on a business's ability to plan for the future are also extremely important to members and so we would ask that in addition to payment for employers, employers are also given help in finding replacement staff (30% consider this important) and that training schedules are flexible (considered by 21% a key incentive). In addition approximately half of members have asked for two to three months notice if one of their staff is going to be deployed. The commitment to making deployment more predictable, giving employers more notice and telling them about training should help small firms plan cover for the employee that will be away. There is no doubt that for the smallest businesses this will be a challenge.

FSB members are also particularly keen on any Government support specifically targeting the needs of small and micro businesses rather than big business and it is clear for example that awareness of MoD employer awareness events is very low and that this could be improved. It is striking that we have such a low level of engagement between small businesses and our forces today, as evidenced by nearly nine in ten, (89%) of members, stating they had never heard of the awareness events that are held around the country from time to time. The FSB is happy to offer to help the MoD to publicise these events to our member firms, across the country via our national and local social media channels and weekly e- newsletter.

UNFAIR DISMISSAL OF RESERVE FORCES: NO QUALIFYING PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT

Employment regulations often pose a challenge for small and micro businesses that naturally have a less formal approach to running their business since they lack the resources of a larger counter-part. Small and micro businesses are generally amongst the best employers and in general employees are happiest working for smaller firms. However, small and micro businesses can also be put off from taking on staff if it will be overly burdensome for them. Views on whether small and micro businesses would consider employing a member of the reserve forces were positive with almost 40% of small businesses saying they would consider employing a Reservist in the future and 7% stating that they currently or have previously employed a Reservist.

Even though we see the rationale to consider legislating in order that unfair dismissal qualifying periods of employment should not apply if the dismissal is connected with the employees membership of the reserve forces, we would not want to see further changes to employment regulation in relation to reserve forces as this could add to a business's uncertainty about taking on a member of the reserve forces.

An overwhelming majority of 95% of businesses surveyed said that potential employees should always be clear and upfront and inform the business if they are Reservists, so that they can be supported.

The Employers Charter that is now in place should make a positive contribution.

FURTHER SUPPORT FOR BUSINESSES EMPLOYING A MEMBER OF THE RESERVE FORCES

The FSB believes the Defence Reform Bill could go further in introducing measures to encourage small and micro businesses to employ a member of the reserve forces, and indeed regular members of the Armed Forces when they have completed their service.

Undoubtedly members of the reserve forces have strong skill sets which will be useful to a diverse range of businesses. Given this, the FSB suggests that in certain sectors where particular skills are essential, there is a 'central pool' of labour that could fill vacancies for any employer. Secondly there could be a far better way of 'matching' regulars (and possibly those Reservists) who wanted to find a job, with employers who had vacancies—in essence an MoD-led 'matching service' which could operate online but also at Job Centre Plus branches, Armed Forces Recruitment centres, and Territorial Army (TA) centres.

FURTHER ISSUES FOR CLARIFICATION

There are also some fairly fundamental questions around detailed support—in particular when a Reservist returns to their civilian role, and any apparent medical condition becomes apparent at a later date. This will inevitably lead to questions around liability, issues over sickness absence and possibly finding another replacement to cover what in essence is not a further deployment, but a further absence of their employee for a longer period than anticipated. It raises important questions under current employment legislation.

Concerns have also been voiced if TA centres are to be amalgamated as the large majority of Reservists engage because their TA centres are local, and they have colleagues or friends serving as well. If extended travelling which is remote from where they live is to happen either to their local centre, or to training grounds, then this could raise further issues. The extension of training though from 35–40 days unless a business operated shift patterns over the weekends, should not cause the majority of employers any problem.

Finally, although the accredited military training that Reservists will receive should help develop highly valued skills that can be easily transferred to their civilian roles, the accreditation process will need to be understood and meaningful to employers. At the moment, businesses do not know what Reservists will be accredited to and what areas the training will be in.

CONCLUSION

Although there is appetite amongst small businesses to employ members of the reserve forces it is clear that without government aids small businesses find employing a Reservist an administrative, financial and resourcing challenge. This coupled with the fact that many small businesses are of the view proposed changes will have a negative impact on their business means that Government support to specifically target small and micro businesses would be welcome. Financial incentives are the preferred means of encouraging small businesses to employ Reservists, but other measures such as help with finding replacement staff and adequate notice of when staff would be mobilised would also be useful. It is also extremely important to small businesses that potential employees tell them if they are members of the reserve forces. Finally, it is clear through our survey work that more should be done to engage small and micro businesses with MoD employer awareness events.

September 2013

Written evidence from Brigadier (retired) Allan Mallinson

I have studied the last great period of army reform—in the decade before the Great War—for many years, writing about it in *The Making of the British Army* (Bantam, 2009) and in *1914: Fight the Good Fight—Britain, the Army, and the Coming of the First World War* (Bantam, 2013). I was thirty-five years a soldier, ten of which as an infantryman, until 2004 when I retired as a brigadier (with reserve liability to 2007). I have remained in close touch with the army since then, writing defence comment for *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Times*.

My opinion of the plans for the Reserve remain as published in *The Times* on October 27 last year:

THE VISION FOR THE NEW TERRITORIALS MUST BE RADICAL

On May 9, 1859, as war between Austria, Italy and France raised again the spectre of invasion, *The Times* published a call to arms by the Poet Laureate, Alfred Lord Tennyson, *The War*, with the ringing words “Ready, be ready to meet the storm!/Riflemen, riflemen, riflemen form!”

Three days later the Secretary of State for war, Jonathan Peel, wrote to the county lieutenancies authorising them to raise volunteer rifle corps and coastal artillery units. Numbers quickly reached 200,000. They were the forerunners of the Territorial Army (TA), the “citizen-soldiers” who give up their spare time to supplement the Regular Army.

The Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond, is about to publish a consultation paper setting out proposals for recruiting more “Territorials” who are to have a greater role in the redesigned Army of 112,000, comprising 82,000 full-time and 30,000 part-time soldiers by 2020, as established in the “Future Force 2020” (FF2020) report.

A different vision is needed for the TA, as Hammond himself acknowledges: “We’re not interested in reservists who want to play at being a soldier. It will be a serious commitment.”

We have been here before. In June 1912 the great army reformer Richard Burdon (Lord) Haldane stood down as Secretary of State for war after six and a half years of reshaping the nation’s land forces after the debacle of the Boer War. With the help of generals such as “Wullie” Robertson and Douglas Haig he had reorganised the War Office, professionalised the regulars and reinvigorated the reserves, so that in August 1914 the all-regular British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was the best-equipped, best-trained army we had ever sent abroad.

But in one key respect the reforms were incomplete: the Territorial Force (later, Territorial Army), formed in 1908 from Tennyson’s volunteers for home defence, could not be made to serve abroad. Haldane funded them well, put their organisation, equipment and training on a surer footing, but never felt able to initiate legislation to use them as reinforcements for the BEF.

Fortunately, Haldane had simultaneously converted the part-time militia, which dated back to the Tudor “trained bands”, into a quasi-regular force, renaming them the “Special Reserve” (SR) and for the first time making them liable for deployment overseas. SR recruits received full-time initial training, and annual refresher training, on regular rates of pay, plus an annual retention bounty, and were closely aligned with the regulars. In 1914 the SR would prove invaluable. After the war, nevertheless, the SR was progressively sidelined in favour of a reconstituted TA with new terms of service requiring them to serve overseas on general mobilisation.

Since the Cold War the TA has ceased realistically to be a force of formed units, and is instead a supplier of individual reinforcements. Many a regular infantry battalion has served in Afghanistan with “Terriers” swelling its ranks, but no TA battalion as a whole has deployed. Yet without significant mobilisation of the TA, many believe FF2020 will not be able to meet the obligations set by the National Security Council to conduct, simultaneously and routinely, “a single non-enduring complex intervention, a single non-enduring simple intervention and an enduring stabilisation operation”.

In some areas—medical and logistics for example—a reservist brings invaluable specialist skills and needs relatively little additional training to make him or her ready for operational deployment. In the infantry, on the other hand, competence is in large part a matter of repetition in training. It seems inconceivable that a stabilisation operation of the complexity and danger of Afghanistan could be conducted by infantry almost half of which were Territorials, still less that these should be in formed units (battalions and companies).

The answer is to shed the vestiges of the Rifle Volunteers, embracing instead Haldane’s concept of the Special Reserve. The old pattern of scattered drill halls in small towns the length and breadth of Britain, each with its weekly “drill night” with occasional weekends on the local training area, is not cost-effective. Nor can it produce the level of professionalism required of “part-time regulars”.

Though some exceptions for particular specialists might be made, reservists should do their basic training in one go, at a (Regular) Army Training Regiment. A recruit who is unable to take leave from work for these 14-week courses is unlikely to be able to take the better part of a year’s leave for a six-month operational tour and pre-deployment training.

A start has been made. To boost its image the name “Territorial Army” is being dropped in favour of the more appropriate “Reserve”. But for this to be more than window-dressing, the Secretary of State will have to finish the job his illustrious predecessor, Lord Haldane, began a century ago, disposing of “territorialism” in all its aspects to create a professional and truly usable second-line force.

One of the committee’s members, Julian Brazier, took issue with what I believe he thought was my denigrating the TA in the Great War, writing to *The Times*:

TERRITORIALS AND THE GREAT WAR

Sir, Allan Mallinson (“The vision for the new Territorials must be radical”, *Military Matters*, Oct 27) makes an interesting attempt to draw lessons for today’s Army from Haldane’s great reforms a century ago, but he wrongly identifies the lack of a legal requirement for the then Territorial Force to be deployed overseas as the key weakness at the outset of that war.

Despite the legal position, more than six divisions of Territorial units flooded across to the Continent in 1914 and early 1915. They were praised in the highest terms by BEF commander Sir Douglas French, but the flow ceased after Kitchener and Haig had traduced and disposed of French, as Kitchener stopped allowing Territorials to be deployed as formed units. Territorial commanding officers then advised their soldiers not to transfer piecemeal into Kitchener’s hastily assembled and often poorly trained general service battalions. In early 1916, this policy was reversed again. A huge number of TF (Territorial Force) units were rapidly deployed in formed units, brigades and divisions, winning 71 VCs. General Anthony Farrar-Hockley remarked: “If Kitchener had ... reinforced the BEF with units of the Territorial Force—as ultimately he was forced to do—the BEF would have become by the end of 1915 a great and formidable force whose technical quality matched the moral and physical excellence of its men” (*The Somme*, A. H. Farrar-Hockley).

Mallinson rightly calls for more upfront training to raise standards in the Territorial Army. This should be applied to officer candidates, who normally have plenty of time (and a growing need for money) during their university courses. In this way, we can rebuild the leadership needed for units to provide a genuine framework for re-expansion in case of crisis, rather than just a trickle of individuals to regular units.

Julian Brazier, MP House of Commons

To which (and another from Colonel Malcolm Watson) I made reply:

FUTURE FORCE 2020

Sir, Colonel Malcolm Watson (letter, Oct 30) rightly says “It is quite possible to be a serious soldier and enjoy what that entails. If the commitment is not enjoyable, there will not be enough reservists to play with, now or in 2020”. I would add that the same goes for regular soldiers too.

Pressure on space led to a cut in what I said (*Register*, Oct 27) of the consultation paper about to be published by the Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond, on how to raise the 30,000 reservists who will replace the 20,000 regulars in the plan known as Future Force 2020 (FF2020): “Hammond’s experience of business coupled with the practicality of the Chief of the General Staff, Sir Peter Wall, a Sapper, should mean that the paper is imaginative and robust, yet few senior officers believe it will be enough.”

As to historical example, Julian Brazier, MP, a long-serving TA officer, rightly points to the Territorials’ service in France in the latter months of 1914, and 1915, and the praise they earned from the BEF’s commander, Sir John (not Sir Douglas) French. But the fact is that initially the Territorial Force could not be compelled to

serve abroad, and this materially and critically delayed the reinforcing of the BEF. The voluntary response was admirable, but it was patchy and too slow for the pace of events in August and September 1914.

However, I wholeheartedly agree with Brazier's call to make better use of the university officer training corps, which Lord Haldane had championed as a source of officers for the Special Reserve. I maintain that FF2020 is doable, but not unless the old TA is dismantled and replaced by a force along the lines of Haldane's quasi-regular SR.

Allan Mallinson, The Cavalry and Guards Club, London

I speak only of the infantry, on which the burden of operations always falls, and which is usually—and quite wrongly—thought to be the easiest arm in which to gain proficiency. It is in fact the hardest, for while the others require skills which can be taught as akin to industrial, the infantryman acquires his proficiency—which is about judgement of ground and situation—only by long experience.

From my close observation of the infantry in the past ten years—their experience of Iraq and Afghanistan—I am convinced that the integration of TA soldiers as individuals within a regular unit is the best use of their potential (which in many cases is considerable), and therefore best for the army overall. Even to deploy as a section of eight or ten infantrymen within a platoon is to make a two-speed command, which except for the most benign of operations—such as Military Aid to the Civil Community—is inefficient and therefore dangerous. The TA of late 1914/1915 did indeed earn plaudits; but they died in their needful thousands—undertrained and prematurely deployed.

To preserve a structure purely to give majors and lieutenant-colonels an enjoyable command is unprofessional, and we can no longer afford it. To give these officers—company and battalion commanders—responsibility instead for the preliminary collective (not individual) training of reservists, their career management, administration, and occasionally to command them in formed deployments on, say, MACC tasks—or, at maximum effort “garrison” duties to release regular units (as envisaged by Haldane)—would be a far better, and ultimately more rewarding, objective.

September 2013

Written evidence from Brigadier (retired) Ben Barry OBE, Senior Fellow Land Warfare, International Institute for Strategic Studies

IISS' Defence and Military Analysis Programme assess trends in military strategies, capabilities and expenditure. Work on land warfare, land forces and all land capabilities has analysed strategic trends in modern war. This submission assesses the Army 2020 change programme against IISS' work on global strategic trends in modern conflict and land forces.

KEY ASSESSMENTS

The 8% reduction in UK Defence Spending announced in 2010 reduced the conventional military capabilities of all three UK services by 20–30%. Levels of ambition for readiness and expeditionary operations were similarly reduced. Army 2020 required a 20% reduction in regular manpower whilst increasing the capability of its reserves. Meeting these requirements has resulted in an ambitious programme of restructuring and re-equipment which represents the most radical re-organisation of the Army for 50 years. By 2020 innovative new organisations should embed many of the important lessons from recent wars, much useful equipment should have been brought back from Afghanistan and there should be a more capable reserve. But important Army capabilities will have reduced, including numbers of infantry, armoured vehicles, artillery and engineers. Other IISS assessments include:

- Events since 2010 have validated the general themes of MoD's Future Character of Conflict work and the Future Land Operating Concept. The Army's analysis of future conflict, including the relevance of “hybrid” enemies, the importance of heavy forces, precision artillery, ISTAR, military broadband connectivity and soft effects including information operations, reconstruction and development, matches IISS' analysis. As does the Army's conclusion that the global mega-trend of urbanisation means that conflict in urban areas is no longer exceptional, but more the “new normal”.
- Many problems experienced by the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan were a result of failures to institutionalise the relevant lessons of the Northern Ireland and Balkan campaigns. Army 2020 incorporates many key capability lessons of the Iraq and Afghan wars that are widely applicable to future conflict. This includes new organisations; mixed gun/rocket close support artillery regiments, the Intelligence and Surveillance Brigade, the Security Assistance Group and the EOD and Search Group.

- The heavy forces contained in the Reaction Forces' armoured infantry brigades should be capable of hard fighting against the most demanding conventional and "hybrid" enemies, as well as the toughest of peace enforcement missions. But this capability depends on the modernisation of Warrior and Challenger, as well as replacement of the obsolete CVR(T) and FV432 families of recce, APC and utility vehicles. Although these are funded, it appears that the Scout and Utility Vehicle programmes may lag behind Army 2020 structural re-organisation, with resulting capability risk.
- The lighter forces contained in the Adaptable Force should be capable of conducting close combat, peace-keeping and stabilisation operations in a less demanding threat environment. Climate change, increased social and economic interdependencies and negative consequences of globalisation are likely to increase the challenges to UK resilience. The Adaptable Force will be well placed to assist with this.
- Both 16 Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines (including its Army element) remain capable of "early entry" operations, albeit against less demanding scenarios than before 2010. It appears that greater risk has been taken with airborne capability than with amphibious capability. Given the use of French airborne capability in Mali, this risk may be greater than appeared in 2012.
- The US and French Armies have "medium weight" combined arms brigades equipped with families of wheeled armoured vehicles that can move rapidly over distance. These have been invaluable in Iraq, Afghanistan and Mali. Army 2020 does not have such a capability.
- Between the 1997 SDR and 2012, numbers of engineer and logistic units increased, to better support expeditionary operations. Army 2020 reverses this.
- Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the value of divisional and corps level command capabilities. The Army's divisional command capability is reducing to a bare minimum.
- The Iraq and Afghan wars showed that there were insufficient UK battlefield helicopters. Future manoeuvre, surveillance, logistic and medical evacuation capabilities all depend on expansion and modernisation of Army and RAF battlefield helicopters.
- Army NBC defence capability has reduced in recent years. Events in Syria and the continued global proliferation of WMD imply that this is an increasing risk.
- Implementation depends on ending combat operations in Afghanistan as planned and on a significant increase in the utility of the reserves. Whilst the former appears on track, it is too early to tell whether the latter will be successful. Growing the reserves as required is feasible. It will require resources, imagination, and the full attention of the Army's leadership. Attitudes of society, employers and the regular and reserve armies will need to change. Pairing of regular and reserve units will help this.
- The last decade's wars acted as powerful recruiting sergeants. But decreasing opportunities for adventure and excitement would adversely impact on retaining the combat-hardened talent the Army needs for the future, as well as recruiting sufficient adventurous young men and women. Investing in realistic, challenging training that blends field exercises with the last decade's revolutionary advances in simulation and virtual environments will be essential.
- MOD spending on land equipment is at an all-time low. Historically cost growth in UK maritime and air equipment programmes has been funded by MOD reducing land programme spending. The Treasury has agreed to a limited growth of equipment, support and pay budgets. Any unplanned increases in these could squeeze operating costs, especially training.
- It will be important that the New Employment Model being developed by the MOD is retention positive and does not increase disincentives to military service.
- Implementing Army 2020 depends on the change programme being properly led, managed, and resourced and the Army being able to exploit the management freedoms it has been given by the Defence Reform programme. And on the likely gaps in reserve and armoured capability after 2015, not being over-matched by unforeseen threats at home and abroad.
- Across the lines of development the Army is close to the critical mass necessary to deliver its (reduced) operational outputs, to sustain genuine combat capability and be a credible partner to other armies. Any further resource reductions would be certain to further reduce capability.

THE ARMY'S ROLE IN DEFENCE ENGAGEMENT

Army 2020's proposition that there is an increased opportunity for the Army to conduct a wide variety of defence engagement activity is supported by IISS analysis. That this will be a major activity for the regular and reserve components of the Adaptable Force is a sound deduction.

But defence engagement will need to draw on the whole Army. For example, in the Middle East have large numbers of tanks and armoured vehicles. Engagement with these will need to draw upon the armoured capability of the Reaction Force. And important armies in the Asia Pacific have invested in the full range of modern combat support, suggesting that Force Troops will also have an important defence engagement role.

The Army's proposition that there will be value added by aligning Adaptable Force brigades with regions of strategic importance to the UK is supported by IISS' analysis. This practice was adopted by US Army

Special Forces before 9/11, allowing language and cultural expertise to better develop and building stronger long-term relationships. This practice has already been adopted by the wider US Army.

There is a further factor which does not appear to have been discussed in public. This is the way defence engagement directly improves the Army's operational capability. The conflicts in Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan have required formations, units, officers and soldiers to train, work alongside and integrate with armed forces of other nations to a degree that was not practiced in the Cold War or the Balkan campaigns. Indeed during that period this building the capacity of indigenous forces was largely the preserve of UK Special Forces.

In the wars of 9/11 partnership and capacity building has been a core activity for all the Army's conventional forces, as seen by the mentoring and liaison teams fielded in Helmand and the integration of Task Force Helmand's operations with the Afghan Security Forces. This is an activity that is difficult to replicate in peace time training. Defence engagement activity, especially training tasks, will require those involved to display the same language and cultural awareness skills as well as tact, diplomacy, sense of humour and dogged persistence that have been so central to building the ANSF under fire.

So defence engagement should no longer be regarded as a peripheral activity, but should be seen as core mission that not only develops UK influence, but that also directly strengthens the Army's operational capability. This should be recognised by the MoD, not least in cultural attitudes and its internal charging regime. In the past these have acted as unnecessary and unhelpful internal obstacles to defence engagement, and sometimes handed business opportunities to private military and security companies.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT—HARD TIMES AND HARD CHOICES

Global Strategic Trends Relevant to Land Forces

The US, UK and NATO found the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan more difficult and costly than expected. This eroded confidence in the utility of land forces and influences current popular, political and media attitudes. In the UK the statements and body language of some politicians, officials and media commentators suggest that they think that Afghanistan and Iraq were so problematic that 'in most foreseeable scenarios British boots on the ground are not required'¹⁰. In the US some commentators argue that the increasing importance of the Gulf and the US pivot to Asia means that air, maritime, amphibious and Special Forces capabilities are of greater utility and less risk than land forces.

But unconstrained by these limitations, many actors are using force on land, not least insurgents in Latin America, Africa and Asia. In parts of Brazil and Mexico criminals and narcotic barons have overmatched the police, requiring extensive military support. More UN peacekeepers are deployed on land than ever. There is no shortage of flashpoints that could result in land war, including the Korean peninsula and India's borders with Pakistan and China. Countries that might confront the west are investing in and sometimes using force, especially North Korea and Iran, triggering enhancements to the South Korean and Gulf armies. Brazil, Russia, India, China and other rising economies are converting increased prosperity into improved land capabilities.

Global defence spending is falling in real terms—1.5% in 2011 and a further 2% in 2012. The trend varies regionally—falling in US, NATO and Europe, but rising in Russia, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. So US, NATO and European armies must not only contend with budget cuts, but also prevailing gloom in their countries about the utility of force, arising from the unpopularity of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is ironic that this is at a time when improvements in capability resulting from these wars, particularly ISTAR and precision weapons, offer options for waging war more effectively and with less civilian casualties and collateral damage.

So accepting that armies cannot do what navies and air forces can, what are their roles? The US Army's mission to 'fight on land as part of an integrated joint force' seems as good as any. Whilst the other two services can attack enemy land forces, only armies can defeat them. They can secure ground and the people living there, which gives greater influence over populations than air or sea power. So a force that can root out enemies can achieve 'land control', is as valid a concept and military/political tool as 'sea control' or 'air control'.

Armies in Afghanistan are currently optimised for counter-insurgency; depending on static bases, lavish contractor and logistic support and unprecedented access to bandwidth and processing power, uncontested by electronic attack. After withdrawal from Afghanistan they will need to reconstitute the capability to perform the full spectrum of roles required by their defence policy. They face hard choices—not least affordability of equipment and the increasing expense of and competition for quality people, which is also subject to similar inflationary pressure. And many of the advanced conventional weapons they had previously hoped to buy have been cancelled or delayed, often to fund other equipment urgently required for Iraq and Afghanistan

Changes to US and French Land Forces

These factors all bear on NATO armies. The US Army has long been an important factor influencing British Army's capability, not least interoperability. And both the 2003 invasion of Iraq and operations in Helmand

¹⁰ A précis of views expressed to the author by a number of UK civilian officials from a variety of UK government departments

have seen the UK operating under the command of America's other army—the US Marine Corps (USMC). And France remains the other medium-sized European Army with expeditionary combat capabilities and the national strategic culture to use them.

Their land forces are reducing in size and have reduced their operational ambitions, including the size of forces to be deployed overseas. Both seek to retain a core combined arms combat capability and the robust culture, and leadership essential to sustaining fighting spirit. They plan to retain many of the capability advances made over the last decade, such as precision artillery, attack helicopters and air/land integration. They are institutionalising the progress made in ISTAR in the last decade, including tactical surveillance drones and dedicated ISTAR formations such as the US Army Battlefield Surveillance Brigades and the French Intel Brigade.

The US Army will retain three different types of brigade combat teams (BCT), heavy BCTs with tracked armoured vehicles, Stryker BCTs using Stryker wheeled armoured vehicles and infantry BCTs with no armour. They retain their airborne and air assault divisions. There are to be fewer BCTs but those remaining are to get larger with a third manoeuvre battalion. The US Marine Corps' amphibious capability, a mixture of light infantry, medium armour and some tanks will remain.

The recent French "Livre Blanc" sees the French Army reducing from eight to seven all-arms brigades: two heavy, three medium and one airborne. So the British and French land components will be of roughly equivalent size, albeit with a different mix of brigade capabilities, the French having a specialist mountain brigade and no equivalent of the UK Adaptable Force.

As well as retaining airborne and amphibious "forced entry" formations, both nations are retaining heavy armoured brigades. These will be capable of hard fighting against both conventional and "hybrid" enemies, as well as tough peace enforcement missions. The US and French also retain substantial medium forces based on wheeled armour. The British will not have similar medium brigades.

All four armies plan to modernise aging armoured vehicle fleets. The USMC seeks new amphibious armoured vehicles and new wheeled APCs. The US Army plans to modernise its Abrams tanks and replace its Bradley fighting vehicles with a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and its M-113 utility vehicles with an Armoured Multipurpose Vehicle. At an estimated cost of \$29 billion the GCV is the largest and most expensive armoured vehicle programme in NATO. The French have just fielded the VBCI wheeled armoured infantry fighting vehicle and are developing a new wheeled APC's and armoured cavalry vehicles.

All these plans depend on budgets being sustained. Whilst the recent French "Livre Blanc" sought to sustain French defence spending at current levels, increasing equipment and personnel costs required reductions in force structure. And the current prospects for the French economy are not encouraging. Given the White House and Congress' difficulty in agreeing a way out of sequestration, it is unsurprising that Defence Secretary Hagel recently announced that his Strategic Choices and Management Review had concluded that there was scope for further reductions in the planned size of the US Army and its reserves. These could be cuts of up to 15% and 11% respectively.

The main deductions to be drawn from these factors are:

- The reduction in size of the US and French land forces means that on operations they will become even more dependent on contributions from other armies, prospectively including the British.
- The US and French land forces are subject to many of the same strategic factors, drivers and pressures as the British Army.
- Many of their responses have been broadly similar to the changes being made under Army 2020.

6 September 2013

Written evidence from David Lyon former Colonel Commandant, Special Air Service

IMPLEMENTING ARMY 2020 PLAN: CULTURAL AND BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE. THE NEED FOR MEANS TO MATCH THE MANTRAS

1. Change runs through every aspect of Army 2020 Plan. Successful implementation of the Plan will need comprehensive and integrated management of change, which must be properly resourced.

2. There has been a number of Change Management, Continuous Improvement initiatives over the last several years driven MoD and Lord Levene' report etc. Their high ambitions have been not been matched by their outcomes. Success has been patchy.

3. The reasons are a combination of:

- (a) ailure by the most senior leadership to find sufficient time to personally engage in overtly leading the change process. Not surprising given their workload.
- (b) ailure, then, to appoint sufficiently capable and authoritative change leaders, as opposed to change technicians, below them and their rapid turnover.

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- (c) failure to provide the resources for staff to train and experiment for change and for best practices to be spread.
 - (d) constant cuts in funding and personnel have worked against the requirement for an open, flat and cooperative organization within which to develop change.

4. A very substantial amount of work was carried out on the ways and means to achieve Cultural and Behavioural Change and Continuous Improvement during Project Hyperion; the amalgamation of the Wilton and Upavon Headquarters into Andover. Other priorities, current operations, planning for Reserves 2020 and Army 2020 and implementing cost reductions, took a toll on the exploitation of this work. The Hyperion work was well documented and much remains relevant to Army 2020.

5. The Army looks forward to seven years of greater certainty. It should now be able to provide the top-most leadership time and matching resources to tackle the undoubted challenges of change inherent in the Army 2020 Plan. Without that combined commitment, maintained consistently over the years to 2020, implementation will be under-optimized.

6. Success in managing change will come in many places and in differing ways. The Army needs to have a small number of passionately committed change leaders who have a remit to transmit and transfer best practice across the whole organization. They need to be selected from long serving military personnel who have already demonstrated the ability to innovate and push boundaries.

Responsibility should be direct to CGS. Reporting to ACGS would be a second rate choice

7. The management of Cultural and Behavioural Change is made less difficult if those in leadership roles are in post for sufficient time to live with the consequences of the changes they have initiated—3 to 5 years.

8. It is neither easy, nor impossible, to measure Cultural and Behavioural Change. The difficulty in putting hard numbers to it has caused many to back off attempting to quantify movement. The Army should make early decision on the metrics to use. Trends and ratios will be useful tools.

9. Given the acknowledged importance of Cultural and Behavioural Change to the successful implementation of Army 2020 Plan the HCDC might consider asking for a detailed paper now on how the Army is managing and resourcing Change, with an update every 18 months to 2020.

November 2013
