Defence CommitteeWritten evidence from Professor Andrew Dorman, King’s College London

Future Army 20201

1. In October 2010 the coalition government published a new National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) which proposed to reduce the army to 95,000 regular personnel by 2015 and 90,000 by 2020. At this point the army planned to develop a force of five multi-role brigades plus 16 Air Assault Brigade. Shortly after the publication of the SDSR the current Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards, stated that the force was only affordable if the defence budget was increased by some 2% per annum in year terms from 2015 onwards. This was subsequently collaborated by ministers appearing before the Defence Committee.

2. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) then undertook what become known as the ‘Three Month Review’ which had as its core aim the reconciliation of the future defence programme with the envisaged level of defence spending. As a result the Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond, announced a series of further defence adjustments in May 2012 including the decision to return to revert to the F-35B variant of the Joint Strike Fighter.

3. In July 2012 the army’s Future Force 2020 was announced. It included a further reduction in the planned size of the regular component to be offset by an increase in the reserve component. The army’s new Future Force 2020 structure was significantly different from the previous proposed structure involving two force elements—Reaction Forces and the Adaptive Force. The former is to be based around 16 Air Assault Brigade and three armoured infantry brigades whilst the latter comprises some 7 infantry brigades of varying composition.

4. The implementation of the new proposed structure is deeply problematic. As part of the ‘Three Month Review’ the Secretary of State for Defence confirmed that the Treasury had agreed that the equipment budget would increase by 1% per annum from 2015. The problem with this is that it was:

a.Less than the amount CDS indicated the SDSR was based on.

b. Only applied to the equipment budget, there was no guarantee that the overall defence budget would be increased at all.

5. Subsequently, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced further reductions to the defence budget as part of the autumn 2012 budget statement. Moreover, defence remains one of the department’s still to agree its budget for the next Spending Review due for publication this month. It therefore seems highly unlikely that the overall spending plans for defence are likely to be met and that the MoD will have to manage with less resources than envisaged in the 2010 SDSR or the 2012 Defence Equipment Plan.

6. With reduced resources within the MoD existing programmes and capabilities will inevitably compete for the remaining resources. Here the Future Army 2020 faces further challenges. It is clear that some areas are either protected because of successive government policy (ie nuclear replacement) or are ring-fenced for contractual reasons (eg historically the Eurofighter programme and more recently the Aircraft Carrier programme). Therefore the scope for savings and reductions in other areas of the defence budget are increasingly limited.

7. Furthermore, the 2010 SDSR has already been strongly criticized for some capability gaps, reductions or lack of investment (eg Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability). It therefore seems likely that there will be a requirement in the 2015 SDSR to move some resources to other areas.

8. For the above reasons the Future Army 2020 programme will be repeatedly reviewed in the years to 2020. The problem Future Army 2020 has is that the proposed structure is hard to protect as the minimum requirements. For example, why does the army need to have 82,000 regulars and not 80,000? Thus the army in many ways finds itself in the navy’s position in 1981 when defending the surface fleet became problematic. By way of contrast in 1981 the army’s position was easier to justify based on its’ deployment to Northern Ireland and treaty commitments to Germany. The air force and navy have a far easier task in justifying their force numbers in terms of generating force elements and peacetime commitments.

9. This raises the question of what elements of Future Army 2020 is most likely to be protected and which is most vulnerable? The answer to this question is that the Reaction Force has a far clearer strategic rationale. In contrast the Adaptive Force of seven brigades looks particularly vulnerable with the following basic questions likely to be raised:

i.Why do you need 7 brigades? If it is about stabilisation operations with a 6 month deployment every three years (ie the Iraq/Afghanistan model) then only 6 are needed.

ii.Can any of these brigades be substituted with other units? It could be argued that with time elements of the Reaction Force and/or 3 Commando Brigade could be substituted.

iii.Can any of these brigades be moved to the reserve force, ie have less regular reserve headquarters?

iv.Could the forces of London district replace one of the brigades if necessary?

10. In terms of the Reaction Forces the main threat to these will be in accompanying equipment programme. In addition to the financial challenges noted above there is also the question of whether the MoD can, for the first time, maintain control of the costs within its planned equipment programme. The existing planned defence programme contains some provision for potential cost overruns but, as the National Audit Office noted, this provision is based on the assumption that costs increases are generally matched by decreases, an assumption that runs counter to the MoD’s historical experience.

11. Thus the likelihood of the army achieving its’ proposed 2020 force structure appear quite remote and the sensible way forward would be to plan an alternative force mix based on far less resources.

June 2013