Defence CommitteeWritten evidence from Child Soldiers International

Summary

1. Child Soldiers International¹ welcomes the call for evidence issued by the Select Committee in relation to its inquiry into Future Army 2020. Child Soldiers International calls on the Committee to examine the Army’s current policy of actively recruiting minors and make recommendations for a full, independent review of the minimum recruitment age for Army 2020, as part of its focus on “Personnel challenges including recruitment, retention and training”.

2. This memorandum summarises and expands on material previously published by Child Soldiers International which highlights the benefits to the Army and young people of phasing out the recruitment of minors (defined as individuals below the age of 18 years). Full details, statistics and analysis of the issues raised in this memorandum are contained in the documents listed in Appendix I, which lists recent reports and briefing papers by Child Soldiers International related to the recruitment, retention and training of minors in the British Army. Copies are enclosed with this submission and available to download at the hyperlinks provided.

3. The evidence presented in this submission contends that phasing out the recruitment of minors would:

Save approximately £94 million per year on training and recruitment;

Increase operational effectiveness, including improving the ratio of deployable personnel;

Have a positive effect on recruits’ education and long-term career prospects;

Reduce incidence of mental health problems amongst soldiers and veterans; and

Ensure “the best interests of the child” are prioritised, in line with international legal obligations.

4. This memorandum also contains a brief examination of how the recruitment of minors could be phased out without detriment to Army 2020’s projected staffing requirement.

5. Throughout the past decade, UK parliamentary and UN committees have repeatedly called on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to reconsider its policy of recruiting minors, but it has so far failed to do so. Child Soldiers International urges the Committee to recommend the MoD undertake a full, independent review of the minimum recruitment age without further delay, including a feasibility study for phasing out the recruitment of minors by 2020, with a deadline for reporting back on its findings.

I. The Financial Case

6. The report “One Step Forward”, published jointly in April 2013 by Child Soldiers International and ForcesWatch, calculated in detail the relative costs of recruiting and successfully training adults and minors for identical Army roles in a nominal ten year career. Based on data from the financial year 2010–11, the calculations indicate that the cost of recruiting at age 16–17½ is 75–98% higher than that of recruiting from 17½.² On this basis, the Army would save between £81.5 million and £94 million per annum by recruiting adults only.³ The full details of these calculations are included in Appendix II of this memorandum.

7. The calculations account for the longer period of initial training for minors, at 23 or 50 weeks’ duration (depending on the recruit’s trade), compared with 14 weeks for adults;⁴ the higher drop-out rate amongst trainees who enlisted as minors, at 36.6%, compared with 28.3% for adult recruits;⁵ and the longer average service amongst minors who successfully complete training, at 10 years, compared with 7.6 years for adult recruits (based on data from the Infantry).⁶

8. Although minors tend to serve for slightly longer if they complete training, the prolonged duration of training for minors and higher drop-out rate amongst trainees makes recruitment from age 16 and 17 cost-ineffective when all three factors are accounted for.

9. A significant part of the additional expenditure on training minors is spent on delivering basic literacy and numeracy programmes for those who enlisted before finishing their secondary education. A 2012 study on “Armed Forces Basic Skills” by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (“the BIS study”) noted that “delivering literacy and numeracy education to recruits with Entry Level skills represents a large claim on resources, including funding for provision and military training time for literacy and numeracy programmes”.⁷ The study recommended that the MoD “reduce the Services’ literacy and numeracy skills training liability for recruits by adjusting minimum literacy and numeracy standards for joining”.⁸ Raising the minimum recruitment age to ensure that all recruits have completed their basic secondary level education before joining the Army would facilitate implementation of this recommendation and the associated resource savings.

10. Finally, whilst the large majority of recruits under 18 are still in training, approximately 150 minors at any time have completed training but are too young to be deployed (see below).⁹ It costs around £2.65 million per annum to pay the salaries of these soldiers, as well as leaving their unit short-staffed.¹⁰

Conclusion

11. Raising the minimum recruitment age to 18 years would save approximately £94 million per annum and decrease trainee drop-out rates.

II. The Operational Case

12. The UK government interprets its obligations under Article 1¹¹ of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC) by barring minors from deployment ‘on operations where hostile forces are involved’,¹² whilst reserving the right to deploy them in a range of circumstances.¹³

13. As minors constitute a significant percentage of personnel in regiments with front-line responsibilities, this can entail last-minute switching of personnel in units about to be deployed.¹⁴ This causes considerable inconvenience¹⁵ and jeopardises the unit’s effectiveness.

14. Furthermore, the MoD has admitted that its measures to prevent underage recruits from being deployed are “not infallible”.¹⁶ Since 2003, at least 20 minors were accidentally deployed to operational theatres in Afghanistan and Iraq in violation of international law.¹⁷ One was in Helmand for six weeks and took part in armed combat. The MoD attributes these mistakes to “the pressures on units prior to deployment”.¹⁸

15. The difficulties of ensuring effective age screening in units deploying under time pressure are likely to increase when the Reserve forces become more integrated with the Regulars, as per the Army 2020 plans, as the Reserves already have a minimum recruitment age of 18 years. This could lead to an inefficient, two-tier deployment process.

16. In addition to the extra financial costs involved (see above), supporting young recruits with poor literacy and numeracy skills has an operational cost for the Army. The BIS study noted that providing the necessary support was “likely to corrode...operational efficiency”,¹⁹ particularly on active service, and questioned to what extent junior personnel requiring such support could be considered “operationally effective”.²⁰ In contrast, the BIS study noted that “Trainees with sound literacy and numeracy skills are more flexible in the roles they can undertake and are able to work more effectively without supervision”.²¹

Conclusions

17. Raising the minimum recruitment age to 18 years would ensure that all recruits are immediately deployable upon completion of training; the risk of accidental deployment of minors would be eliminated; individual recruits would be more operationally effective.

III. Ensuring Respect for the “Best Interests of the Child”

18. As a State Party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the UK government has a legal obligation to ensure that, “In all actions concerning children [defined as individuals below the age of 18 years], whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”²² Consequently, there is a legal obligation for the MoD to ensure that its recruitment age policy serves the best interests of minors.

19. Article 38(3) of the CRC and Article 3 of OPAC provide a clear indication that the recruitment of minors is undesirable. The fact that these provisions fall short of a total prohibition on enlisting minors in the armed forces does not give states total discretion in their recruitment policies. Armed forces that recruit minors have a duty of care towards them, and must review regularly whether the rights of minor recruits, notably their right to education (CRC Article 28), physical and mental health (CRC Article 24), and freedom from physical or mental violence, abuse, or exploitation (CRC Article 19) are respected.

20. The MoD has repeatedly claimed that recruiting minors into the armed forces provides them with positive education and training opportunities. However, the evidence summarised below demonstrates that recruits enlisting as minors have significantly reduced education, training and employment options compared to those who remain in (civilian) education.

21. Additionally, despite the failure of the MoD to collect data on duty of care issues disaggregated by age, the available evidence demonstrates that recruits enlisting as minors are at significantly increased risk of serious mental health problems, injury, and death upon future deployment.

22. In light of the direct correlation between youth and heightened risks faced by minors in the armed forces, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has expressed concern at the high number of minors recruited by the UK armed forces and recommended the government increase efforts to recruit persons of 18 years and above.²³ With these international legal obligations in mind, Child Soldiers International calls on the Committee to consider whether current policy on recruitment age adequately respects the best interests of young people, or whether these would be better served by raising the enlistment age by two years.

Education and employment

23. The comparative provision of education and training, as well as future employment prospects for those recruited as minors, is examined in detail in Child Soldiers International’s report “Mind the Gap” and the memorandum to the Defence Committee inquiry on the education of Service personnel (see Appendix I).

24. Academic qualifications on offer at the Army Foundation College Harrogate (“AFC Harrogate”)—where approximately 80% of minors undertake Phase One training²⁴—do not include GCSEs, A- or AS-levels, BTECs, HNCs or HNDs.²⁵ Instead, recruits undertake Functional Skills qualifications in English and Maths (Level One) and an IT diploma (Level Two).

25. Functional Skills courses were criticised by a Department for Education commissioned review as ‘conceptually incoherent’ and ‘certainly not in themselves an adequate “maths and English” diet for the 16–19 cohort’.²⁶ The review concluded that Grade A*-C passes in GCSE English and Maths were the educational foundation essential for employability of young people from all backgrounds, regardless of their prior level of educational attainment.²⁷

26. The Army’s only formal target for the education of minors falls far short of this finding, leaving young recruits at a significant disadvantage compared to their peers in mainstream education. Recruits are only expected to achieve a Functional Skills qualification in literacy and numeracy at Level One, which is approximately equivalent to GCSE grade G.²⁸ Furthermore, the MoD does not collect data on how many recruits actually achieve this target.

27. Training at AFC Harrogate focuses predominantly on military skills training such as “weapon handling, fieldcraft, camouflage, survival...[how to] handle and shoot the SA80 rifle...drill...march and parade”.²⁹ This is particularly the case for recruits entering into “combat oriented roles” in the Infantry, Royal Armoured Corps, Royal Artillery and some Royal Logistic Corps.³⁰ Almost half of recruits enlisting as minors—46%—join the Infantry, which entails some of the most specialised combat-specific training of all.³¹

28. This specialised military training does not lead to civilian qualifications and has very little, if any, direct transferable value to future civilian employment. The typical Infantry recruit who joins as a minor will serve for about ten years before leaving to join the civilian employment market in his mid-twenties.³² There, he will be competing against his peers for work, 94% of whom will have continued in civilian education after age 16.³³ Former soldiers (recruited as minors) who were interviewed by Child Soldiers International reported that after leaving the Army they found it very difficult to find work, as their skills and training were considered irrelevant by civilian employers. When asked what advice he would give other young men considering enlisting at 16, one interviewee said, “Go to college. Go to uni. Get a proper education. Don’t go into the Army thinking you’ll get a certificate in mechanics. It’s the wrong way. I got nothing from the Army, nothing. You sign up for 8 years and when you come out you’ve got nothing. You’re in the same boat as when you went in.”³⁴

29. Recruitment materials for AFC Harrogate emphasise the possibility of undertaking an “apprenticeship”. However, the “apprenticeship” referred to is an “Army apprenticeship”, which is the name given to the package described above entailing Functional Skills, IT diploma and basic military training. It is not an apprenticeship in the commonly understood meaning of the term, ie transferable vocational training leading to a nationally recognised professional qualification in, for example, mechanics, plumbing, carpentry or electronics. This type of vocational training is not on offer at AFC Harrogate.³⁵

30. It is evident that the academic qualifications and vocational training on offer to minors in the Army are of greatly reduced range and level to those available to young people in the mainstream education system. In this context, it should be recalled that the Army actively target minors for recruitment, operating in de facto competition with the civilian education sector, rather than simply offering a “last resort” for those who have already left the education system. This policy is contrary to successive governments’ efforts to encourage young people—particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds—to stay on in education to at least age 18, and cannot be considered to be in “the best interests of the child”. One former young soldier interviewed by Child Soldiers International described his experience of Army recruitment as “a fishing net, not a safety net”.³⁶

Mental health and duty of care

31. Whilst minors are not routinely deployed by the British Army, they still face significant risks to their physical and mental well-being. In many cases, the risks faced by those enlisting as minors are significantly higher than for those recruited as adults. A recruitment policy which increases, rather than reduces the risks faced by minors, cannot be considered to be “in the best interests of the child”. Contrary to assertions that Army recruitment provides an escape route for the most disadvantaged and vulnerable young people, the studies listed below indicate that these recruits are precisely the ones most likely to suffer serious negative outcomes. The physical and mental health risks to young recruits are explored in detail in the reports “One Step Forward” and “Catch 16–22” (see Appendix I). The main concerns are summarised below.

32. Whilst military personnel in general have higher rates of common psychological disorders than the civilian population, younger recruits are particularly susceptible.³⁷ The particular vulnerability of adolescents in this respect is noted in the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General Comment on Adolescent Health and Development.³⁸ Numerous studies have shown that, compared with adult recruits, younger recruits face a higher risk of bullying,³⁹ sexual harassment (female recruits),⁴⁰ self-harm,^41,42 and post-traumatic stress disorder (male recruits).⁴³ Compared with civilians of a similar age, younger recruits in the armed forces also face a substantially higher risk of serious alcohol problems⁴⁴ and, amongst male recruits, suicide.⁴⁵ Direct exposure to combat, especially to traumatic events, has been found to increase substantially the risk of committing violent offences; again, youngest recruits are the most susceptible.⁴⁶

33. Given the direct correlation between low age at recruitment and increased incidence of mental health or other duty of care problems, the current recruitment policy cannot be considered to be in the best interests of young people.

Increased risk of fatality

34. Soldiers who enlist as minors are disproportionately likely to join the Army’s front-line roles, because these have the lowest age and qualification entry requirements. Consequently, they face the greatest risk of death or serious injury once they turn 18 and can be deployed. For example, the Infantry contains one third of all the Army’s minors even though it comprises only one quarter of the Army overall;⁴⁷ Infantry fatality and casualty rates in Afghanistan are five times those faced by soldiers in the rest of the Army.⁴⁸

35. By allowing minors to enlist into Army frontline combat roles at an earlier age than they can enlist into the other, less hazardous roles (such as technical support or logistics) the MoD obliges minors—particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds with few qualifications—to shoulder a greater burden of risk than adult recruits throughout their entire Army career. This cannot be considered to be in their best interests.

Safeguards

36. Whilst written parental consent is compulsory for the enlistment of minors, this does not necessarily safeguard young recruits’ best interests effectively. Contrary to OPAC’s requirement that recruitment of minors should only take place with the “informed consent of the person’s parents or legal guardians”,⁴⁹ the MoD does not require recruiters to make any contact with parents/guardians. One senior recruiter said in 2007 that “most” recruits’ parents never meet recruiting staff.⁵⁰ This statement is borne out by the experience of young recruits interviewed by Child Soldiers International, who confirmed that their parents did not speak to recruiters or visit the recruiting office until after the application process was complete, if at all.⁵¹ The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has expressed concern at this practice and called on the UK to “Ensure that parents are included from the outset and during the entire process of recruitment and enlistment.”⁵²

37. Recruitment literature for recruits and their parents does not seriously attempt to explain the complex terms of service or increased risks faced by recruits enlisting as minors, and the guidance papers provided to applicants are complicated. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that parents granting consent are aware of the risks, difficulties and complex legal obligations of enlistment. Evidence from the independent information and advice services At Ease and BeforeYouSignUp.info indicates that many parents are confused about the terms of service and struggle to find simple and accurate information about their child’s rights and obligations.⁵³

Conclusions

38. Current recruitment policy does not respect “the best interests of the child” and puts minors at significantly increased risk of serious long-term physical and psychological harm compared to adult recruits.

IV. Feasibility

39. All European Union (EU) states field armed forces comparable in size, per capita, to those of the UK;⁵⁴ Appendix III tabulates military recruitment data for all EU countries. It shows that in 25 member states compulsory education ends at 16 or earlier, and that the minimum age for military recruitment is higher than this in every state except the UK. Indeed, 21 of the 27 EU states recruit from age 18, leaving a two-year gap during which time a young person can continue in education or look for civilian work.⁵⁵ This shows that linking the minimum age of military recruitment with the national school leaving age is unnecessary.

40. Traditionally, the armed forces have relied heavily on recruiting minors to meet the trained strength requirement. In the past, removing this age group from the pool of potential recruits might have left staffing shortages but this risk is rapidly diminishing. The proportion of minors entering the armed forces has fallen in the last decade, from over a third to under a quarter. Although 23% of Army recruits in fiscal year 201213 were minors,⁵⁶ the minimum age of enlistment could still be raised without detriment to the trained strength requirement, for at least two reasons.

41. First, the Army discharges a large number of personnel under the rubric of Service No Longer Required (SNLR). This is an administrative category used for various reasons including the discretionary discharge of personnel who wish to leave but have no legal right to do so, as well as discharges for minor offences. However, most such discharges are of personnel who have served for some years but not progressed up the ranks. Currently, the Army prefers to discharge these soldiers on the grounds that they are less fit and motivated than younger recruits. This contrasts with the Navy and RAF, which rarely discharge using SNLR.

42. The Army’s policy on SNLR can be distressing for personnel who are laid off without the right of the redundancy process they would expect in civilian life. It is also extremely costly to the Army. In 2006, 2,775 soldiers were discharged for SNLR—more than the total number of 16 year-olds the Army recruited that year.⁵⁷ To replace these recruits with new enlistments at 16 would have cost in the order of £400 million at 2010–11 prices.⁵⁸ So, had the Army retained just half of the recruits discharged for SNLR, it could have saved up to £200 million that year.

43. Second, Government plans to restructure the Army through to 2020 will see a large number of regular troops replaced with Reservists. Assuming that rates of adult recruitment remain as they are now, the Army’s overhaul will eliminate the need to recruit minors.⁵⁹ By 2020, the number of enlisted (ie not officers) personnel is forecast to fall from around 89,200 to 71,600.⁶⁰ If the Army relied entirely on adult recruits to meet this requirement it would need to enlist 11,476 per year (assuming the current adult in-training drop-out rate of 28.3%). This is around 900 more adults than the Army recruited in 2009–10.⁶¹ Since phasing out the recruitment of minors would result in an increase in the recruitment of adults (as minors who were genuinely dedicated to joining the Army would do so as they turned 18), the Army could comfortably expect to meet this target by relying solely on adult recruits.

44. As an initial step, recruitment of 16 year-olds could be phased out immediately. Since 2001–02, the proportion of 16-year-olds joining the Army has been falling and as of 2012–13 stood at 9.2% of the total intake (880 individuals).⁶² Replacing these with older recruits is readily feasible.

Conclusions

45. Phasing out the recruitment of minors is readily achievable in the space of a few years, without detriment to the Army 2020 trained strength requirement.

V. Recommendations

46. Despite repeated calls on it to do so over the past decade, the MoD has never reviewed the minimum Army recruitment age. It therefore lacks a comprehensive evidence base on which to support maintaining the current policy. This policy is, moreover, called into question on financial, operational and child rights grounds by the data summarised in this memorandum and explored in detail in the documents listed in Appendix I.

47. Child Soldiers International urges the Committee to call on the MoD to undertake a full, independent review of the minimum recruitment age without further delay, including a feasibility study for phasing out the recruitment of minors by 2020, with a deadline for reporting back on its findings.

APPENDIX I

FURTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Recent reports and briefing papers published by Child Soldiers International containing material relevant to this inquiry include:

Memorandum to the Defence Select Committee for the Armed Forces Bill
Published February 2011.
Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmarmed/779/779.pdf

Catch 16–22: Recruitment and retention of minors by the British armed forces.
Published March 2011.
Available at: http://www.child-soldiers.org/research_report_reader.php?id=290

Mind the Gap: Education for minors in the British armed forces.
Published July 2012.
Available at: http://www.child-soldiers.org/research_report_reader.php?id=337

Memorandum to the Defence Select Committee Inquiry: The Armed Forces Covenant in Action? Part 4: Education of Service Personnel
Published January 2013.
Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/942/m1.htm

One Step Forward: The case for ending recruitment of minors by the British armed forces.
Published April 2013.
Available at: http://www.child-soldiers.org/research_report_reader.php?id=650

A hard copy of each of these documents is enclosed with this submission. Additional copies are available upon request.

APPENDIX II

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ENLISTING MINORS AND ADULTS INTO THE ARMY

The following analysis is extracted from the report “One Step Forward” (see Appendix I). Limitations of the data and calculations are detailed in full in the original report; the variation in all cases is small and does not materially affect the conclusions.

1. The Army enlists non-officer recruits as Junior Entrants or Standard Entrants, depending on the age and trade of the recruit.⁶³ Generally, Junior Entrants are soldiers beginning training aged between 16 and 17 years and five months, although there is some minimal variation.⁶⁴ In this analysis ‘17½’ is used for convenience to refer to the upper age limit for Junior Entry. All soldiers older than this enlist as Standard Entrants.

2. Initial training for all recruits divides into two phases. Phase One is basic soldier training carried out at a few centres around the UK. On completion of Phase One, recruits join their regimental or corps units for Phase Two training, which is of variable length and specific to the recruit’s assigned role.

3. Phase One training is conducted in separate institutions for Junior and Standard Entrants. In 2010–11 all Junior Entrants were enrolled into either the Army Foundation College in Harrogate (“AFC(H)”) for 50 weeks or the Army Technical Foundation College in Winchester (“ATFC(W)”) for 23 weeks.⁶⁵ Phase One courses for Standard Entrants are much shorter, at 14 weeks, and carried out at other centres.

Junior and Standard Entry: Breakdown

4. In fiscal year 2010–11 the Army recruited 14,180 soldiers, of whom 2,390 were aged under 18 at enlistment.⁶⁶ Of these, 1,922 (80%) were Junior Entrants, with 1,315 attending AFC(H) and 607 attending ATFC(W).⁶⁷ This leaves 468 (20%) minors joining as Standard Entrants (ie they were aged at least 17 years and five months when they began training).⁶⁸

Recruitment Costs

5. In 2010–11 the cost of recruiting a soldier, including selection but excluding marketing and training, was £10,000. This cost does not vary between those who are under or over 18 years of age.⁶⁹

Phase One Training costs

6. Since the duration of Phase One training differs between Junior and Standard Entry, the training spend for each category of recruit and the amount of salary paid during the course also differ. Data from the MoD showing the extent of these differences in 2010–11 are shown in the table below:⁷⁰

PHASE ONE TRAINING COST (PER TRAINEE)

	Training costs	Salary costs	Total
Junior Entry
at AFC(H)	£64,458	£29,000	£93,458
at AFTC(W)	£53,985	£25,000	£78,985
Standard Entry
at ATC, Pirbright	£21,318	£11,000-£12,000	£32,818
at ATR, Bassingbourn	£26,992	£11,000-£12,000	£38,492
at ITC, Catterick	£26,543	£11,000-£12,000	£38,043

COSTS COMPARISON OF JUNIOR AND STANDARD ENTRY

Cost	Per trainee	Cohort
Junior Entry costs, 2010–11
Estimated no. of Junior Entrants:	1,922
of which joining AFC(H):	1,315
of which joining ATFC(W):	607
of recruitment	£10,000	£19,220,000 (n=1,922)
of training (Phase One)
AFC(H):	£93,458	£122,897,270(n=1,315)
ATFC(W):	£78,985	£47,943,895 (n=607)
Total cost of recruitment and Phase One training	£88,985—£103,458	£190,061,165

STANDARD ENTRY COSTS, 2010–11

Cost	Per trainee	Cohort
Estimated no. of Standard Entrants:	12,258
of recruitment	£10,000	£122,580,000 (n=12,258)
of training (Phase One)
minimum (at ATC, Pirbright)	£32,818	£402,283,044 (n=12,258)
maximum (at ATR, Bassingbourn)	£38,492	£471,834,936 (n=12,258)
Total cost of recruitment and Phase One training	£42,818—£48,492	£524,863,044—£594,414,936

In-Training Drop-out and Post-Training Career Length

7. Two further factors significantly affect the cost-effectiveness of recruiting Junior and Standard Entrants. The first is the drop-out rate amongst trainees, which is higher amongst minors, at 36.6%, compared with 28.3% amongst adults.⁷¹ The second is the average career length of those who successfully complete training, which (based on data from the Infantry) is longer amongst those who enlisted as minors, at 10 years, compared with 7.6 years for adult recruits.⁷²

8. Given that 80% of minors enlisting in the Army join as Junior Entrants, this analysis assumes that enlistment age (under or over 18) may be used as a proxy for entry category (Junior or Standard) for the purposes of estimating drop-out rates and average career length in these groups. Furthermore, as the Infantry is the largest part of the Army, this paper also tentatively assumes that differences in Infantry career length according to age at enlistment are broadly similar throughout the rest of the Army.

9. With an in-training drop-out rate amongst minors of 36.6%, the 1,922 soldiers recruited as Junior Entrants in 2010–11 would result in 1,219 completing Phase Two and joining the trained strength.

10. To recruit and successfully train the same number of soldiers as Standard Entrants in 2010–11, the Army would have had to enlist 1,700, assuming a drop-out rate of 28.3% for adult trainees. Based on the per-trainee cost of Standard Entrants (£42,818—£48,492), the total cost of recruiting and training 1,700 new soldiers in this group is between £72,790,600 and £82,436,400.

11. As discussed, the cost-effectiveness of recruiting at Junior and Standard Entry depends further on the average career length for each group. Using data on Infantry career length based on age at enlistment as a proxy for Junior and Standard Entrants’ career length in the Army as a whole, the equivalent cost of recruiting Standard Entrants for a nominal equivalent ten-year career may be calculated as follows.

A = Estimated total cost of recruiting 2010–11 Junior Entry cohort:	£190,061,165
B = Estimated cost of recruiting 2010–11 Junior Entry cohort as Standard Entrants:	£95,792,430 to £108,486,302
Cost before adjusting for career length:	£72,790,600 to £82,436,400
Adjustment factor for average career length of Standard Entrants who complete training:	x 1.316 (ie 10/7.6)
A-B = Potential annual saving from phasing out Junior Entry (based on FY 2010–11):	£81,574,863 to £94,268,735

Conclusion

12. The cost of recruiting and training minors is 75–98% higher, per successfully trained intake of soldiers completing a nominal ten-year Army career, than that of recruiting adults. The estimated annual saving from entirely replacing Junior Entry with Standard Entrants would be £81.5—£94 million.

APPENDIX III

ARMED FORCES RECRUITMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

EU states which recruit minors into their armed forces are bold italics.

Member State	Age at which compulsory education ends (as of 2007)73	Minimum age for military recruitment (as of 2012)74	Conscription practised (as of 2011)75		Size of armed forces as percentage of population (as of 2005)76
Austria	14	17 (low numbers)		Yes		0.42%
Belgium	18	18		No		0.39%
Bulgaria	14	18		No		0.66%
Cyprus	14	17 (low numbers)		Yes		1.33%
Czech Republic	15	18		No		0.56%
Denmark	16	18		Yes		0.42%
Estonia	15	18		Yes		0.41%
Finland	16	18		Yes		0.52%
France	16	17½		No		0.41%
Germany	18	17 (training only)		No		0.34%
Greece	14	18		Yes		1.60%
Hungary	16	18		No		0.33%
Ireland	15	18		No		0.25%
Italy	15	18		No		0.34%
Latvia	15	18		No		0.21%
Lithuania	15	18		No		0.37%
Luxembourg	15	18		No		0.20%
Malta	15	18		No		0.53%
Netherlands	17	17½ (training only)		No		0.33%
Poland	15	18		No		0.43%
Portugal	14	18		No		0.43%
Romania	14	18		No		0.45%
Slovakia	15	18		No		0.41%
Slovenia	14	18		No		0.33%
Spain	16	18		No		0.35%
Sweden	16	18		No		0.31%
United Kingdom	16	16		No		0.35%

May 2013

References

1 Child Soldiers International is a human rights research and advocacy organization, formerly known as the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. Child Soldiers International seeks to end the military recruitment and use in hostilities of child soldiers (boys and girls below the age of 18) and other human rights abuses resulting from their association with armed forces or groups. We seek the release of child soldiers from armed forces or groups, promote their successful return to civilian life and accountability for those who recruit and use them. Child Soldiers International promotes global adherence to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.

2 Army recruitment is divided between “Junior” entry, for those enlisting below the age of 17 ½ years, and “Standard” entry for those enlisting age 17 ½ and above.

3 The analysis compares the cost of recruiting and training new soldiers to the end of Phase One training. Figures for the cost of Phase Two training are not available, although the MoD states they do not differ according to age at enlistment. Hansard: HC Deb, 15 December 2011, c865W.

4 Hansard: HC Deb, 15 December 2011, c865W.

5 Army data for 2010-11. Hansard: HC Deb, 25 November 2011, c595W.

6 Hansard: HC Deb, 12 September 2011, c1007W (based on age at enlistment of those leaving between 1 July 2009 and 31 July 2011).

7 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, BIS Research Paper Number 78: Armed Forces Basic Skills Longitudinal Study Part I, June 2012, page 36 (hereinafter “BIS Research Paper”).

8 ibid, page 14.

9 Based on the position at 1 July 2012. Hansard: HC Deb, 10 September 2012 c74W.

10 (Trained recruit annual salary 2013/14 = £17,690) x 150 trained under-18s = £2,653,500 per annum. Armed Forces Pay Review Body, 2013-2014 United Kingdom Rank - Rating & Wage Chart, online at http://www.navycs.com/uk/2013-british-military-pay.html (accessed 4 April 2013); and Hansard: HC Deb, 10 September 2012 c74W.

11 As a State Party to OPAC, the UK must “take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities”. OPAC Article 1.

12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (nd): Practice Relating to Rule 137: Participation of Child Soldiers in Hostilities, Section VI: Other National Practice, online at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_gb_rule137 (accessed 21 August 2012).

13 The UK reserves the right to deploy minors on operations where hostile forces are involved when the MoD deems that there is a genuine military need, the situation is urgent, it is otherwise not practicable to withdraw minors before deployment, or it would undermine operational effectiveness. Cited in Child Soldiers International, Louder than words: An agenda for action to end state use of child soldiers 2012, p. 47.

14 HC Deb, 19 January 2011, c824W. As of 1 April 2010, 2.7 per cent of army personnel were under 18 but in the three largest front-line regiments (Infantry, Artillery, Armoured Corps), the proportion of minors was higher than this average, at between 3.4 per cent and 3.6 per cent.

15 Army officer of senior rank, personal communication, November 2008.

16 Hansard: HC Deb, 1 February 2007, c508w.

17 Child Soldiers International, Louder than words: An agenda for action to end state use of child soldiers,2012, p. 49; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Catch 16-22: Recruitment and retention of minors in the British Armed Forces, 2011, p. 5.

18 Hansard: HC Deb, 18 October 2011, c868W.

19 BIS Research Paper: Part 1, page 10; BIS Research Paper: Part 2, page 207.

20 BIS Research Paper: Part 1, page 59.

21 ibid, page 60.

22 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 3.1.

23 UK, CRC/C/15/Add.188, paragraph 54, 2002.

24 HC Deb, 6 December 2010, c2W.

25 Hansard: HC Deb, 19 July 2011, c862W and HC Deb, 30 November 2011, c976W, in Child Soldiers International Mind the Gap: Education for Minors in the British Armed Forces, 2012.

26 Alison Wolf, Review of Vocational Education – The Wolf Report, Department for Education, 2011, p 84, 170.

27 Ibid. p. 8.

28 Hansard: HC Deb, 30 November 2011, c975W.

29 See “Army Colleges” brochure available at www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/ArmyJuniorE-LowRes.pdf.

30 The combat-focused nature of these roles is highlighted by the fact that the corps which Harrogate “Long Course” graduates enter have consistently had the highest death and injury rates throughout the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan – HC Deb, 6 December 2010, c2W.

31 HC Deb, 10 January 2012, c12W.

32 Hansard: HC Deb, 12 September 2011, c1007W (based on age at enlistment of those leaving between 1 July 2009 and 31 July 2011).

33 Alison Wolf, op. cit., 2011, p.51.

34 Child Soldiers International telephone interview with former soldier “R”, 10 May 2011.

35 HC Deb, 13 September 2011, c1147W.

36 Child Soldiers International interview with former soldier “B”, 23 May 2011.

37 For example, see N Fear et al., 'What are the consequences of deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan on the mental health of the UK armed forces? A cohort study', The Lancet, 13 May 2010, online at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(10)60672-1/fulltext (accessed 13 May 2010). For civilian comparators, see, for example, S McManus et al. [eds.], ‘Adult psychiatric morbidity in England, 2007: Results of a household survey’, National Health Service, 2009, online at http://www.ic.nhs.uk/pubs/psychiatricmorbidity07 (accessed 13 May 2010). Note that the cohort age range for these studies varies and is not specific to minors in all cases. However, the heightened risks demonstrated for recruits at the youngest end of the studied age scale is consistent throughout and it is therefore reasonable to conclude that minors are included in the most at-risk group in each study.

38 CRC/GC/2003/4: General comment No. 4: Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

39 There is some evidence to indicate that bullying in armed forces training establishments is higher than amongst the trained strength. See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Catch 16-22: Recruitment and retention of minors in the British armed forces, 2011, p. 9-10.

40 A report commissioned by the MoD from the Equal Opportunities Commission in 2006 found that 15 per cent of all female recruits surveyed and 20 per cent of female recruits aged 16-23 reported having experienced a ‘particularly upsetting’ experience of unwanted sexual behaviour directed at them in the previous 12 months. Rutherford, Sarah; Schneider, Robin; Walmsley, Alexis, ‘Quantitative & Qualitative Research into Sexual Harassment in the Armed Forces’, (Equal Opportunities Commission and the Ministry of Defence, 22 March 2006), p. 22.

4 Amongst male recruits, pre-enlistment vulnerability to a number of negative health outcomes including PTSD and previous self-harm is associated with ‘being single, of lower rank, having low educational attainment and serving in the Army’, all of which are typical of the profile of those who enlist in the armed forces as minors. Iversen, A et al. ,‘Influence of childhood adversity on health among male UK military personnel’, The British Journal of Psychiatry, 2007, 191: p. 506-511.

42 Pinder, R et al., ‘Self-harm and attempted suicide among UK Armed Forces personnel: Results of a cross-sectional survey’, International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 21 June 2011, 58: p. 433-439

43 Iversen, A et al., Influence of childhood adversity on health among male UK military personnel op. cit., 2007.

44 A 2010 Lancet study found that 26.1 per cent of armed forces personnel aged 18-24 were ‘drinking heavily’, compared with 8.8 per cent of civilian men in a similar age group (16-24); the rate of heavy drinking amongst this age group was the highest in the armed forces. ‘Drinking heavily’ is defined as ‘a high level of alcohol problems’ including ‘feeling of guilt or remorse after drinking, blackouts, alcohol-related injury, other concern about alcohol consumption’. N Fear et al. (2010) op. cit.; S McManus et al. [eds.] (2009) op. cit.

45 Male recruits under 20 face a higher risk of suicide than the general population; for young male Army recruits, for example, the risk is 47% higher than for the general population. Defence Analytical Services and Advice (DASA) Suicide and open verdict deaths in the UK Regular Armed Forces: numbers and standardised mortality ratios, 1984 - 2010, males only, online at http://www.dasa.mod.uk/modintranet/UKDS/UKDS2011/c3/table306.php (accessed 22 August 2012).

46 D Macmanus et al., ' Violent offending by UK military personnel deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan: a data linkage cohort study', The Lancet, 16 March 2013, online at http://www.lancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(13)60354-2/fulltext (accessed 16 March 2013).

47 Hansard: HC Deb, 19 January 2011, c824W.

48 Calculated from Ministry of Defence, British Fatalities: Operations in Afghanistan online at https://www.gov.uk/government/fields-of-operation/afghanistan (accessed 13 March 2013). The casualty:fatality ratio is assumed here to be constant for infantry and non-infantry soldiers. See Appendix IV.

49 OPAC Article 3.3: “States Parties that permit voluntary recruitment into their national armed forces under the age of 18 years shall maintain safeguards to ensure, as a minimum, that: ... (b) Such recruitment is carried out with the informed consent of the person’s parents or legal guardians”.

50 Senior recruiter, London, personal communication with David Gee, November 2007.

51 Child Soldiers International telephone interview with former soldier “D” (enlisted aged 16), 13 May 2013.

52 CRC/C/OPAC/GBR/CO/1.

53 At Ease, personal communication, 2007; www.BeforeYouSignUp.info, 2012. This weakness in the safeguarding regime may be compounded when the legal guardian is an appointed representative of a local authority who has limited personal knowledge of their ward and insufficient time to investigate the issues involved.

54 David Gee, ‘Informed Choice? Armed Forces Recruitment Practice in the United Kingdom’, 2008p. 24.

55 See Appendix III.

56 DASA UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel Report, 1April 2013.

57 2006 is the most recent year for which SNLR statistics are available. Information obtained from the MoD by the author under the Freedom of Information Act, disclosed on 5 October 2007; also DASA, TSP 19 - UK Regular Forces Intake And Outflow By Age For Financial Year 2005/06: Tables 4 and 5, [data tables], 18 May 2006, online at http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/tsp19/pdfs/tsp19_2005_2006.pdf, (accessed 5 September 2007).

58 SNLR = 2,775. (New enlistments: 4,377 [to account for 36.6% expected drop-out rate] = 2,755 recruits completing training) x (Cost of Junior Entry recruit = £93,458) = £409million. For breakdown of costs of recruiting for Junior Entry, see Appendix I.

59 Hansard: HC Deb, 5 July 2012, c1085-1088. According to the plans, by 2020 the Army will be formed of two components. The first will be a ‘reaction force’ comprising mainly well-trained regular troops to provide a rapid, agile force-projection capability. The second is envisaged to be an ‘adaptable force’ of regular and reserve personnel for long-term defence roles, ceremonial duties, and supplementing the reaction force as necessary. The Government plans to maintain the overall size of the Army at 110,000-120,000 but use the creation of the adaptable force as an opportunity to replace a large number of regular personnel with reservists aged 18 and above. Greater use will also be made of private contractors.

60 Given the current average career length of 8.7 years and assuming this attrition rate is constant, the Army currently needs to enlist and fully train 10,256 new recruits each year to replace those who leave. By 2020, this requirement will fall to 8,288, assuming that all other factors remain the same. Proportion of Officers to Other Ranks extrapolated from DASA, Table 2.5b Full-time trained strength and requirement, at 1 April each year at http://www.dasa.mod.uk/modintranet/UKDS/UKDS2011/c2/table205b.php (accessed 1 September 2012).

61 This is based on the current in-training drop-out rate for adults of 28.3 per cent.

62 DASA UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel Report, 1 April 2013.

63 Standard Entry is sometimes also called Senior Entry.

64 For example, soldiers joining the Royal Mechanical and Electrical Engineers may join as Standard Entrants once they reach 17 years and one month of age. Ministry of Defence (nd): ‘REME soldier’ online at http://www.army.mod.uk/reme/3203.aspx (accessed 15 June 2012); Ministry of Defence (nd): ‘AFC Harrogate’ online at http://www.army.mod.uk/training_education/training/7127.aspx (accessed 15 June 2012); Ministry of Defence (nd): ‘ATFC Winchester’ online at http://www.army.mod.uk/training_education/training/7409.aspx (accessed 15 June 2012).

65 Hansard: HC Deb, 15 December 2011, c865W. As of 2012 ATFC(W) stopped providing Junior Entry training and all Junior Entrants now train at AFC(H).

66 Hansard: HC Deb, 30 November 2011, c977W; HL Deb, 19 October 2011, c67W.

67 During the 2010-11 academic year, 55 per cent of recruits who were under 18 at enlistment joined AFC(H) and 25.4 per cent joined ATFC(W) to begin their Phase One training (Hansard: HC Deb, 19 July 2011, c861W; HC Deb, 8 December 2011, c426W). Assuming that no Junior Entrants were trained in institutions other than AFC(H) and ATFC(W) and the proportions of AFC(H) and ATFC(W) entrants for the academic year are the same as for the fiscal year, this suggests that in fiscal year 2010-11 there were approximately 1,922 (80 per cent) Junior Entrants.

68 Although figures for minors who joined as Standard Entrants (i.e. aged 17½+ at enlistment) are not published, it is consistent with the data to assume that the remaining 19.6 per cent of those recruited as minors in 2010-11 were in this group. In 2010-11 the DASA stopped collecting age-related data for the armed forces’ annual intake. However, over the three previous years, the proportion of minors recruited aged 16 and 17 has varied little, and stood at 47.7 per cent and 52.3 per cent respectively. This allows an estimate of the number of new army recruits aged 16-17½ in 2010-11, based on the known number of minors recruited that year. For historical data, see DASA, UK Regular Forces Intake And Outflow By Age For Financial Year 2007/08, 2009; UK Regular Forces Intake And Outflow By Age For Financial Year 2008/09; UK Regular Forces Intake And Outflow By Age For Financial Year 2009-10, online at http://www.dasa.mod.uk (accessed 11 June 2012).

69 Hansard: HC Deb, 15 December 2011, c865W (rounded in original source to nearest £1,000).

70 Hansard: HC Deb, 13 September 2011, c1146W; Hansard: HC Deb, 15 December 2011, c865W. Salary rates are rounded in original source to nearest £1,000; for the purpose of producing a total per-trainee cost for Standard Entrants’ Phase One training, the average salary rate has been assumed at £11,500.

71 Hansard: HC Deb, 25 November 2011, c595W.

72 Hansard: HC Deb, 12 September 2011, c1007W (based on age at enlistment of those leaving between 1 July 2009 and 31 July 2011).

73 The data is from 2007 in most cases. United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture Institute for Statistics, Education, 2009, cited at ChartsBin, http://chartsbin.com/view/qpp (accessed 24 September 2009).

74 Child Soldiers International, ’,2012, p. 142-160. In Malta’s case, the law allows for military recruitment from age 17 but this has not taken place since 1970.

75 European Bureau for Conscientious Objection,Report To The Committee On Civil Liberties, Justice And Home Affairs Of The European Parliament, 2011, online at http://www.ebco-beoc.org/files/2011-EBCO-REPORT-EU.pdf (accessed 23 August 2012).

76 Calculated from Eurostat: ‘Total Population’ [table – data for 1 January 2005], online at http://tinyurl.com/zzasn (accessed 5 June 2007); and Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004, 17 November 2004, online at http://www.child-soldiers.org/library/global-reports (accessed 5 June 2007).