Conclusions and recommendations
Nomenclature
1. It
is acknowledged by several contributors to the inquiry that the
terms remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) and remotely piloted air(craft)
system (RPAS) are not yet widely adopted. Nonetheless, we believe
these are the most accurate terms to use when referring to the
armed MQ-9 Reaper operated by the RAF in Afghanistan. These aircraft
are flown remotely by a human pilot who, along with a wider crew
operating from a ground control station, has general oversight
and control. In relation to existing unarmed systems used by the
Army for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR),
it may be more appropriate to refer to unmanned air systems (UAS).
(Paragraph 20)
Automation and autonomy
2. There
is considerable potential for development of future remotely piloted
air systems which have a greater degree of autonomy, however,
the MoD has stated explicitly that remotely piloted combat missions
will always involve human operators and pilots. We support this
policy for all current and future UK armed remotely piloted air
system operations. (Paragraph 28)
Current British doctrine
3. The
conclusion to Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 conceded that its relevance
was "of the order of 18 months and during that period much
of its detail and many of the issues raised will be overtaken
by events". Now, some three years later it is clear that
further consideration of many of the issues the Joint Doctrine
Note raises is overdue. We recommend that the MoD revisit these
issues and publish an updated Joint Doctrine Note setting out
its current approach to remotely piloted aircraft systems no later
than September 2014. (Paragraph 38)
Personnel
4. It
was very clear from the visit to XIII Squadron and discussions
with Reaper aircrew that all were experienced professional personnel
with a clear purpose and keen understanding of the Rules of Engagement
which govern their operations. Despite being remote from the battle
space they exhibited a strong sense of connection to the life
and death decisions they are sometimes required to take. This
was in stark contrast to the image portrayed by some commentators
of "drone" pilots as video gaming "warrior geeks".
We record here our appreciation for the important role they continue
to perform in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 57)
A combined Reaper fleet?
5. In
light of these apparently inconsistent answers by Ministers, we
call upon the MoD to provide absolute clarity about whether UK
Reaper aircraft have ever been operated by US personnel outside
the launch and recovery phase. If public confidence is to be built
around the use of remotely piloted air systems it is important
that it is clear that UK aircraft have only been utilised within
Afghanistan and always in accordance with UK rules of engagement.
(Paragraph 62)
Civilian casualties
6. We
consider it important that the MoD is as transparent as it can
be about remotely piloted air system operations in order to build
public confidence about their use and to debunk myths and counter
misinformation. We note that a review is conducted and a report
produced after every remotely piloted aircraft weapons release.
While the public do not need to know every time weapons are released
they do need to feel confident that rules of engagement are applied
and followed consistently. (Paragraph 66)
7. UK operations in
Afghanistan have drawn heavily on new and emerging remotely piloted
air system technologies in order to offer better protection to
UK, ISAF and Afghan forces on the ground. The intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance capabilities of our forces have been enhanced
immeasurably. More controversial has been the use of the Reaper
remotely piloted air system platform to conduct strike operations
using precision-guided weapons. Following this inquiry, we are
satisfied that RAF Reaper pilots and flight crew have a high level
of experience and appropriate training to conduct such strikes.
We are also satisfied that the RAF rules of engagement for Reaper
operations, as outlined to us directly by senior RAF officers
during this inquiry, are common with those in force for manned
aircraft, and provide a high level of assurance that, as far as
possible, civilian casualties will be avoided and collateral damage
minimised. (Paragraph 67)
Constraints on the use of remotely piloted air
systems
8. There
are many constraints on the use of remotely piloted air systems
in shared airspace whether in the UK or elsewhere. In its response
to this report we invite the MoD to set out in detail what action
the Government as a whole is taking domestically and internationally
to facilitate the development of the technologies, systems and
regulatory changes which will be required prior to the full and
safe integration of remotely piloted air systems into shared airspace.
(Paragraph 82)
Integration post-Afghanistan
9. We
call upon the MoD to set out which of the existing remotely piloted
and unmanned air systems it intends to retain beyond the end of
operations in Afghanistan and to confirm that continuing operating
costs can be funded from within its core programme budget from
financial year 2014-15 onwards. (Paragraph 92)
ISTAR force composition
10. In
its response to this report the MoD should set out how remotely
piloted air systems, including Reaper, fit within its overall
ISTAR strategy. (Paragraph 97)
Emerging technologies
11. Due
to significant delays to the programme, it is now unlikely that
Watchkeeper will be utilised on operations in Afghanistan, the
theatre for which it was originally procured. The MoD should set
out in detail in its response to this report the reasons for the
delays experienced in bringing Watchkeeper to full operating capability
and the lessons identified for future remotely piloted air system
programmes. (Paragraph 102)
12. It is of vital
importance that the lessons identified from the much delayed Watchkeeper
system inform the development and trials of all future remotely
piloted aircraft and any associated weapons systems by the MoD.
In its response to this report we call on the MoD to provide us
with a more detailed update on the Scavenger and Taranis programmes
and explain how they will contribute to future UK air combat and
ISTAR capabilities. (Paragraph 108)
13. We recognise the
importance of sensor technology for ISTAR capability whether deployed
on manned or unmanned platforms. We consider it vital that UK
ISTAR assets are equipped with up to date sensor suites which
maximise their effectiveness. We call upon the MoD to provide
us with details of its planned investment in future sensor technology
and exploitation for remotely piloted air systems and other ISTAR
assets. (Paragraph 112)
14. We note the potential
for deployment of new and increasingly accurate weapons systems,
including the Brimstone missile, on UK armed remotely piloted
aircraft. We call on the MoD to provide us, in its response to
our report, with a progress report on current trials and future
plans. (Paragraph 114)
Partnering—strategic choices
15. As
part of SDSR 2015, the MoD has a strategic choice to make about
the future direction for UK remotely piloted air systems. Post-Afghanistan,
a commitment to the existing partnership arrangements with the
USAF, including a continuing presence at Creech Airforce Base,
would provide the RAF with access to future upgrades to the Reaper
platform and training opportunities for UK Reaper aircrew which
would be likely to prove problematic in the UK given the airspace
restrictions which exist presently. However, with other European
NATO nations, including France, Italy and the Netherlands now
operating Reaper it may be advantageous to form more collaborative
arrangements at a European level in order to share experience
and seek economies of scale for the delivery of training and maintenance.
In the medium to long term, projects such as Scavenger and the
Future Combat Aircraft System demonstration programme being developed
with France may require a shift in focus. We recommend that the
MoD clarifies its intentions and explains how European level co-operation
can be co-ordinated with existing bi-lateral partnership projects.
(Paragraph 124)
Non-military uses
16. Remotely
piloted air systems have extensive potential for non-military
uses in the UK and overseas. Projects such as those developed
by the ASTRAEA consortium have begun to test the technologies
and operating procedures required to make the use of RPAS more
commonplace and research into the potential for other uses is
continuing. We welcome Government support to strengthen UK research
and development programmes which have the potential to expand
the nascent civilian market for remotely piloted air systems in
the future. We call upon the Government to set out in detail what
joint working is currently ongoing across government departments
to consider the implications for the utilisation of remotely piloted
air systems in the civilian environment. In relation to the issue
of privacy, we recognise that existing laws which protect personal
privacy, including data protection and surveillance, whether by
the police, state intelligence agencies or private companies,
will need to be carefully reviewed and updated. (Paragraph 131)
Ethical and legal issues
17. It
is important in maintaining the public acceptability of remotely
piloted air systems that the perception cannot be allowed to develop
that their increased use has in some way reduced the threshold
for military intervention. We call on the MoD to set out how it
intends to address this potential problem in its response to this
report. (Paragraph 137)
18. We welcome the
report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.
We note that he has identified a number of legal questions on
which there is no clear international consensus. We recommend
that the UK Government engage actively in the debate on these
matters and report on progress in its response to our report.
(Paragraph 157)
Targeted killings
19. We
acknowledge that over the last few years there has been a growing
concern in relation to the sharing of intelligence with allies
and the uses to which such data may contribute. While the issues
raised by Reprieve stray beyond the terms of reference for our
inquiry and indeed the remit of the Defence Committee, we do believe
that there should be greater transparency in relation to safeguards
and limitations the UK Government has in place for the sharing
of intelligence. Matters concerning the activities of the intelligence
services are more appropriately addressed by the Intelligence
and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC). We invite the ISC
to consider in future work programmes the issues raised with us
during this inquiry which fall within its remit. (Paragraph 161)
20. The licensing
of arms exports and other controlled goods is a matter for the
Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC). We will work with our
colleagues on CAEC to ensure that this issue is given appropriate
scrutiny. (Paragraph 162)
Conclusions
21.
We consider that it is of vital importance that a clear distinction
be drawn between the actions of UK Armed Forces operating remotely
piloted air systems in Afghanistan and those of other States elsewhere.
On the basis of the evidence we have received we are satisfied
that UK remotely piloted air system operations comply fully with
international law. (Paragraph 163)
22. We recommend
that the MoD should continue its public awareness programme surrounding
remotely piloted air system operations in order to aid public
understanding and acceptance. (Paragraph 164)
23. We note the conclusion
of the UN Special Rapporteur that in any case in which civilians
have been, or appear to have been, killed, there is an obligation
on the State responsible to conduct a prompt, independent and
impartial fact-finding inquiry and to provide a detailed public
explanation. We recognise that this is not a simple and straightforward
request as to do so could seriously jeopardise continuing operations.
Nonetheless, we recommend that, to the extent that it is operationally
secure to do so, following an event which has resulted in confirmed
civilian casualties the MoD should seek to publish details about
the incident and any lessons learned from the review process.
(Paragraph 165)
24. The rapid development
of remotely piloted air system capabilities by the UK Armed Forces
over the past decade has contributed greatly to the effectiveness
of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The provision
of enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support
to our troops on the ground has undoubtedly saved lives and prevented
casualties. With the final withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan
now rapidly approaching, MoD thinking must turn to the future
for the UK's existing remotely piloted air systems. We consider
it to be a key capability which must continue to be supported.
We expect future development, in partnership with allies, to form
an important strand of the SDSR 2015 equipment programme. (Paragraph
166)
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