2 Remotely Piloted Air Systems
Nomenclature
9. This section provides some essential definitions
related to remotely piloted air systems and other associated technologies.
A glossary of terms used in the report is provided in Annex B.
10. In its written memorandum, the MoD pointed out
that most existing manned aircraft terminology remains equally
relevant to unmanned aircraft operations.[3]
11. In its memorandum, the Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI) differentiated current remotely piloted air systems
according to size and capabilities:
· Nano
- smallest class of systems used for low-resolution image capture
in scenarios such as infantry local-area reconnaissance, especially
in the urban environment. Example: Black Hornet.
· Miniature
- small size lightweight design used for short-range surveillance
using small and fairly basic sensors. Example: Desert Hawk.
· Tactical
- a larger class, with 20m wingspans, longer range and endurance.
Equipped with medium-quality imaging and transmission systems
for ISTAR purposes and, for armed variants, attack. Examples:
MQ-9 Reaper; Watchkeeper.
· Strategic
- largest class of current unmanned systems, having wingspans
analogous with manned aircraft and able to carry large payloads.
Equipped with high-powered surveillance systems able to work in
numerous spectrums and high-quality video feeds. Used for battlefield
reconnaissance, undertaking roles previously filled by manned
aircraft. Example: Global Hawk.[4]
Drone
12. The term "drone" was used originally
to refer to unmanned aircraft used for target practice. Its origins
can be traced back to the de Havilland Queen Bee aircraft developed
by the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough.[5]
Development of an air gunnery practice machine started in the
mid-1930s. Queen Bee aircraft were converted from standard de
Havilland Tiger Moth trainers into which a primitive radio-control
system could be fitted.
13. Using "drone" to refer to modern air
systems is inaccurate and misleading as it fails to capture either
their purpose or degree of technological sophistication. Nonetheless,
we acknowledge that the term has become commonplace, particularly
in the media, when referring to modern remotely piloted aircraft.
Unmanned Aircraft (UA), Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV)
and Unmanned Air(craft) System (UAS)
14. These terms describe an aircraft which is intended
to operate with no human pilot on board as part of an unmanned
aircraft system, which includes a number of elements such as the
ground-based control unit, ground-launch system and the aircraft
and all associated flight safety-critical elements. An unmanned
aircraft:
· is capable
of sustained flight by aerodynamic means;
· is remotely
piloted or capable of autonomous operation;
· is reusable;
and
· is not
classified as a guided weapon or similar one-shot device designed
for the delivery of munitions.
15. According to the Military Aviation Authority
the terms unmanned aircraft, unmanned air vehicle and unmanned
air system are obsolete having been superseded by remotely piloted
aircraft and system. However, these terms are still in common
usage particularly in relation to civilian systems or military
systems which do not require to be flown by a qualified pilot.
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), Remotely Piloted
Air Vehicle (RPAV) and Remotely Piloted Air(craft) System (RPAS)
16. These terms were introduced in order to convey
the fact that these systems are not "unmanned" but rather
under the control of a human pilot or operator. Larger and more
sophisticated remotely piloted aircraft generally require a qualified
pilot to be at the controls.
Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS)
17. There is no commonly agreed definition of an
unmanned combat air system, but several systems currently under
development represent a class of remotely piloted aircraft with
offensive and defensive capabilities, including low-observable
(stealth) design, making it suitable for applications in high
threat environments.[6]
18. Nomenclature has proven to be somewhat of a vexed
issue as far as this subject is concerned. The use of the term
"drone" has become commonplace, particularly among the
mainstream media despite its outmoded status when used to refer
to modern unmanned aircraft. We believe that it is important that
the debate about current and future use of these systems by the
UK Armed Forces and others is not confused due to the use of inaccurate
terminology.
19. The MoD explained why it differentiated between
the terms unmanned air system and remotely piloted air system:
Although UAS is the preferred term in a military
environment, there are occasions when such a generic term is unhelpful.
The term 'unmanned' can cause confusion or uncertainty over the
actual level of human control and has led to safety, ethical and
legal concerns being raised, particularly with regard to the employment
of weapons and flight in non-segregated airspace. These concerns
can be addressed in part by using terminology that better describes
the level of human control of such aircraft as being equivalent
to that of piloted aircraft; the pilot is simply physically remote
from the aircraft itself. Consequently, the MoD believes it is
more appropriate to use the term Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)
to describe such aircraft, and Remotely Piloted Air(craft) System
(RPAS) to describe the entirety of that which it takes to deliver
the overall capability.[7]
20. It is acknowledged by several contributors
to the inquiry that the terms remotely piloted aircraft (RPA)
and remotely piloted air(craft) system (RPAS) are not yet widely
adopted. Nonetheless, we believe these are the most accurate terms
to use when referring to the armed MQ-9 Reaper operated by the
RAF in Afghanistan. These aircraft are flown remotely by a human
pilot who, along with a wider crew operating from a ground control
station, has general oversight and control. In relation to existing
unarmed systems used by the Army for intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (ISR), it may be more appropriate to refer
to unmanned air systems (UAS).
Automation and autonomy
21. The concepts of automation and autonomy are often
applied to unmanned aircraft interchangeably, but, as the MoD
has noted, the distinction is important "as there are moral,
ethical and legal implications regarding the use of autonomous
unmanned aircraft".[8]
22. In its written memorandum for this inquiry, the
MoD pointed out that there is often a misconception that remotely
piloted air systems are autonomous, despite the fact that there
is always human involvement in the decision making process. Its
submission explained:
Industry and academia often discuss automation
and autonomy interchangeably, referring to technology research
for all types of UAS. There are no universally agreed definitions.
But the MoD defines autonomy as a machine's ability to understand
higher level intent, being capable of deciding a course of action
without depending on human oversight and control. Automation
refers to a system that is programmed to logically follow a pre-defined
set of rules with predictable outcomes, such as an automatic landing
system. Improving capability can include automating part of a
process to make the remote Pilot or operator's job easier. But
current UK policy is that the operation of weapon systems will
always be under human control. No planned offensive systems are
to have the capability to prosecute targets without involving
a human.[9]
23. Referring specifically to the armed Reaper remotely
piloted air system, the Royal Aeronautical Society summarised
the present position:
There has [also] proved to be a constant misconception
that "drones" are autonomous killing machines, whereas
in reality each Reaper is controlled all the time by highly-trained
operators bound by the same [Rules of Engagement] ROE as manned
combat aircraft. There is no artificial intelligence associated
with Reaper, only a lower level automation, such as an autopilot.
The current need for humans in the loop is dictated by the complexities
of attack missions and airspace de-confliction requirements. Remote
piloting is expected to remain required for the foreseeable future.[10]
24. Air Commodore (Retd) Bill Boothby, former Deputy
Director of Legal Services (RAF), in a response to our inquiry
into UK Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework for
Future Operations, explained that autonomy and automation
of attack decisions were the subject of significant current research.
There was, however, no current internationally agreed interpretation
of the precise meaning of autonomy:
My current view is that autonomy can most sensibly
be seen as something of an absolute in which it is the machine
that, by understanding higher level intent and by perceiving its
environment, itself decides on appropriate action without human
oversight or control. Its individual actions may not be predictable.
This interpretation of autonomy is not universally shared. I consider
that reaching an internationally agreed interpretation of terminology
is a necessary precursor to a sensible international discussion
of the acceptability of such technologies. For the time being,
however, it would seem sensible to regard autonomy as an absolute
state in which the weapon system learns its own lessons, modifies
its behaviour accordingly and in which its behaviours are not
constrained by human involvement. All lesser forms of mechanical
decision-making would then be classed as automation, so there
will be 'degrees of automation' but not 'degrees of autonomy'.[11]
25. Drone Wars UK, a campaign group, argued that
a new generation of unmanned aircraft being developed and test
flown (such as BAE Systems Mantis and Taranis and the Northrop
Grumman X-47B) "are not piloted remotely from the ground
but rather fly autonomously following [a] pre-programmed mission".[12]
26. Northrop Grumman Corporation, a leading manufacturer
of unmanned air systems, confirmed that a distinction should be
drawn between the degree of autonomy of UAS versus RPAS:
RPAS are aircraft, such as medium-altitude long
endurance (MALE) unmanned aircraft, that are flown with a remote
aircraft control stick by a ground based pilot-in-control through
a direct link to the aircraft
UAS are autonomous aircraft, flown by an on-board
computer but controlled by a pilot from a ground station. These
can fly routes that are entirely pre-programmed or a route that
is entirely "ad-hoc" as changed by the pilot-in-command.
Autonomy separates command and control. Autonomy allows the aircraft
to control itself, leaving the pilot free to command the aircraft
and the mission.[13]
27. Looking to the future use of remotely piloted
air systems by the UK, the MoD told us:
Given the nature of combat operations there will
always be a role for highly skilled operators and pilots to ensure
that remotely piloted combat missions are conducted appropriately,
proportionately and legally.[14]
28. There is considerable potential for development
of future remotely piloted air systems which have a greater degree
of autonomy, however, the MoD has stated explicitly that remotely
piloted combat missions will always involve human operators and
pilots. We support this policy for all current and future UK armed
remotely piloted air system operations.
Current UK operations
29. The MoD operates a range of remotely piloted
air systems and unmanned air systems principally for intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) purposes. The Department
told us that the UK currently only deploys these systems in support
of operations in Afghanistan:
In Afghanistan UAS provide intelligence in support
of our ground commanders, enabling them to stay one step ahead
of the enemy. Whether for targeting the Taliban or supporting
troops on patrol, their ability to loiter over and survey areas
for enemy activity and then feed back images and video in real
time means they are an invaluable asset to our forces on the ground.
Together, the UK's fleet of UAS have carried out over 160,000
hours of ISR operations.[15]
30. In its written submission, the MoD emphasised
that the UK operates remotely piloted air systems in Afghanistan
under the authority of UN Security Council resolutions and that
"governance and accountability arrangements in place for
UK operated unmanned air systems are the same as those for manned
aircraft".[16]
SYSTEMS
31. In its memorandum, the MoD provided us with information
about all of the UK's current remotely piloted air systems.
| Unmanned Air System
| Number of UAS |
Comments |
| REAPER
| 10 | Reaper RPAS is a medium altitude, long endurance remotely piloted aircraft system providing ISR capabilities to UK and coalition ground forces in Afghanistan. It is the only armed RPAS used by the UK. RAF aircrew operate the aircraft in Afghanistan from control stations based at RAF Waddington, Lincolnshire and Creech Air Force Base in the United States. Since it came into service in 2007 Reaper has flown over 50,000 hours on operations supporting ground forces in Afghanistan.
|
| HERMES 450
| 8 | Hermes 450 is a Tactical UAS providing ISR capability (principally video) in support of UK ground forces in Afghanistan. The system is provided to the UK MoD via a service provision contract with Thales. Hermes 450 is operated by 1st Artillery Brigade. Since it came into service in 2007 Hermes 450 has flown over 84,000 hours on operations supporting ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
|
| DESERT HAWK III
| 222 | Desert Hawk III is a mini UAS providing an organic ISR capability (principally video) to Platoon, Company and Battle Group level ground forces in Afghanistan. Currently there are 12 Desert Hawk III systems operated in Afghanistan. The majority of these systems are operated by 1st Artillery Brigade. Each comprises between eight and ten aircraft. Since it came into service in 2007 Desert Hawk III has flown over 27,500 hours on operation in support of forces in Afghanistan.
|
| BLACK HORNET
| 324 | Black Hornet is a nano UAS providing 'over the wall' ISR capability (video) and is operated by the Infantry. There are 162 systems in operation. Each complete system comprises a handheld controller, a display, a base station and two Black Hornet Aircraft.
|
| TARANTULA HAWK
| 18 | The Tarantula Hawk (T-Hawk) is a mini UAS, part of the Talisman Route Proving and Clearance capability and is used for Counter-IED Convoy Protection on operations. T-Hawk is operated by 1st Artillery Brigade soldiers embedded in the Royal Engineer squadron.
|
Table 1: Ministry of Defence, Current MoD Systems
(as at 1st April 2013). Images: Crown Copyright
2013
British Army
32. The Army currently operates four unarmed systems
in Afghanistan:
· Hermes
450
· Desert
Hawk III
· Tarantula
Hawk
· Black
Hornet
33. According to the MoD, the current purpose of
these systems is to support UK, ISAF and Afghan forces:
The supported forces will submit an ISR request
in advance and, once a UAS has been tasked, the mission will be
planned in close cooperation with the Ground Force, and communications
maintained throughout the mission to ensure threats and opportunities
are exploited rapidly.[17]
Royal Air Force
34. The RAF operates the UK's only armed remotely
piloted air system, the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper. It has been
armed with precision-guided weapons since May 2008. The aircraft
is operated by a pilot and a sensor operator, aided by a mission
intelligence coordinator.
Royal Navy
35. The Royal Navy will shortly operate ScanEagle,
a maritime surveillance remotely piloted air system, in conjunction
with existing ISR assets used on naval operations such as helicopters
and long-range radar.
CURRENT BRITISH DOCTRINE
36. In March 2011 the MoD published The UK Approach
To Unmanned Aircraft Systems Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 (JDN
2/11)[18] which "considers
how UAS may contribute to the UK's future defence and security
needs between now and 2030". The introduction to the Joint
Doctrine Note states that:
Unmanned aircraft now hold a central role in
modern warfare and there is a real possibility that, after many
false starts and broken promises, a technological tipping point
is approaching that may well deliver a genuine revolution in military
affairs.[19]
37. However, the conclusion to the Joint Doctrine
Note raised a series of fundamental questions about the existing
and future use of remotely piloted air systems by UK Armed Forces:
Do military planners and politicians understand
the full implications of the systems they are currently tasking
and those they hope to procure? In the current economic climate,
who will decide the best balance between keeping existing equipment
and personnel, or whether to give these up to fund new unmanned
systems? Do we understand even the basic implications of such
decisions for the associated defence lines of development? Crucially,
do we have a strategic level of understanding as to how we will
deliver the considerable number of changes that will need to be
made to existing policy, concepts, doctrine and force structures?
38. The conclusion to Joint Doctrine Note 2/11
conceded that its relevance was "of the order of 18 months
and during that period much of its detail and many of the issues
raised will be overtaken by events". Now, some three years
later it is clear that further consideration of many of the issues
the Joint Doctrine Note raises is overdue. We recommend that the
MoD revisit these issues and publish an updated Joint Doctrine
Note setting out its current approach to remotely piloted aircraft
systems no later than September 2014.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
39. As with UK manned combat aircraft, the MoD told
us that UK remotely piloted aircraft operate within the constraints
of UK rules of engagement (ROE) and policy, even where operational
control is assigned to a Coalition Commander, such as the Commander
of ISAF. The MoD also stated that UK policy relating to targeting
by remotely piloted aircraft is exactly the same as that for manned
aircraft (and land and maritime weapons where applicable):
It is entirely compliant with International Humanitarian
Law. Targets are always positively identified as legitimate military
objectives and both pattern of life assessment and collateral
damage estimate conducted. Strikes are carried out in accordance
with the Law of Armed Conflict.[20]
40. Air Commodore (Retd) Bill Boothby stated:
Remotely piloted aircraft, or drones as they
are colloquially called, are subject to the same body of targeting
and weapons law as other weapon systems, such as manned attack
aircraft.[21]
REAPER OPERATIONS
41. The General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper operated by the
RAF is the UK's only armed remotely piloted air system. The RAF
fleet rose to ten in early 2014 as an additional five aircraft
were accepted into service. RAF Reapers provide persistent intelligence,
surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) for
ISAF forces in Afghanistan, mostly in support of UK forces in
Helmand province.
42. General Atomics explained the role the aircraft
was able to fulfil:
The RPA's ability to remain airborne for nearly
40 hours without refuelling provides the persistent ISR essential
to the collection of extensive data on adversary activities. For
the soldier on the ground RPA can transmit images directly to
a portable device and also provide a time-sensitive strike capability
to counter fleeting threats. Additional applications include convoy
protection, where the use of ISR sensors to identify IEDs (Improvised
Explosive Devices) is invaluable.[22]
43. Since May 2008, UK Reaper aircraft have been
armed with precision-guided weapons—Hellfire laser guided
air-to-ground missiles
and GBU-12 Paveway 500lb laser guided bombs. An investigation
into the use of the MBDA Brimstone missile is also underway.[23]
The Brimstone, currently used by the RAF on the Tornado, has an
advanced sensor and a smaller warhead than a Hellfire missile,
with a resulting higher level of accuracy and lower collateral
damage.
44. By 31 August 2013, UK operated Reaper aircraft
had flown over 50,000 hours on operations in the ISR role with
418 weapons fired in the same period.[24]
45. The Reaper is not an autonomous system—aircraft
are remotely piloted with aircrew involved at all times. On current
operations the Reaper is launched from Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan
by crews deployed in theatre. If the satellite communications
link from the ground control station is lost and cannot be re-established
the aircraft will fly a pre-programmed route to a "Launch
and Recovery Element" area where it can be landed safely
via line of sight communication links.
PERSONNEL
46. Madeleine Moon MP's visit to RAF Waddington allowed
her to meet with Reaper aircrew from XIII Squadron, including
pilots, sensor operators and mission intelligence co-ordinators.
She was also able to witness at first hand a Reaper mission being
flown over Afghanistan from a ground control station in the base.
47. Prior to the visit, the MoD explained how remotely
piloted air system operations compared with manned operations:
The UK experience of operating the Reaper RPAS
in Afghanistan suggests that Reaper aircrew, despite being based
at RAF Waddington and Creech Air Force Base in the US, are just
as, if not more, connected to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan
as compared to operators of other aircraft types. The increased
information available to operators and subsequently ground commanders,
the endurance of Reaper and the substantial operational experience
of Reaper crews, whose years of experience flying missions over
Afghanistan, results in an unrivalled depth of knowledge. This
in itself can make a significant contribution to the safety and
security of UK and coalition forces in Afghanistan, while also
helping to minimise the risk to civilians.[25]
48. Discussion with the men and women responsible
for operating Reaper provided helpful insight into their roles
and experience. XIII Squadron Reaper pilots have a mix of previous
experience, having flown aircraft as diverse as Harrier, Nimrod
and Tornado. There are few direct entrants to remotely piloted
air system operations at present, but they would undertake appropriate
pilot training before converting to remotely piloted air system
operations. It is also possible for pilots to move from Reaper
to other platforms: two pilots from 39 Squadron have retrained
for Typhoon.
49. The vast majority of operational time by UK Reapers
is spent on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
tasks, supporting ground commanders in Afghanistan. Prior to an
operation, crews receive a daily mission brief which sets out
what their mission is that day. Important information such as
key changes in theatre, weather conditions and planned shift changes
are outlined. Crew members' procedural knowledge and judgement
is also tested through questions and discussion of possible scenarios
which might arise. Video footage from recent missions is used
to highlight specific issues and to aid learning.
50. In general, crews operate on a 2-3 hour programmed
shift followed by a break and crew change. They may return to
the ground control station to continue the mission they were engaged
in previously or receive a fresh mission brief.
51. Following any weapons release there is a formal
debrief process in which learning points are identified. Lessons
learned are shared with other aircrew as part of future daily
mission briefs.
52. Asked about the psychological impact of their
role and the challenges associated with balancing work with family
life, crew members reflected on the importance of decompression
and keeping the two parts of their lives discreet. Trauma Risk
Management (TRiM)[26]
assistance is available for anyone who requires it, but crew found
that informal chats with one another are often the best way to
decompress. In terms of separating work from family life, some
personnel who had previously operated from Creech Air Force Base
in Nevada, USA, as part of 39 Squadron, had found the one hour
drive to and from work was beneficial to them in keeping work
distinct from home life. That commute was not a feature of operating
from RAF Waddington. Crew members were, however, disciplined about
maintaining an operational focus during their shift by, for example,
having no access to a mobile phone while at work.
53. Personnel were keen for the public to know more
and understand better what it is they do and to dispel some myths
that have grown up about Reaper operations in particular. One
pilot commented that the public needed to know that remotely piloted
aircraft are "not robots, they're not autonomous and we spend
an awful lot of time training to fly them". This training
emphasised all aspects of the RAF rules of engagement such as
whether a strike is necessary, whether any civilians are nearby,
and what instructions have been received from the ground commander.
Reaper aircrew were firmly of the view that the loiter time of
remotely piloted aircraft allowed more informed decisions to be
made and consequently the risk of civilian casualties was reduced
should a missile strike be required.
54. All personnel present were convinced that the
lives of British and ISAF forces had been saved through use of
remotely piloted air systems in Afghanistan and they felt that
there was a strong sense of gratitude from ground forces for the
support Reaper crews provided.
55. Asked what they needed to do their jobs better,
crew members focused on three elements:
· Additional
personnel as, despite the enduring nature of the campaign, they
only have the minimum necessary to fulfil the task;
· Upgrades
to the sensor suites on the Reaper to further enhance their capability;
and
· A UK
training system rather than a continuing reliance on the USAF.
56. Personnel did, however, voice some concerns about
career development prospects given uncertainty about the future
of UK Reaper operations. They were unclear what would happen should
the programme end at the conclusion of operations in Afghanistan.
57. It was very clear from the visit to XIII Squadron
and discussions with Reaper aircrew that all were experienced
professional personnel with a clear purpose and keen understanding
of the Rules of Engagement which govern their operations. Despite
being remote from the battle space they exhibited a strong sense
of connection to the life and death decisions they are sometimes
required to take. This was in stark contrast to the image portrayed
by some commentators of "drone" pilots as video gaming
"warrior geeks". We record here our appreciation for
the important role they continue to perform in Afghanistan.
A COMBINED REAPER FLEET?
58. Some campaign organisations have raised concerns
that the UK has provided assistance to a covert programme of remotely
piloted air strikes by the USA in countries including Pakistan.
Information released by the MoD in February 2014, in response
to a Freedom of Information request from Drone Wars UK, revealed
that between October 2006 and 31 December 2012, of the 2,150 Reaper
missions flown by UK personnel in support of operations in Afghanistan
and Libya, there were 271 missions in Afghanistan when UK personnel
utilised a US Reaper as a UK Reaper was unavailable. During these
missions, UK personnel released 39 weapons.[27]
59. Asked about the matter in a debate on Afghanistan,
the Secretary of State for Defence, Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP,
explained:
We operate a combined fleet with the US and there
is ISAF tasking. UK and US aircraft therefore fly ISAF mission
tasks and they may be piloted by UK or US pilots. However, UK
pilots always operate to UK rules of engagement. The rules of
engagement for remotely piloted aircraft are exactly the same
as those for our Tornado aircraft and those that will apply to
our Apache rotary-wing aircraft when they are in action.[28]
60. The Secretary of State for Defence also stated
that UK remotely piloted aircraft operated only in Afghanistan
and that other members of ISAF had not been able to use any for
intelligence gathering or for armed attacks in Pakistan.[29]
61. However, the Secretary of State's oral answer
appeared in part to contradict a written answer given by Anna
Soubry MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and Minister
for Defence Personnel, Welfare and Veterans. Asked to provide
details of US Air Force personnel manning UK Reapers on non-UK
missions outside the launch and recovery phase, the Minister replied:
"Outside of the launch and recovery phase, UK Reaper RPAS
have always been operated by UK pilots".[30]
62. In light of these apparently inconsistent
answers by Ministers, we call upon the MoD to provide absolute
clarity about whether UK Reaper aircraft have ever been operated
by US personnel outside the launch and recovery phase. If public
confidence is to be built around the use of remotely piloted air
systems it is important that it is clear that UK aircraft have
only been utilised within Afghanistan and always in accordance
with UK rules of engagement.
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
63. The MoD told us that it was aware of only one
incident involving an armed UK remotely piloted air system Reaper,
which had resulted in the deaths of civilians:
On 25 March 2011, an attack on two pick-up trucks
resulted in the destruction of a significant quantity of explosives
and the death of two insurgents. Sadly, four Afghanistan civilians
were also killed. In line with current ISAF procedures, an ISAF
investigation was conducted to establish if any lessons could
be learned or if any errors in operational procedures could be
identified. In that case, the report concluded that the actions
of the Reaper crew had been in accordance with extant procedures
and rules of engagement.[31]
64. An Operational Learning Account and After-Action
Report (OLAAAR) is produced after every weapon release. Aircrew
involved in the strike engage in a formal debrief process in which
learning points are identified. Any lessons identified are shared
with other aircrew as part of future daily mission briefs.
65. In light of concerns about the potential for
civilian harm in remotely piloted aircraft strikes, the Bureau
of Investigative Journalism argued that it was "important
that the British government establishes the international precedent
of publishing a fuller record of drone strikes and their impact,
to the extent that is operationally secure".[32]
66. We consider it important that the MoD is as
transparent as it can be about remotely piloted air system operations
in order to build public confidence about their use and to debunk
myths and counter misinformation. We note that a review is conducted
and a report produced after every remotely piloted aircraft weapons
release. While the public do not need to know every time weapons
are released they do need to feel confident that rules of engagement
are applied and followed consistently.
CONCLUSION
67. UK operations in Afghanistan have drawn heavily
on new and emerging remotely piloted air system technologies in
order to offer better protection to UK, ISAF and Afghan forces
on the ground. The intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
capabilities of our forces have been enhanced immeasurably. More
controversial has been the use of the Reaper remotely piloted
air system platform to conduct strike operations using precision-guided
weapons. Following this inquiry, we are satisfied that RAF Reaper
pilots and flight crew have a high level of experience and appropriate
training to conduct such strikes. We are also satisfied that the
RAF rules of engagement for Reaper operations, as outlined to
us directly by senior RAF officers during this inquiry, are common
with those in force for manned aircraft, and provide a high level
of assurance that, as far as possible, civilian casualties will
be avoided and collateral damage minimised.
Use by other nation-states
68. In its submission, RUSI listed countries known
to have RPAS capabilities:
| USA | USAF
General Atomics MQ-1 Predator (Armed or unarmed)
General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper (Armed or unarmed)
Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk (Unarmed)
AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven (Unarmed)
Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel (Unarmed)
The US Navy, Army, Border Agency, Coast Guard and CIA also operate fleets, totalling a larger number than in USAF service.
|
| Italy | MQ-1 Predator (Armed or unarmed)
MQ-9 Reaper (Armed or unarmed)
|
| France | EADS Harfang
|
| Israel | IAI Eitan, MALE Tactical RPAS, Israel Air Force
IAI Heron, MALE Tactical RPAS, Israel Air Force
Elbit Hermes 450, Tactical RPAS, Israel Air Force
BlueBird SpyLite, Miniature RPAS, Israel Air Force
|
RUSI written memorandum.
In addition, the Dutch Ministry of Defence announced
in November 2013 that it had decided to purchase four Reaper remotely
piloted air systems, initially unarmed. The RUSI memorandum also
noted that NATO nations operating under ISAF in Afghanistan, including
Germany and Canada had invested in remotely piloted air systems.
Other countries such as Russia, Iran and China also have unmanned
capabilities, but a lack of concrete information meant it was
difficult to provide a detailed analysis.[33]
69. A study by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles: Opportunities and challenges for the Alliance,
published in 2012, provided additional information about NATO
Member States' use of these systems.
While at least 25 of the Alliance's Member States
possess drones, most of these are smaller tactical drones with
neither the capacity nor the endurance of larger "flagship"
UAVs like the Predator, Reaper, or Global Hawk. Encouragingly,
NATO has taken an important first step in remedying the UAV shortfall
with the recent agreement on the Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS)
system. By 2017, 13 Member States will have acquired five Global
Hawk high-altitude long endurance drones, which will be operated
and maintained by all 28 Member States.[34]
Constraints on the use of remotely
piloted air systems
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY USE
70. The MoD told us that the constraints on military
use of unmanned air systems in the UK and overseas included, but
were not limited to, the following:
Use of Airspace and Safety - the lack of "Sense-and-Avoid"
technology
71. The MoD told us that Watchkeeper was being fitted
with a system that would make it compliant with International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards.[35]
Basing - proximity to the target area of interest
72. The MoD told us that in order to utilise unmanned
air systems in the most efficient manner, they should be based
as close as possible to the target area of interest to allow for
the longest loiter time possible. In a "non-permissive"
or hostile environment this would be "extremely difficult":
Larger platforms' reliance upon an airfield potentially
reduces their utility, and consideration must be given to basing
within a permissive location, which may create additional burdens
(force protection, Command & Control, logistics etc).
[36]
Command Delay - via satellite relay
73. As UAS suffer from a very slight command delay,
inputs into the controls from the ground station take a brief
time to reach the aircraft, but there are robust procedures to
deal with it. The main challenge is for take off and landing,
leading to the need for a visual line of sight (VLOS) pilot at
the airfield. [37]
Weather
74. This can be particularly difficult for lighter
airframes to manage and significantly constrains their flying
hours in certain environments, such as areas that suffer from
high cross winds, icing or lightning strikes. [38]
Electromagnetic Environment (EME)
75. The use of UAS is entirely dependent upon data
feeds. They also require access to frequencies and spectrum to
operate.[39] Additional
demands for bandwidth will need to be factored into future military
electromagnetic spectrum requirements.
REGULATION AND AIRWORTHINESS
76. The MoD explained that military registered remotely
piloted air systems are regulated by the Military Aviation Authority
(MAA), while the safe operation of civil remotely piloted air
systems in the UK is governed by the requirements of the Air Navigation
Order 2009. RPAS, as with all other aircraft, will only be permitted
to operate in UK airspace if it is considered that it is safe
for them to do so. Remotely piloted air system specific airworthiness
regulations are in the early stages of development, but this is
being done on an international scale, with a view to global harmonisation,
rather than the UK 'going it alone'.[40]
77. The Royal Aeronautical Society stated that airspace
integration was one of the great challenges for future remotely
piloted air system operations. It pointed to various international
efforts to evolve rules, regulations and the technology necessary
for integration.[41]
78. The Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned
Systems (JARUS) is a group of experts from National Aviation Authorities
(NAAs) and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). Its purpose
is to recommend a single set of technical, safety and operational
requirements for the certification and safe integration of Unmanned
Aircraft Systems into airspace and at aerodromes. The work of
JARUS will take into account emerging ICAO standards, recommended
practices and guidance material on the matter.[42]
European participants in JARUS are also committed to the development
of the European RPAS Steering Group Roadmap. The European
RPAS Roadmap proposes a series of actions to be taken to achieve
remotely piloted air systems integration into the European air
system from 2016. The material will be made available to interested
parties such as, ICAO, EASA, NAAs and industry, for consideration
and use.[43]
79. General Atomics argued that, at a pan-European
level, the main area of constraint on the expansion of remotely
piloted air systems is "precise specifications to enable
RPA to conform to regulatory requirements governing full access
to [controlled] airspace". It is presently prioritising the
development of a "Type Certifiable"[44]
Reaper aircraft.[45]
80. Due to safety and reliability issues, Drone Wars
UK warned that it would be unlikely that British forces would
be able regularly to fly and train with larger unmanned aircraft
within non-segregated and even within segregated British airspace
within a few years: "without a dramatic improvement in the
reliability and safety record of military UAVs it is highly unlikely
that the CAA as regulators nor the British public would accept
this".[46]
81. Until the necessary technical, safety and operational
requirements for remotely piloted air system integration into
shared airspace are met, only a very limited number of zones around
the UK will be available for flight training and testing. In May
2013, in response to a Parliamentary Question the MoD published
a map of Ministry of Defence (MoD) reserved airspace areas within
the UK where remotely piloted air systems may be operated. The
answer stated that these airspace areas, which are subject to
future changes as new operating practices and platforms come into
service, can be used either for specific periods by RPAS as detailed
in the UK Aeronautical Information Publication or by activation
of a Notice to Airman (NOTAM).[47]
A copy of the map of MoD reserved airspace areas is included at
Annex A.
CONCLUSION
82. There are many constraints on the use of remotely
piloted air systems in shared airspace whether in the UK or elsewhere.
In its response to this report we invite the MoD to set out in
detail what action the Government as a whole is taking domestically
and internationally to facilitate the development of the technologies,
systems and regulatory changes which will be required prior to
the full and safe integration of remotely piloted air systems
into shared airspace.
3 Ev w2, para 2.14 Back
4
Ev w11 Back
5
"Automatic Flight", Flight, 16 May 1958 Available at:
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1958/1958%20-%200642.html
Back
6
Systems currently under development include Taranis (UK), Neuron
(France), and X47B (USA). Back
7
Ev w2, para 2.13 Back
8
Ministry of Defence, The UK Approach To Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 (JDN 2/11), March 2011. Available
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/jdn-2-11-the-uk-approach-to-unmanned-aircraft-systems Back
9
Ev w2 Back
10
Ev w53, para 15 Back
11
Air Commodore (Retd) Bill Boothby, memorandum received in response
to inquiry into UK Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework
for Future Operations Back
12
Ev w50, para 3 Back
13
Ev w41 Back
14
Ev w7 Back
15
Ev w2, para 3.2 Back
16
Ev w9, para 7.1 Back
17
Ev w2, para 3.5 Back
18
Ministry of Defence, The UK Approach To Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 (JDN 2/11), March 2011. Available
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/jdn-2-11-the-uk-approach-to-unmanned-aircraft-systems
Back
19
Ministry of Defence, The UK Approach To Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 (JDN 2/11), March 2011. Available
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/jdn-2-11-the-uk-approach-to-unmanned-aircraft-systems
Back
20
Ev w5, para 3.13 Back
21
Air Commodore (Retd) Bill Boothby, memorandum received in response
to inquiry into UK Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework
for Future Operations Back
22
Ev w101, para 11 Back
23
Ev w11 Back
24
Ev w2, para 3.3 Back
25
Ev w5, para 4.4 Back
26
The TRiM programme trains small teams of non-medical personnel
to recognise the signs and symptoms of stress and to give advice
to individuals from within their own units on coping strategies
and how to manage them. Available at: http://www.raf.mod.uk/community/wellbeing/stressmanagement.cfm
Back
27
Ministry of Defence, FoI response 4 February 2014. Available at:
http://dronewarsuk.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/20130204-cole-reaper-weapons-released-reply-u.pdf
Back
28
HC Deb, 10 February 2014, col 588 Back
29
HC Deb, 10 February 2014, col 593 Back
30
HC Deb, 15 January 2014, col 578W Back
31
Ev w5, para 4.3 Back
32
Ev w31 Back
33
Ev w13 Back
34
Pierre Claude Nolin, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles: Opportunities and challenges for the Alliance,
20 November 2012 Available at: http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=3024
Back
35
Ev w9, para 6.12 Back
36
Ev w9, para 6.12 Back
37
Ev w9, para 6.12 Back
38
Ev w9, para 6.12 Back
39
Ev w9, para 6.12 Back
40
Ev w9, para 6.9 Back
41
Ev w54, para 25 Back
42
JARUS, http://jarus-rpas.org/ Back
43
European RPAS Steering Group, Roadmap for the integration of
civil Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Systems into the European Aviation
System, June 2013. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/aerospace/uas/index_en.htm
Back
44
A type certificate is issued to signify the approval of the design
of certain types of aircraft, engines and propellers. Back
45
Ev w100 Back
46
Ev w51, para 7 Back
47
HC Deb, 5 May 2013, col 222W Back
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