3 Forward Programme
Integration post-Afghanistan
84. Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were
the genesis of many of the remotely piloted air systems currently
used by UK Armed Forces with the majority procured as Urgent Operational
Requirements (UORs). With operations in Afghanistan due to conclude
at the end of 2014, we were interested to establish what lessons
had been identified for future operations. We were also keen to
understand whether the MoD had decided to integrate remotely piloted
air systems into post-Afghanistan Armed Forces' structures.
LESSONS IDENTIFIED
85. The MoD told us that there were a range of lessons
identified from operating remotely piloted air systems in Afghanistan.
The importance of their contribution lay in the better intelligence,
precision and situational awareness they could provide and it
was "difficult to imagine a future campaign where such technology
will not have a role to play".[48]
86. The MoD stated that the key remotely piloted
air system strength demonstrated in Afghanistan was the persistent
ISR presence it provided, far in excess of manned air platforms
whose endurance was often considerably less. It argued that "persistence
also maximises precision", resulting in fewer civilian deaths
arising from air strikes.[49]
87. However, the MoD also acknowledged that the lessons
from Afghanistan might not be universally applicable because conditions
there (adequate basing and lines of communication, operating in
permissive and relatively uncongested air space, against a technologically
unsophisticated adversary) would not necessarily exist in other
theatres of war. [50]
88. The Royal Aeronautical Society highlighted some
additional lessons:
It has also brought challenges associated with
dislocated operations. No. 39 Sqn., the first to operate the Reaper,
is based in the USA and UK, and flies near constantly over Afghanistan.
As a result the command and control chain is long and complex,
with the challenge of balancing the many conflicting demands on
this capable platform. Delivering an enduring 24/7 capability
has proved to be a strain on Sqn. personnel, who are on operations
for 3-year tours, rather than the 6 months for those deployed
forward in theatre.[51]
MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY
89. How the MoD will keep remotely piloted air system
capability meaningfully alive post 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan
is dependent on funding decisions to be taken as part of SDSR
2015. Until now, all UK unmanned air systems and remotely piloted
air systems have been funded from UORs. If such equipment is returned
to the UK and becomes part of the Armed Forces' core equipment,
the MoD would be responsible for the cost of regenerating it.
However, as part of our inquiry into Securing the Future of
Afghanistan, the Secretary of State for Defence told us that
the MoD would not be liable to reimburse the capital costs of
procurement for these systems.[52]
90. In its written submission, the MoD told us that
it was considering whether its various systems (Reaper, Desert
Hawk III, Black Hornet, Tarantula Hawk) acquired as UORs for Operation
Herrick in Afghanistan should be retained as core programmes or
not, when UK forces redeploy in 2014.[53]
If they are not retained as core programmes it is unclear what
will happen to the systems and the personnel who operate them.
One option would be to retain some systems in a reduced formation.
However, competition for funding for other capabilities such as
maritime surveillance will have a significant bearing on available
resources.
91. Interviewed in January 2014, Air Vice-Marshal
Philip Osborn, Director of Capability, Joint Forces Command stated
that the UK had "every intention of continuing to utilise
Reaper beyond Afghanistan". He continued:
You will see us plan to bring Reaper more into
an expeditionary, rather than deployed mode, and over the next
few years we will shift from Reaper into the Scavenger programme,
[which] should be capable of doing far more, on a worldwide basis.[54]
92. We call upon the MoD to set out which of the
existing remotely piloted and unmanned air systems it intends
to retain beyond the end of operations in Afghanistan and to confirm
that continuing operating costs can be funded from within its
core programme budget from financial year 2014-15 onwards.
TRAINING
93. The ability to train remotely piloted air system
pilots, sensor operators and other aircrew is fundamental to maintaining
a deployable future capability. The Royal Aeronautical Society
told us:
Recent operations have underlined the requirement
for training specialised crews to operate unmanned aircraft. The
RAF has recently graduated its first class of RPAS pilots and
a number of RPAS operators are currently examining the training
requirements to operate various classes of unmanned aircraft in
future.[55]
94. In respect of Reaper operations, training for
pilots and sensor operators is conducted jointly with the USAF
in the USA. Given the current constraints on flying remotely piloted
aircraft in UK airspace there is likely to be a continuing dependency
on the USAF for flight training in the short to medium term.
ISTAR force composition
95. In the last Parliament, our predecessor committee
published two reports into intelligence, surveillance, target
acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) and the contribution of
unmanned systems to that capability.[56]
We have maintained a close interest in the subject, particularly
in relation to capability gaps in our maritime surveillance following
the cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 programme.
96. In July 2013, the MoD provided us with an update
on the initial findings of its Air ISTAR Optimisation Study (AIOS),
which is looking at the requirements and capabilities of air-based
ISTAR to inform resource decisions as part of the next SDSR. This
confirmed that unmanned air systems had been considered as options
for delivering the range of desired air ISTAR capabilities. In
addition, Air Command had assessed the utility of Reaper in a
Maritime Surface Surveillance role for the period 2015-18.[57]
97. In its response to this report the MoD should
set out how remotely piloted air systems, including Reaper, fit
within its overall ISTAR strategy.
Emerging technologies
98. In the introduction to its Joint Doctrine Note
The UK Approach To Unmanned Aircraft Systems (JDN 2/11)
the MoD stated that its purpose was to:
identify and discuss policy, conceptual, doctrinal
and technology issues that will need to be addressed if such systems
are to be successfully developed and integrated into future operations.
Although broad agreement has been achieved amongst contributors,
the JDN does not describe a position of consensus. It does, however,
seek to energise debate within the UK and move UAS-related thinking
forward.[58]
In that context, we invited the MoD to tell us about
the systems it would be developing from now to 2020.
| Unmanned Air System
| Number of UAS |
Comments |
| WATCHKEEPER
| 54 | Watchkeeper is not yet in service and is planned to replace Hermes 450. Watchkeeper is the core Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System which will provide enduring ISR support to UK ground forces. It is equipped with a radar surveillance capability in addition to video. The original design and manufacturing contract was placed with Thales UK in 2005. The first UK flight took place in Parc Aberporth, West Wales in April 2010. In March 2014, Watchkeeper was cleared to begin military flight training with the Royal Artillery in a restricted airspace over the Salisbury Plain Training Area.
|
| SCANEAGLE
| | Scan Eagle is a UAS being delivered to meet a UOR for additional maritime surveillance. The capability is expected to start becoming available to the Royal Navy from late 2013 onwards. The capability will be provided as a service provision by the contractor (Boeing UK) and will initially consist of 300 hrs surveillance per month.
|
SCAVENGER
Concept - no photograph
| | Scavenger is the MoD's core requirement for a Deep and Persistent Armed ISR capability, from 2018. Analysis has indicated a medium altitude, long endurance RPAS-class system is the most cost-effective solution. The MoD is considering acquisition options from around the globe. At this stage the UK has not ruled out any possibilities and potential opportunities remain for international co-operation.
|
MARITIME UNMANNED AIR SYSTEMS
Concept - no photograph
| | The Royal Navy has awarded a contract to Agusta Westland to provide a Capability Investigation and Concept demonstrator of an unmanned rotary wing air system. The air vehicle used for the demonstration will be a 1.8 ton helicopter which will demonstrate radar, electro-optics, mine counter measures and hydrographic survey capabilities.
|
| TARANIS
| | Project Taranis is a UCAS technology demonstrator programme focusing on the next generation of Low Observable intelligence and attack aircraft. It will provide the MoD with experimental evidence on the potential capabilities, helping to inform decisions on the future mix of manned and remotely piloted systems. UCAS will not replace any of the RAF's front-line aircraft in the short term, but in the longer term a mix of manned fast-jets and UCAS could be used on operations. Taranis ground tests commenced in 2010 and flight trials took place in 2013. Taranis investment will be exploited in Future Combat Aircraft Systems which will offer more advanced capabilities compared to the current generation of aircraft. Given the nature of combat operations there will always be a role for highly skilled operators and pilots to ensure that remotely piloted combat missions are conducted appropriately, proportionately and legally.
|
Future Combat Aircraft Systems (FCAS)
Concept - no photograph
| | The UK and France have a requirement to examine the options for the next generation of combat aircraft systems after Rafale and Typhoon are due to come out of service in the 2030 timeframe. One option being considered is Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems and work has commenced scoping a cooperative Demonstration Programme.
|
Table 2: Ministry of Defence, Future MoD Systems.
Images: Crown Copyright 2013
WATCHKEEPER
99. In 2005, the MoD awarded Thales UK a contract
to develop an all-weather tactical ISTAR unmanned air system for
the British Army. Watchkeeper is the UK MoD's largest current
unmanned air system procurement programme (valued at approximately
£1bn). It is designed to provide operational commanders with
unmanned day and night all weather capability to detect and track
targets without the need to deploy troops into potentially sensitive
areas.
100. In response to a report by our predecessor committee
in 2008, the MoD stated that the Watchkeeper programme was "on
track" to reach full operating capability in 2013. However,
since that time there have been significant delays to the programme
and Watchkeeper achieved neither its initial forecast in-service
date in 2010 nor the revised date of April 2012. In order to address
the need for ISTAR in Afghanistan, the MoD procured Hermes 450
system as an urgent operational requirement in 2007. The MoD told
us:
The delay to the introduction of Watchkeeper
into service is being mitigated by the continuation of the Hermes
450 service provision to ensure there is no capability impact
on current operations.[59]
101. The system finally received a Statement of Type
Design Assurance (STDA) from the Military Aviation Authority in
October 2013.[60] On
5 March 2014, the MoD announced that Watchkeeper had been cleared
to begin military flight training with the Royal Artillery in
a restricted airspace over the Salisbury Plain Training Area.[61]
102. Due to significant delays to the programme,
it is now unlikely that Watchkeeper will be utilised on operations
in Afghanistan, the theatre for which it was originally procured.
The MoD should set out in detail in its response to this report
the reasons for the delays experienced in bringing Watchkeeper
to full operating capability and the lessons identified for future
remotely piloted air system programmes.
TARANIS
103. Taranis is an unmanned combat aircraft system
(UCAS) advanced technology demonstrator programme, designed and
built by BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, the Systems division of GE
Aviation (formerly Smiths Aerospace) and QinetiQ, working alongside
UK MoD military staff and scientists.[62]
104. The MoD explained that the project would provide
"experimental evidence on the potential capabilities, helping
to inform decisions on the future mix of manned and remotely piloted
systems". Although unmanned combat aircraft systems would
not replace any of the RAF's front-line aircraft in the short
term, in the longer term a mix of manned fast-jets and UCAS could
be used on operations. Ground tests commenced in 2010 and flight
trials took place in 2013.[63]
105. Announcing details of the first flight of the
Taranis demonstrator, BAE Systems stated:
The aircraft was designed to demonstrate the
UK's ability to create an unmanned air system which, under the
control of a human operator, is capable of undertaking sustained
surveillance, marking targets, gathering intelligence, deterring
adversaries and carrying out strikes in hostile territory.[64]
106. The MoD told us:
Any future in-service systems based on such a
concept design will at all times be under the command of highly
skilled ground-based crews controlling a platform able to operate
in contested airspace behind enemy lines unlike current unmanned
systems.[65]
SCAVENGER
107. Scavenger is an MoD programme which is intended
to deliver future UK capability for "deep and persistent
armed ISR collection from 2018 to 2030", as a replacement
for Reaper. The programme is "pre-Initial Gate", which
means that the concept is still in development and options are
being assessed. It is currently planned to be met by a Medium
Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) remotely piloted air system capable
of conducting ISR across a very wide area and with the potential
to be armed. The MoD told us:
The Scavenger Assessment Phase is focused on
maturing and de-risking the sole-source acquisition of a future
variant of Reaper, as a Military-Off-The-Shelf solution. The UK
is still considering acquisition options to satisfy its Scavenger
capability requirement, including retaining its Reaper as a Core
Capability. Nothing has been ruled out and UK remains open to
considering cooperative options.[66]
108. It is of vital importance that the lessons
identified from the much delayed Watchkeeper system inform the
development and trials of all future remotely piloted aircraft
and any associated weapons systems by the MoD. In its response
to this report we call on the MoD to provide us with a more detailed
update on the Scavenger and Taranis programmes and explain how
they will contribute to future UK air combat and ISTAR capabilities.
SENSOR TECHNOLOGY
109. General Atomics Aeronautical
Systems, Inc. (General
Atomics), a leading manufacturer of remotely piloted air systems
(including the RAF's Reaper), tactical reconnaissance radars,
and electro-optic surveillance systems, told us that the UK had
the potential to expand further its remotely piloted air system
capability and utility:
By introducing various enhancements, including
podded systems and extended endurance, the range of missions for
both military and civilian applications could be expanded significantly.
This would provide opportunities for the UK's world-class aerospace
industry to collaborate more closely with GA-ASI and potentially
access wider markets, e.g. through the provision of a flexible
maritime surveillance capability and possibly the integration
of self-protection measures which could enable operations in less
benign environments than hitherto. Operations in more demanding
environments might also be facilitated by adoption, in time, of
a possible Avenger[67]/Reaper
fleet mix.[68]
110. Thales UK, another major defence contractor,
told us that "to maintain and strengthen the UK's relative
position in UAS, development of key sensor and information exploitation
elements is of primary importance". It explained that the
key determinant of reconnaissance effectiveness was the range
and capabilities of the sensors an aircraft carried.[69]
111. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has stated
that over half the cost of building a complex intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance remotely piloted air system is related to sensing
technologies and data exploitation capabilities.[70]
112. We recognise the importance of sensor technology
for ISTAR capability whether deployed on manned or unmanned platforms.
We consider it vital that UK ISTAR assets are equipped with up
to date sensor suites which maximise their effectiveness. We call
upon the MoD to provide us with details of its planned investment
in future sensor technology and exploitation for remotely piloted
air systems and other ISTAR assets.
NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS
113. Looking towards the development of weapons systems
which might be deployed on the Reaper or other armed remotely
piloted air systems in the future, MBDA, manufacturer of the Brimstone
missile, told us:
An RPAS equipped with reliable and accurate missile
systems are able to deliver the desired operational effect with
a much smaller warhead charge than those equipped with less accurate
weapons. Furthermore, the use of reliable and accurate missile
systems increases the number of opportunities available to engage
legitimate targets, including some that would ordinarily be considered
too difficult to attack, with confidence that the risk of causing
unintended collateral damage had been significantly reduced. Accuracy
also means that the cost per successful engagement is minimised.[71]
114. We note the potential for deployment of new
and increasingly accurate weapons systems, including the Brimstone
missile, on UK armed remotely piloted aircraft. We call on the
MoD to provide us, in its response to our report, with a progress
report on current trials and future plans.
Partnering - strategic choices
115. As part of our call for written evidence for
this inquiry we invited comments on the UK's future requirements
for remotely piloted air systems out to 2020. We were keen to
explore the potential for new systems to be researched and developed
with allies should the UK decide to a develop a strategic partnership.
THE USA - AN EXISTING PARTNERSHIP
116. A strong partnership exists between the RAF
and USAF built upon extensive shared experience of operating Reaper
remotely piloted air systems in Afghanistan. The RAF's 39 Squadron
still operates from Creech Air Force Base in Nevada, USA, alongside
USAF counterparts.
117. The Royal Aeronautical Society argued that co-operation
with the USAF Reaper programme had allowed the UK to benefit from
economies of scale and shared facilities that it would not otherwise
have enjoyed.[72] However,
the consequence of this strategic partnership is a significant
continuing UK dependence on the USAF for support infrastructure
and future upgrades to Reaper systems, and access to the USAF
training programme for Reaper pilots and sensor operators.
UK-FRANCE DEFENCE CO-OPERATION
Future Combat Aircraft Systems
118. In its memorandum, the MoD told us that as part
of the requirement to examine the options for the next generation
of combat aircraft systems, the UK and France were considering
unmanned combat air systems and work had commenced scoping a co-operative
demonstration programme. It also explained that the investment
in Taranis would be exploited in a "Future Combat Air System"
(FCAS) "which will offer more advanced capabilities compared
to the current generation of aircraft".[73]
119. The MoD explained that as the UK must make a
strategic capability decision on FCAS as part of the next SDSR,
the next phase of the programme was important to "de-risk
critical technologies", and would underpin SDSR 2015 decision
making.[74]
120. Following the UK-France Summit held on 31 January
2014, it was announced that the two governments had agreed to
launch a two year £120m Feasibility Phase to develop the
concepts and technologies to provide their respective Armed Forces
with an unmanned combat air vehicle. This would build on preparatory
studies conducted since the last Summit by six industry partners
- Dassault Aviation, BAE Systems, Thales France, Selex, Rolls
Royce and Safran. A decision would be taken in 2016 whether to
collaborate on demonstration and manufacturing phases. A formal
Memorandum of Understanding is expected to be signed at the 2014
Farnborough Airshow.[75]
We understand that this will also build on the French led multinational
"nEUROn" UCAS demonstrator project with Dassault Aviation
as prime contractor.[76]
Medium Altitude Long Endurance
121. The Declaration on Defence and Security
issued following the 2014 UK-France Summit also provided an update
on co-operation on MALE remotely piloted air system capabilities,
including a proposed "joint user group" for Reaper,
"to exchange lessons learnt and work together on air certification,
training, through life support and interoperability". This
group would be set up in consultation with the United States,
and would be open to the European nations operating Reaper.[77]
122. In respect of Watchkeeper, the Declaration anticipated
France taking a decision on procurement by the end of 2014. In
addition to joint acquisition, the two countries were "looking
at the potential benefits of a joint force in terms of training,
support, equipment, operations and development".[78]
THE EU DIMENSION
123. The European Council of 19-20 December 2013
held a thematic debate on defence and identified priority actions
for stronger cooperation.[79]
In its conclusions, the Council stated that it remained committed
to "delivering key capabilities and addressing critical shortfalls
through concrete projects by Member States, supported by the European
Defence Agency". As part of this the Council committed to:
the development of Remotely Piloted Aircraft
Systems (RPAS) in the 2020-2025 timeframe: preparations for a
programme of a next-generation European Medium Altitude Long Endurance
RPAS; the establishment of an RPAS user community among the participating
Member States owning and operating these RPAS; close synergies
with the European Commission on regulation (for an initial RPAS
integration into the European Aviation System by 2016); appropriate
funding from 2014 for R&D activities.[80]
CONCLUSION
124. As part of SDSR 2015, the MoD has a strategic
choice to make about the future direction for UK remotely piloted
air systems. Post-Afghanistan, a commitment to the existing partnership
arrangements with the USAF, including a continuing presence at
Creech Airforce Base, would provide the RAF with access to future
upgrades to the Reaper platform and training opportunities for
UK Reaper aircrew which would be likely to prove problematic in
the UK given the airspace restrictions which exist presently.
However, with other European NATO nations, including France, Italy
and the Netherlands now operating Reaper it may be advantageous
to form more collaborative arrangements at a European level in
order to share experience and seek economies of scale for the
delivery of training and maintenance. In the medium to long term,
projects such as Scavenger and the Future Combat Aircraft System
demonstration programme being developed with France may require
a shift in focus. We recommend that the MoD clarifies its intentions
and explains how European level co-operation can be co-ordinated
with existing bi-lateral partnership projects.
Non-military uses
125. ADS, the trade organisation representing
the UK aerospace, defence, security and space industries suggested
that if current regulations on remotely piloted aircraft in UK
airspace could be reformed, increased domestic uses might include:
· Security
- through the increased use of airborne surveillance systems at
events and dangerous situations
· Search
and Rescue - to eventually replace manned
services where more efficient
· Agriculture
- the monitoring of crops
· Telecommunications
- creating temporary communications links in emergency situations
or at every day events
· Conservation
- to track endangered species and changes to wildlife habitats
· Energy
- the monitoring of overhead power-lines and Nuclear PowerStation
construction
· Construction
- to inform architects and project managers of progress and for
the lifting of materials
· Logistics
- for movement and delivery
Other submissions we received suggest that to the
list might be added:
· Oil
and gas - exploration, installation and pipeline monitoring
· Airport
security
· Border
security
· Humanitarian
and disaster relief
126. Research Councils UK told us that within the
science community remotely piloted air systems are used for a
number of applications including species surveys, terrain mapping
and geophysics surveys. In addition, research is being conducted
on applications in areas such as remote inspection in hostile
environments, autonomous driving, defence, logistics, security,
and environmental research (e.g. atmospheric and climate studies).
Funding from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
(BIS), delivered via the Research Councils, has supported a wide
range of research projects in these areas.[81]
ASTRAEA
127. ASTRAEA (Autonomous Systems Technology Related
Airborne Evaluation and Assessment) is a UK industry-led consortium
focusing on the technologies, systems, facilities, procedures
and regulations that will allow autonomous vehicles to operate
safely and routinely in civil airspace over the United Kingdom.
The consortium comprises seven companies: AOS, BAE Systems, Cassidian,
Cobham, QinetiQ, Rolls-Royce and Thales. Its aim is to:
enable the routine use of UAS (Unmanned Aircraft
Systems) in all classes of airspace without the need for restrictive
or specialised conditions of operation. This will be achieved
through the coordinated development and demonstration of key technologies
and operating procedures required to open up the airspace to UAS.[82]
The project was co-funded by the Technology Strategy
Board (the UK's innovation agency), the Welsh Assembly Government
and Scottish Enterprise.[83]
128. In April 2013, ASTRAEA conducted a first remotely
piloted flight from Preston, Lancashire, to Inverness using an
adapted Jetstream research aircraft. The flight through shared
UK airspace was staged in conjunction with NATS (the UK's En-Route
Air Traffic Control Service provider) and used advanced sensors
and on-board robotic systems to control the aircraft once in the
air, with the pilot based at Warton, Lancashire.[84]
PRIVACY ISSUES
129. The potential expansion of the use of remotely
piloted air systems for security and other purposes raises the
prospect of privacy infringements. The European RPAS roadmap identified
that increased use of remotely piloted air systems "may raise
serious and unique privacy and data protection concerns",
potentially undermining the overall benefits from this innovative
technology. It encouraged action to ensure full compliance of
remotely piloted air system operations with existing privacy and
data protection legislation or amendment of the existing regulatory
framework if required.[85]
130. Professor Nicholas Wheeler, Institute for Conflict,
Co-operation and Security, University of Birmingham, told us:
Privacy is a factor which any UK Government would
need to consider in the deployment of any ISR system. Legal measures
for their use and any data collected would need to be in force.
There will also be advocacy groups which will make their views
known and there will be a lively public debate in consequence
[...] The role of public opinion in such a debate could provide
one of the strongest impediments to the use of UAVs in the round.
It may take time for the public to accept them and many people
will not be confident in their utility.[86]
CONCLUSION
131. Remotely piloted air systems have extensive
potential for non-military uses in the UK and overseas. Projects
such as those developed by the ASTRAEA consortium have begun to
test the technologies and operating procedures required to make
the use of RPAS more commonplace and research into the potential
for other uses is continuing. We welcome Government support to
strengthen UK research and development programmes which have the
potential to expand the nascent civilian market for remotely piloted
air systems in the future. We call upon the Government to set
out in detail what joint working is currently ongoing across government
departments to consider the implications for the utilisation of
remotely piloted air systems in the civilian environment. In relation
to the issue of privacy, we recognise that existing laws which
protect personal privacy, including data protection and surveillance,
whether by the police, state intelligence agencies or private
companies, will need to be carefully reviewed and updated.
Ethical and legal issues
132. Some human rights groups and humanitarian organisations
have questioned the legality of the use of armed remotely piloted
air systems for combat operations. This section considers the
ethical and legal issues pertaining to UK use of remotely piloted
air systems: consideration of remotely piloted air system operations
by other States is addressed only to the extent that it serves
to highlight differences with the UK approach.
133. In its memorandum, the MoD discussed a number
of ethical issues commonly raised in relation to the use of armed
remotely piloted air systems, the most significant of which are
discussed below.
Removal of a man in the loop
134. The Royal Aeronautical Society expressed the
view that significant legal and ethical questions arise over the
expanding use of military remotely piloted air systems, especially
as technology enables their operation to become more autonomous.
The MoD, however, rejected the perception held by some people
that the removal of a pilot from the cockpit combined with distance
from the "action" led to reduced situational awareness
and impaired the judgement of remotely piloted air system aircrew.
It argued that "the situational awareness offered by numerous
information feeds into a HQ is greater than that of a pilot operating
in isolation, potentially facilitating wiser judgement calls to
be made" and pointed out that a conscious decision is still
required to prosecute a target.[87]
Is the use of armed RPAS moral?
135. The MoD argued that the greater loiter-time
of Reaper aircraft enabled crews to "exercise their judgement
in a more measured way, free from the stresses of the combat zone
or concerns about survivability", thus minimising the risk
of civilian casualties and increasing confidence levels in target
identification. In response to arguments from some quarters that
distance from the battlefield introduced an emotional and possibly
moral disengagement by Reaper aircrew, the MoD stated:
It is true that Reaper crews do not face the
same level of direct danger as crews of conventional aircraft.
However crews are commonly assigned to Reaper operations for several
years and may fly missions in Afghanistan over extended periods,
rather than on the short deployments associated with conventional
crews. Experience of Reaper shows that aircrew are fully immersed
in the reality of combat, possibly to an even greater extent than
operators of conventional-aircraft. The persistence offered results
in crews observing the aftermath of their attacks: a sobering
experience rarely shared by other pilots or artillerymen. Furthermore,
viewing the battlefield indirectly through sensors or targeting
systems is far from new or unique to Reaper operators.[88]
Will the UK allow autonomous release of weapons?
136. The MoD ruled out autonomous release of weapons
from remotely piloted air systems:
Current UK policy is that the operation of weapon
systems will always be under human control and that no planned
offensive systems are to have the capability to prosecute targets
without involving a human. By retaining highly-trained and qualified
aircrew at the heart of the decision making process, the UK ensures
that the legal requirements governing the use of force during
armed conflicts are observed. There are no plans to replace military
pilots with fully autonomous systems.[89]
Threshold for intervention
137. Some commentators have raised the possibility
that remote warfare might lower the threshold for Governments
to intervene militarily because they are not putting their own
troops at risk[90]. As
there is limited evidence available at present it is not possible
to reach a conclusion on this point in this report. However, the
decision to undertake military action is never one that should
be taken lightly. It is important in maintaining the public
acceptability of remotely piloted air systems that the perception
cannot be allowed to develop that their increased use has in some
way reduced the threshold for military intervention. We call on
the MoD to set out how it intends to address this potential problem
in its response to this report.
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
138. The International Committee of the Red Cross
considers that international humanitarian law (IHL) and international
human rights law are two distinct but complementary bodies of
law. IHL applies in situations of armed conflict while human rights
law applies at all times, in peace and in war.[91]
Both international humanitarian law and human
rights law apply in armed conflicts. The main difference in their
application is that international human rights law allows a State
to suspend a number of human rights if it faces a situation of
emergency. IHL cannot be suspended (except as provided in Article
5 to the Fourth Geneva Convention). [...]
States have a legal duty to respect and implement
both IHL and human rights law. Compliance with IHL requires a
state to introduce national legislation to implement its obligations,
to train its military and to bring to trial those in grave breach
of such law. Human rights law also contains provisions requiring
a State to take legislative and other appropriate measures to
implement its rules and punish violations. [92]
139. Often referred to as the 'law of armed conflict',
or the 'law of war', IHL is defined by the ICRC as:
[…] a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian
reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons
who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities
and restricts the means and methods of warfare.[93]
140. The ICRC considered that human rights, being
tailored primarily for peacetime, apply to everyone:
Their principal goal is to protect individuals
from arbitrary behaviour by their own governments. Human rights
law does not deal with the conduct of hostilities.[94]
THE LEGALITY OF UK REMOTELY PILOTED
AIR SYSTEM OPERATIONS
141. The ICRC, in a submission to our inquiry into
UK Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework for Future
Operations, stated that there was currently a lot of controversy
about the legality of the extraterritorial use of force using
remotely piloted air systems. It stated that "extraterritorial
use of force by drones can be governed either by IHL or by international
human rights law and the relevant domestic law, depending on whether
the situation in which they are used amounts to an armed conflict
or not". It concluded:
It is important that this issue continue to be
discussed and clarified among States. In the view of the ICRC
there is no "one-size-fits-all" approach. The ICRC takes
a case-by-case approach in determining which body of law is applicable
to which situation of violence and, consequently, which rules
have to be followed.[95]
142. Professor Steven Haines, Professor of Public
International Law, University of Greenwich, in a submission to
our inquiry into UK Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework
for Future Operations, explained why remotely piloted aircraft
were not in and of themselves unlawful:
UAVs are, quite simply, aeroplanes. The fact
that they are un-manned and remotely operated does not alter that
basic fact in any way. Aeroplanes are not unlawful; UAVs are not,
therefore, in and of themselves unlawful. UAVs operating exclusively
for reconnaissance, data gathering and intelligence purposes are
not weapons. It is only when a UAV is weaponised that it becomes
a weapon and is required to be compliant with LOAC weapons law.
Even then, as long as the weapon it is carrying is itself lawful
(not subject to a ban under the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention,
for example), the UAV will be compliant with the law. That is
not to say that it cannot be operated in an unlawful manner or
for unlawful purpose. All weapons can be put to unlawful purpose;
UAVs are no different from other weapons in that respect.[96]
143. Public Interest Lawyers (PIL) submitted a legal
opinion which concluded that "armed drones themselves are
unlikely to be illegal per se, but that fully automated
drones would breach international law". In respect of the
question of the legality of the UK Government's use of armed remotely
piloted air systems in Afghanistan, PIL concluded it was "highly
likely" that the UK's
use was unlawful:
There is a strong probability that the UK has
misdirected itself as to the requirements of the IHL principles
of proportionality, distinction and humanity and as to its human
rights obligation to protect human life and to investigate all
deaths (civilians and combatants alike) arguably caused in breach
of that obligation. We conclude that the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) is capable of application to the UK's
use of drones and that human rights accountability and the rule
of law require its application. We call for urgent accountability
for the UK's drones programme.[97]
144. The MoD insisted that the UK complied fully
with all of its obligations under international humanitarian law
irrespective of the weapons systems used:
This includes those set out in Article 36 of
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions to review all
new weapons, means and methods of warfare to determine whether
the employment would in some or all circumstances be prohibited
by the Protocol or any other rule of international law. That process
applies to UAS just as to manned capabilities. The UK is also
a signatory to the Missile Technology Control Regime, which controls
the proliferation of unmanned delivery systems. The weaponisation
of Reaper was reviewed under this basis in accordance with all
relevant domestic and international law before its introduction
into service.[98]
145. The MoD memorandum stated that UK Rules of Engagement
reflect international humanitarian law "following the principles
of distinction, humanity, proportionality and military
necessity" and are the same for Reaper as for manned
aircraft.[99] It continued:
The RAF has well-established command, control,
supervisory, training and qualification frameworks for conducting
air operations and makes full use of these structures to ensure
Reaper are used in a legal and ethical manner.[100]
Transparency and accountability
146. The All Party Parliamentary Group on drones
raised concerns about a lack of transparency and accountability
about the use of remotely piloted air systems by the UK Government
particularly in relation to:
· the
poor recording of the status and numbers of those killed and injured
in drone strikes;
· the
limited consideration of the psychological impact of drones on
operators and those living in affected areas; and
· the
broader relationship between the achievement of the UK's military
and diplomatic objectives and drone use.
147. The Association of Military Court Advocates
submitted:
The problem is not that UAVs are unlawful in
themselves, but that their numbers, sophistication, relative cheapness
and adaptability offer unparalleled opportunities for secrecy.
If there are no independent arrangements for the scrutiny of deployment
and targeting decisions, then there can be no means of ensuring
compliance with the basic principles of proportionality and discrimination.
Just as importantly for the major democracies, public support
for hostilities is unlikely to be sustained unless there is a
perception of jus in bello (law in war).[101]
Governance and oversight
148. The MoD provided us with details of UK governance
and oversight arrangements for unmanned and remotely piloted air
systems deployed on operations. It explained that all UK operations
are authorised by Ministers and directed by the Chief of Defence
Staff (CDS) in accordance with agreed plans. The chains of command
for the tasking of UAS and RPAS in Afghanistan are summarised
below:
Army Operated UAS (Hermes 450, Desert Hawk III, T Hawk, Black Hornet)
Full Command - Chief of the General Staff
↓
Operational Command - Chief of Joint Operations
↓
Operational Control - Commander Task Force Helmand
|
RAF Operated RPAS (REAPER)
Full Command - Chief of the Air Staff
↓
Operational Command - Chief of Joint Operations
↓
Operational Control - Commander ISAF
↓
Tactical Command - UK Air Component Commander
|
Source: Ministry of Defence[102]
149. Where operational control of UK remotely piloted
air systems is assigned to a Coalition Commander, such as the
Commander of ISAF, the MoD explained that that commander can only
direct UK operations within the constraints of UK Rules of Engagement
(ROE) and policy:
A UK officer 'Red Card holder' is assigned to
each ISAF HQ, with responsibility for coalition operations including
the use of UK UAS, so that UK ROE and policy are strictly adhered
to. Crews operating UAS receive training on a regular basis on
domestic and international law concerning the use of force by
UK forces in Afghanistan. Training includes the understanding
of, and compliance with, UK ROE. In addition, UAS crews have access
to legal advice and support during operations 24 hours a day,
every day of the year (this includes the ability to talk with
legal advisors and commanders by phone if required, an option
not available to crews of manned aircraft).[103]
UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR
150. UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism,
Ben Emmerson QC, published in September 2013 an interim report
to the UN General Assembly on the use of remotely piloted aircraft
in counter-terrorism operations. The central objective of the
Special Rapporteur's inquiry was to "evaluate allegations
that the increasing use of remotely piloted aircraft has caused
disproportionate civilian casualties, and to make recommendations
concerning the duty of States to conduct independent and impartial
investigations".[104]
151. Commenting on the accountability and transparency
of strikes by remotely piloted aircraft, the UN Special Rapporteur's
report stated:
The single greatest obstacle to an evaluation
of the civilian impact of drone strikes is lack of transparency,
which makes it extremely difficult to assess claims of precision
targeting objectively.[105]
152. In respect of operations conducted by the UK,
the Special Rapporteur acknowledged that the RAF was accountable,
through the MoD, to Parliament, which "allowed for a degree
of transparency, including as to civilian casualties" although
he noted that the MoD did not comment publicly on use of remotely
piloted air systems for special operations. The report continued:
The Ministry has informed the Special Rapporteur
that, under operating procedures followed by the United Kingdom
in Afghanistan, every remotely piloted aircraft weapons discharge
is the subject of internal review involving the senior qualified
weapons instructor. A mission report is prepared and is then reviewed
by the most senior British officer at the Combined Air Operations
Centre in Afghanistan and his or her legal adviser. This includes
a review of video footage and communications reports. If there
is any indication of civilian casualties, the incident is referred
to the Joint Incident Assessment Team at ISAF, whose personnel
are independent of the chain of command involved in any strike.
Individuals are presumed to be civilian for this purpose unless
it can be established that they were directly involved in immediate
attempts or plans to threaten the lives of ISAF personnel.[106]
Targeting intelligence
153. The UN Special Rapporteur commented that "the
accuracy of targeting intelligence is critical to the proper application
of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution".
He reported that the UK had informed him that during its operations
in Afghanistan targeting intelligence was "thoroughly scrubbed"
to ensure accuracy before authorisation to proceed was given.[107]
154. Acknowledging that responsibility for drawing
up a targeting directive and rules of engagement in any armed
conflict rests with the MoD, the UN Special Rapporteur explained
that the targeting directive set out legitimate targets (which
may be individuals, groups or locations) and included a list of
restricted and prohibited targets. The report concluded:
the United Kingdom has specifically informed
the Special Rapporteur that in making targeting decisions involving
the use of remotely piloted aircraft in Afghanistan it does not
authorize strikes on the basis that the infliction of civilian
casualties would be proportionate to a high-value military target.
It is the policy of the Ministry of Defence that weapons should
not be discharged from any aerial platform unless there is a zero
expectation of civilian casualties, and that any individual or
location should be presumed to be civilian in nature unless there
is clear evidence to the contrary.[108]
Special Rapporteur's conclusions
155. The Special Rapporteur concluded that if used
in strict compliance with the principles of international humanitarian
law, remotely piloted aircraft were capable of reducing the risk
of civilian casualties in armed conflict by significantly improving
the situational awareness of military commanders.[109]
156. In relation to the duty of States to protect
civilians in armed conflict, the Special Rapporteur concluded:
in any case in which civilians have been, or
appear to have been, killed, the State responsible is under an
obligation to conduct a prompt, independent and impartial fact-finding
inquiry and to provide a detailed public explanation. This obligation
is triggered whenever there is a plausible indication from any
source that civilian casualties may have been sustained, including
where the facts are unclear or the information is partial or circumstantial.
The obligation arises whether the attack was initiated by remotely
piloted aircraft or other means, and whether it occurred within
or outside an area of active hostilities.[110]
157. We welcome the report of the UN Special Rapporteur
on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism. We note that he has identified
a number of legal questions on which there is no clear international
consensus. We recommend that the UK Government engage actively
in the debate on these matters and report on progress in its response
to our report.
Targeted killings
158. The greatest controversy and debate about the
use of armed remotely piloted air systems has arisen not from
ISAF military operations in Afghanistan, but rather due to counter-terrorism
operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) and
the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in other countries
such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. These so called "targeted
killings" were only acknowledged publicly by President Obama
and other US Administration officials in 2010.
159. In its submission to our inquiry, Reprieve,
a legal charity, argued that the remotely piloted air system programmes
of the UK and the US were closely intertwined. It alleged that
the UK shared intelligence with the US "in order to support
its programme of covert drone strikes, carried out by the CIA
and Special Operations in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia". Reprieve
also alleged UK complicity in these operations because:
· The
UK Government and UK companies provide communications networks
without which the US would not be able to operate this programme;
· The
US is able to make use of RPAS airframes belonging to the RAF;
· UK companies
manufacture key drone components, and are allowed to export them
to the US by the UK Department for Business.[111]
160. UN Special Rapporteur, Ben Emmerson QC, considered
the principal areas of legal controversy surrounding the use of
armed remotely piloted air systems. He expressly avoided use of
the expression "targeted killing" because "its
meaning and significance differ according to the legal regime
applicable in specific factual circumstances", principally
whether such a killing takes place within or outside a situation
of armed conflict. In the conclusion to his interim report, the
Special Rapporteur urged the United States to clarify its position
on the legal and factual issues raised, including its publicly
asserted right under international law to use lethal force in
counter-terrorism operations outside areas of active hostilities.
He also sought declassification of information relevant to its
lethal extraterritorial counter-terrorism operations and the release
by the US Government of its own data on the level of civilian
casualties inflicted through the use of remotely piloted air systems,
together with evaluation methodology.[112]
161. We acknowledge that over the last few years
there has been a growing concern in relation to the sharing of
intelligence with allies and the uses to which such data may contribute.
While the issues raised by Reprieve stray beyond the terms of
reference for our inquiry and indeed the remit of the Defence
Committee, we do believe that there should be greater transparency
in relation to safeguards and limitations the UK Government has
in place for the sharing of intelligence. Matters concerning the
activities of the intelligence services are more appropriately
addressed by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament
(ISC). We invite the ISC to consider in future work programmes
the issues raised with us during this inquiry which fall within
its remit.
162. The licensing of arms exports and other controlled
goods is a matter for the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC).
We will work with our colleagues on CAEC to ensure that this issue
is given appropriate scrutiny.
48 Ev w5, para 4.1 Back
49
Ev w5, para 4.3 Back
50
Ev w5, para 4.5 Back
51
Ev w53, para 14 Back
52
Defence Committee Tenth Report of Session 2012-13, Securing the
Future of Afghanistan, HC 413, para 133 Back
53
Ev w5, para 5.1 Back
54
"RAF ready for Reaper fleet boost, confirms expeditionary
plan", Flightglobal, 16 January 2014. Available at:
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/raf-ready-for-reaper-fleet-boost-confirms-expeditionary-394929/
Back
55
Ev w54, para 18 Back
56
Defence Committee, Thirteenth Report of Session 2007-08, The
contribution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to ISTAR capability,
HC 535; Eighth Report of Session 2009-10, The Contribution
of ISTAR to operations, HC 225 Back
57
Defence Committee, Report on Future Maritime Surveillance: Government
update, 10 July 2013. Back
58
Ministry of Defence, The UK Approach To Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 (JDN 2/11), March 2011. Available
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/jdn-2-11-the-uk-approach-to-unmanned-aircraft-systems
Back
59
Ev w5, para 5.2 Back
60
Thales UK "Thales's Watchkeeper receives Statement of Type
Design Assurance from the UK Military Aviation Authority"
www.thalesgroup.com Back
61
Ministry of Defence "Army cleared to fly next-generation
eye-in-the-sky" www.gov.uk 5 March 2014 Back
62
BAE Systems "Taranis" www.baesystems.com Back
63
Ev w7 Back
64
BAE Systems "Taranis" www.baesystems.com Back
65
Ev w6, para 5.5 Back
66
Ev w6, para 5.3 Back
67
The jet powered Predator C Avenger is described by General Atomics
as a "highly advanced, next generation UAS". http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator_c.php Back
68
Ev w100 Back
69
Ev w20 Back
70
European Defence Agency, Factsheet - Remotely Piloted Aircraft
Systems, November 2013. Available at: http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/publications/publication-details/pub/factsheet-remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-(rpas)
Back
71
Ev w117 Back
72
Ev w53, para 14 Back
73
Ev w7 Back
74
Ev w6, para 5.6 Back
75
Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, "UK-France Summit
2014: agreements: Declaration on Defence and Security", www.gov.uk
Back
76
Dassault Aviation, "nEUROn". Available at: http://www.dassault-aviation.com/en/defense/neuron/introduction/ Back
77
Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, "UK-France Summit
2014: agreements: Declaration on Defence and Security", www.gov.uk Back
78
Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, "UK-France Summit
2014: agreements: Declaration on Defence and Security", www.gov.uk Back
79
European Council Conclusions, Nr: EUCO 217/13, 20 December 2013.
Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf Back
80
European Council Conclusions, Nr: EUCO 217/13, 20 December 2013.
Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf Back
81
Ev w60, para 7 Back
82
ASTRAEA, http://astraea.aero/ Back
83
ASTRAEA, http://astraea.aero/ Back
84
ASTRAEA, http://astraea.aero/ Back
85
European RPAS Steering Group, Roadmap for the integration of
civil Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Systems into the European Aviation
System, June 2013. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/aerospace/uas/index_en.htm Back
86
Ev w126 Back
87
Ev w10, para 7.5 Back
88
Ev w10, para 7.5 Back
89
Ev w2 Back
90
See for example: RUSI, Hitting the target: How New Capabilities
are Shaping International Intervention. Whitehall Report 2-13.
March 2013. Back
91
International Committee of the Red Cross, "IHL and human
rights law", 29 October 2010 Back
92
International Committee of the Red Cross, "IHL and human
rights law", 29 October 2010 Back
93
International Committee of the Red Cross, "War and International
Humanitarian Law" Back
94
International Committee of the Red Cross, "IHL and human
rights law", 29 October 2010 Back
95
ICRC, memorandum received in response to inquiry into UK Armed
Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework for Future Operations. Back
96
Professor Steven Haines, memorandum received in response to inquiry
into UK Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework for
Future Operations. Back
97
Ev w80, para 1.5 Back
98
Ev w9, para 7.2 Back
99
Ev w9, para 7.3 Back
100
Ev w9, para 7.4 Back
101
Ev w31, para 44 Back
102
Definition of the command terms above can be found in Ministry
of Defence, Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(D): Allied Joint
Doctrine. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ajp-01-d-allied-joint-doctrine Back
103
Ev w4, para 3.12 Back
104 United
Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
countering terrorism, A/68/389, 18 September 2013. Available
at: http://unispal.un.org Back
105
As above Back
106
As above Back
107
As above Back
108
United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
countering terrorism, A/68/389, 18 September 2013. Available
at: http://unispal.un.org Back
109
As above Back
110
As above Back
111
Ev w117 Back
112
United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
countering terrorism, A/68/389, 18 September 2013. Available
at: http://unispal.un.org Back
| 
