HC 772 Defence CommitteeWritten evidence from the Royal Aeronautical Society
Summary
The use of “drone” to describe the various types of uninhabited aircraft should be discouraged. Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) is a more accurate term.
All of the current generation of RPAS require considerable human interaction with a man-in-the-loop to exercise judgement and, in the case of Reaper, to release weapons.
The RAF experience operating RPAS over Afghanistan and elsewhere has highlighted some key lessons. Cooperation with the USAF Reaper programme has allowed us to benefit from economies of scale and shared facilities we would not otherwise have enjoyed. But it has also brought challenges associated with dislocated operations.
Recent operations have underlined the requirement for training specialised crews to operate unmanned aircraft. The RAF has recently graduated its first class of RPAS pilots and a number of RPAS operators are currently examining the training requirements to operate various classes of unmanned aircraft in future.
Timescales for emerging technologies cannot be precise. RPASs have the potential to be employed across the full range of airpower roles and platforms can be expected to grow steadily in numbers over the coming decades, including highly sophisticated vehicles operating on the boundaries of space.
There is widespread legal, academic, media and public concern over RPAS operations to the extent that their legality is questioned in some quarters; the development of international humanitarian law may not be quick enough to keep pace with potential autonomous developments.
The majority of military sorties are flown for reconnaissance purposes. The minority tasked with weapons delivery are subject to the standard application of the laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement. The primary issue in recent operations has been the extent to which armed sorties have been under the direction of foreign intelligence agencies with different rules of engagement.
The UK needs to be clear on its own stance. It is necessary for policy makers and commanders to understand where the UK stands on the questions of legality. With the blurring of law and policy, this may be a question the UK Government would rather not have to answer.
An important factor is the degree to which UK personnel are actively engaged in armed operations, or are complicit in their conduct. This could include the provision of intelligence, active participation, or carrying out other activities which free up capacity for lethal RPAS operations.
Introduction
1. The Royal Aeronautical Society is the learned society for the aerospace and aviation community. It has over 17,000 members world-wide. Its activities are supported by a number of Specialist Groups, including an Air Power and a UAS Group.
Nomenclature
2. This has been the subject of much debate (and some confusion) amongst analysts and in public debate generally. The popular default position has been to adopt the word “drone” to describe the uninhabited (a gender free variant of unmanned) air (or aerospace) vehicle (or system (hence UAV or UAS). This is an echo perhaps of the radio-controlled converted aircraft used for target practice. Drone also has a useful resonance in headlines and popular imagination. The use of the term drone to describe a class of far more sophisticated aircraft is, however misleading and should be avoided.
3. The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has described all aircraft without a pilot on board as “pilotless”. The terms Unmanned Aircraft and Unmanned Aircraft Systems, UAS cover all aircraft fixed, rotary, lighter than air etc., that are pilotless. For the “foreseeable future”, only Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), that is UAS that have a human pilot located somewhere (on the ground, on a ship, another aircraft, in space) who is able to control the flight of the aircraft, will be able to operate in non-segregated airspace. ICAO has adopted a very rigid definition of “autonomous” as operation of the aircraft where a human pilot is not able to intervene in the management of the flight. This does not align with the NATO and other “scales” of autonomy, which relate to levels of authority and decision support.
4. The term RPA is not intended to imply that the aircraft is expected to be flown routinely manually or even that it has the potential to be flown manually (use of autopilot, etc, is covered by the term)—the requirement is that the pilot can manipulate the flight controls, as appropriate, during flight. From this it follows that RPA and Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) (which include the “pilot station” and the command and control infrastructure) are a subclass of Unmanned Aircraft and Unmanned Aircraft Systems respectively.
5. However, this nomenclature is not yet widely adopted, although there is a growing use of the term “RPAS”, which the Society will use in this submission.
6. The term UCAS, describes Uninhabited Combat Air Systems—advanced armed platforms currently under development in the US, Europe and elsewhere.
Context
7. The emergence of RPAS platforms is potentially one of the more overtly “transformational” aspects of modern warfare. Although much of the current debate has been centred on their use by the US, the UK and other advanced military powers, access to RPAS technology is increasingly global in extent. RPAS programmes and research are to be found in several centres, many outside the usual aerospace producing countries. The ubiquity of RPAS development and production in itself constitutes an important change factor in the world defence industry and in future military operations.
8. Currently, there are over 30 countries with some form of unmanned programme, with over 7000 platforms in total deployed. Many are small and unsophisticated vehicles, and the ability to develop and to deploy the more sophisticated surveillance and armed RPAS is more concentrated. But this still has the potential to pose a challenge to established military aerospace producers and has implications for future military operations conducted by the UK and its allies, especially as the technology becomes more ubiquitous.
Current Use
9. The current generation of RPAS began as reconnaissance vehicles. Modern electro-optical sensors, satellite tracking technology and long endurance combined to enable them to remain airborne for long periods while being controlled from great distances and to monitor activity on the ground continuously in real time. The General Atomics MQ-1 Predator, and its immediate predecessor the Gnat, were first employed by the CIA for covert surveillance over the Balkans and Afghanistan in the 1990s.
10. Frustration in Washington at being unable to quickly strike targets of opportunity identified by RPV feeds led to the Predator being armed with Hellfire missiles post 9/11 and they have since become the USA’s weapon of choice against militants in Afghanistan and (controversially) Pakistan and elsewhere. Over 30 countries now operate unmanned aerial vehicles, with many developing their own indigenous capabilities. However, the spotlight has remained on the USA because of the size of its inventory and the lethal nature of its RPAS operations.
11. The MQ-9 Reaper, an advanced and more heavily armed version1 of Predator, is currently the RAF’s only RPAS and is being employed over Afghanistan. It can stay airborne for up to 20 hours, has a ceiling of 50,000 feet, and its payloads include electro-optical and infrared sensors in a manoeuvrable turret, and a synthetic aperture radar with moving target indicator. It can be armed with Hellfire missiles and GBU-10 precision guided bombs. The system has multi-role capability and can conduct a wide range of missions from pattern of life surveillance to assisting with anti-IED tasks and precision attack. The RAF currently operates 10 Reapers in two squadrons. They fly from airfields in the theatre but are remotely controlled, via satellite links, by RAF personnel based at Creech AFB Nevada and now at RAF Waddington, UK.
12. Air power is not the sole domain of the RAF. The Army also deploys RPASs in Afghanistan, ranging from the small short range Desert Hawk to the larger Israeli built Hermes 450 for surveillance and artillery target spotting. The Watchkeeper, based on the Hermes, is currently entering service with the Royal Artillery in this role. However, Reaper is presently the only armed UK-operated system. All UK RPASs require considerable human interaction, with a man-in-the-loop to exercise judgement and, in the case of Reaper, to release weapons. Significant numbers of personnel on the ground are required also to exploit the larger systems’ outstanding capability as ISR2 platforms.
13. In the last decade RPASs have progressed from minor players in the intelligence and situational awareness role to a key part of Allied air campaigns over Iraq and Afghanistan, with single platforms capable of achieving the entire find, fix, track, target, engage and assess kill chain. Their development follows a similar path to the evolution of aviation over the battlefields of WW 1, where aircraft began by providing artillery observation, then carrying rudimentary bombs and ended up engaging in major air battles against each other. Early indications are that parallels between the development of manned and unmanned aircraft will not end there; the capabilities of RPASs will continue to develop and they will increasingly play a part in all air power roles.
Lessons Learned from Operations in Afghanistan
14. The RAF experience operating RPASs over Afghanistan and elsewhere has highlighted some key lessons. Cooperation with the USAF Reaper programme has allowed the UK to benefit from economies of scale and shared facilities that the UK would not otherwise have enjoyed. But it has also brought challenges associated with dislocated operations. No. 39 Sqn., the first to operate the Reaper, is based in the USA and UK, and flies near constantly over Afghanistan. As a result the command and control chain is long and complex, with the challenge of balancing the many conflicting demands on this capable platform. Delivering an enduring 24/7 capability has proved to be a strain on Sqn. personnel, who are on operations for three-year tours, rather than the six months for those deployed forward in theatre.
15. There has also proved to be a constant misconception that “drones” are autonomous killing machines, whereas in reality each Reaper is controlled all the time by highly-trained operators bound by the same ROE as manned combat aircraft. There is no artificial intelligence associated with Reaper, only a lower level automation, such as an autopilot. The current need for humans in the loop is dictated by the complexities of attack missions and airspace de-confliction requirements. Remote piloting is expected to remain required for the foreseeable future.
16. Field experience has also highlighted the large number of personnel needed to support RPAS operations. The Reaper squadrons have a complement of 185, over half required for intelligence handling and processing. Experience has also shown that, while RPASs have great utility in complex counter-insurgency operations, they are best employed as part of a mixed force of manned and unmanned aircraft. The flexibility offered by manned aircraft means they will continue to be required for more specialised roles, such as wide area surveillance, for some time to come. The present Chief of Air Staff (RAF) is on record as stating that he foresees only one third of RAF aircraft being unmanned in 2030, although the proportion may yet increase as technology and therefore capability develops.
17. RPASs also proved their value over Iraq and in NATO’s Operation Unified Protector over Libya in 2011. In the latter case, Italy and France both deployed unmanned aircraft for surveillance, but NATO had to rely primarily on US assets. Armed USAF Predators flew attack missions and Global Hawks provided high altitude bomb damage assessment, particularly in areas where there remained a residual air defence threat. An overriding lesson from the conflict was that RPASs were in great demand and more were required to fulfil all operational missions. Also proving their usefulness over Iraq and Libya were smaller short range RPASs, flying as “eyes in the sky” in support of both ground and naval operations.
18. Recent operations have underlined the requirement for training specialised crews to operate unmanned aircraft. The RAF has recently graduated its first class of RPAS pilots and a number of RPAS operators are currently examining the training requirements to operate various classes of unmanned aircraft in future.
19. Complex operations have underlined the importance of a manned/unmanned mix of aircraft. Wide area surveillance platforms such as the RAF’s Sentinel R1 aircraft are important to successful use of RPASs. Short term developments will focus on expanding the ISR capabilities of RPAS platforms.
Tomorrow’s Potential—New Capabilities by 2020
20. Timescales for emerging technologies cannot be precise. RPASs have the potential to be employed across the full range of airpower roles. General RPAS and UCASplatforms can be expected to grow steadily in numbers over the coming decades, including highly sophisticated vehicles operating on the boundaries of space. There will be a range of different platforms; practically all will be multi-role and most are likely to be weapons capable. There will have to be increased focus on platform survivability, probably including development of advanced multi-spectral countermeasures as well as stealth technologies.
21. The development of relatively low cost disposable RPASs, with more advanced payloads may also increase the range of roles for the RPAS. Advances in technology can be expected to give RPASs greater persistence and endurance and multi-role utility. A current shortcoming of armed RPASs is their small weapon load, but Directed Energy Weapons (DEW), which could be available as early as 2025, will give much greater attack capability. RPASs will be particularly important for operations in contested airspace with an air defence threat. DEW will enable multiple attacks on ground and air targets, simultaneously if required.
22. Near term developments aimed at shaping the RAF’s Future Force 2020 will be invested in expanding networked combat ISTAR3 and command and control capabilities for both manned and unmanned aircraft. This is highly relevant to increasing RPAS capabilities. While UCAS can be expected to take over many attack missions, control of the air, especially in congested, cluttered and contested airspace, will probably remain the preserve of manned fighter aircraft at least until post 2030.
23. As RPASs proliferate, we can expect costs to come down. There will also be implications for manning and force structures as numbers grow and platforms become more automated. Military forces are already examining future training and skill requirements to operate next generation RPAS. The RAF has already created a new aircrew category—Remotely Piloted Air Systems Pilot. Given increased levels of autonomy, future RPASs may not all require qualified pilots.
24. The RAF’s MQ-9 Reapers were acquired hastily under an Urgent Operational Requirement. The UK has since set up two programmes in the last few years to explore new RPV technologies. The MANTIS technology demonstrator is exploring technologies associated with Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) systems, for which there is a joint Anglo-French development contract. BAE Systems’ Taranis, which was unveiled in July 2010, is more futuristic, being developed to explore advanced UCAS technologies and roles.
25. The UK is also involved in research to allow coordinated operation in the same airspace by manned and unmanned aircraft. Airspace integration remains one of the great challenges for future RPV operations. The German government has just been forced to cancel the EuroHawk unmanned high altitude SIGINT4 aircraft programme, valued at over a $1 billion, because certification for it to operate in civilian airspace was unlikely. The successful integration of RPASs into controlled airspace will have a dramatic impact on the RPAS industry, with new markets driving down the cost of the more sophisticated platforms as well as paving the way for a more extensive para-military and civil security role. Both the US and Europe (with ICAO providing coordination at an international level) are evolving rules, regulations and the technology necessary for such an integration of operations.
26. There is much work in this respect underway in the US and Europe. The European Commission having recently published a “road map” on this subject. The Commission and the European Defence Agency also want to coordinate research in this area and have proposed an extensive programme of research in this area, which will be presented to the EU Defence Council in November.
Legal Considerations
27. There are significant legal and ethical questions over the expanding use of military RPASs, especially as technology enables their operation to become more autonomous. At the simplest of levels it is very easy to assuage concerns over the legality of operating RPASs. They are almost invariably flown over sparsely populated areas in uncontrolled airspace or with individual dispensation. They are seamlessly tasked, operated and deconflicted on routine air tasking orders. Moves to develop a regime for incorporating RPAS into controlled airspace are underway in North America, Europe and elsewhere, but this will require significant technical improvements in key areas such as “see and avoid” capabilities.5
28. The majority of military sorties are flown for reconnaissance purposes. And the minority tasked with weapons delivery are subject to the standard application of the laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement. Targets are approved through the same exacting process as used for manned aircraft. The insistence on the use of the term RPASs is designed to reassure the world that these sophisticated weapon systems are not drones acting autonomously (or to simple mechanical algorithms), but the human operator is very much in the loop. Fire orders can therefore be issued after considerable deliberation and the risks of collateral damage are considerably reduced.
29. The reality, however, is that there is still widespread media and public concern over these operations to the extent that their actual legality is questioned. Furthermore, the whole context in which they are used is raising questions about the development of international humanitarian law not being quick enough to keep pace. Domestic concerns over the potential (and actual) use of drones in UK airspace for law enforcement or intelligence gathering raise other doubts over privacy and so forth, but will not be dealt with in this section.
30. The American use of Predator and Reaper systems by both the USAF and the CIA has generated the most angst and it is therefore appropriate to review their formal stance. The United States’ position is that it is in an “armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces”.6 This is in response to the 9/11 attacks and constitutes self defence under international law (specifically Article 51 of the UN Charter). Under domestic law Congress authorised the use “of all necessary and appropriate force” through the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force which remains in force.
31. Many US lawyers, academic analysts and officials therefore consider the “drone” operations legal under international and domestic law. Indeed the President has a formal duty to exercise this force against the nation’s enemies. A senior State Department legal advisor has underlined the American adherence to the principles of distinction, proportionality and the need to ensure minimal collateral damage.7 Beyond this, the majority of legal issues raised in the US have been based on lethal operations that have targeted American citizens who have become involved in al-Qaeda.8
32. Inevitably, there are numerous objections to this very straightforward interpretation and much ink has been spilt in academic debate; it is not proposed to take this debate beyond highlighting issues that could directly impinge on UK interests. The central point here is the degree to which British forces, policy makers and members of the intelligence community are actively engaged in, or complicit with, US operations. Depending on the interpretation of the law, this could involve participation in war crimes. It is, however, worth pointing out that where the interpretation of the law begins (very rapidly) to blur, the distinction between international law and the Administration’s policy also becomes less distinct, to the point where a simplistic rendering of the law has merely served to legitimise (at least in their eyes) a chosen course of action.
33. The major concern is the use of lethal action undertaken by the CIA, rather than the USAF or other armed forces. CIA operations have moved from covert, to deniable to public knowledge.9 The targeting is specific to each use of force, but remains highly classified. It is claimed that it is based on the imminence of the threat; the nature of the sovereignty of the states involved; and on their willingness and ability to suppress the threat. The delegation of weapons release authority to a civilian organisation, and their operating lethal systems has stretched the definition of “combatant”. This is equally true on the enemy side where many insurgents swap from civilian occupations to military operations, which is at odds with the ICRC definition of a combatant as being engaged in a “continuous combat function”.10
34. Article 51(3) of the UN Charter forbids the targeting of civilians; this in turn is mirrored in the Additional Protocols (especially AP 1) and in the Rome Charter where excessive use of force against civilians could amount to a war crime. While America may be willing and able to dismiss the possibility that its CIA personnel could be prosecuted as unlawful belligerents, this may not be as easy for personnel of European (or other) nations who either knowingly, or heedless of consequences (recklessly), are involved in such operations (and are potentially subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC). The lack of transparency at all levels is of considerable concern.
35. Although it is very straightforward to ascertain the American position on the conduct of these operations under domestic and international law, the UK needs to be clear on its own stance. Divergence begins immediately with the assertion of being in a state of global armed conflict and follows from there. It is necessary for policy makers and commanders to understand where the UK stands on the questions of legality. With the blurring of law and policy, this may be a question the UK Government would rather not have to answer.
36. The second factor is the degree to which UK personnel are engaged in these operations, or are complicit in their conduct. This could include the provision of intelligence, active participation, or other activities which free up capacity for lethal drone operations. The third factor is the use subsequently made of material gained (including patterns of lifestyle etc) from CIA/USAF drone operations. The final issue worthy of consideration under the legal framework is one of public confidence. In the UK, and in America, adherence to the laws of war by the military is the norm. The training, education and briefing processes are such that even where there are breaches (such as in interrogation procedures) the public is aware of what has been breached. The CIA operations do not offer such confidence.
15 September 2013
1 UK remains one of the few countries to deploy armed RPASs.
2 Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
3 Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance
4 Signals Intelligence
5 Military operations normally take place in specially designated “segregated” airspace where civilian traffic is restricted to some extent. Military aircraft operating under Operational Air Traffic (OAT) rules in non segregated airspace (incorrectly called civil airspace) are required to exercise “due regard” and not hazard civil traffic or populations.
6 Taken from a speech by Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department, delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, The Obama Administration and International Law on 25 March 2010. Available at http://www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/139119.htm accessed 5 August 2013.
7 Ibid.
8 Department of Justice White Paper published by NBC News at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf accessed 5 August 2013.
9 See for example, Jane Mayer, “The Predator at War, What are the risks of the C.I.A.’s covert drone program?” The New Yorker, 26 October 2009 available at http://www.newyorker.com./reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer accessed 6 August 2013.
10 For a much wider discussion see Ryan J. Vogel, “Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy Vol. 39.1, pp. 101–138.