Conclusions and recommendations
Background
1. We pay tribute
to the bravery of all those ISAF personnel who engaged the enemy
during the attack on Camp Bastion that night. We express our deepest
sympathy to the families of Lieutenant Colonel Raible and Sergeant
Atwell for their profound loss. (Paragraph 3)
The burning man incident
2. At the time of
the attack the Memorandum of Understanding between USCENTCOM and
PJHQ had not been revised, despite the fact that all parties appeared
to agree on the necessity to make revisions in the aftermath of
the "burning man incident". Witnesses were neither able
to explain to us which members of the Executive Steering Group
rejected the revised draft MOU nor what the reasons for the rejection
were. The delays to the process of revision allowed weaknesses
in command and control arrangements for force protection to persist.
It is an enduring characteristic of conflict that the enemy fights
back. ISAF personnel were exposed to unnecessary risk. In response
to our report the MoD must explain why the failure to revise the
MOU prior to the September 2012 attack should not be regarded
as an act of omission. (Paragraph 24)
Security incidents recorded inHelmand Province
3. The inference we
drew from the Chief of Joint Operation's evidence was that the
number of security incidents was unusually high in Helmand Province
in 2012. Unfortunately the MoD declined to provide us with comparable
details of the level of security incidents recorded in Helmand
for previous years as this information was classified. This would
have allowed us to make an informed assessment of the relative
threat levels in the area at the time. (Paragraph 26)
Camp Bastion Guard towers
4. The arrangements
for manning of the guard towers around the perimeter of Camp Bastion
were exposed by the attack as inadequate. The decision not to
man Tower 16 on the night of 14-15 September 2014 contributed
directly to the failure to detect the insurgents at an early stage
which might have limited the impact of their assault. We note
that all guard towers are now manned constantly. (Paragraph 33)
Perimeter security
5. We were concerned
to learn of the number of breaches of the perimeter fence of Camp
Bastion in the two years prior to the attack and the apparent
tolerance of poppy cultivation immediately outside the fence.
We consider that the failure to take concerted action to prevent
these activities increased the risk of surveillance and intelligence
gathering by Afghan nationals which could have assisted insurgent
planning for an attack on the base. (Paragraph 38)
Force protection projects and expenditure
6. Media reports suggested
that prior to the September 2012 attack additional security measures
at Camp Bastion were denied funding by the MoD on cost grounds.
We have seen no evidence that proposals for improved force protection
measures were turned down by the UK chain of command. (Paragraph
45)
7. The "burning
man" incident in March 2012 prompted a review of security
measures around the perimeter of the Bastion airfield. We consider
that the decision by the Executive Steering Group to create a
ditch and berm defensive obstacle rather than erect additional
fencing was a proportionate response to the threat of an insider
attack through vehicular incursion onto the airfield from within
the base. It is unlikely that additional fencing around the airfield
perimeter would have presented a significant impediment to the
insurgents on 14-15 September 2012 and altered significantly the
outcome of the attack. (Paragraph 46)
Conclusion
8. The MoD were wrong
to refuse to share the report on the attack prepared by Lieutenant
General Bradshaw, in his capacity as Deputy Commander ISAF. As
this was the highest level UK report into the attack, its status
as an ISAF document should not have prevented its release to us.
The MoD has been obstructive and unhelpful to us as we tried to
establish the facts surrounding the attack. (Paragraph 48)
9. We are concerned
that the perimeter security and force protection measures in place
at the time of the attack were inadequate. We were told that the
focus of ISAF commanders had been on security incidents elsewhere
in Helmand Province and on threats from insider attack. Insufficient
attention was given to the fundamental requirement of defending
Camp Bastion from external assault. We believe that this was complacent.
Given that the attack took place in the British sector of the
camp, British commanders must bear a degree of responsibility
for these systemic failures and associated reputational damage.
(Paragraph 49)
10. We note the acknowledgement
by the MoD that errors were made which, collectively, created
the vulnerabilities which were so devastatingly exploited by the
enemy. From the evidence we have received, we are satisfied that
as far as possible, these vulnerabilities have now been addressed.
(Paragraph 50)
11. We recommend that
the MoD capture the lessons identified from this extraordinary
attack as part of its wider efforts to learn lessons from Afghanistan
for future operations. It should explain how it intends to do
so in its response to our report. (Paragraph 51)
|