2 Accountability review
US Department of the Army report
(redacted), 19 August 2013
11. Prepared by Lieutenant General William B. Garrett
III, U.S. Army, Investigating Officer, and Major General Thomas
M. Murray, U.S. Marine Corp, Deputy Investigating Officer, the
report set out the circumstances surrounding the attack on Camps
Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak, collectively referred to as
the BLS Complex[4], in
Afghanistan, that occurred on 14-15 September 2012. The investigating
officers were also asked to report any fault, negligence, or failure
of responsibility.
12. The scope of the investigation was "to determine
the accountability of US commanders and staff at all levels for
the planning and execution of force protection in relation to
the attack". The scope of the investigation did not include
a directive to assess any potential responsibility of other coalition
forcesand so it did not include findings regardingthe effectiveness
or efficiency of UK forces.[5]
13. The review found that Major GeneralGurganus and
Major GeneralSturdevant were responsible for force protection
in the BLS Complex and accountable for the failure to take adequate
measures to mitigate the vulnerabilities which the attack exposed.
The review also found that the underlying causal factor for the
attack was the failure of Major GeneralGurganus and Major GeneralSturdevant"to
adequately ensure that an integrated, layered, defense-in-depth
was in place to protect US personnel and equipment on the Camp
Bastion airfield".[6]
Three contributing factors were cited in the report:
· Underestimation of the enemy;
· A lack of overall unity of command and
effort for anti-terrorism/force protection on the BLS Complex;
and
· A failure to provide adequate command
direction and oversight.
UK ACCOUNTABILITY
14. In oral evidence, Lieutenant General Capewell,
Chief of Joint Operations, acknowledged that errors had been made
by UK personnel but that "they were not culpable errors".
He pointed out that the US investigation had determined that the
two US Generals, as general officers in command of RC (SW), were
culpable:
Fundamentally, at the end of the day, that is
why those general officers were found to be accountable, because
the causal errors evident in the aftermath contributed to that
vulnerability. That vulnerability cannot be put down to a single
item that failed. The single item that failed may or may not have
had a British officer or serviceman in the chain of command, but
fundamentally they could not make judgments about the whole picture.
It is the business of general officers commanding in-theatre to
make that judgment. That was why the US determined the outcome
that they did.[7]
Memorandum of Understanding between
USCENTCOM and PJHQ
15. According to the redacted US report, a January
2011 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between US Central Command
(USCENTCOM) and the UK Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), titled
"The Command and Support Arrangements for UK/US Forces Based
at Bastion/Leatherneck Combined Operating Base Afghanistan"established
the anti terror/force protection command and control arrangementsfor
the BLS Complex. This MOU has not been published.
16. The US report stated that the 2011 MOU established
that the separate camps would "run on national lines,"
and several personnel interviewed by the Investigating team described
the two camps as separate "sovereign" territory. The
2011 MOU established the separate camps, in addition to the Bastion
airfield, which was a UK-US shared airfield located on Camp Bastion
and operated by the UK 903 Expeditionary Air Wing, as the Airfield
Operating Authority. The 2011 MOU further specified that the US
would protect Camp Leatherneck and conduct security operations
in Area of Operation Belleau Wood (AOBW), which included the area
surrounding the BLS Complex.
17. The MOU also specified that the UK was responsible
for protection of Camp Bastion, including the airfield, and for
security patrols in AOBW. The MOU stated that US and UK force
protection standards would be in accordance with national command
element requirements, but it did not specify those standards.
This arrangement "effectively created two different camps
with two different protection standards".[8]
18. In the wake of the attack Lt Gen Bradshaw, the
Deputy Commander ISAF, is reported to have characterised the USCENTCOM-PJHQ
MOU as a "sub-optimal C2 (command and control) solution".[9]
THE BURNING MAN INCIDENT
19. On 14 March 2012, Major GeneralGurganus and other
members of the RC(SW) staff were waiting on the airfield for the
arrival of US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta when a local national
interpreter working for coalition forces commandeered a vehicle
and drove it onto the airfield. He narrowly missed Major GeneralGurganus
and his party before being pursued into a ditch. The individual
then set himself on fire, dying of his wounds that evening. This
became known as the "burning man incident".[10]
20. A revised draft MOU, which, if agreed,would have
unifiedcommand by providing one commander for the base and for
the security forces, was drafted following this incident, but
the BLSExecutive Steering Group (ESG) did not agree to it. The
ESG was a combinedUS-UK board designed tointegrate actions affecting
both Camp Bastion and CampLeatherneck. Following the ESG's decision,the
command and control issue was escalated to ISAF Joint Command
(IJC) and ISAF. The US report stated that the proposals met with
"friction" from the IJC and ISAF staffs,and that neither
were supportive of combining the two camps, instead directingCommander
RC(SW) to work on a supported/supporting command relationship.[11]
21. In oral evidence, Lieutenant General Capewell
told us that the MOU in force at the time of the attack was the
one which had been agreed in 2011. He described it as "very
adequate" but subject to "dynamic review" as circumstances
changed and the size of Camp Bastion grew over time. Rather than
having been rejected by the ESG, Lieutenant General Capewell considered
that a revised MOU had been"under development".[12]
22. Paul Rimmer, Chief of Staff (Policy and Finance),
Permanent Joint Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, tried to provide
an explanation of the process:
My understanding at the time was that there was
the MOU, which was signed in 2011. After the March 2012 incident,
that shone some light on some of the command and control arrangements
within the broader complex. The Americans raised some concerns
about how that was reflected in the MOU, and that was discussed
by the Executive Steering Group, but I am not familiar with all
the detail and the argumentation at the time. The Americans then
raised that up to ISAF Joint Command (IJC), but it got pushed
back. My recollection from the review is that it didn't go any
further at the time, and that was one of the points that the American
accountability review raised. Having touched on an issue with
the MOU, the Americans did not pursue it as far as they might
have done. What we can say subsequent to the [September 2012]
attack is that that MOU was annulled and the issues that it covers
have each been dealt with.[13]
23. We were not satisfied by the responses we received
and asked further questions about the MOU following the evidence
session. In its response, the MoD told us that the principal differences
between the 2011 MOU and the revised MOU now in force related
to command relationships and organisation which had been streamlined
under Commander Regional Command (South West). Specifically, the
Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabakcomplex now operates under the command
of the US Marine Corps Commander of RC(SW).[14]
24. At the time of the attack the Memorandum of
Understanding between USCENTCOM and PJHQ had not been revised,
despite the fact that all parties appeared to agree on the necessity
to make revisions in the aftermath of the "burning man incident".
Witnesses were neither able to explain to us which members of
the Executive Steering Group rejected the revised draft MOU nor
what the reasons for the rejection were. The delays to the process
of revision allowed weaknesses in command and control arrangements
for force protection to persist. It is an enduring characteristic
of conflict that the enemy fights back. ISAF personnel were exposed
to unnecessary risk. In response to our report the MoD must explain
why the failure to revise the MOU prior to the September 2012
attack should not be regarded as an act of omission.
Security incidents recorded inHelmand
Province
25. Lieutenant General Capewell told us that in 2012,
prior to the attack on Camp Bastion, the focus of attention for
ISAF commanders in terms of security incidents had been elsewhere
in Helmand province:
The activity on the ground at the time in the
Helmand area, the Sangin valley and in the vicinity of the ISAF
footprint in and around northern and southern Helmand was a very
high incident rate. Commanders' minds were focused on that.[15]
26. The inference we drew from the Chief of Joint
Operation's evidence was that the number of security incidents
was unusually high in Helmand Province in 2012. Unfortunately
the MoD declined to provide us with comparable details of the
level of security incidents recorded in Helmand for previous years
as this information was classified. This would have allowed us
to make an informed assessment of the relative threat levels in
the area at the time.
Security and force protectionoperations
in Camp Bastion
27. According to the US report, security and force
protection for Camp Bastion and the airfield was the responsibility
of UK Number 5 RAF Force Protection Wing (5 FP Wing), who reported
directly to Commander Bastion.It comprised members of: the Wing
Headquarters, 51st Squadron, RAF Regiment; 2622 (Highland) Squadron
Royal Auxiliary Air Force Regiment; RAF No 2 (Tactical) Police
Squadron; the Tonga Defence Services; and elements of the 16th
Regiment Royal Artillery. The 5 FP Wing provided counter-threat
activity, airfield security, and air transport security for Camp
Bastion.
28. Asked to clarify who was in overall charge of
security and force protection for Camp Bastion and the airfield
at the time of the attack, the MoD told us:
In accordance with the then extant MOU (dated
January 2011), Commander Leatherneck was designated as the Battlespace
owner of Area of Operations Belleau Wood and a Security Force
Commander (US Marine Corps officer) was responsible for executing
security operations in Area of Operations Belleau Wood, within
which CampBastion is located. The Bastion Force Protection Commander
(a UK officer) was responsible for providing perimeter and on
base Force Protection of Bastion, including Bastion Airfield.
The Bastion Force Protection Commander worked for Commander Bastion
who was in turn the Commanding Officer 903 Expeditionary Air Wing.[16]
29. In oral evidence, Lieutenant General Capewell
told us thatsince the attack in September 2012, there had been
significant enhancements to force protection at the BLS complex
in terms of manpower, obstacles, defences and military capabilities,including
the deployment of additional personnel, improved command and control
arrangements and enhanced base surveillance measures.[17]
30. In a subsequent submission, the MoD explained
that additional manpower hadbeen provided in 2009 to "mitigate
the increased threat against air operations and increased steadily
from approx 110 personnel in 2009 to 293 personnel by September
2012".[18]
CAMP BASTION GUARD TOWERS
31. Eleven of the twenty-four guard towers on Camp
Bastion were manned at the time of the attack. The UK 5 FP Wing
did not employ a dedicated security force on the Camp Bastion
perimeter. Instead, they relied upon a "camp tax" (tasking
to provide guards) from various UK tenant units at the BLS Complex
to augment the Tonga Defence Services in the perimeter guard towers.
It was also typical on Camp Leatherneck to man approximately 50
percent of the existing towers.[19]
32. On the night of the attack Tower 16, in closest
proximity to the point of incursion, was not manned. Tower 15did
not have direct line of sight to the route taken by the insurgents
or the breach point due to high ground inbetween. Tower 17 was
250 metresfrom the breach site and it was very dark with just
two percent illumination on the night. The US report stated:
it would have been difficultto observe an approaching
attacker who was attempting to conceal his movement, even on anight
with better illumination, and even if the guard was constantly
scanning back and forthwith a night vision device. The attackers'
movement was partially obscured by the routethrough a shallow
wadi, and if the guards would have oriented their observation
primarilyeast (forward from the tower), the breach point, although
definitely visible, would have beento the right side of their
vantage point in an area of low ground.[20]
33. The arrangements for manning of the guard
towers around the perimeter of Camp Bastion were exposed by the
attack as inadequate. The decision not to man Tower 16 on the
night of 14-15 September 2014 contributed directly to the failure
to detect the insurgents at an early stage which might have limited
the impact of their assault. We note that all guard towers are
now manned constantly.
PERIMETER SECURITY
34. According to the redacted US report, the RC(SW)
command knew of external fence breaches before the 14-15 September
2012 attack, including a breach of the perimeter fence in the
Camp Leatherneck sector near Tower 40 or 41 that occurred in late
June 2012and three breaches that occurred in the Camp Bastion
perimeter in July-August 2012, identified by UK patrols after
the breaches occurred. The cause or purpose of the breaches was
unknown, but the 5 FP Wing had assessed them as "scrapping"
activity by individuals who would try to come near the base to
take or steal metal to sell.[21]Statements
by US personnel suggested that on at least one occasion intruders
were able to enter unoccupied guard posts.[22]
The US Army also released, as one of the exhibits associated with
the investigation report, surveillance video footage dated 18
July 2012 of a night time breach of the perimeter by two individuals
who moved near the cryogenics lab by the airfield and then departed
out of the same breach.[23]
35. The MoD told us that there had been around nine
breaches in 2011 and 12 breaches in 2012 in both the UK and US
sectors. The breaches were considered by UK personnel to be low-level
scrapping and criminal activity and any identified breaches had
been repaired.[24]
36. Several US personnel, including Major General
Gurganus and Major General Sturdevant, expressed concerns they
had about encroachment on the southeast side of the base by poppy
farmers. Major General Sturdevant, interviewed as part of the
US investigation following the attack, stated:
We literally had poppy growing right up against
the perimeter fence. That was another thing that Maj. Gen. Gurganus
tried to take action on, but he wasn't able to accomplish that.
It was because the Afghans had to do it. We weren't allowed to.
The biggest external threat to the base came from there, and Task
Force Belleau Wood was down there running patrols every single
day.[25]
37. In oral evidence, Lieutenant General Capewell
characterised the decision to allow poppy cultivation close to
the perimeter fence as a "minor tactical error" which
had contributed to the enemy's success.[26]
38. We were concerned to learn of the number of
breaches of the perimeter fence of Camp Bastion in the two years
prior to the attack and the apparent tolerance of poppy cultivation
immediately outside the fence. We consider that the failure to
take concerted action to prevent these activities increased the
risk of surveillance and intelligence gathering by Afghan nationals
which could have assisted insurgent planning for an attack on
the base.
RISK ASSESSMENT OF INTRUDER ACCESS
TO THE FLIGHT LINE
39. According to the US report, the 3d Marine Aircraft
Wing (Forward) (3d MAW (FWD)) and RC(SW) chains of command were
aware of the threat of both vehicle and pedestrian access identified
by the airfield incursion on 14 March 2012.[27]In
a written submission, the MoD told us that following the incident
a security survey had highlighted the following:
The current Airfield perimeter defences, in place
to defend against incursions onto the flight line, are not appropriate
for the size and number of personnel requiring access.
And that:
The almost constant construction work and continuous
redevelopment has seen the airfield outgrow the previously recommended
protective measures.[28]
40. Based on the assessed threat, the UK, in coordination
with the 3d MAW (FWD) anti-terrorism/force protection Officer,
submitted a project request for vehicular and pedestrian restrictions
to the airfield.[29]
41. The MoD explained that this had led to proposals
from the Executive Steering Group, which had resulted in a request
to PJHQ for authority to install a ditch and berm, which was started
in September 2012, just prior to the attack.[30]
Neither this nor the concertina wire, which was breached using
wire cutters,had presented significant obstacles to the Taliban
attackers on their way to the airfield.[31]
FORCE PROTECTION PROJECTS AND EXPENDITURE
42. The main US report suggested that both the ESG
and PJHQ had denied a request for construction of a fence all
the way around the airfield following the review conducted in
the wake of the "burning man" incident. However, associated
interviews published by the US Army provided clarification that
the ESG had considered various options including fencing, but
instead approved measures designed to counter vehicle-borne IEDs
(VBIED), through construction of an anti-vehicle ditch and berm
obstacle, and to restrict pedestrian access through the placement
of concertina wire. The threat from a VBIED was considered to
be the biggest threat to the flight line at the time.[32]
43. Paul Rimmer told us that he had not seen any
evidence that any proposals for improved force protection had
been turned down.[33]Lieutenant
General Capewell expressed the view that additional fencing would
not have prevented the attack.[34]
44. We asked what force protection projects had been
implemented in the 12 months prior to the September 2012 attack,
the MoD explained that a total of 21 infrastructure projects had
been completed, covering, in the main, installation or modification
of protective walls, CCTV, additional fencing and a range of other
enhancements. For those projects completed under the in-theatre
delegation of £500,000, the total contract value was around
£680,000.[35]
45. Media reports suggested that prior to the
September 2012 attack additional security measures at Camp Bastion
were denied funding by the MoD on cost grounds. We have seen no
evidence that proposals for improved force protection measures
were turned down by the UK chain of command.
46. The "burning man" incident in March
2012 prompted a review of security measures around the perimeter
of the Bastion airfield. We consider that the decision by the
Executive Steering Group to create a ditch and berm defensive
obstacle rather than erect additional fencing was a proportionate
response to the threat of an insider attack through vehicular
incursion onto the airfield from within the base. It is unlikely
that additional fencing around the airfield perimeter would have
presented a significant impediment to the insurgents on 14-15
September 2012 and altered significantly the outcome of the attack.
4 In the UK, the BLS complex is commonly referred to
as Camp Bastion but is in fact a complex of camps accommodating
UK (Bastion), US (Leatherneck), Afghan (Shorabak) and other coalition
personnel and contractors. Back
5
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
6
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
7
Q44 Back
8
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
9
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
10
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
11
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
12
Qq16-24 Back
13
Q25 Back
14
Ministry of Defence (ACB0001) Back
15
Q2 Back
16
Ministry of Defence (ACB0001) Back
17
Q1 Back
18
Ministry of Defence (ACB0001) Back
19
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
20
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
21
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
22
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
23
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
24
Ministry of Defence (ACB0001) Back
25
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
26
Q100 Back
27
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
28
Ministry of Defence (ACB0001) Back
29
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
30
Ministry of Defence (ACB0001) Back
31
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
32
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on the Camp Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
(redacted version), 19 August 2013 Back
33
Q51 Back
34
Q56 Back
35
Ministry of Defence (ACB0001) Back
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