UK Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework for Future Operations - Defence Committee Contents

3  Human rights law and International Humanitarian Law

Human Rights Law and the European Convention on Human Rights

47. Current IHL has been the basis of the protection of both civilians and combatants since 1947 but, in more recent conflicts,tension between IHL and HRL as to the primary source of legal authority and responsibility has emerged.More recently there have been a number of judgments concerning the application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to:

·  foreign nationals killed or detained by UK Armed Forces personnel deployed on operations outside the UK;

·  UK Armed Forces killed while on military operations.

48. The MoD is particularly concerned with the aspects of human rights law relating to extraterritorial application and the burdens imposed by procedural obligations:

    The two principal areas of uncertainty related to the ECHR in the field of military operations have probably been the extent of the Convention's effect extraterritorially and the extent of the burdens imposed by the procedural obligation derived from the right to life and the prohibition on torture (articles 2 and 3).[50]

The MoD further told us that it was concerned about the possibility of a retrospective application of these obligations to events in much earlier conflicts such as the Malayan emergency over 60 years ago and about the number of cases it might face.[51]

49. Article 1 of the ECHR requires parties to the Convention to "secure within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms" defined in the ECHR. This means that the question of appropriate jurisdiction and the extent to which the ECHR applies outside the UK (extraterritorially) is of increasing importance. The traditional understanding of extraterritorial application[52] held that the notion of jurisdiction was "essentially territorial" and "only in exceptional circumstances" could acts outside a state's own territory constitute "an exercise of jurisdiction" within the meaning of Article 1.[53] More recent cases, in particular Al-Skeini, have changed this position (see paragraphs 52 to 56 below).

50. Professor Roberts said that human rights law and the relevant institutions are here to stay and, in some respects, their role had been positive and should not be rejected but he also recognised that there were some issues which needed to be addressed:

    To criticise the role of all law on the grounds that it hampers military operations would be to misunderstand the long-standing and important role of the law of armed conflict in this area. Even a more limited rejection of any and all application of human rights law in armed conflicts and occupations overseas would be problematic: it would deny aggrieved parties a mechanism of redress, and would invite extensive international criticism. There are, however, issues, particularly in relation to the application of human rights law in situations of armed conflict and occupation, that need to be addressed.[54]

The law as it relates to insurgents/combatants/civilians

51. The MoD told us that "it is an essential element of the Government's position that International Humanitarian Law together with domestic law provides a proper framework for the protection and legitimate rights of combatants and non-combatants alike".[55]


52. In 2004, the families of six Iraqis who died in Basra in 2003 brought a legal action against the MoD, claiming that the British authorities had failed to conduct adequate investigations into the deaths of their relatives (Al Skeini case). Four of the deceased had been shot by British troops out on patrol; one was a bystander who had been shot and killed in the course of an exchange of fire between British troops and Iraqi gunman; and the sixth, Baha Mousa, died at a military base while in the custody of British troops.[56]

53. In March 2004, the Secretary of State for Defence decided not to order an independent inquiry into the deaths. The families then applied for a judicial review of this decision. The High Court found that the death of Baha Mousa came within the scope of the ECHR and the Human Rights Act and that there had been a breach of the obligation arising under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to carry out a proper investigation. However, the High Court ruled that the complaints of the other five claimants did not fall within the UK's jurisdiction. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in 2005 and the House of Lords in 2007.[57] However, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights took a different view and ruled that, in Iraq, the UK had assumed the exercise of some of the powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government, in particular responsibility for the maintenance of security in south-east Iraq.[58] The Court also held that the UK had failed to carry out an adequate investigation under Article 2 into the deaths of the Iraqis with the exception of Baha Mousa which was by then the subject of a public inquiry.[59]

54. Furtherlegal claims have been brought against the Government regarding the form that inquiries take into deaths and allegations of abuse. In 2010, the Government established an Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT) to investigate allegations of abuse of Iraqi citizens by British service personnel. However, the High Court decided that where deaths had occurred, IHAT was not sufficient and that more inquest-style inquiries should be conducted.[60] In October 2013, the Divisional Court ruledthat compelling service personnel to give evidence would be the only effective way of determining what happened as soldiers might be reluctant to give evidence at all.[61]

55. The MoD told us that there was still uncertainty as to the extent of the ECHR requirement for scrutiny of the circumstances in which people were killed.The MoD is making arrangements for the inquisitorial inquiries into deaths akin to Coroners' inquests to take place once IHAT investigations and any resulting prosecutions have been concluded.[62]

56. The death of Baha Mousa while in UK detention in Iraq in 2003 was a horrific incident in which some members of the UK Armed Forces behaved illegallyand inhumanely in their treatment of anindividual, resulting in his death. The public inquiry into Baha Mousa's death reported in September 2011. The Report said that "During his detention, Baha Mousa was subjected to violent and cowardly abuse and assaults by British servicemen whose job it was to guard him and treat him humanely". Nine other Iraqis, detained with him were also subjected to significant abuse. The Report detailed 73 recommendations to the MoD.[63] Professor Roberts commended the Public Inquiry:

    The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry Report (September 2011), is excellent both as an analysis of the facts and as an exposition of the legal situation surrounding them. Part XVII made 73 recommendations to the MoD. The MoD has made certain responses to the report's recommendations, including initiating certain much-needed improvements to training in detainee-related matters.[64]

57. The Al Sweady Inquiry is a public inquiry, announced in November 2009, into allegations that Iraqi nationals were detained after a firefight with British soldiers in Iraq in May 2004 and unlawfully killed at a British camp, and that others had been mistreated at that camp and later at a detention facility.On 20 March 2014, the lawyers acting for the Iraqi nationals withdrew the cases of unlawful deaths of five Iraqi. The allegations of the mistreatments of Iraqi civilians in British custody remain. The website for Al Sweady Inquiry states:

    It is for the Chairman to reach all conclusions and he will detail findings of fact in his report. In so doing he will draw on all the evidence he has seen and heard, including the statement made today by the legal representatives for the Iraqi Core Participants.

    The Inquiry continues and will hear closing submissions from Core Participants on 16 April 2014. Thereafter, the Chairman will write his report.[65]

58. The burden on the MoD of the number and costs of the necessary investigations and legal inquiries is likely to be great. It is estimated that as many as 150 to 160 deaths of Iraqi citizens may need to be investigated with a further 700 to 800 allegations of mistreatment. The Baha Mousa Inquiry cost £25 million and the Al Sweady Inquiry[66] has cost more than £22.2 million to 28 February 2014. Other inquiries launched beforethe High Court ruling on the need for inquest-style inquiries are costing some £7.5 million a year.[67]


59. In 2005, Halal Abdul Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda, who had been arrested on suspicion of being a member of a terrorist group involved in weapons-smuggling and then detained in a British detention centre in Basra, took legal action to challenge his indefinite detention without trial. Broadly, British courts agreed that the UK was authorised by UN Security Council Resolution to exercise powers of detention where it was necessary for reasons of security in Iraq. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, however,took a different view, holding that because the Resolutions authorised the UK to detain prisoners, but did not oblige it to do so, the case fell within the UK's jurisdiction and that the UK had violated Article 5 of the ECHR.[68]

60. Professor Roberts thought that there had been significant weaknesses in the UK's performance regarding implementation of the laws of armed conflict:

    Perhaps the most important weaknesses have been the cases of maltreatment of detainees in Iraq following the 2003 invasion.[69]

The death of Baha Mousa in British custody was a shocking example of this.

61. Professor Roberts was, however, concerned with the European Court of Human Rights judgments and the legal approach taken by the UK in two cases, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda:

    The record of the European Court of Human Rights with respect to UK and other military actions is far from being problem-free. A particular issue in which its record has been widely questioned is the relation between human rights law and the law of armed conflict. Naturally the court is more familiar with human rights law, and in some cases it has been criticized for apparently giving priority to human rights law, even in the circumstances of international armed conflict—for which, of course, the law of armed conflict is the lexspecialis. This issue arose in two major judgments against the UK in July 2011, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda.[70]

    He further said that the second case (Al Jedda) was more problematic and should have been legally argued in a different way by the UK:

    In the second case, the Court decided that states parties to the European Convention on Human Rights may not intern civilians unless there is a binding and explicit UN Security Council mandate, or a derogation to Article 5 of the European Convention has been entered. This outcome may have been the result of a flawed argument by government lawyers, who had apparently chosen not to raise provisions of the law of armed conflict as a basis for detention, but instead to rely on the authority of a UN Security Council resolution. The legally peculiar judgment simply contradicted clear provisions in the law of armed conflict (especially 1949 Geneva Convention IV) whereby non-criminal detention for imperative security reasons is permitted. The Court's conclusion could even be read to apply equally to the internment of prisoners of war. Legal experts of the International Committee of the Red Cross have been justifiably concerned about the implications of this judgment.[71]

62. Martin Hemming was also concerned by the results of the Al-Jeddacase:

    One of the most difficult aspects of recent ECtHR [European Court of Human Rights] jurisprudence has been the view taken on security detention in the Al Jedda case—in effect, that a UN Security Council Resolution that authorizes detention for imperative reasons of security is insufficient to override, in accordance with Article 103 of the UN Charter, Article 5 ECHR obligations such as would arise in relation to a detention within the UK.Only an explicit Security Council requirement or obligation to detain could do that, or a derogation under Article 15 of the ECHR.[72]

63. On the Al-Jedda case, the MoD told us that the Government had been forced to pay large sums of money to persons who were reasonably suspected of attacking and conspiring against UK forces and whose detention was believed at the time to be entirely lawful:

    An important example is the European Court of Human Rights' decision in the case of Al-Jedda. In this case the Court rejected the submissions of the UK Government that the Convention did not apply to military operations in Iraq and went on to rule that the detention of the claimant, a suspected insurgent, was contrary to their human rights although detention operations had been foreseen at the time the United Nations Security Council Resolutions authorised the military operations.[73]


64. The MoD told us that because the circumstances of the military operations in Afghanistan differed in important and legally significant ways from those of the Iraq campaign, the Convention (ECHR) did not apply to the operations of UK Forces in Afghanistan. The primary reason is that such operations are conducted under the auspices of the International Security Assistance Force, NATO and cases were unlikely to fall under UK jurisdiction for the purposes of the ECHR. The MoD did point out though that these matters will be tested in a number of forthcoming cases.[74]

65. The number of legal challenges facing the MoD in respect of human rights law is large, uncertain and growing. We recognise that there is nothing the MoD can do to prevent these existing cases but we recommend it should fight each of them vigorously. We will cover possible future arrangements including legislation and procedural changes later in this Report. The MoD should inform us of the size and costs of the legal challenges it is facing in regard to the challenges from people in Iraq and Afghanistan on human rights grounds. It should also set out the arrangements it has introduced for carrying out the required inquiries akin to Coroners' inquests on those people who died in Iraq as a result of the actions of the UK Armed Forces.

66. The MoD should identify the lessons from the legal issues arising in Iraq and Afghanistan and ensure that in all future operational deployments, the Armed Forces are clear about the legal position of the deployment and that all measures have been taken to ensure that they will not be open to legal challenge.

67. Baha Mousa's treatment and subsequent death in detention was an horrific example of a few Armed Forces personnel behaving inhumanely and illegally. It is obviously right in such cases that individuals and the Armed Forces should feel the weight of the law. In its response, the MoD should detail how it is addressing the recommendations from the Baha Mousa Inquiry and the progress made to date in the implementation of these recommendations.


68. On legal aid, the MoD told us that the use of legal aid by people with little personal stake in the matter caused the Government concern:

    [...] The first is the apparently ready availability of legal aid for actions challenging the conduct of military operations, some of them weak or ill-thought out. Such actions are often brought in the name of overseas nationals or of UK nationals who may have little or no personal stake in the matter. While the government recognises that, within the legislative framework for legal aid, decisions on support to be provided to individuals must be made independently, the Ministry of Defence has been concerned that legal aid has been granted recently for at least two judicial review cases to be taken to appeal after having been roundly rejected at the High Court. It therefore welcomes the steps announced by the Ministry of Justice to reform the rules on access to legal aid, particularly in cases brought by overseas claimants.[75]

69. The MoD alsotold us that it was concerned by the use of judicial review:

    The second aspect is the use of judicial review in cases which might more appropriately have proceeded as personal injury claims. Judicial review is there as a mechanism for the scrutiny of decisions primarily made by or on behalf of Ministers. In many cases of alleged personal injury, particularly those arising from operations in Iraq, however, the claimants' lawyers have proceeded by way of judicial review, alleging inadequate investigation even before the investigation has concluded. Given that neither the Minister nor his officials have taken any decision, this seems an inappropriate way of proceeding and it is certainly one which leads to the expenditure of far larger amounts on legal fees than would personal injury claims.[76]

70. We await with interest the results of the Government's work on the reform of legal aid. The MoD should inform us how any such reform will impact on the legal challenges it faces. The Government should also tell us of its intentions to limit the use of judicial review in respect of military operations.


71. There have been a number of attempts to harmonise the standards with regard to holding detainees. The Copenhagen Process[77] on Handling Detainees in International Military Operations was launched in October 2007 by the Danish Government and concluded in October 2012.Participants recognised that detention is a necessary, lawful and legitimate means of achieving the objectives of international military operations. It did not seek to create new legal obligations under international law but to develop principles to guide the implementation of the existing obligations with respect to detention in international military operations; by facilitating a common approach the Copenhagen Processshould theoretically contribute to ensuring the humane treatment of detainees and the effectiveness of international military operations.[78] On the outcome of the Copenhagen Process, Professor Roberts said:

    The Copenhagen Process [...] has been a useful attempt to facilitate a common approach. As paragraph II of this document states, 'it should contribute to ensuring the humane treatment of detainees and the effectiveness of international military operations'; paragraph IV notes a still unresolved doctrinal issue when it recognizes 'the challenges of agreeing upon a precise description of the interaction between international human rights law and international humanitarian law.'[79]

72. ProfessorRoberts referred to other projects which were attemptingto secure the full application of the laws of armed conflict. For example, Geneva Call sought the participation of non-state armed groups, placing particular emphasis on specific issues such as certain weapons and child soldiers. He also mentioned a more ambitious project—the work on Harmonising Standards for Armed Conflict led by Sir Daniel Bethlehem, former legal adviser to the FCO. The project has been working on a model declaration that states might make unilaterally to agree to be bound by the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocol I (albeit with certain reservations) in conflicts of a non-international character.[80]

73. The ICRC is currently examining ways of strengthening the protection of persons deprived of their liberty in non-international armed conflict which is the predominant form of conflict in the world today. It told us:

    [...] there is a significant disparity between the robust and detailed provisions applicable to the deprivation of liberty in the context of international armed conflict, and the very basic rules codified for non-international armed conflict. While the Four Geneva Conventions contain over 175 provisions regulating detention in virtually all its aspects in relation to international armed conflicts, there is no comparable regime for non-international armed conflict. The very limited treaty rules applicable to non-international armed conflict cannot adequately respond to the myriad of legal and protection issues that arise in practice. This relative absence of specificity within IHL has led to uncertainty about the source and content of the rules governing detention in non-international armed conflict, and on-going discussion regarding the applicability and adequacy of human rights law, and the precise contours of customary IHL [81]

The ICRC told us it had identified four key areas in which the law was in need of strengthening: conditions of detention; vulnerable categories of detainees; transfer of detainees; and grounds and procedures for internment.[82]

74. The UK Government should participate in appropriate international work to strengthen International Humanitarian Law and, in particular, should be more actively involved in the ICRC consultations on detention in non-international armed conflict and on strengthening compliance with IHL.

Human rights law, duty of care and members of the Armed Forces

75. The MoD told us that the judicial development of duty of care concepts is "a matter of real and current concern to the Government". The MoD described changes to the law on whether Service personnel could sue the MoD for death or injury on operations or training:

    Historically the Crown could not be sued in its own Courts. When that rule was abolished after the Second World War (by the Crown Proceedings Act 1947) an exception was made by section 10 of that Act for members of the Armed Forces who remained unable to sue the Government for death or personal injury caused by another member of the Armed Forces if the death or injury was certified as pensionable by the Secretary of State. This exception was repealed by the Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act 1987, although by section 2 of the 1987 Act (which is still in force) the effect of section 10 could be revived [...] in case of either (a) any imminent national danger or (b) for the purposes of any warlike operations in any part of the world outside the UK. Since 1987 no revival order has been made.

It also described the doctrine of combat immunity as follows:

    Given the virtually universal recognition that members of the Armed Forces on operations are in an inherently dangerous occupation and that the duty of care applicable to a civilian context cannot apply to them in the same way, the doctrine ofcombat immunity was rapidly adapted by the UK Courts to cover the position of UK armed forces on operations where they come under attack or face the threat of attack or violent resistance: the leading case was that of Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence (1996) which related to the first Gulf War, which of course took place four years after the 1987 Act came into force.[83]

76. Coroners' inquests are held on all Armed Forces personnel killed overseas whose bodies are returned to the UK. The introduction of narrative verdicts[84]in 2004 has meant that Coroners who often have limited military expertise have been able to comment on the circumstances of an individual's death and on operational matters rather than solely reach a judgment as to the cause of the death. This has led to criticisms of the MoD, the Armed Forces and individual Service personnel by coroners about the circumstances of these deaths.[85]

77. The legal cases about deaths in combat in Iraq and the application of the ECHR to UK Armed Forces personnel deployed outside the UK have yet to be fully resolved by the Courts. It is, therefore, not yet possible to determine their likely impact on military operations although the impacts are likely to be significant.

78. Much disquiet has been expressed about the application of human rights law onto the battlefield. In a debate in the House of Lords on the Armed Forces and Legal Challenge, some Members of the House of Lords expressed concern about the increased "jurification of military conflict" and that legal developments were undermining the Armed Forces' ability to operate effectively in conflict situations. Others defended the use of the law. In particular, Lord Hope, Supreme Court judge in the Smith case, said that when a claim was brought before the court, a judge had to deal with it and the issues could not be ducked however difficult or uncomfortable they may be.[86]

79. In his evidence, General Parker expressed his concern about the disconnect between the operational environment and the courtroom:

    [...] there is a real risk that future legal examination of an individual's action, which takes place in the sterilised environment of a court room, far away from the front line and with the benefit of hindsight, fails to appreciate the requirement to take action under extreme pressure and with no time to spare.The application of UK domestic law to a counter insurgency situation in a place where the culture, geography and value of life may be entirely different to that at home, must be delivered with extreme care.[87]

80. General Shaw took a very strong view on the impact of human rights legislation on military operations:

    HR [human rights] legislation is fundamentally incompatible to the soldier's unlimited contract on which soldiering depend. The intrusion of the right to life on to the battlefield will inevitably undermine the military profession and result in far bloodier engagements on the battlefield as a commander can take fewer risks with their own troops who might sue him so resorts to massive violence against the opposition to lessen the risk to his own troops.[88]


81. Cases (Smith and others v the MoD)relating to deaths and serious injury of Service personnel in Iraq were taken to the Supreme Court in early 2013. One of these incidents was as a result of 'friendly fire'. These cases, brought on both human rights and civil liability grounds, are described by the MoD below:

    The implications of this year's Supreme Court judgment in the conjoined cases of Smith and others v MOD, Ellis v MOD, and Allbutt and others v MOD are not yet clear. These are all tragic cases of deaths on the field of combat in Iraq: the Government has every sympathy with the claimants but is obliged to defend these claims on important grounds of legal principle. Briefly, the argument of the claimants is that, while these tragic incidents did indeed take place in the course of combat, combat immunity should not apply because they can be traced back to previous decisions about the provision of equipment and training to the soldiers which could—they argue—have protected them more effectively.[89]

82. The MoD is of the view that this argument could be applied to virtually any claim to which the principle of combat immunity has hitherto been understood to apply, and if accepted could have the effect of opening up the conduct of combat to the scrutiny of the courts after the event. It believes that this could have seriously debilitating effects on the decision-making of commanders on the ground which could in the long run seriously impair this country's military effectiveness.[90]

83. The Supreme Court considered the question of whether, and to what extent, Article 2 (the right to life) of the ECHR imposes positive obligations on the Government to prevent the deaths of its own soldiers in active operations against the enemy. On 19 June 2013, the Supreme Court ruled by a majority of four to three not to strike out these claims but to allow them to proceed to trial. The majority said that the court must avoid imposing positive obligations on the state in connection with the planning for and conduct of military operations in situations of armed conflict which are unrealistic and disproportionate. Policy decisions made at a high level of command and things done on the battlefield would fall outside the scope of Article 2 but finding whether there is room for claims to be brought in the middle ground would require the exercise of judgment in the light of the facts on each case.[91]In his judgment on the Smith case, Lord Hope specifically said:

    [...] the court must avoid imposing positive obligations on the state in connection with the planning for and conduct of military operations in situations of armed conflict which are unrealistic or disproportionate. But it must give effect to those obligations where it would be reasonable to expect the individual to be afforded the protection of the article. It will be easy to find that allegations are beyond the reach of article 2 if the decisions that were or ought to have been taken about training, procurement or the conduct of operations were at a high of command and closely linked to the exercise of political judgment and issues of policy. So too if they relate to things done or not done when those who might be thought to be responsible for avoiding the risk of death or injury to others were actively engaged in direct contact with the enemy. But finding whether there is room for claims to be brought in the middle ground, so that the wide margin of appreciation must be given to the authorities or to those actively engaged in armed conflict is fully recognised without depriving the article of content, is much more difficult. No hard and fast rules can be laid down. It will require the exercise of judgment. This can only be done in the light of the facts of each case.[92]

84. The MoD took comfort in aspects of the majority judgment, in particular, that it upheld the continuing existence of the doctrine of combat immunity and that liability of those actually engaged in active combat was specifically excluded.[93] The MoD also said:

    As Lord Hope said in his speech explaining the majority view, when the cases come to trial "the trial judge will be expected to follow the guidance set out in this judgment as to the very wide measure of discretion which must be accorded to those who were responsible on the ground for the planning and conduct of the operations during which these soldiers lost their lives and also to the way issues as to procurement too should be approached".[94]

85. Professor White, Professor of Law at University of Nottingham, told us that he did not regard this judgment as a difficult one as Lord Hope expressed the view that the law should not undermine the state's ability to defend itself:

    The law should enter this field with great caution, according to Lord Hope, and the Courts should not risk undermining the ability of a state to defend itself or risk democracy itself. Thus, it would require a manifest violation of positive obligations to trigger responsibility of the government—either a serious error by a commander, or a serious failure in planning or procurement.[95]

However, he also recognised the strength of the minority view set out by Lord Mance in the Smith casewhich had warned of the 'judicalisation of war'.[96]

86. We are concerned about the implications of the Supreme Court judgment in June 2013 in the Smith case for the principle of combat immunity. We recognise that the judgment appeared to limit the scope of the cases to the 'middle ground' between the policy and the conduct of the armed conflicts. However, we believe that this may still open up decisions, taken in situations of intense armed conflict where commanders are forced to make the best judgments they can, to examination by the Courts.

50   Ev 1 Back

51   Ev 2 Back

52   Set out by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of European Rights in Bankovic v Belgium [2001] II BHRC 435 Back

53   Bankovic v Belgium [2001] II BHRC 435, paragraph 67 Back

54   Ev 61 Back

55   Ev 1-2 Back

56   House of Lords library note: the Armed Forces and Legal Challenge 1 November 2013, LLN 2013/03 Back

57   [2005] EWCA Civ 1609 and [2007] UKHL 26, Back

58   Al Skeini and others v the UK [2011] 55721/07 Back

59   House of Lords library note: the Armed Forces and Legal Challenge 1 November 2013, LLN 2013/03. Back

60   Ibid Back

61   [2013] EWHC 2941 (Admin) Back

62   Ev 2 Back

63   The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry, HC 1452, September 2011 Back

64   Ev 59-60 Back

65 Back

66   Ibid Back

67   House of Lords library note: the Armed Forces and Legal Challenge 1 November 2013, LLN 2013/03 Back

68   Ibid Back

69   Ev 59-60 Back

70   Ev 61 Back

71   Ibid Back

72   Ev 98 Back

73   Ev 1 Back

74   Ev 1-2 Back

75   Ev 3 Back

76   Ibid Back

77   The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations involved representatives from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Tanzania, the Netherlands, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and representatives from the Africa Union, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross also attended the meetings as observers. Back

78   Ev 60 and Copenhagen Process website Back

79   Ev 60 Back

80   Ibid Back

81   Ev 15 Back

82   Ibid Back

83   Ev 3 Back

84   Narrative verdicts allow coroners to comment on the circumstances of an individual's death as well as reach a judgment as to the cause of death. Back

85   Ev 101 Back

86   House of Lords debate Armed Forces and Legal Challenge 7 November 2013 Back

87   Ev 30 Back

88   Ev 93 Back

89   Ev 3 Back

90   Ibid Back

91   House of Lords library note: the Armed Forces and Legal Challenge 1 November 2013, LLN 2013/03 Back

92   Smith and others v MoDetc [2013]UKSC 41, paragraph 76 Back

93   Ev 3 Back

94   Ibid  Back

95   Ev 47 Back

96   Ev 47-48 Back

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