Conclusions
and recommendations
Introduction
1. We
note that the Ministry of Defence defined intervention "as
the projection of military force (augmented by other agencies
as required) outside UK sovereign territory to achieve an effect
in securing, protecting or promoting UK national interests through
the use or threat of force". However this definition seems
to us to be very narrow, as it takes minimal account of the UK's
wider responsibilities as a UN Security Council member or as a
member of NATO or other alliances where national interests might
have to be balanced by wider global responsibilities. We also
note that several of our witnesses have referred to humanitarian
intervention which does not appear to fit within the Government's
definition. We call on the Government to develop definitions of
the terms "intervention" and "humanitarian intervention"
which can be used across Government Departments and be included
in the next iterations of the National Security Strategy and the
Defence and Security Review. (Paragraph 7)
Strategic rationale for intervention
2. A
strategic and well-articulated vision of the UK's position in
the world would lead to more rational decisions on whether or
not to intervene as well as a better public understanding of the
rationale for any future decision. It would also assist in identifying
the strategic objective of such operations, contributing to a
more coherent UK foreign, defence and security policy. (Paragraph
21)
3. We
remain concerned about the lack of realism in the Government's
assertion that there will be no shrinkage of UK influence when
resources are still being reduced. We call on the Government to
set out in the next National Security Strategy whether it still
maintains this assertion and, if so, how it could be achieved.
(Paragraph 22)
4.
The next National Security Strategy should consider the case for
the UK developing a regional strategic focus, particularly in
light of new or re-emerging threats to European defence and security.
We acknowledge that there will be times when the UK would have
to act beyond this regional focus. The next National Security
Strategy and the next Defence and Security Review should also
include a discussion on the UK's future role in NATO and its resourcing
by its members. (Paragraph 23)
5. We
continue to support the Government's adoption of an "adaptable
posture" in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.
The threats to UK national security remain uncertain and unpredictable
and it is important that the Government and UK Armed Forces retain
the flexibility to deal with them. The 2010 National Security
Strategy said that the national security apparatus had focused
on non-state actors and that the current main national security
threat was from international terrorism. We agree that these threats
remain, but call on the Government to ensure that the next National
Security Strategy gives due weight to the likelihood of a return
to an increased threat of state versus state conflict and that
the force structure, manpower, equipment and capability decisions
in the next Defence and Security Review ensure that UK Armed Forces
are able to meet all these threats. (Paragraph 24)
6. We
agree that intervention in its many forms has an important role
to play in the UK's national security and maintaining the national
interest. We note the MoD's statement that military intervention
remains an option of last resort in the UK's national security
strategy and should only be considered when other means have failed.
Unfortunately, but understandably, the last resort is often seen
by the public as the first resort due to the Government's failure
to communicate the other means it has employed prior to a decision
to intervene. In addressing this perception, the Government should
set out how it determines that other means have failed and that
intervention is the best option. The Government should consider
building on the so-called "Chicago doctrine" from 1999
by including in the next National Security Strategy a statement
of the criteria for when and whether to intervene. (Paragraph
31)
7. We
call on the Government to include in the next National Security
Strategy (NSS) and the next Defence and Security Review a description
of interventions that it regards as non-discretionary and the
rationale behind this view. This would give a good indication
of UK intent in terms of its national security interests. We note
that the Ministry of Defence recognises that some interventions
can be regarded as discretionary. While we understand that the
Government will need to be selective in undertaking discretionary
interventions, it should consider developing a base criteria for
these types of interventions to be included in the next NSS. Such
criteria would assist the Government in deciding whether an intervention
was in the UK's national interest and also assist in communicating
and engaging with the public on intervention decisions. The next
NSS should also detail what types of discretionary intervention
operations the Government envisages the UK would be able to undertake
on its own and those which it would undertake with allies. (Paragraph
32)
8. We
have welcomed the establishment of the National Security Council
(NSC) and support its attempts to bring greater coordination and
focus across Government on security matters to lead to greater
operational effectiveness. National security requires a whole
government joined up approach. However, we are concerned that
the NSC becomes too involved in operational matters and short-term
imperatives rather than giving the strategic lead on questions
such as intervention policy. (Paragraph 34)
9. The
legal justification for military intervention will continue to
be controversial. We note the Government's statement that when
there is no UN Security Council Resolution for action, there is
a legal basis available under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
which would permit the UK under international law to take exceptional
measures in order to alleviate a humanitarian catastrophe providing
certain conditions are met. We question whether the Government's
position is generally accepted by the international community
or the British public. The Government should set out in detail
in the next iterations of the National Security Strategy and the
Defence and Security Review the principles of its legal position,
including its relationship with the UN Charter, international
law and the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, on the deployment
of UK Armed Forces for intervention operations. This would assist
with providing the public with greater information on, and understanding
of, the Government's position on the use of UK Armed Forces rather
than waiting to the heat of debate immediately prior to a potential
deployment. (Paragraph 49)
10. We
welcome the Government's publication of summaries of its legal
position on the deployment of UK Armed Forces. We note the Government's
view that the confidentiality of the Attorney General's full legal
advice needs to be upheld and that legal privilege is an essential
component of the UK's legal system. We hope that the publication
of summaries of the Government's legal position on the deployment
of Armed Forces will continue to be regarded as normal and best
practice. We recommend that these notes should always state how
this position was formulated and who was consulted. We further
recommend that the Government should undertake to continue to
publish its legal position on the deployment of the Armed Forces.
(Paragraph 51)
11. The
role of Parliament in conflict decisions is a contentious issue.
The House of Commons' decision in August 2013 to reject the potential
deployment of military force to Syria (despite provisions in the
Government's resolution that would have required efforts to secure
a UN Security Council Resolution authorising such action and a
further vote in the House of Commons on direct UK involvement)
has significantly added to the debate on what the role of Parliament
should be in conflict decisions and its relationship with the
Royal Prerogative on such matters. The Government should intensify
its efforts to resolve this matter. We regard Parliament's role
as one of a strategic inquisitor on military deployments. As a
first step, we call on the Government to clarify its position
on whether it wishes to legislate to formalise the requirement
to consult Parliament on military action or whether it favours
codifying the role of Parliament in a Parliamentary resolution.
We do not consider it appropriate for the Government to wait until
the next possible military deployment to resolve this issue. We
conclude that, wherever possible, Parliament should be consulted
prior to the commencement of military action, but recognise that
this will not always be possible such as when urgent action is
required. We call on the Government to commit to ensuring that
a summary of the legal justification on military action is available
to Parliament in advance of any such debate. (Paragraph 65)
12. We
understand and acknowledge the current lack of appetite for military
operations given the experiences and tensions of the past decade
for operations in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. However,
it is also necessary to understand and acknowledge that there
are consequences to decisions by the UK and the international
community not to intervene in humanitarian or non-humanitarian
situations. Non-intervention decisions have implications for the
UK's place in the world and its influence which are as profound
as a decision to undertake an intervention operation. Decisions
not to intervene could have wide global implications for efforts
to deter hostile actions by other states or non-state actors.
The Government should be more forthright in stating the consequences
of non-intervention when it proposes intervention actions. The
next National Security Strategy and the next Defence and Security
Review should also include an indication of how the Government
balances and decides between these two choices.
(Paragraph 70)
13. We
welcome the Government's intention that any deployment of UK Armed
Forces should have a clear strategic aim. While conscious that
deployments will differ and some will be of an urgent nature we
repeat our call that the Government should develop this concept
by undertaking a more detailed, comprehensive and strategic assessment
before deciding to intervene. This should address the strategic
ends, ways and means, including generating the necessary parliamentary
support. We call on the Government to set out in the next Defence
and Security Review how it determines and measures success against
the strategic aims set for the deployment of UK Armed Forces.
We have seen no sign that its approach has resulted in a more
strategic use of the Armed Forces since the 2010 Strategic Defence
and Security Review. (Paragraph 74)
Interventions: How?
14. The
Government must ensure that the plans and resources for Future
Force 2020 enable the Armed Forces to carry out the roles intended
for them, including that of undertaking intervention operations.
We note the commitment to a 1% real terms increase in the equipment
budget from 2015 but this must not be achieved by further manpower
cuts. We also note the concepts listed in the 2010 SDSR (readiness,
reconstitution, reinforcement, regeneration and dependency) as
being central to achieving the optimal effect for Future Force
2020. We will explore the MoD's progress in fulfilling these concepts
as part of our forthcoming inquiry into Future Force 2020. (Paragraph
80)
15. We
agree that the UK will be required to work closely with allies
and partners in interventions, not just in terms of military capability
and force size but as a means of maintaining and demonstrating
legitimacy. We note the Ministry of Defence's statement that it
may sometimes be necessary to limit or modify the objectives of
a possible intervention to achieve the broadest possible support
from the international community. However, this must not be at
the risk of undermining the strategic aim of the intervention
operation. We agree with our witnesses that regional ownership
of interventions can on occasions be important and desirable.
The next National Security Strategy and the next Defence and Security
Review should set out how the Government plans to develop regional
partnerships which will help in delivering the UK's national security
objectives. (Paragraph 86)
16. We
note the US's stated intention to have a greater strategic focus
on the Pacific region. However, the level to which the US will
reduce its strategic focus on, and interest in, European affairs
is unclear, particularly in the light of recent events in Ukraine.
We call on the Government and other European NATO countries to
develop a strategy for the future role of NATO and its resourcing
that takes this into account. This should include a vision of
the leading role to be played by the UK in encouraging European
NATO states to take on a greater degree of responsibility in NATO
operations. The NATO summit in September 2014 provides an opportunity
for consideration of such matters. The summit also provides an
opportunity to discuss the role of non-NATO countries in NATO-led
operations. We call on the Government, in its response to this
Report, to set out how it intends to take these matters forward
at the summit. (Paragraph 87)
17. The
development of new capabilities, such as the ability to take offensive
cyber action, has profound implications for the way the UK intervenes.
Although these capabilities bring with them advantages, in terms
of not putting UK Armed Forces personnel in harm's way, their
use also raises a number of questions. The next National Security
Strategy and the next Defence and Security Review should consider
the implications of these capabilities and their use in future
interventions. (Paragraph 89)
18. We
welcome the Government's commitment to a "Comprehensive Approach".
We also welcome the emphasis on conflict prevention envisaged
in Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) and the International
Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES) and the involvement of UK Armed
Forces with other agencies. It is important that the Armed Forces
and other actors understand the context in the countries in which
these activities are taking place, including the development of
the language skills required for effective engagement with the
local population and authorities. The Government should also outline
the metrics it has developed to measure the effectiveness of both
the BSOS and the IDES. In interventions where the purpose is not
for humanitarian reasons, care must be taken to ensure that the
coercive or deterrent action taken is proportionate and that the
risks are fully assessed. (Paragraph 96)
19. Strategic
communications are vital for intervention operations. The perceptions
of local populations affected by such operations are crucial to
the success of these missions. Success also requires the strategic
aims and objectives of the mission to be understood by the public
in the UK. We call on the Government to develop coherent and understandable
meanings for the terms used across Government Departments for
its intervention policy and defence engagement strategy. It should
also develop methods to increase public understanding of them
as this will assist in improving public understanding and perceptions
of the use of the Armed Forces. (Paragraph 101)
20. We
welcome the intention to plan for viable exit strategies for deployed
UK Armed Forces although we recognise that this risks sending
signals to adversaries that intervention is bound in time, space,
military force or desired effect. However, it is vital that consideration
of an exit strategy should commence at an early stage, perhaps
even prior to deployment. (Paragraph 108)
21. Interventions
bring with them responsibilities in respect of exit strategies
and end states and these will invariably take longer than anticipated.
Securing the peace is as important an objective as winning the
war. The Government should set out in the next National Security
Strategy and the next Defence and Security Review how it defines
and assesses successful exit strategies and end states, including
how long they should take for each of the actors involved and
how it measures the success of the transition from exit strategies
to the desired end state. Exit strategies must also ensure safety
of Armed Forces personnel remaining in country and that of other
UK agencies such as DFID. (Paragraph 109)
22. Lessons
learned from military deployments are vital and the Government
must ensure they take place in a timely manner. We note that the
Ministry of Defence says it works with other Government Departments
in capturing best practice. The Government must ensure that a
unified vocabulary is used across Government. As well as ensuring
the capture of good practice, the lessons learned process must
capture mistakes so that future operations can be appropriately
informed and planned. The Government should outline what steps
it is taking to engender a culture of openness and willingness
to share mistakes and the lessons learned from them across the
various participants involved in such operations. (Paragraph
117)
23. We
welcome the Government's use of Global Strategic Trends and the
Future Character of Conflict as part of the work on the next National
Security Strategy (NSS) and the next Defence and Security Review
(DSR). We call on the Government to include in the next NSS and
the next DSR an outline of the contribution of this work to improvements
in the UK's national security. In response to our Report, the
Government should set out the use it has made of external academic
and research resources as part of its analysis of future global
trends and national security requirements. (Paragraph 119)
Conclusions
24. Intervention
policy and decisions have the potential to be controversial and
to polarise opinion. This Report is intended to assist the articulation
of the rationale for an intervention strategy in the next National
Security Strategy and the next Defence and Security Review which
might make for better decision making by Government and assist
in alleviating some of the controversy on decisions to intervene.
(Paragraph 120)
25. As
a starting point the Government must articulate a realistic vision
of the UK's place in the world, its level of strategic influence
and the way the world is changing as well as the identification
and prioritisation of the risks to it. The next Defence and Security
Review should then translate this vision into defence planning
assumptions and the development of the appropriate force structure.
This would assist more strategic decisions on why, when and how
to intervene. (Paragraph 121)
26. The
next National Security Strategy (NSS) and the next Defence and
Security Review (DSR) should define and communicate the circumstances
in which the UK might intervene and the role of interventions,
and set out the legal basis for the UK's interventions. The NSS
and the DSR should also set out what interventions the Government
regards as non-discretionary and those which are discretionary.
The Government should also outline the different approaches it
might use such as defence engagement, conflict prevention and
the projection of military force and how it ensures coordination
and unity of purpose between the different Government Departments
and agencies and ensures that appropriate lessons are learned
from previous interventions. This will lead to more effective
intervention operations in the future. (Paragraph 122)
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