2 Strategic rationale for intervention
National Security Strategy and
the UK's place in the world
8. A key starting point for any consideration
of intervention strategy is the Government's strategic vision
of the UK's place in the world, and the level of influence it
might realistically exert. This has been an area of contention
that commentators have raised with us throughout this Parliament,
questioning particularly the coherence of the vision outlined
in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) with the subsequent
decisions on the manpower and capabilities of UK Armed Forces
in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). The
2010 NSS stated that "any strategy for national security
must begin with the role we want Britain to play in the modern
world"[17] and that
the UK's strategy was "to use all our national capabilities
to build Britain's prosperity, extend our nation's influence in
the world and strengthen our security".[18]
The Government claimed that the NSS represented a "whole
government approach"[19]
and that its intention was to use all the instruments of national
power to prevent conflict and avert threats beyond the UK's shores,
including UK Embassies and High Commissions worldwide, the international
development programme, the intelligence services, defence diplomacy
and cultural assets. The NSS said the top priority was countering
the threat from terrorism in the UK and abroad and that the UK
would:
[...] maintain the defensive and offensive
capabilities needed to deploy armed force to protect UK territory
and its citizens from hostile action and to meet our commitments
to our allies.[20]
9. In 2010, the Government set as its
priority the reduction of the UK's budget deficit. In their foreword
to the 2010 NSS, the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister
saw the ability to meet current and future national security threats
as depending on tackling the budget deficit. They added:
Our national security depends on our
economic security and vice versa. An economic deficit is also
a security deficit. So at the heart of the Strategic Defence and
Security review are some tough choices to bring the defence budget
back to balance. Those choices are informed by the risks, analysis
and prioritisation set out in this National Security Strategy.[21]
10. Although the Government saw reduction
of the budget deficit as its main priority, in terms of the UK's
influence in the world the NSS stated that "the National
Security Council [NSC] had reached a clear conclusion that Britain's
national interest requires the rejection of any notion of the
shrinkage of influence".[22]
The NSC's statement was controversial. Air Chief Marshal Lord
Stirrup, Chief of the Defence Staffat the time of the NSS and
SDSR, told us during our 2011 inquiry into the SDSR and NSS that
this statement had caused much debate in the NSC:
Personally, I did not buy it, and my
view is that if the priority is to eliminate the deficit over
the course of a Parliament, the rather drastic action that will
be necessary means a period of strategic shrinkage. That is my
personal view, but that was not the view that prevailed in the
production of the document. As I said, what we sought to do was
reverse that strategic shrinkage over the second half of the decade,
but that is still an open question.[23]
Other witnesses to this inquiry were
also critical of the statement and told us that the UK's influence
was shrinking.[24]
11. Our 2011 Report on the National
Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review
acknowledged that not reducing the budget deficit would have implications
for maintaining the nation's security.[25]
However, we concluded that, although influence should not just
be measured in military hardware or capability, given the Government's
declared priority of deficit reduction, a period of strategic
shrinkage was inevitable.[26]
We were concerned that the Government appeared to believe that
the UK could maintain its influence while reducing spending, not
just in the area of defence but also at the FCO. We concluded
that if the UK's influence in the world was to be maintained,
the Government should demonstrate in a clear and convincing way
that these reductions had been offset by identifiable improvements
elsewhere rather than make imprecise assertions of an increased
reliance on diplomacy and 'soft power'. We warned that if the
Government could not do so, the NSSwas in danger of becoming a
'wish list' that failed to make the hard choices necessary to
ensure the nation's security. Our Report also raised concernsthat
the impact of defence cuts on the UK's influence, defence commitments
and role within NATO and other strategic alliances did not appear
to have been fully addressed. UK defence does not operate in a
vacuum and decisions taken in the UK have repercussions for the
spending commitments and strategic posture of allies and alliances.[27]
12. Our concerns were also shared by
the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS)
who said that a key point of the NSS was to set priorities, and
to guide choices in an era of diminished resources and that although
the NSS might contain aspirational elements it must also be realistic.
The JCNSS found that NSS's simultaneous recognition of the rise
of new global powers, shifts in the centres of economic activity,
and reduced resources in the UK, while at the same time asserting
"no reduction in influence" was wholly unrealistic in
the medium to long term and the UK needed to plan for a changing,
and more partnership-dependent, role in the world.[28]
13. In its response to our Report, the
Government said:
Global influence is not just about the
size or even the capability of a country's armed forces. [
]
the UK exerts influence in a variety of ways: diplomatic and economic,
development assistance, and technological and cultural exchanges,
in addition to our capability and willingness to use military
force. Through the work of the NSC, the NSS, and the SDSR the
Government has sought to coordinate these different aspects so
the sum of the whole is demonstrably greater than the sum of the
individual parts, reflecting the judgment, [
] that we have
to exert ourselves to ensure that the UK's influence does not
automatically shrink as our proportion of the world's economy
and population naturally reduces.[29]
14. Notwithstanding the Government's
response to our 2011 Report, we have continued to call for the
next NSS and DSR to include a realistic assessment and statement
of the UK's place in the world and its level of global influence.
Our Report on Towards the next Defence and Security Review:
Part One called for a vision of the UK's place in the world
to be articulated in the next NSS and for this to form the basis
for the consideration of the next DSR.[30]
In its response to our Report, the Government said it had noted
the recommendation but that the scope of the next NSS would be
decided at the time of the next review. The response said that
the Prime Minister had stated that the 2010 NSS had helped set
the context for what the Government wanted to do in defence and
security and that the strategy should inform decisions on these
matters. It also emphasised the Government's contention that the
2010 NSS "set out for the first time a clear over-arching
vision to use all our national capabilities to build Britain's
prosperity, extend our nation's influence in the world and strengthen
our security. It needs to be refreshed rather than subjected to
a complete overhaul".[31]
15. As we discussed in our Report, Towards
the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, this debate
has increased in importance due to the potential implications
of a US strategic pivot, or rebalancing, to the Pacific and the
implications of the associated expectation that Europe should
take on greater responsibility for its own security.[32]
The Secretary of State for Defence acknowledged in evidence to
us that this would be the case and that this would require an
increase in the proportion of GDP that European NATO countries
spent on defence, which he thought unlikely in the short term,
necessitating more effective defence spending by these countries.[33]
The Secretary of State described what the UK might do in the context
of its European strategic relationships, and the implications
for the future of NATO:
The North Africa, Middle East, Horn
of Africa area is certainly an area of focus for bilateral joint
operations, particularly with the French, but it is also an area
for European NATO to consider as, if you like, a subset of an
organisation. As you will be aware, there is a tension within
European NATO about the relative focus that there should be on
the defence of the NATO homeland against a currently non-existent
but potential future threat from Russia versus the creation of
expeditionary capabilities to forward defend Europe's interests
in areas such as the Middle East and North Africa.[34]
16. We concluded in our Report, Towards
the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, that there
could be few developments more fundamental to the UK's strategic
position than the US's intention to focus more on the Pacific
region.[35] The Government's
thinking on the implications of this for the country's broader
security and for the military capabilities that the UK would require
is a matter of vital interest for Parliament and the public. Our
Report concluded that the development of the next NSS should be
a vehicle for the Government to seek to engage both in this debate.
In a March 2014 speech in Washington on the "special relationship
that exists between the UK and the US", the Secretary of
State for Defence was keen to emphasise the Government's planned
future investment in UK Armed Forces and the benefit that it could
bring to the UK's relationship with the US:
With a fully integrated force of 190,000
regulars and reserves, retaining our ability to deploy into the
field a division-size force, our cutting-edge, broad spectrum
conventional capabilities, our world class Special Forces, and
our unique intelligence network, the UK will continue to be able
to project and sustain military power around the world.
We will remain the most capable and
most interoperable ally of the United States of America.[36]
ADAPTABLE POSTURE
17. The 2010 SDSR stated that, based
on the NSS, the NSC has decided on an "adaptable posture"
(although this phrase does not appear in the NSS).[37]The
principal elements of the "adaptable posture" included
tackling the four tier one risks identified in the NSS (terrorism,
cyber security, natural hazard or accident, and an international
military crisis drawing in the UK). In addition, the SDSR envisaged
this posture would enable the UK to deter the "low probability
but very high impact risk of a large-scale military attack by
another state [
] including through the nuclear deterrent
and by ensuring, in partnership with allies, the ability to regenerate
capabilities given sufficient strategic notice".[38]
It would also include the means to respond to growing uncertainty
about longer-term risks and threats, by pursuing an over-arching
approach which:
· identifies and manages risks
before they materialise in the UK, with a focus on preventing
conflicts and building local capacity to deal with problems;
· maintains a broad spectrum
of defence and other capabilities, able to deterand contain, as
well as engage on the ground, developing threats;
· ensures those capabilities
have in-built flexibility to adjust to changing future requirements;
· strengthens mutual dependence
with key allies and partners who are willing and able to act,
not least to make our collective resources go further and allow
nations to focus on their comparative advantages; and
· coordinates and integrates
the approach across government, achieving greater effect by combining
defence, development, diplomatic, intelligence and other capabilities.[39]
18. The then Secretary of State for
Defence told us in 2011 that in adopting an "adaptable posture",
two other postures had been advocated to the Government but these
had been rejected. The first was the establishment of "Fortress
Britain", withdrawing closer to the UK and investing in appropriate
assets to sustain this posture. The second posture was a "highly
committed" one with the assumption that conflicts of the
future would be similar to Afghanistan, with perhaps, for example,a
large number of deployable land forces and no requirement for
widespread maritime capabilities.[40]
19. The 2010 NSS stated that, since
the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the national security apparatus
had focused on non-state actors and that the current main national
security threat was from international terrorism.[41]
The NSS set out three tiers of risks to UK national security in
order of priority, but also acknowledged that over the next 20
years the UK could face threats from a variety of sources rather
than having one clear type of threat on which to focus.[42]
Preventative measures, such as conflict prevention, international
aid and defence diplomacy, were recognised as major objectives,
but the ability to identify threats at an early stage and be adaptable
to them remained a crucial component of the NSS.[43]
20. In our 2011 Report on the SDSR and
NSS we supported the adoption of an adaptable posture.[44]
Recent events such as those in the Ukraine would appear to support
this decision. Indeed, in his evidence for our inquiry, Towards
the next Defence and Security Review: Part Two, General (retired)
Sir Robert Fry suggested that the period 1991-2012 (where many
interventions had involved combat with non-state actors) had the
look of an historical aberration and that it could be anticipated
that there would be a return to state versus state scenarios.[45]
He told the Committee:
It may also be that we can anticipate
a return to classical strategic mores in the future. Transnational
terrorism will not go away but may look a minor chord in international
affairs in comparison to, say, a Sino-Japanese conflict in the
South China Sea or an Israeli attack on Iran. And, while the centennial
echoes of 1914 may have invited over-literal comparisons between
the United Kingdom at the beginning of World War One and the US
as a 'weary titan, staggering under the too vast orb of its fate'and
bound to share imperial decline, great power relationships look
set to return as the currency of strategic exchange. The instruments
of engagement will fit the Twenty First Century and might include
the use of cyber or currency weapons, but the strategy which calibrates
those instruments in pursuit of a defined outcome is likely again
to have a recognisably classical form.[46]
21. A
strategic and well-articulated vision of the UK's position in
the world would lead to more rational decisions on whether or
not to intervene as well as a better public understanding of the
rationale for any future decision. It would also assist in identifying
the strategic objective of such operations, contributing to a
more coherent UK foreign, defence and security policy.
22. We
remain concerned about the lack of realism in the Government's
assertion that there will be no shrinkage of UK influence when
resources are still being reduced. We call on the Government to
set out in the next National Security Strategy whether it still
maintains this assertion and, if so, how it could be achieved.
23. The
next National Security Strategy should consider the case for the
UK developing a regional strategic focus, particularly in light
of new or re-emerging threats to European defence and security.We
acknowledge that there will be times when the UK would have to
act beyond this regional focus. The next National Security Strategy
and the next Defence and Security Review should also include a
discussion on the UK's future role in NATO and its resourcing
by its members.
24. We
continue to support the Government's adoption of an "adaptable
posture" in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.
The threats to UK national security remain uncertain and unpredictable
and it is important that the Government and UK Armed Forces retain
the flexibility to deal with them. The 2010 National Security
Strategy said that the national security apparatus had focused
on non-state actors and that the current main national security
threat was from international terrorism. We agree that these threats
remain, but call on the Government to ensure that the next National
Security Strategy gives due weight to the likelihood of a return
to an increased threat of state versus state conflict and that
the force structure, manpower, equipment and capability decisions
in the next Defence and Security Review ensure that UK Armed Forces
are able to meet all these threats.
THE ROLE OF INTERVENTION
25. In a speech in Chicago in 1999,
the then Prime Minister Rt Hon Tony Blair set out his so called
"Chicago doctrine" on intervention decisions:
So how do we decide when and whether
to intervene. I think we need to bear in mind five major considerations
First, are we sure of our case? War
is an imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress;
but armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing with dictators.
Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? We should always
give peace every chance, as we have in the case of Kosovo. Third,
on the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are there
military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth,
are we prepared for the long term? In the past we talked too much
of exit strategies. But having made a commitment we cannot simply
walk away once the fight is over; better to stay with moderate
numbers of troops than return for repeat performances with large
numbers. And finally, do we have national interests involved?
The mass expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo demanded the
notice of the rest of the world. But it does make a difference
that this is taking place in such a combustible part of Europe.
I am not suggesting that these are absolute
tests. But they are the kind of issues we need to think about
in deciding in the future when and whether we will intervene.[47]
26. Military intervention should not
be considered in isolation. The 2010 SDSR said that the Armed
Forces would "focus more on tackling risks before they escalate,
and on exerting UK influence, as part of a better coordinated
overall national security response".[48]As
part of this approach there would be renewed emphasis on using
conventional forces to deter potential adversaries and reassure
partners, including through military deployments to demonstrate
resolve and capability and through joint exercises with partners.[49]We
considered the strategic role of deterrence in our Report on Deterrence
in the twenty-first century.[50]
Also associated with this is the concept of containment.[51]The
SDSR also envisaged greater coordination of civilian and military
expertise in both conflict prevention and crisis response in building
stability overseas.[52]
Defence diplomatic engagement would be focused overseas on where
it added most value within the Government's overall approach,
for example to support operational activity or, where appropriate,
defence exports.[53]
Part of this integrated approach would include alternative forms
of intervention, such as overseas defence engagement (the use
of defence assets and activities short of combat operations to
achieve influence),[54]information
warfare, and conflict prevention.[55]
The MoD told us that the Government was clear in the 2010 NSS
that intervention had an important role to play when other means
of dealing with threats had failed.[56]
The 2010 NSS said:
We will work with others to seek to
prevent such crises developing, to deter malign forces and, in
the last resort, to intervene militarily. We therefore need preventative
and stabilisation activity, including diplomatic action and strategic
intelligence capability, the ability to deter, and the ability
and will to intervene militarily where absolutely necessary. We
would work closely with our allies and partners at all stages
of an international military crisis.[57]
27. Therefore one of the eight National
Security Tasks in the 2010 NSS was:
Help resolve conflicts and contribute
to stability. Where necessary, intervene overseas, including the
legal use of coercive force in support of the UK's vital interests,
and to protect our overseas territories and people.[58]
28. The ability to intervene was described
in the 2010 SDSR under Military Task 6: "Defending our interest
by projecting power strategically and through expeditionary interventions".[59]
The SDSR also outlined Defence Planning Assumptions which envisaged
how the Armed Forces would be sized and the operations they might
be required to undertake.[60]
It also defined the different types of operations that the Armed
Forces might undertake: standing commitments, intervention operations
and stabilisation operations and set out the difference between
enduring and non-enduring operations. These were intended as guides
for the structure and scale of forces and the SDSR acknowledged
there could be considerable overlap.
29. The MoD asserted that the 2010 SDSR
emphasised a "strong preference against intervention, and
stresses that the Armed Forces will focus more on tackling risks
before they escalate, and on exerting UK influence, as part of
a better coordinated overall national security response."[61]
The MoD argued that the NSS made it clear that intervention should
only be undertaken in support of the UK's national security interests:
Our strategic interests and responsibilities
overseas could in some circumstances justify the threat or use
of military force. There will also be occasions when it is in
our interests to take part in humanitarian interventions. Each
situation will be different and these judgements will not necessarily
be easy.[62]
30. The MoD recognised that there were
interventions that might be termed "non-discretionary",
for example when justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter
which confirms the inherent rights of states to collective or
individual self-defence.[63]
This could include the protection of UK Overseas Territories such
as the Falklands or the conduct of non-combatant evacuation operations
to protect UK citizens abroad. The MoD also cited international
treaty obligations, such as those under NATO, which might require
military action in collective self-defence. The MoD added:
To this end, as the 2010 NSS makes clear,
the UK maintains "the defensive and offensive capabilities
needed to deploy armed force to protect UK territory and its citizens
from the full range of threats from hostile action and to meet
our commitments to our allies."[64]
However the MoD also acknowledged that
there were "discretionary" interventions where there
is a political choice about whether or not to intervene, in what
way to do so and to what extent.[65]
31. We
agree that intervention in its many forms has an important role
to play in the UK's national security and maintaining the national
interest. We note the MoD's statement that military intervention
remains an option of last resort in the UK's national security
strategy and should only be considered when other means have failed.
Unfortunately, but understandably, the last resort is often seen
by the public as the first resort due to the Government's failure
to communicate the other means it has employed prior to a decision
to intervene. In addressing this perception, the Government should
set out how it determines that other means have failed and that
intervention is the best option. The Government should consider
building on the so-called "Chicago doctrine" from 1999
by including in the next National Security Strategy a statement
of the criteria for when and whether to intervene.
32. We
call on the Government to include in the next National Security
Strategy (NSS) and the next Defence and Security Review a description
of interventions that it regards as non-discretionary and the
rationale behind this view. This would give a good indication
of UK intent in terms of its national security interests. We note
that the Ministry of Defence recognises that some interventions
can be regarded as discretionary. While we understand that the
Government will need to be selective in undertaking discretionary
interventions, it should consider developing a base criteria for
these types of interventions to be included in the next NSS. Such
criteria would assist the Government in deciding whether an intervention
was in the UK's national interest and also assist in communicating
and engaging with the public on intervention decisions. The next
NSS should also detail what types of discretionary intervention
operations the Government envisages the UK would be able to undertake
on its own and those which it would undertake with allies.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
33. Following the 2010 General Election,
the new Coalition Government established the National Security
Council (NSC) with its own secretariat based in the Cabinet Office.
The NSC is a Cabinet Committee which, in similar fashion to other
such committees, derives its authority from, and ultimately has
its decisions ratified by, the Cabinet.[66]
The October 2010 National Security Strategy stated that the NSC
had been established "to make sure the government takes decisions
properly".[67]In
its written evidence to our 2010 inquiry into the processes followed
in the development of the SDSR, the MoD stated that "the
new NSC provides high-level strategic guidance to Departments,
co-ordinates responses to the dangers we face, and identifies
priorities".[68]
We have welcomed the establishment of the NSC in several of our
Reports in this Parliament but are conscious that concerns continue
to be expressed about its work and role. The Joint Committee on
the National Security Strategy has been critical of the NSC's
focus on operational matters and short-term imperatives rather
than "considering long term and blue skies topics",
and its failure to make the contribution it should to "enabling
Government to work as a co-ordinated whole".[69]In
our Report, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part
I, we echoed these concerns[70]
and in our Future Army 2020Report, we expressed concern
that the Army 2020 plan had not been considered by the NSC.[71]
34. We
have welcomed the establishment of the National Security Council
(NSC) and support its attempts to bring greater coordination and
focus across Government on security matters to lead to greater
operational effectiveness. National security requires a whole
government joined up approach. However,we are concerned that the
NSC becomes too involved in operational matters and short-term
imperatives rather than giving the strategic lead on questions
such as intervention policy.
United Nations Charter and the
legal debate
UK LEGAL POSITION
35. Another area to be considered in
discussing the strategic rationale of intervention policy is the
legal context within which it operates. The legality of intervention
is highly controversial and an area of substantial disagreement,
not just between nations but also among legal practitioners, academics
and commentators. This disagreement has also been demonstrated
within the public debate on intervention operations.
36. The MoD defined intervention as
"the projection of military force (augmented by other agencies
as required) outside UK sovereign territory to achieve an effect
in securing, protecting or promoting UK national interests through
the use or threat of force".[72]
The MoD acknowledged that any military intervention in a sovereign
state was likely to be controversial. The Department told us:
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter[73]
prohibits the use of force in international relations and it is
well-established international law that States are prohibited
from intervening in the internal matters of another state. There
are well accepted exceptions to that general rule: a state's inherent
right to individual or collective self-defence, as recognised
by Article 51 of the UN Charter, and the right of the UN Security
Council to authorise the use of force to maintain or restore international
peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. A number
of states, including Russia and China, both of whom have the power
of veto within the UN Security Council, are reluctant to allow
the international community to exercise its powers under Chapter
VII where it would involve intervention in a third state.[74]
37. In its written evidence, the MoD
told us that if there was no UN Security Council resolution for
action then "the UK would still be permitted under international
law to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate a humanitarian
catastrophe".[75]
The UK Government's position is that such a legal basis is available,
under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, provided the
following three conditions are met:
a) there is convincing evidence,
generally accepted by the international community as a whole,
of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate
and urgent relief;
b) it must be objectively clear
that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if
lives are to be saved; and
c) the proposed use of force must
be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian
need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to this aim
(i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other
purpose).[76]
38. However, it is unclear to what degree
the UK Government's interpretation of the legal position is accepted
by either the international community or the general public in
the UK.[77] In the following
paragraphs we set out the concept of the Responsibility to Protect
together with a description of the legal debate on intervention.
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
39. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
came about from a report from the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001.The ICISS wanted
to create a right of humanitarian intervention outside the auspices
of the UN Charter, but the international community ultimately
rejected this. The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change in its 2004 reportagreed that the international community
had a responsibility to protect populations when their government
does not, but limited this to saying that the UN Security Council
was the gatekeeper to intervention. The 2005 UN World Summit adopted
the concept of R2P, but this was much narrower than that envisaged
by the ICISS. It limited application of R2P to situations of war
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing
and stated that any action must be taken within the framework
of the UN Charter and therefore limited interventions to those
authorised by the UN Security Council.[78]R2P
was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1674.[79]
40. The R2P asserted that all States
have a responsibility to protect their populations from genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing and where
a State is manifestly unable or unwilling to do this, that the
international community has a responsibility, on a case-by case
basis, to protect those populations.[80]
The MoD told us that "this could include the use of coercive
measures, such as sanctions, or the use of force authorised by
the Security Council".[81]
However, the MoD added that R2P did not alter international law
governing the use of force.[82]
The Humanitarian Intervention Centre, an independent foreign policy
think tank, agreed that the R2P had not changed the legal position
on intervention:
Despite widespread hope for the concept
following the ICISS report, it [R2P] has not emerged as a developing
legal norm, although it has the potential to be. Future interventions
still have to be authorised by the Security Council and thus all
R2P has done is add more legitimacy to these authorisations to
use force. To date, R2P has only been employed in Libya and the
Côte d'Ivoire and its advancement has been seriously compromised
by lack of application in Syria.
The Humanitarian Intervention Centre
believes that the UK could become the leading nation in championing
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. If the UK is firm in emphasising
the fact that sovereignty is conditional on protecting your population
and that they will take action if the state fails to protect,
then they can use R2P to legitimise interventions in the future.
The application of the responsibility to protect in the Libya
conflict is a prime example of when the principle should be used
in practice.[83]
41. The Henry Jackson Society added:
Unfortunately, the decision regarding
the use of force under R2P resides with the UN Security Council,
and as such any action can be vetoed by one of the Permanent Five
members. Moreover, whilst R2P does impose a moral obligation
to use force if both necessary and authorised, it does not make
intervention a legal requirement.[84]
42. UNA-UK suggested that the R2P affirmed
by UN member states differed from the common conception of humanitarian
intervention in a number of respects and that several points needed
to be considered in this regard:
· It relates specifically to
the prevention of and response to four crimes based in international
law: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity;
· All states have a primary
responsibility to protect their populations from these crimes
at all times: there is never a case in which R2P is not applicable;
· R2P calls specifically for
the prevention of these crimes and their incitement;
· Measures in the UN Charter,
under Chapter VI, VII and VIII are to be used only when prevention
fails or is thought likely to fail; and
· Military force, akin to what
is commonly known as 'humanitarian intervention', is endorsed
by R2P under Chapter VII but it must be authorised by the Security
Council.[85]
THE LEGAL DEBATE
43. The legal status of intervention
is a major area of dispute. The United Nations Association-UK
(UNA-UK) told us that "contemporary international law may
be read as either permitting or prohibiting international intervention
for humanitarian reasons".[86]Intervention
for humanitarian purposes has been defined as "forcible military
action by an external agent in the relevant political community
with the predominant purpose of preventing, reducing or halting
an ongoing or impending grievous suffering or loss of life."[87]
44. UNA-UK defined intervention as:
'Intervention' has generally referred
to the external deployment of a one-nation or multination military
force into another country (or its airspace or national waters)
with or without the prior consent of (a) the country in question
or (b) the international community as represented by the United
Nations. Such variations are mirrored in the purpose and goal
of the interveners but, in basic terms, may be held to be the
alleviation of civilian suffering by securing or facilitating
food, shelter and water and so forth; by protecting civilians
through the provision of secure geographical areas or by attacking
a party or parties to the conflict directly.[88]
45. UNA-UK added that as:
stated in the Background Research Essays
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's
(ICISS) 2011 report, "The definition of 'humanitarian,' as
a justification for intervention, is a high threshold of suffering.
It refers to the threat or actual occurrence of large scale loss
of life
massed forced migrations, and widespread abuses of
human rights. Acts that shock the conscience and elicit a basic
humanitarian impulse remain politically powerful."[89]
46. Although events could be shocking
and the desire of the international community would be to alleviate
suffering, humanitarian intervention remains controversial, even
when recognised as being the most extreme of the options available
to prevent and halt threats against civilians. The UNA-UK told
us that the controversy arose from a "disconnect between
the understanding that, beyond an explicit agreement arrived at
between the 'intervening parties' and the nation-state in question,
the only legitimate intervention is one mandated by the international
community through the United Nations Security Council, and which
is outlined in the United Nations Charter".[90]
47. The primary legal obligation to
the UN Charter has been supplemented by a number of international
conventions such as the 1947 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the four Geneva Conventions
in 1948 and subsequent protocols, and the 1998 Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court.[91]
However, there is still a major debate on whether military measures
should be used to enforce the conventions and also how they relate
to a State's overriding obligation to the UN Charter.
48. Our witnesses have highlighted that
a consistency of response was unlikely as UN Security Council
agreement was dependent on the vested interests of the Permanent
Five members being satisfied or those countries would use their
vetoes.[92] There were
also concerns that military intervention was seen as a threat
to state-sovereignty, especially where the intervention was seen
to be aimed at regime change rather than the protection of civilians.[93]
Professor Mary Kaldor, Professor of Global Governance, Civil Society
and Human Security Research Unit, London School of Economics and
Political Science, suggested there was an argument for developing
a legal mechanism, with appropriate safeguards, for exceptions
to UN Security Council authorisation.[94]
The Oxford Research Group called for Parliament to work with data
providers from the intelligence community and legal communities
as well as civil society to understand the availability and limitations
of data on conflict and issues such as weapons of mass destruction
as a means of establishing the evidentiary threshold that would
be necessary and sufficient for UK Armed Forces to be committed
to combat.[95]
49. The
legal justification for military intervention will continue to
be controversial. We note the Government's statement that when
there is no UN Security Council Resolution for action, there is
a legal basis available under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
which would permit the UK under international law to take exceptional
measures in order to alleviate a humanitarian catastrophe providing
certain conditions are met. We question whether the Government's
position is generally accepted by the international community
or the British public. The Government should set out in detail
in the next iterations of the National Security Strategy and the
Defence and Security Review the principles of its legal position,
including its relationship with the UN Charter, international
law and the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, on the deployment
of UK Armed Forces for intervention operations. This would assist
with providing the public with greater information on, and understanding
of, the Government's position on the use of UK Armed Forces rather
than waiting to the heat of debate immediately prior to a potential
deployment.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LEGAL ADVICE
ON MILITARY ACTION
50. Although the Government has not
committed to do so on every occasion, ithas published notes summarising
its legal position on the possible deployment of UK Armed Forces,
for example in respect of Libya and the potential use of force
in Syria. We welcomed this practice in our Report on operations
in Libya together with the Government's commitment to consider
publication of an updated summary should significant developments
occur that necessitated a reassessment of the Attorney General's
advice.[96] In respect
of the advice published on Syria, Dr Arman Sarvarian, Director,
Surrey International Law Centre, was concerned that the summary
of the legal position was not attributed to the Attorney General,
unlike that for the Libya deployment which stated that he had
been consulted. Dr Sarvarian told us:
The note published by the Office of
the Prime Minister ('the Note') does not constitute legal advice
in the true sense of the term, namely, as an independent opinion
produced by a lawyer who accepts professional responsibility for
it. It is not signed by the Attorney General and is not attributed
to him. It is consequently best-treated as the collective view
of the Cabinet, or alternatively as the individual view of the
Prime Minister. Although it is not clear to what degree the Note
is based upon legal advice provided by the Attorney, its value
as a definitive statement of the legal position of the United
Kingdom is diminished by the fact that the Attorney (unlike in
the case of Lord Goldsmith concerning Iraq) did not undertake
personal responsibility for it through a ministerial statement
to the House of Commons.[97]
51. We
welcome the Government's publication of summaries of its legal
position on the deployment of UK Armed Forces. We note the Government's
view that the confidentiality of the Attorney General'sfull legal
advice needs to be upheldand that legal privilege is an essential
component of the UK's legal system. We hope that the publication
of summaries of the Government's legal position on the deployment
of Armed Forces will continue to be regarded as normal and best
practice. We recommend that these notes should always state how
this position was formulated and who was consulted. We further
recommend that the Government should undertaketo continue to publish
its legal position on the deployment of the Armed Forces.
Role of Parliament
52. The role of Parliament in decisions
on the deployment of UK Armed Forces has been the subject of contentious
debate over a number of years.The 2007 Consultation Paper set
out the previous Government's view of the current constitutional
position:
The constitutional position of the UK
Armed Forces is that their government and command are vested in
Her Majesty. Direct control of the armed forces under the Sovereign
is divided between the Government and the Defence Council. Parliamentary
control of the armed forces is based primarily on the need for
annual renewal by Parliament of the Acts which govern enlistment
and discipline in the armed forces. Acts of Parliament also affect
the use of armed forces within the United Kingdom.
For overseas operations, the political
decision to deploy the Armed Forces rests with the Prime Minister
or Cabinet through their exercise of the Royal Prerogative. It
is the Defence Council which has the power of command over the
members of the Armed Forces and the power to make appointments
within the Armed Forces.The Defence Council is also responsible
for such matters relating to the administration of the armed forces
as the Secretary of State directs.
In theory the prerogative powers could
allow the Government to send Armed Forces into armed conflict
abroad without any Parliamentary discussion or debate, or without
Parliamentary consent. In practice it is inconceivable that any
government could make such an important decision without the support
of the House of Commons as the executive is dependent on the support
of Parliament for its survival and it is fully accountable to
Parliament. [
][98]
53. Successive Governments have undertaken
to involve and inform Parliament, both in the decision to use
force and the progress of military campaigns. This has been primarily
through statements to the House, questions and debates. In recent
years a convention has developed that the House of Commons should
have the opportunity to hold a debate on conflict decisions. The
Government has acknowledged this development. In March 2011, the
then Leader of the House of Commons, Rt Hon Sir George Young MP,
said:
A convention has developed in the House
that before troops are committed, the House should have an opportunity
to debate the matter. We propose to observe that convention except
when there is an emergency and such action would not be appropriate.
As with the Iraq war and other events, we propose to give the
House the opportunity to debate the matter before troops are committed.[99]
54. On the occasion where a vote on
the deployment of the Armed Forces has been held, it could be
argued, that were the Government to be defeated, it would be under
no constitutional obligation to change its policy given its prerogative
power in these matters. However, such a defeat would indicate
the view of Parliament,and the Government would be under political
and public pressure to take that view into account.
55. There have been several consultations
and proposals put forward by Governments, Opposition parties,
Parliamentary Committees and others to formalise the role of Parliament
in the authorisation of military action. The previous Government
proposed a draft parliamentary resolution on war powers in a White
Paper in 2008, but the House did not have an opportunity to consider
such a motion before the General Election in May 2010. The 2008
White Paper said:
While not ruling out legislation in
the future, the Government believes that a detailed resolution
is the best way forward. This will take the form of a House of
Commons resolution which sets out in detail the processes Parliament
should follow in order to approve any commitment of Armed Forces
into armed conflict. The resolution could be underpinned by a
specific standing order, but that is ultimately a matter for each
House and not the Government. The uncertain nature of military
deployments and likelihood that the lead up to each conflict or
potential conflict situation would not necessarily conform to
any pattern would require a high degree of flexibility from the
proposed mechanism. A resolution will define a clear role for
Parliament in this most important of decisions, while ensuring
our national security is not compromised by the introduction of
a less flexible mechanism.[100]
56. In March 2011, the Foreign Secretary
went further in the debate on the deployment of UK Armed Forces
to Libya when he said the Government would "enshrine in law
for the future the necessity of consulting Parliament on military
action".[101]
However, no legislative proposals have been brought forward by
the Government amid reports that Government officials were unable
to draft appropriate legislation whilst maintaining the Government's
ability for rapid decisions in an emergency.
57. Throughout this Parliament, the
Political and Constitutional Affairs Committee of the House of
Commons has scrutinised this question and published reports on
the role of Parliament in conflict decisions.[102]
The latest of these Reports was published in March 2014 and included
a draft parliamentary resolution setting out the process that
should be followed to consult Parliament on conflict decisions.
It saw this as an interim step towards enshrining Parliament's
role in conflict decisions in law.[103]
The Committee summarised the key points of its Report as:
· The Government needed to
make a clear statement of how it intends to honour the Foreign
Secretary's commitment of 2011, and give a specific Minister responsibility
for making progress on this.
· A parliamentary resolution
would serve as a useful interim step towards enshrining Parliament's
role in law, by embedding the current convention and clarifying
some of the ambiguities that exist under current arrangements.[104]
58. The tension between the Executive's
authority under the Royal Prerogative and the role of Parliament
was given greater prominence by the Government's defeat in the
House of Commons in August 2013 on the proposal to authorise the
potential use of military force in response to the situation in
Syria and the use of chemical weapons. The substantive motion
put before the House of Commons asked the House to "agree
that a strong humanitarian response is required from the international
community and that this may, if necessary, require military action
that is legal, proportionate and focused on saving lives by preventing
and deterring further use of Syria's chemical weapons".[105]
The motion also said "that every effort should be made to
secure a Security Council Resolution backing military action before
any such action is taken, and notes that before any direct British
involvement in such action a further vote of the House of Commons
will take place".
59. The Official Opposition proposed
an amendment to the Government's motion stating that the House
would only support military action if and when certain conditions
had been met. The conditions included UN Security Council consideration
and vote on the matter following reports to it by UN weapons inspectors,
a clear legal basis in military law for collective military action,
and the Prime Minister making a further report to the House on
the achievement of these conditions so that the House of Commons
could vote on UK participation in military action in Syria.[106]
Both the Government motion and the Opposition amendment were defeated.
60. Immediately following the announcement
of the results of the votes, Rt Hon Edward Miliband MP, Leader
of the Opposition, raised a point of order asking "the Prime
Minister [to] confirm to the House that, given the will of the
House that has been expressed tonight, he will not use the Royal
Prerogative to order the UK to be part of military action before
there has been another vote in the House of Commons".[107]
In response the Prime Minister told the Chamber:
I strongly believe in the need for a
tough response to the use of chemical weapons, but I also believe
in respecting the will of this House of Commons. It is very clear
tonight that, while the House has not passed a motion, the British
Parliament, reflecting the views of the British people, does not
want to see British military action. I get that, and the Government
will act accordingly.[108]
61. Some commentators have regarded
this as an assertion of the sovereignty of Parliament and a limitation
to the Royal Prerogative on these matters. It has been suggested
that any significant future military action cannot now be contemplated
without prior consultation with Parliament. Professor Malcolm
Chalmers from RUSI said:
It is now hard to see how any UK Government
could undertake significant military action without the support
of Parliament, or indeed of the wider public. And it is difficult
to see such support being given unless there is a clear national
interest involved, or if military operations are undertaken with
the imprimatur of a UN Security Council mandateat least
until the shadows of Iraq and Afghanistan have faded much further
from the national consciousness [...]
The UK Parliament and public are no
longer prepared to give their Government the benefit of the doubt
on military operations, and the Government will be constrained
in what it can do in future as a result. The consequences for
UK defence and foreign policy will be examined with interest by
allies and potential adversaries alike.[109]
62. Former FCO Minister Alistair Burt
MP, suggested that the Government's power to launch military action
was now in a mess and the role of Parliament should be revisited,
including at what stage it should be consulted on a military deployment.[110]
In his written evidence to our inquiry into UK Armed Forces
Personnel and the legal framework for future operations, Steven
Haines, Professor of Public International Law, University of Greenwich
told us:
It is an interesting question whether
or not the current PM's decision to refer Syria to Parliament
has set a precedent that subsequent PMs will find it difficult
not to repeat.One suspects this is the case but, as with all such
constitutional shifts, we must wait for subsequent experience
to either confirm a shift in that direction or mark the Syria
decision out as an exceptional departure from a constitutional
norm.
Whatever the future holds in that respect,
I remain convinced that giving Parliament a role in decision-making
of this sort would be unfortunate.It is the role of HMG in our
constitution to decide within the law, with Parliament determining
what the law should be.Clearly this means that if Parliament decides
through legislation that military deployment decisions must be
made by Parliament, then future governments will be obliged to
comply with that.However, I believe this would grant Parliament
inappropriate executive responsibility for matters that it is
not appropriately configured to shoulder.[111]
63. However, other commentators have
supported the role of Parliament in conflict decisions. Professor
Nigel White, Professor of Public International Law at the University
of Nottingham, said it was essential. In written evidence to the
Political and Constitutional Affairs Committee, he said:
Parliamentary approval for any use of
force has become essential primarily because of the anachronism
of unregulated prerogative powers. Powers that once belonged to
monarchs should not be wielded without proper democratic accountability;
indeed they should be effectively regulated/replaced by clear
statutory rules.[112]
64. In his March 2014 Washington speech
the Secretary of State for Defence said that the UK had not lost
its appetite for foreign military interventions despite the rejection
of such action in respect of Syria and this should not been seen
as implying a retreat from international engagement. He added
the UK "remained determined to plays [its] role on the world
stage and to do so as an ally and partner of the US". [113]
65. The
role of Parliament in conflict decisions is a contentious issue.
The House of Commons' decision in August 2013 to reject the potential
deployment of military force to Syria (despite provisions in the
Government's resolution that would have required efforts to secure
a UN Security Council Resolution authorising such action and a
further vote in the House of Commons on direct UK involvement)
has significantly added to the debate on what the role of Parliament
should be in conflict decisions and its relationship with the
Royal Prerogative on such matters. The Government should intensify
its efforts to resolve this matter. We regard Parliament's role
as one of a strategic inquisitor on military deployments.As a
first step, we call on the Government to clarify its position
on whether it wishes to legislate to formalise the requirement
to consult Parliament on military action or whether it favours
codifying the role of Parliament in a Parliamentary resolution.
We do not consider it appropriate for the Government to wait until
the next possible military deployment to resolve this issue.We
conclude that, wherever possible, Parliament should be consulted
prior to the commencement of military action, but recognise that
this will not always be possible such as when urgent action is
required. We call on the Government to commit to ensuring that
a summary of the legal justificationon military action is available
to Parliament in advance of any such debate.
Non-intervention
66. As well as considering the strategic
rationale and legal framework for taking intervention action,
our witnesses told us there would also be consequences from a
decision not to intervene. The Humanitarian Intervention Centre
said:
military intervention is always associated
with a risk that conflict might spill out across the country subject
to intervention and into neighbouring states. In this regard international
intervention may have potentially destabilising effects on a region.
But on the other hand, non-intervention may similarly lead to
regional destabilisation, especially where terror networks spread
out across porous borders and into neighbouring countries that
are often powerless to prevent this.[114]
67. In her evidence, Professor Mary
Kaldor told us that while there was considerable and understandable
reluctance to intervene in the aftermath of operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq, the current situation in Syria demonstrated the dangers
of non-intervention:
The current situation in Syria, characterised
by massive human rights [violations] including the shelling of
civilians, forcible population expulsion, sexual violence, the
provocation of sectarianism, the growth of jihadism and ofcriminality,
the use of chemical weapons, not to mention the risk of the spread
of this type of violence, illustrates the perils of non-intervention.[115]
68. Witnesses have suggested that non-intervention
could have wider global implications than merely in the current
area of concern.[116]
In this regard, non-intervention can be related closely to a failure
of deterrence, for whilst the capability to intervene might exist,
the lack of will to intervene undermines the ability to deter.
For example, the question arises whether the decision not to intervene
in Georgia or Syria might have encouraged the current Russian
action in the Ukraine.
69. General Sir Peter Wall, Chief of
the General Staff, discussed this point in his March 2014 speech
at Chatham House.[117]
He suggested that the political tensions regarding, and the experiences
of, previous deployments over the last decade such as in Iraq
and Afghanistan had fuelled a political and public reluctance
to use military force in the future, particularly in committing
land forces. General Wall said that a "sense of what some
have described as moral disarmament in the West, after ten years
of politically awkward campaigns and a false sense of negligible
threats, may already be a factor in others' expectations of our
reaction to provocation". He added that in the domestic context,
the political inclination for the UK to be involved in new operations
was currently low. He suggested that "the Syria vote, a preference
for stand-off engagement with precision weapons with limited land
engagement which we saw in Libya, are indications of this reticence.
In the case of the latter we now understand better the limitations
of such an approach" and he warned that the UK should be
prepared for potential adversaries to exploit this and noted a
danger of over correcting due to the experiences of the last decade.
He concluded that "ultimately history tells us that in some
circumstances committed land forces may be the only way to achieve
decisive outcomes in support of our strategic objectives."
It should be noted that this debate is not limited to the UK.
For example, there is a growing debate in Germany on the future
of its Armed Forces and whether they should play a greater role
in resolving international conflicts and whether this would mean
a higher level of deployments.[118]
70. We
understand and acknowledge the current lack of appetite for military
operations given the experiences and tensions of the past decade
for operations in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. However,
it is also necessary to understand and acknowledge that there
are consequences to decisions by the UK and the international
community not to intervene in humanitarian or non-humanitarian
situations. Non-intervention decisions have implications for the
UK's place in the world and its influence which are as profound
as a decision to undertake an intervention operation. Decisions
not to intervene could have wide global implications for efforts
to deter hostile actions by other states or non-state actors.The
Government should be more forthright in stating the consequences
of non-intervention when it proposes intervention actions. The
next National Security Strategy and the next Defence and Security
Review should also include an indication of how the Government
balances and decides between these two choices.
SDSR and the use of UK Armed
Forces
71. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security
Review (SDSR) set out five principles which would govern the use
of UK Armed Forces:
We will be more selective in our use
of the Armed Forces, deploying them decisively at the right time
but only where key UK national interests are at stake; where we
have a clear strategic aim; where the likely political, economic
and human costs are in proportion to the likely benefits; where
we have a viable exit strategy; and where justifiable under international
law.[119]
72. In its written evidence, the MoD
asserted that these principles were particularly appropriate to
interventions that might be described as 'discretionary' (see
paragraph 30 above) i.e. where there was a political choice about
whether or not to intervene, in what way and to what extent.[120]
73. An
example of a discretionary intervention was Libya in 2011. In
our Report on Operations in Libya, we noted the 2010 SDSR's
principles for the deployment of UK forces. While accepting that
operations should have a clear strategic aim, we recommended that
the Government should develop this concept more by undertaking
a more detailed, comprehensive and strategic assessment before
deciding to intervene.[121]
In its response to our Report the Government stated the SDSR's
principles governing the use of UK Armed Forces were a "clear
benchmark against which [it would] consider any proposed deployments".[122]
However, the Government added that the precise form of any analysis
would be dependent on the circumstances prevailing at the time,
including the urgency, scale and nature of the potential deployment.
74. We
welcome the Government's intention that any deployment of UK Armed
Forces should have a clear strategic aim. While conscious that
deployments will differ and some will be of an urgent nature we
repeat our call that the Government should develop this concept
by undertaking a more detailed, comprehensive and strategic assessment
before deciding to intervene. This should address the strategic
ends, ways and means, including generating the necessary parliamentary
support. We call on the Government to set out in the next Defence
and Security Review how it determines and measures success against
the strategic aims set for the deployment of UK Armed Forces.
We have seen no sign that its approach has resulted in a more
strategic use of the Armed Forces since the 2010 Strategic Defence
and Security Review.
17 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, p 4 Back
18
Ibid, p 9 Back
19
Ibid p 10 Back
20
Ibid p 9 Back
21
Ibid p 4 Back
22
Ibid p 10 Back
23
Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, The Strategic
Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy,
HC 761, Qq 274-275 Back
24
Ibid, Q 454 [Professor Julian Lindley-French] Back
25
Ibid, para 54 Back
26
Ibid, para 64 Back
27
Ibid, para 65 Back
28
Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, First Report
of Session 2010-12, First review of the National Security Strategy
2010, HL 265 HC 1384 Back
29
Defence Committee, Ninth Special Report of Session 2010-12, The
Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security
Strategy: Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report
of Session 2010-12, HC 1639, p 8 Back
30
Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards
the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, paras
34-37 Back
31
Defence Committee, Tenth Special Report of Session 2013-14, Towards
the next Defence and Security Review: Part One: Government Response
to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, HC 1175,
pp 5-6 Back
32
Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards
the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, paras
38-43 Back
33
Ibid, para 39, Q 218 Back
34
Ibid, Q 220 Back
35
Ibid, para 43 Back
36
Speech at The Heritage Centre on 26 March 2014, Why Britain
and America must remain partners of choice in Defence(available
at: http://www.heritage.org/events/2014/03/philip-hammond-mp);
see also "The UK-US defence partnership", Ministry of
Defence press release, 27 March 2014. Back
37 HM
Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010,
pp 9-10 Back
38
Ibid, p 10 Back
39
Ibid, p 10 Back
40
Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, The Strategic
Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy,
HC 761, Q 94 Back
41 HM
Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, p 18 Back
42
Ibid, p 27 and p 18 Back
43
Ibid, p 9 and p 18 Back
44
Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, The Strategic
Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy,
HC 761, para 83 Back
45
Available on the Defence Committee's website at: http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/WrittenEvidence.svc/EvidencePdf/8405 Back
46
Ibid Back
47
Rt Hon Tony Blair speech on the "Doctrine of International
Community", 24 April 1999. Available at: http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=279 Back
48 HM
Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010,
p 17 Back
49
Ibid, p 17 Back
50
Defence Committee, Eleventh Report of Session 2013-14, Deterrence
in the twenty-firstcentury, HC 1066. The MoD provided the
Committee with the following definition of deterrence: deterrence
employs the proportionate threat of force to discourage someone
from doing something, by convincing them that the costs of their
actions will outweigh any possible benefits (Defence Committee,
Eleventh Report of Session 2013-14, Deterrence in the twenty-firstcentury,
HC 1066, Ev w1). Back
51
Definitions of Containment:Military containment: The geographical
restriction of action of enemy forces; Crisis containment:
Measures to limit the geographical spread of a crisis; and
Containment as grand strategy: Measures taken to limit
the geographical spread of an ideology or the influence of power
(Source: Ministry of Defence, BR 1806: British Maritime Doctrine,
Third Edition, May 2004, Glossary. Available at: http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/jscsc/courses/RND/bmd) Back
52 HM
Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010,
p 17 Back
53
Ibid, p 17 Back
54
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, International
Defence Engagement Strategy, February 2013, p 1 Back
55 HM
Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010,
p 17 and pp 44-47 Back
56
Ev w1 Back
57 HM
Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, p 30 Back
58
Ibid, p 33 Back
59
Ev w1-2; HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October
2010, p 18-19 Back
60
Ibid, p 19 Back
61
Ev w1-2; HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October
2010, p 17 Back
62
Ev w2; HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, p 30
Back
63
Ev w2 Back
64
Ev w2; HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, p 9 Back
65
Ev w2 Back
66
Ev w2-3 Back
67
HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
National Security Strategy, October 2010, Cm 7953, p 5 Back
68
Defence Committee, First Report of Session 2010-11, The Strategic
Defence and Security Review, HC 345, Ev 13 Back
69
Second Report of the Joint Committee on the National Security
Strategy of 2012-13, The work of the Joint Committee on the
National Security Strategy in 2012, HL 115 and HC 984, paras
9-10 Back
70
Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards
the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, para
14 Back
71
Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2013-14, Future
Army 2020, HC 576, para 15 Back
72
Ev w1 Back
73
Article 2(4) "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Back
74
Ev w1 Back
75
Ev w1 Back
76
Ev w1 Back
77
For examples see Ev w13, Ev w19-21, Ev w39-46 and Ev w55-58. Back
78
Ev w42 Back
79
Ev w1 Back
80
Ev w1 Back
81
Ev w1 Back
82
Ev w1 Back
83
Ev w42 Back
84
Ev w16 Back
85
Ev w5-6 Back
86
Ev w4 Back
87 Dr
James Pattison,Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility
to Protect: Who should intervene? (Oxford, 2010) Back
88
Ev w4 Back
89
Ev w4 Back
90
Ev w4 Back
91
Ev w5 Back
92
Ev w6, Ev w16, Ev w22, Ev w40 and Ev w54 Back
93
Ev w6 Back
94
Ev w22 Back
95
Ev w13 Back
96
Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, Operations
in Libya, HC 950, para 24, and Defence Committee, Eleventh
Special Report of Session 2010-12, Operations in Libya: Government
Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2010-12,
HC 1952, p 3 Back
97
Ev w56 Back
98
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, The Governance of Britain: War powers and treaties:
Limiting Executive powers, Cm 7239, October 2007, p 22 Back
99
HC Deb, 10 March 2011, col 1066 Back
100
Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain-Constitutional
Renewal, Cm 7342-I, March 2008, p 50 Back
101 HC
Deb 21 March 2011, col 799 Back
102
Political and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Eighth Report
of Session 2010-12, Parliament's role in Conflict Decisions,
HC 923, Twelfth report of Session 2010-12, Parliament's role
in Conflict Decisions-further Government Response, HC 1673,
eighth report of Session 2013-14, parliament's role in Conflict
Decisions: an update, HC 649, and Twelfth Report of
Session 2013-14, Parliament's role in Conflict Decisions: a
way forward, HC 892 Back
103
Political and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Twelfth Report
of Session 2013-14, Parliament's role in Conflict Decisions:
a way forward, HC 892, paras 21-25 and Annex Back
104
Ibid, Summary Back
105
HC Deb, 29 August 2013, cols 1425-1426 Back
106
HC Deb, 29 August 2013, col 1440 Back
107
HC Deb, 29 August 2013, col 1555 Back
108
HC Deb, 29 August 2013, col 1555-1556 Back
109
Royal United Services Institute Analysis, Parliament's Decision
on Syria: Pulling our Punches, August 2013 (available at:
https://www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=commentary&ref=C52210D1AC29AE) Back
110 The
Guardian, 6 February 2014,
"MPs should lose right to vote on war, says former Middle
East minister" Back
111
Defence Committee, Twelfth report of Session 2013-14, UK Armed
Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework for Future Operations,
HC 931, Ev 89 Back
112
Political and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Twelfth Report
of Session 2013-14, Parliament's role in Conflict Decisions:
a way forward, HC 892, Evidence from Professor Nigel White,
available at: http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/WrittenEvidence.svc/EvidenceHtml/2838 Back
113
Speech at The Heritage Centre on 26 March 2014, Why Britain
and America must remain partners of choice in Defence(available
at: http://www.heritage.org/events/2014/03/philip-hammond-mp);
see also "The UK-US defence partnership", Ministry of
Defence press release, 27 March 2014. Back
114
Ev w50 Back
115
Ev w21 Back
116
Ev w14, Ev w48 and Ev w50 Back
117
Speech at Chatham House on 12 March 2014, Defence Engagement:
The British Army's Role in Building Security and Stability Overseas,(available
at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/20140312Defence%20Engagement.pdf) Back
118
For example see speeches by the German Federal President and the
Federal Minister of Defence at the Munich Security Conference
on 31 January 2014 (available at: https://www.securityconference.de/en/activities/munich-security-conference/msc-2014/reden/).
Back
119 HM
Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, p 17 Back
120
Ev w2 Back
121
Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, Operations
in Libya, HC 950, para 55 Back
122
Defence Committee, Eleventh Special Report of Session 2010-12,
Operations in Libya: Government Response to the Committee's
Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1952, p 8 Back
|