Intervention: Why, When and How? - Defence Committee Contents

3  Interventions: How?

75. The previous chapter discussed the strategic rationale (the why and when) for intervention operations, but equally important is how these operations are undertaken. The development of the most robust strategy for intervention counts for little if it cannot be implemented. Therefore in this chapter we consider the various different aspects of implementation of the UK's intervention strategy.

Future Force 2020

76. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) set out the intended structure, capability and manpower of each of the Services to be achieved by 2020 (Future Force 2020).[123] We have announced our intention to hold an inquiry into Future Force 2020 before the end of the current Parliament as part of our work looking towards the next Defence and Security Review (DSR) and so do not comment in detail on it here.[124] The transition to Future Force 2020 has continued with an associated commitment to a 1% real terms increase in the defence equipment budget each year from 2015[125] although there have been concerns expressed about possible further reductions in Armed Forces personnel and the UK's ability to man and deploy such a force.

77. Since the 2010 SDSR, further significant announcements have been made which alter the design of Future Force 2020. An example of this was the Army 2020 plan which radically changed the Army envisaged under Future Force 2020 in the 2010 SDSR.[126] These changes included further reductions in manpower, changes to the Army structure from Multi-Role Brigades to a structure of a Reaction Force, an Adaptable Force and Force Troops, and a revised and more integrated role for Reservists. We commented on these changes in our Report, Future Army 2020.[127]

78. As part of the development of Future Force 2020 it should be noted that, with the end of combat operations in Afghanistan, UK Armed Forces are moving from a posture of enduring operations to one of a contingent capability (see paragraph 4 above). Under this contingent posture the intention is that UK Armed Forces will have the capability to respond effectively and rapidly to events that might require their deployment, including intervention operations.

79. The 2010 SDSR stated that Future Force 2020 was designed to permit the UK to deploy highly capable assets quickly when required, but also to prepare a greater scale and range of capability if required.[128] The SDSR listed five concepts for Future Force 2020 which it said were essential to achieving the optimal effect:

·  Readiness: a small number of the most capable units to be held at high readiness while the majority of Forces are held at graduated levels of lower readiness;

·  Reconstitution: some capabilities will be held at extended readiness (a concept which we note entails lower, rather than increased, readiness). The capabilities are not available for operations in the short term but are capable of being reconstituted if strategic notice is given of possible, but low probability, events to which a response may be required to protect UK national interests;

·  Reinforcement: Reserve Forces will contribute to each element of the Future Force to provide additional capacity when Regular Forces are deployed at maximum effort. Reserves would also provide specialist capabilities;

·  Regeneration: the UK will maintain the ability to regenerate capabilities that it does not plan to hold for the immediate future; and

·  Dependency: the UK will rarely deploy alone. UK Armed Forces and NATO Allies are dependent on each other for particular capabilities.[129]

Each of these concepts is directly relevant to the UK Armed Forces' ability to undertake intervention operations.

80. The Government must ensure that the plans and resources for Future Force 2020 enable the Armed Forces to carry out the roles intended for them, including that of undertaking intervention operations. We note the commitment to a 1% real terms increase in the equipment budget from 2015 but this must not be achieved by further manpower cuts. We also note the concepts listed in the 2010 SDSR (readiness, reconstitution, reinforcement, regeneration and dependency) as being central to achieving the optimal effect for Future Force 2020. We will explore the MoD's progress in fulfilling these concepts as part of our forthcoming inquiry into Future Force 2020.

Collaboration with Allies

81. The 2010 SDSR made it clear that UK Armed Forces will rarely act alone.[130] The UK will seek to work closely with allies and partners. The MoD told us it regarded these collaborations, whether formal alliances or coalitions of the willing, as important, not just in military capability terms and mass, but as a means of demonstrating and maintaining legitimacy.[131] The MoD cited the importance of the support of the Arab League for operations in Libya alongside other allies. The MoD added:

It may sometimes be necessary to limit or modify the objectives of a potential intervention in order to achieve the broadest possible support from within the international community.The need to work effectively with other nations will become a larger feature of future interventions and forms a key part of planning activity.[132]

82. In our Report on Operations in Libya, we welcomed the significant involvement of non-NATO countries in the operation.[133] However, we were concerned to establish the command and control arrangements for non-NATO countries and how they were implemented and coordinated and asked the Government to set this out in its response to our Report.We also asked the Government to set out how it ensured that any bilateral alliances between non-NATO countries and the Libyan rebels did not impact on the NATO mission or infringe the UN mandate. In its response, the Government said that the inclusive involvement of non-NATO countries in shaping the response to the Libya crisis helped improve these countries' awareness and understanding of the humanitarian, political and military objectives of the campaign.[134] The Government added that it maintained routine political, policy and military bilateral relations during the campaign which enabled issues relating to Libya to be discussed.

83. Witnesses, such as the Oxford Research Group, agreed that it matters who intervenes. Although they accepted that inter-operability would be the main concern in respect of alliances, they believed that regional ownership of interventions was desirable.[135]

84. Our Report on Operations in Libya also noted NATO's over reliance on US command and control capabilities for that operation.[136] In its response to our Report the Government accepted that some NATO allies shared significantly more of the burden than others and that this imbalance needed to be addressed in the future.[137] The Government noted that there was a discrepancy between what some allies were willing to contribute to the Alliance in terms of defence spending and willingness to deploy on NATO operations, and the benefits they expect to receive in terms of security guarantees, infrastructure, appointments and influencing policy direction. This was something that the Government accepted which it, NATO and allies needed to "take a hard look" at.

85. The disparity between NATO members on defence spending and contributions to deployments and operations has continued. In his March 2014 speech in Washington, Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, Secretary of State for Defence, said that in light of events inUkraine, there was a need to "reassert the pivotal role of NATO in our collective security, and demonstrate that we are prepared to put our money where our mouths are."[138]He also recognised the challenges that European defence faced in the current period of austerity, but urged European NATO countries to take on greater responsibility for providing security in Europe. This might become more of an issue following the US's announcement of an intention to have a greater strategic focus on the Pacific region. The level to which the US disengages from European affairs remains to be seen, particularly in light of events in the Ukraine and the possible re-emergence of Cold War era state-versus-state tensions. These topics could well be the major topic to be considered at the forthcoming NATO summit in September 2014.

86. We agree that the UK will be required to work closely with allies and partners in interventions, not just in terms of military capability and force size but as a means of maintaining and demonstrating legitimacy. We note the Ministry of Defence's statement that it may sometimes be necessary to limit or modify the objectives of a possible intervention to achieve the broadest possible support from the international community. However, this must not be at the risk of undermining the strategic aim of the intervention operation. We agree with our witnesses that regional ownership of interventions can on occasions be important and desirable. The next National Security Strategy and the next Defence and Security Review should set out how the Government plans to develop regional partnerships which will help in delivering the UK's national security objectives.

87. We note the US's stated intention to have a greater strategic focus on the Pacific region. However, the level to which the US will reduce its strategic focus on, and interest in, European affairs is unclear, particularly in the light of recent events in Ukraine. We call on the Government and other European NATO countries to develop a strategy for the future role of NATO and its resourcing that takes this into account. This should include a vision of the leading role to be played by the UK in encouraging European NATO states to take on a greater degree of responsibility in NATO operations. The NATO summit in September 2014 provides an opportunity for consideration of such matters. The summit also provides an opportunity to discuss the role of non-NATO countries in NATO-led operations. We call on the Government, in its response to this Report, to set out how it intends to take these matters forward at the summit.

New intervention capabilities

88. The evolution of new capabilities such as cyber have implications for UK intervention policy in that they provide a capability to intervene and project force without necessarily deploying Armed Forces personnel. Since publication of the NSS and SDSR in 2010 the Secretary of State for Defence has acknowledged, in September 2013, that the UK had an offensive cyber capability.[139] We noted the potential legal difficulties of the offensive cyber capability in our Report on Deterrence in the twenty-first century,concluding that:

We welcome the emphasis that the Government places on the importance of cyber defence and we note the commitment of resources to a new cyber strike capability. We are concerned that the difficulty in identifying actors in a cyber attack makes the ability to deter that much harder as hostile parties may feel more confident that they can mount an attack with impunity. Another challenge for deterrence is that question marks over the proportionality and legality of a response to a cyber attack may have a bearing on a hostile actor's calculations about the UK's readiness to deploy its own offensive capability, adding to this sense of impunity on the part of a potential aggressor.[140]

89. The development of new capabilities, such as the ability to take offensive cyber action, has profound implications for the way the UK intervenes. Although these capabilities bring with them advantages, in terms of not putting UK Armed Forces personnel in harm's way, their use also raises a number of questions. The next National Security Strategy and the next Defence and Security Review should consider the implications of these capabilities and their use in future interventions.

Other approaches to intervention

90. Alongside military intervention capabilities, the UK has other approaches to intervention which involve other Government Departments and agencies and others such as contractors and NGOs.[141] Our predecessor Committee recognised this in its Report on The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace.[142]The Report concluded that when troops are committed to operations in future there must be robust plans to coordinate military and reconstruction efforts from the earliest stages.[143] Our predecessor Committee recommended that the MoD, the FCO and DFID, working together with the Stabilisation Unit,[144] produce a Comprehensive Approach policy and doctrine that brought together all the elements for such a policy in one place.[145] In its response to the Report, the newly elected Government said it recognised the importance of an integrated approach to policy and decision making on matters of national security.[146]The Government has since published the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS)[147] and the International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES).[148] These are intended to set out the Government's approach to establishing priorities and cohesion across conflict prevention activities, including joint funding mechanisms such as the Conflict Pool.[149]

91. The July 2011 BSOS was developed by the FCO, DFID and MoD. It described how the UK can enhance its own security and prosperity by identifying, preventing and ending instability and conflict overseas, using diplomatic, development, military and security tools, and drawing on Britain's unique experience, relationships, reputation and values.[150]It is intended to build on the National Security Strategy, which identified shaping a stable world as a core Government objective,[151] and the Strategic Defence and Security Review, which made a commitment to tackle threats to our national security at source.[152]The BSOS is founded on three mutually supporting pillars:

·  Early Warning;

·  Rapid Crisis Prevention and Response; and

·  Investing in Upstream Prevention[153]

92. The MoD told us that the BSOS recognised the value of early intervention when necessary and lawful to prevent escalations of conflict.[154] According to the MoD, the BSOS's focus on indicators and warnings within countries at risk of instability was an important way not just of prioritising upstream prevention activity but also of ensuring that the Armed Forces and others prepared for future military operations.[155]

93. The February 2013 International Defence Engagement Strategy set out how all defence activity short of combat operations, would be prioritised to focus engagement efforts on "those countries which are most important to our national interests, and where we are most likely to achieve the desired effect".[156] It was intended to bring forward commitments made in the 2010 National Security Strategy and the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review that set out a vision for an integrated approach to meeting international objectives and greater use of UK influence in upstream conflict prevention. It is intended to ensure that the UK shapes its defence engagement over a period of up to 20 years, and to develop the relationships and influence that will be required to achieve the UK's objectives in a period of significant uncertainty and change.[157] The strategy covers four component areas of activity:

·  security and 'non combat' operations;

·  defence diplomacy;

·  defence and security exports; and

·  regional stability, conflict prevention, post conflict reconstruction and stabilisation.[158]

94. Our witnesses broadly welcomed the BSOS and IDES. Saferworld suggested that defence actors could be involved in the following conflict prevention activities: upstream conflict prevention, support for a nation's security sector, capacity building, and diplomacy and development.[159]

95. A number of witnesses pointed to the challenges for the Armed Forces undertaking these types of intervention activities. Saferworld pointed to the challenge of understanding the context of an intervention situation, including the perceptions of the local populations and potential local political nuances.[160] Other challenges included the need to develop language skills (see also paragraphs 113-115 below) and understanding local customs and traditions.[161] At the end of an intervention, UK Armed Forces might have a role in supporting the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants back into society, the transformation of defence assets toward civilian control, and establishing civilian oversight of the Armed Forces.[162]

96. We welcome the Government's commitment to a "Comprehensive Approach". Wealso welcome the emphasis on conflict prevention envisaged in Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) and the International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES) and the involvement of UK Armed Forces with other agencies. It is important that the Armed Forces and other actors understand the context in the countries in which these activities are taking place, including the development of the language skills required for effective engagement with the local population and authorities. The Government should also outline the metrics it has developed to measure the effectiveness of both the BSOS and the IDES. In interventions where the purpose is not for humanitarian reasons, care must be taken to ensure that the coercive or deterrent action taken is proportionate and that the risks are fully assessed.

Strategic communication

97. A key element of an intervention operation should be a strategic communication. This includes both local communication where the operation is being undertaken and communication with the UK public to explain the rationale and purpose of an intervention operation.

98. In regards to communication with local nationals in the intervention region, Saferworld told us that people's perceptions matter and that the UK could not simply expect to provide security through its interventions.[163] It required the "active consent, participation and ownership of national authorities, security providers and local people in order to achieve lasting peace and security". Saferworld argued that "in many cases local people have little opportunity to play a part in decisions that affect them".In their opinion, this did not mean that the Armed Forces themselves should carry out public perception surveys or work with local communities to identify and address their security and development needs. However support should be provided for civil society and others to carry out this work and it should be a key element of UK intervention strategy.

99. It is also essential that when undertaking intervention operations there is a strategic communications plan for informing the UK public of the reasons and purpose of the operation. This is vital in ensuring the support of the public for the operation. In our Report on Operations in Libya, we were concerned that regime change was being seen as the goal of the mission, rather than the protection of civilians as proscribed in the UN mandate.[164] In our Report on Securing the Future of Afghanistan, we warned that we had seen little evidence that the Government's communications strategy was fulfilling its objectives and recommended that the MoD and FCO reinvigorate their communications strategy for the UK and Afghan populations.[165] The failure of the Government's communications strategies for military operations is illustrated in part by the public's current reluctance to support future expeditionary operations.

100. A further challenge for Government communication strategies is that the terminology used across Government means different things depending on the department in which it is being used. For example, conflict prevention in the MoD might mean using force to remove a threat whilst in the FCO it might mean diplomatic negotiations to facilitate a peace agreement. Therefore, it is not surprising that public understanding of the reasons for intervention operations is not as complete as it should be.

101. Strategic communications are vital for intervention operations. The perceptions of local populations affected by such operations are crucial to the success of these missions. Success also requires the strategic aims and objectives of the mission to be understood by the public in the UK. We call on the Government to develop coherent and understandable meanings for the terms used across Government Departments for its intervention policy and defence engagement strategy. It should also develop methods to increase public understanding of them as this will assist inimproving public understanding and perceptions of the use of the Armed Forces.

Exit strategies and the end state

102. We have welcomed the Government's statement in the 2010 SDSR that it intends to have viable exit strategies when deploying the Armed Forces.[166] In its response to our concerns on exit strategies in our Report on Operations in Libya, the Government told us that there were limits to how far it was sensible to try and envisage or plan the precise way in which UK Armed Forces would exit an operation, adding that it was essential to retain flexibility and the capacity to adapt to events.[167] The Government added that by having a clear strategic aim from the outset as part of an integrated government approach, it was expected that the Government would have a common understanding of the circumstances that would trigger an end to a military deployment and the shift to civilian-led post conflict engagement.

103. The former Prime Minister, Rt Hon Tony Blair, said in his so-called 1999 "Chicago doctrine": "Are we prepared for the long term? In the past we talked too much of exit strategies. But having made a commitment we cannot simply walk away once the fight is over; better to stay with moderate numbers of troops than return for repeat performances with large numbers".[168]

104. Our witnesses agreed exit strategies were important and would become more important given likely complexities of a range of UK agencies remaining in a post-conflict environment. The Humanitarian Intervention Centre described exit strategies as being more than an end to military intervention:

An exit strategy is a transitional plan for disengagement and ultimate withdrawal of external parties from a state's territory, ideally after having attained their principal objectives. Nevertheless, an exit does not necessarily mark the end of all international involvement. So far there has been little explicit discussion of exit strategies in US military doctrines. Similarly, the UN has not issued any guidance on appropriate exit strategies for humanitarian intervention. The term did not find common application in foreign policy until the US engagement in Somalia in 1993, which is often hailed as the prime example of an ill thought-out and rushed exit. In thinking about exit strategies, it is important to emphasise the fact that an exit is a process, not an event; they may therefore more appropriately be described as transitional strategies.[169]

105. Part of a successful exit strategy would be post-conflict reconstruction and nation building. The Oxford Research Group told us that the UK needed to pay as much attention to how it transitions successfully from military to non-military involvement in conflict situations as it did to the transition to military intervention:

The Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) is a welcome contribution to UK policy on a range of prevention and intervention options, primarily outside the military sphere.Similarly welcome are the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability and elements of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES).However, there remains a lack of strategy on planning for the aftermath of military intervention: post-conflict recovery and (re)construction.The challenges and risks of disengagement have been poorly integrated into assessments and planning of military interventions.This has been very obvious in the aftermath of UK/US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the reticence to take decisive 'state-breaking' military action in Syria.[…].[170]

106. Anexit strategy can never be fully planned in advance, but is dependent on a large number of contingent factors and the actions of autonomous parties which are often impossible to foresee. Therefore exit strategies should retain flexibility and include the continuous re-evaluation of goals, objectives, and timeframes during the course of an intervention.[171]

107. As well as establishing viable and achievable exit strategies, in its work on the "Comprehensive Approach" our predecessor Committee highlighted the importance of a clearly defined end state:

In future situations where the Comprehensive Approach is adopted all relevant Government Departments and the Armed Forces should agree a clear set of objectives with appropriate measures of achievement and with a clearly defined end state set in the context of the nature of the challenges faced. The need for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation should be recognised and incorporated into the planning at the earliest stages. These objectives may need to adapt and evolve but it is essential that the agencies pursuing the Comprehensive Approach have an agreed and feasible end state in mind at every appropriate juncture.[172]

108. We welcome the intention to plan for viable exit strategies for deployed UK Armed Forces although we recognise that this risks sending signals to adversaries that intervention is bound in time, space, military force or desired effect. However,it is vital that consideration of an exit strategy should commence at an early stage, perhaps even prior to deployment.

109. Interventions bring with them responsibilities in respect of exit strategies and end states and these will invariably take longer than anticipated. Securing the peace is as important an objective as winning the war. The Government should set out in the next National Security Strategy and the next Defence and Security Review how it defines and assesses successful exit strategies and end states, including how long they should take for each of the actors involved and how it measures the success of the transition from exit strategies to the desired end state. Exit strategies must also ensure safety of Armed Forces personnel remaining in country and that of other UK agencies such as DFID.

Learning lessons and looking ahead

110. Learning lessons from intervention operations, not just those which are military in nature, is vital. In our Report on Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part I, we highlighted the importance of this. We recommended:

that the Ministry of Defence, in close conjunction with the Cabinet Office and National Security Secretariat, initiate the writing of official histories of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and of other conflicts since the end of the Cold War; review how the history function is being undertaken by all three Services and by the Ministry of Defence as a whole; and confirm in the 2015 Defence and Security Review its plans for the preparation and publication of histories and other measures designed to address these deficiencies. This work could usefully call on input and expertise from other Government Departments including the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; since the comprehensive approach became a hallmark of the operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, its lessons should be learnt from and shared across Government as a whole.[173]

111. In its response to our Report the Government agreed on the value of cross-Government learning of lessons from history and cross-Government input into official histories, but also noted the value of a time lag before producing them. The MoD added:

We have already learned some of the most significant and immediate lessons from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the political complexity around them. The need to develop upstream understanding and influence has become a central part of our international Defence Engagement plans. And the lesson of the value of clearer strategy and vision for the role of Defence has influenced responses to Libya and Syria.[174]

112. In respect of intervention, the MoD said that capturing best practice was a vital part of improving the force and the MoD and should involve Joint Forces Command and Front Line Commands.[175] The MoD worked with other Government Departments to capture best practice. It thought Afghanistan had been a good example of the Armed Forces learning from experience. The processes followed included formal debriefs of commanders, presentations to successors and a host of 'best practice' guides in an attempt to help make responses ever more coherent.The MoD recognised that there was a challenge in ensuring that the "same open feedback continued in an era where UK Armed Forces are not constantly engaged in major operations".[176]The Joint Force Command leads on the lessons process and the MoD told us it was working to refine further the mechanism the Forces use for learning from experience as this knowledge would be key in ensuring defence was well set for future tasks. Given the "Comprehensive Approach" taken to intervention operations, a collective approach to learning lessons needed to be adopted across Government.

113. One lesson that has been identified repeatedly was the need for language skills and training. Our predecessor Committee's Report on the "Comprehensive Approach" they said:

We consider the ability to communicate directly with local nationals to be important. We recognise that there has been additional language training for deployment to Afghanistan since 2003 but progress, particularly within DFID and the FCO, has been unimpressive. The three Departments should give the matter higher priority both in current and future operations.[177]

114. Despite our predecessor Committee's comments, this has continued to be an area of concern which was also highlighted in our work on Afghanistan:

In trying to work closely with the local population, it is important for military personnel to be able to communicate directly with people rather than through an interpreter. This places a great deal of importance on acquiring the right language skills quickly.We recommend that the MoD put into place proper planning for language skills in theatre for future operations.[178]

115. In its response, the MoD agreed that direct communication with the local population was important but added that language training had to be balanced against other training needs.[179]The Department added that all soldiers received at least some degree of language training, from the issue of language cards and training on their use through to higher-level language provision, and that the Defence Operational Languages Support Unit which had responsibility for identifying and managing the Defence language requirement was working with Land Forces to outline the language requirements for future Brigades.In addition to the language training provided to Armed Forces personnel prior to deployment, cultural advisors are deployed to theatre to assist with cultural awareness and a large number of interpreters are employed to assist personnel interacting with the local population. The MoD told us that significant resources were already directed to facilitating communication with the local population, but that it would continue to look at ways to further improve this.

116. The Henry Jackson Society warned that although lessons learned procedures were in place in many Government Departments, these should not be too rigid as they tended to reflect the last experience rather than providing a useful guide to future interventions.[180]

117. Lessons learned from military deployments are vital and the Government must ensure they take place in a timely manner. We note that the Ministry of Defencesays it works with other Government Departments in capturing best practice. The Government must ensure that a unified vocabulary is used across Government. As well as ensuring the capture of good practice, the lessons learned process must capture mistakes so that future operations can be appropriately informed and planned. The Government should outline what steps it is taking to engender a culture of openness and willingness to share mistakes and the lessons learned from them across the various participants involved in such operations.

118. As well as looking at the past the Government also undertakes strategic work looking towards the future in its work on Global Strategic Trends and the Future Character of Conflict(FCOC). The MoD told us that FCOC identified challenges, including growing range of actors involved in conflict. In the run up to the next NSS and the next DSR in 2015, the MoD would review the findings of the FCOC with the intention of adapting its Future Force plans to take into account new evidence and analysis.[181]

119. We welcome the Government's use of Global Strategic Trends and the Future Character of Conflict as part of the work on the next National Security Strategy(NSS) and the next Defence and Security Review (DSR). We call on the Government to include in the next NSS and the next DSR an outline of the contribution of this work to improvements in the UK's national security. In response to our Report, the Government should set out the use it has made of external academic and research resources as part of its analysis of future global trends and national security requirements.

123  HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, pp 19-28 Back

124   Defence Committee press notice, "Defence Committee Future Programme, 10 December 2012 Back

125   HC Deb, 26 June 2013, col 307  Back

126   British Army, Modernising to face an unpredictable future: Transforming the British Army, July 2012, and British Army, Transforming the British Army: an update, July 2013 Back

127   Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2013-14, Future Army 2020, HC 576 Back

128  HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, p 20 Back

129   Ibid, p 20 Back

130   Ibid, p 20 and p 63 Back

131   Ev w3 Back

132   Ev w3 Back

133   Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, Operations in Libya, HC 950, para 81 Back

134   Defence Committee, Eleventh Special Report of Session 2010-12, Operations in Libya: Government Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1952, p 10 Back

135   Ev w14 Back

136   Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, Operations in Libya, HC 950, paras 90-91 Back

137   Defence Committee, Eleventh Special Report of Session 2010-12, Operations in Libya: Government Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1952, pp 10-11 Back

138   Speech at The Heritage Centre on 26 March 2014, Why Britain and America must remain partners of choice in Defence(available at:; see also "The UK-US defence partnership", Ministry of Defence press release, 27 March 2014. Back

139   Ministry of Defence press notice, "New Cyber reserve unit created", 29 September 2013 (available at: Back

140   Defence Committee, Eleventh Report of Session 2013-14, Deterrence in the twenty-firstcentury, HC 1066, para 26 Back

141   Ev w2 Back

142   Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2009-10, The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace, HC 224 Back

143   Ibid, para 41 Back

144  The Stabilisation Unit's website says"The Stabilisation Unit's purpose is to help HMG respond to crises and tackle the causes of instability overseas. SU is a uniquely integrated civil-military operational unit funded from the Conflict Pool, designed to be agile and responsive and well-equipped to operate in high threat environments. It combines in-house staff expertise with the ability to draw on a larger pool of civilian expertise for specialised, longer term or larger scale taskings".  Back

145   Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2009-10, The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace, HC 224, para 30 Back

146   Defence Committee, First Special Report of Session 2010-11, The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace: Government's Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2009-10, HC 347, p 3 Back

147   Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, Building Stability Overseas Territory, July 2011 Back

148   Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, International Defence Engagement Strategy, February 2013 Back

149   Ev w2; The Conflict Pool, established in 2001 and restructured in 2008, is funded from a separate HM Treasury Conflict Resources settlement, which also funds the Peacekeeping Budget. It is managed jointly by the DFID, the FCO and the MoD. The pool funds conflict prevention, stabilisation and peacekeeping activities that meet the UK Government's conflict prevention priorities as set out in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy. It brings together the work of the three departments traditionally involved in conflict prevention work: the FCO, DFID and MoD, to conduct joint analysis, establish shared priorities and design and implement joint conflict prevention and management programmes. (DFID, FCO, MoD, Conflict Pool Strategic Guidance, April 2013, available at:  Back

150   Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, Building Stability Overseas Territory, July 2011, p 4 Back

151  HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, p 22 Back

152  HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, p 9 Back

153   Ibid, p 18; Ev w2 Back

154   Ev w2 Back

155   Ev w2 Back

156   Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, International Defence Engagement Strategy, February 2013, p 3 Back

157   Ibid p 1 Back

158   Ibid, p 3 Back

159   Ev w9-10 Back

160   Ev w8-10 Ev w12 and Ev w14-15 Back

161   Ev w8-9 and Ev 15 Back

162   Ev w9-10 Back

163   Ev w9 Back

164   Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, Operations in Libya, HC 950, para 34 Back

165   Defence Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2012-13, Securing the Future of Afghanistan, HC 413, para 150 Back

166   Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, Operations in Libya, HC 950, para 55 Back

167   Defence Committee, Eleventh Special Report of Session 2010-12, Operations in Libya: Government Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1952, p 8 Back

168   Rt Hon Tony Blair speech on the "Doctrine of International Community", 24 April 1999. Available at: Back

169   Ev w52 Back

170   Ex w14 Back

171   Ev w52 Back

172   Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2009-10, The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace, HC 224, para 41 Back

173   Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, paras 76 Back

174   Defence Committee, Tenth Special Report of Session 2013-14, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One: Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, HC 1175, pp 10-11 Back

175   Ev w3 Back

176   Ev w3 Back

177   Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2009-10, The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace, HC 224, para 158 Back

178   Defence Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, Operations in Afghanistan, HC 554, para 135 Back

179   Defence Committee, Eighth special Report of Session 2010-12, Operations in Afghanistan: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1525, p 24 Back

180   Ev w19 Back

181   Ev w3 Back

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