[140]
89. The
development of new capabilities, such as the ability to take offensive
cyber action, has profound implications for the way the UK intervenes.
Although these capabilities bring with them advantages, in terms
of not putting UK Armed Forces personnel in harm's way, their
use also raises a number of questions. The next National Security
Strategy and the next Defence and Security Review should consider
the implications of these capabilities and their use in future
interventions.
Other approaches to intervention
90. Alongside military intervention
capabilities, the UK has other approaches to intervention which
involve other Government Departments and agencies and others such
as contractors and NGOs.[141]
Our predecessor Committee recognised this in its Report on The
Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but
to make a better peace.[142]The
Report concluded that when troops are committed to operations
in future there must be robust plans to coordinate military and
reconstruction efforts from the earliest stages.[143]
Our predecessor Committee recommended that the MoD, the FCO and
DFID, working together with the Stabilisation Unit,[144]
produce a Comprehensive Approach policy and doctrine that brought
together all the elements for such a policy in one place.[145]
In its response to the Report, the newly elected Government said
it recognised the importance of an integrated approach to policy
and decision making on matters of national security.[146]The
Government has since published the Building Stability Overseas
Strategy (BSOS)[147]
and the International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES).[148]
These are intended to set out the Government's approach to establishing
priorities and cohesion across conflict prevention activities,
including joint funding mechanisms such as the Conflict Pool.[149]
91. The July 2011 BSOS was developed
by the FCO, DFID and MoD. It described how the UK can enhance
its own security and prosperity by identifying, preventing and
ending instability and conflict overseas, using diplomatic, development,
military and security tools, and drawing on Britain's unique experience,
relationships, reputation and values.[150]It
is intended to build on the National Security Strategy, which
identified shaping a stable world as a core Government objective,[151]
and the Strategic Defence and Security Review, which made a commitment
to tackle threats to our national security at source.[152]The
BSOS is founded on three mutually supporting pillars:
· Early Warning;
· Rapid Crisis Prevention and
Response; and
· Investing in Upstream Prevention[153]
92. The MoD told us that the BSOS recognised
the value of early intervention when necessary and lawful to prevent
escalations of conflict.[154]
According to the MoD, the BSOS's focus on indicators and warnings
within countries at risk of instability was an important way not
just of prioritising upstream prevention activity but also of
ensuring that the Armed Forces and others prepared for future
military operations.[155]
93. The February 2013 International
Defence Engagement Strategy set out how all defence activity
short of combat operations, would be prioritised to focus engagement
efforts on "those countries which are most important to our
national interests, and where we are most likely to achieve the
desired effect".[156]
It was intended to bring forward commitments made in the 2010
National Security Strategy and the 2010 Strategic Defence and
Security Review that set out a vision for an integrated approach
to meeting international objectives and greater use of UK influence
in upstream conflict prevention. It is intended to ensure that
the UK shapes its defence engagement over a period of up to 20
years, and to develop the relationships and influence that will
be required to achieve the UK's objectives in a period of significant
uncertainty and change.[157]
The strategy covers four component areas of activity:
· security and 'non combat'
operations;
· defence diplomacy;
· defence and security exports;
and
· regional stability, conflict
prevention, post conflict reconstruction and stabilisation.[158]
94. Our witnesses broadly welcomed the
BSOS and IDES. Saferworld suggested that defence actors could
be involved in the following conflict prevention activities: upstream
conflict prevention, support for a nation's security sector, capacity
building, and diplomacy and development.[159]
95. A number of witnesses pointed to
the challenges for the Armed Forces undertaking these types of
intervention activities. Saferworld pointed to the challenge of
understanding the context of an intervention situation, including
the perceptions of the local populations and potential local political
nuances.[160] Other
challenges included the need to develop language skills (see also
paragraphs 113-115 below) and understanding local customs and
traditions.[161] At
the end of an intervention, UK Armed Forces might have a role
in supporting the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
of ex-combatants back into society, the transformation of defence
assets toward civilian control, and establishing civilian oversight
of the Armed Forces.[162]
96. We
welcome the Government's commitment to a "Comprehensive Approach".
Wealso welcome the emphasis on conflict prevention envisaged in
Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) and the International
Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES) and the involvement of UK Armed
Forces with other agencies. It is important that the Armed Forces
and other actors understand the context in the countries in which
these activities are taking place, including the development of
the language skills required for effective engagement with the
local population and authorities. The Government should also outline
the metrics it has developed to measure the effectiveness of both
the BSOS and the IDES. In interventions where the purpose is not
for humanitarian reasons, care must be taken to ensure that the
coercive or deterrent action taken is proportionate and that the
risks are fully assessed.
Strategic communication
97. A key element of an intervention
operation should be a strategic communication. This includes both
local communication where the operation is being undertaken and
communication with the UK public to explain the rationale and
purpose of an intervention operation.
98. In regards to communication with
local nationals in the intervention region, Saferworld told us
that people's perceptions matter and that the UK could not simply
expect to provide security through its interventions.[163]
It required the "active consent, participation and ownership
of national authorities, security providers and local people in
order to achieve lasting peace and security". Saferworld
argued that "in many cases local people have little opportunity
to play a part in decisions that affect them".In their opinion,
this did not mean that the Armed Forces themselves should carry
out public perception surveys or work with local communities to
identify and address their security and development needs. However
support should be provided for civil society and others to carry
out this work and it should be a key element of UK intervention
strategy.
99. It is also essential that when undertaking
intervention operations there is a strategic communications plan
for informing the UK public of the reasons and purpose of the
operation. This is vital in ensuring the support of the public
for the operation. In our Report on Operations in Libya,
we were concerned that regime change was being seen as the goal
of the mission, rather than the protection of civilians as proscribed
in the UN mandate.[164]
In our Report on Securing the Future of Afghanistan, we
warned that we had seen little evidence that the Government's
communications strategy was fulfilling its objectives and recommended
that the MoD and FCO reinvigorate their communications strategy
for the UK and Afghan populations.[165]
The failure of the Government's communications strategies for
military operations is illustrated in part by the public's current
reluctance to support future expeditionary operations.
100. A further challenge for Government
communication strategies is that the terminology used across Government
means different things depending on the department in which it
is being used. For example, conflict prevention in the MoD might
mean using force to remove a threat whilst in the FCO it might
mean diplomatic negotiations to facilitate a peace agreement.
Therefore, it is not surprising that public understanding of the
reasons for intervention operations is not as complete as it should
be.
101. Strategic
communications are vital for intervention operations. The perceptions
of local populations affected by such operations are crucial to
the success of these missions. Success also requires the strategic
aims and objectives of the mission to be understood by the public
in the UK. We call on the Government to develop coherent and understandable
meanings for the terms used across Government Departments for
its intervention policy and defence engagement strategy. It should
also develop methods to increase public understanding of them
as this will assist inimproving public understanding and perceptions
of the use of the Armed Forces.
Exit strategies and the end state
102. We have welcomed the Government's
statement in the 2010 SDSR that it intends to have viable exit
strategies when deploying the Armed Forces.[166]
In its response to our concerns on exit strategies in our Report
on Operations in Libya, the Government told us that there
were limits to how far it was sensible to try and envisage or
plan the precise way in which UK Armed Forces would exit an operation,
adding that it was essential to retain flexibility and the capacity
to adapt to events.[167]
The Government added that by having a clear strategic aim from
the outset as part of an integrated government approach, it was
expected that the Government would have a common understanding
of the circumstances that would trigger an end to a military deployment
and the shift to civilian-led post conflict engagement.
103. The former Prime Minister, Rt Hon
Tony Blair, said in his so-called 1999 "Chicago doctrine":
"Are we prepared for the long term? In the past we talked
too much of exit strategies. But having made a commitment we cannot
simply walk away once the fight is over; better to stay with moderate
numbers of troops than return for repeat performances with large
numbers".[168]
104. Our witnesses agreed exit strategies
were important and would become more important given likely complexities
of a range of UK agencies remaining in a post-conflict environment.
The Humanitarian Intervention Centre described exit strategies
as being more than an end to military intervention:
An exit strategy is a transitional plan
for disengagement and ultimate withdrawal of external parties
from a state's territory, ideally after having attained their
principal objectives. Nevertheless, an exit does not necessarily
mark the end of all international involvement. So far there has
been little explicit discussion of exit strategies in US military
doctrines. Similarly, the UN has not issued any guidance on appropriate
exit strategies for humanitarian intervention. The term did not
find common application in foreign policy until the US engagement
in Somalia in 1993, which is often hailed as the prime example
of an ill thought-out and rushed exit. In thinking about exit
strategies, it is important to emphasise the fact that an exit
is a process, not an event; they may therefore more appropriately
be described as transitional strategies.[169]
105. Part of a successful exit strategy
would be post-conflict reconstruction and nation building. The
Oxford Research Group told us that the UK needed to pay as much
attention to how it transitions successfully from military to
non-military involvement in conflict situations as it did to the
transition to military intervention:
The Building Stability Overseas Strategy
(BSOS) is a welcome contribution to UK policy on a range of prevention
and intervention options, primarily outside the military sphere.Similarly
welcome are the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability and elements
of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and International Defence
Engagement Strategy (IDES).However, there remains a lack of strategy
on planning for the aftermath of military intervention: post-conflict
recovery and (re)construction.The challenges and risks of disengagement
have been poorly integrated into assessments and planning of military
interventions.This has been very obvious in the aftermath of UK/US
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the reticence
to take decisive 'state-breaking' military action in Syria.[…].[170]
106. Anexit strategy can never be fully
planned in advance, but is dependent on a large number of contingent
factors and the actions of autonomous parties which are often
impossible to foresee. Therefore exit strategies should retain
flexibility and include the continuous re-evaluation of goals,
objectives, and timeframes during the course of an intervention.[171]
107. As well as establishing viable
and achievable exit strategies, in its work on the "Comprehensive
Approach" our predecessor Committee highlighted the importance
of a clearly defined end state:
In future situations where the Comprehensive
Approach is adopted all relevant Government Departments and the
Armed Forces should agree a clear set of objectives with appropriate
measures of achievement and with a clearly defined end state set
in the context of the nature of the challenges faced. The need
for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation should be recognised
and incorporated into the planning at the earliest stages. These
objectives may need to adapt and evolve but it is essential that
the agencies pursuing the Comprehensive Approach have an agreed
and feasible end state in mind at every appropriate juncture.[172]
108. We
welcome the intention to plan for viable exit strategies for deployed
UK Armed Forces although we recognise that this risks sending
signals to adversaries that intervention is bound in time, space,
military force or desired effect. However,it is vital that consideration
of an exit strategy should commence at an early stage, perhaps
even prior to deployment.
109. Interventions
bring with them responsibilities in respect of exit strategies
and end states and these will invariably take longer than anticipated.
Securing the peace is as important an objective as winning the
war. The Government should set out in the next National Security
Strategy and the next Defence and Security Review how it defines
and assesses successful exit strategies and end states, including
how long they should take for each of the actors involved and
how it measures the success of the transition from exit strategies
to the desired end state. Exit strategies must also ensure safety
of Armed Forces personnel remaining in country and that of other
UK agencies such as DFID.
Learning lessons and looking
ahead
110. Learning lessons from intervention
operations, not just those which are military in nature, is vital.
In our Report on Towards the next Defence and Security Review:
Part I, we highlighted the importance of this. We recommended:
that the Ministry of Defence, in close
conjunction with the Cabinet Office and National Security Secretariat,
initiate the writing of official histories of the Iraq and Afghanistan
campaigns and of other conflicts since the end of the Cold War;
review how the history function is being undertaken by all three
Services and by the Ministry of Defence as a whole; and confirm
in the 2015 Defence and Security Review its plans for the preparation
and publication of histories and other measures designed to address
these deficiencies. This work could usefully call on input and
expertise from other Government Departments including the Department
for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office; since the comprehensive approach became a hallmark of
the operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, its lessons should
be learnt from and shared across Government as a whole.[173]
111. In its response to our Report the
Government agreed on the value of cross-Government learning of
lessons from history and cross-Government input into official
histories, but also noted the value of a time lag before producing
them. The MoD added:
We have already learned some of the
most significant and immediate lessons from operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq, and the political complexity around them. The need to
develop upstream understanding and influence has become a central
part of our international Defence Engagement plans. And the lesson
of the value of clearer strategy and vision for the role of Defence
has influenced responses to Libya and Syria.[174]
112. In respect of intervention, the
MoD said that capturing best practice was a vital part of improving
the force and the MoD and should involve Joint Forces Command
and Front Line Commands.[175]
The MoD worked with other Government Departments to capture best
practice. It thought Afghanistan had been a good example of the
Armed Forces learning from experience. The processes followed
included formal debriefs of commanders, presentations to successors
and a host of 'best practice' guides in an attempt to help make
responses ever more coherent.The MoD recognised that there was
a challenge in ensuring that the "same open feedback continued
in an era where UK Armed Forces are not constantly engaged in
major operations".[176]The
Joint Force Command leads on the lessons process and the MoD told
us it was working to refine further the mechanism the Forces use
for learning from experience as this knowledge would be key in
ensuring defence was well set for future tasks. Given the "Comprehensive
Approach" taken to intervention operations, a collective
approach to learning lessons needed to be adopted across Government.
113. One lesson that has been identified
repeatedly was the need for language skills and training. Our
predecessor Committee's Report on the "Comprehensive Approach"
they said:
We consider the ability to communicate
directly with local nationals to be important. We recognise that
there has been additional language training for deployment to
Afghanistan since 2003 but progress, particularly within DFID
and the FCO, has been unimpressive. The three Departments should
give the matter higher priority both in current and future operations.[177]
114. Despite our predecessor Committee's
comments, this has continued to be an area of concern which was
also highlighted in our work on Afghanistan:
In trying to work closely with the local
population, it is important for military personnel to be able
to communicate directly with people rather than through an interpreter.
This places a great deal of importance on acquiring the right
language skills quickly.We recommend that the MoD put into place
proper planning for language skills in theatre for future operations.[178]
115. In its response, the MoD agreed
that direct communication with the local population was important
but added that language training had to be balanced against other
training needs.[179]The
Department added that all soldiers received at least some degree
of language training, from the issue of language cards and training
on their use through to higher-level language provision, and that
the Defence Operational Languages Support Unit which had responsibility
for identifying and managing the Defence language requirement
was working with Land Forces to outline the language requirements
for future Brigades.In addition to the language training provided
to Armed Forces personnel prior to deployment, cultural advisors
are deployed to theatre to assist with cultural awareness and
a large number of interpreters are employed to assist personnel
interacting with the local population. The MoD told us that significant
resources were already directed to facilitating communication
with the local population, but that it would continue to look
at ways to further improve this.
116. The Henry Jackson Society warned
that although lessons learned procedures were in place in many
Government Departments, these should not be too rigid as they
tended to reflect the last experience rather than providing a
useful guide to future interventions.[180]
117. Lessons
learned from military deployments are vital and the Government
must ensure they take place in a timely manner. We note that the
Ministry of Defencesays it works with other Government Departments
in capturing best practice. The Government must ensure that a
unified vocabulary is used across Government. As well as ensuring
the capture of good practice, the lessons learned process must
capture mistakes so that future operations can be appropriately
informed and planned. The Government should outline what steps
it is taking to engender a culture of openness and willingness
to share mistakes and the lessons learned from them across the
various participants involved in such operations.
118. As well as looking at the past
the Government also undertakes strategic work looking towards
the future in its work on Global Strategic Trends and the
Future Character of Conflict(FCOC). The MoD told us that
FCOC identified challenges, including growing range of actors
involved in conflict. In the run up to the next NSS and the next
DSR in 2015, the MoD would review the findings of the FCOC with
the intention of adapting its Future Force plans to take into
account new evidence and analysis.[181]
119. We
welcome the Government's use of Global Strategic Trends
and the Future Character of Conflict as part of the work
on the next National Security Strategy(NSS) and the next Defence
and Security Review (DSR). We call on the Government to include
in the next NSS and the next DSR an outline of the contribution
of this work to improvements in the UK's national security. In
response to our Report, the Government should set out the use
it has made of external academic and research resources as part
of its analysis of future global trends and national security
requirements.
123 HM Government, Securing
Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security
Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, pp 19-28 Back
124
Defence Committee press notice, "Defence Committee Future
Programme, 10 December 2012 Back
125
HC Deb, 26 June 2013, col 307 Back
126
British Army, Modernising to face an unpredictable future:
Transforming the British Army, July 2012, and British Army,
Transforming the British Army: an update, July 2013 Back
127
Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2013-14, Future
Army 2020, HC 576 Back
128 HM
Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010,
p 20 Back
129
Ibid, p 20 Back
130
Ibid, p 20 and p 63 Back
131
Ev w3 Back
132
Ev w3 Back
133
Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, Operations
in Libya, HC 950, para 81 Back
134
Defence Committee, Eleventh Special Report of Session 2010-12,
Operations in Libya: Government Response to the Committee's
Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1952, p 10 Back
135
Ev w14 Back
136
Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, Operations
in Libya, HC 950, paras 90-91 Back
137
Defence Committee, Eleventh Special Report of Session 2010-12,
Operations in Libya: Government Response to the Committee's
Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1952, pp 10-11 Back
138
Speech at The Heritage Centre on 26 March 2014, Why Britain
and America must remain partners of choice in Defence(available
at: http://www.heritage.org/events/2014/03/philip-hammond-mp);
see also "The UK-US defence partnership", Ministry of
Defence press release, 27 March 2014. Back
139
Ministry of Defence press notice, "New Cyber reserve unit
created", 29 September 2013 (available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/reserves-head-up-new-cyber-unit) Back
140
Defence Committee, Eleventh Report of Session 2013-14, Deterrence
in the twenty-firstcentury, HC 1066, para 26 Back
141
Ev w2 Back
142
Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2009-10, The Comprehensive
Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better
peace, HC 224 Back
143
Ibid, para 41 Back
144 The
Stabilisation Unit's website says"The Stabilisation Unit's
purpose is to help HMG respond to crises and tackle the causes
of instability overseas. SU is a uniquely integrated civil-military
operational unit funded from the Conflict Pool, designed to be
agile and responsive and well-equipped to operate in high threat
environments. It combines in-house staff expertise with the ability
to draw on a larger pool of civilian expertise for specialised,
longer term or larger scale taskings". Back
145
Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2009-10, The Comprehensive
Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better
peace, HC 224, para 30 Back
146
Defence Committee, First Special Report of Session 2010-11, The
Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but
to make a better peace: Government's Response to the Committee's
Seventh Report of Session 2009-10, HC 347, p 3 Back
147
Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office and Ministry of Defence, Building Stability Overseas
Territory, July 2011 Back
148
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, International
Defence Engagement Strategy, February 2013 Back
149
Ev w2; The Conflict Pool, established in 2001 and restructured
in 2008, is funded from a separate HM Treasury Conflict Resources
settlement, which also funds the Peacekeeping Budget. It is managed
jointly by the DFID, the FCO and the MoD. The pool funds conflict
prevention, stabilisation and peacekeeping activities that meet
the UK Government's conflict prevention priorities as set out
in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy. It brings together
the work of the three departments traditionally involved in conflict
prevention work: the FCO, DFID and MoD, to conduct joint analysis,
establish shared priorities and design and implement joint conflict
prevention and management programmes. (DFID, FCO, MoD, Conflict
Pool Strategic Guidance, April 2013, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-pool).
Back
150
Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office and Ministry of Defence, Building Stability Overseas
Territory, July 2011, p 4 Back
151 HM
Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010, p 22 Back
152 HM
Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010,
p 9 Back
153
Ibid, p 18; Ev w2 Back
154
Ev w2 Back
155
Ev w2 Back
156
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, International
Defence Engagement Strategy, February 2013, p 3 Back
157
Ibid p 1 Back
158
Ibid, p 3 Back
159
Ev w9-10 Back
160
Ev w8-10 Ev w12 and Ev w14-15 Back
161
Ev w8-9 and Ev 15 Back
162
Ev w9-10 Back
163
Ev w9 Back
164
Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, Operations
in Libya, HC 950, para 34 Back
165
Defence Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2012-13, Securing
the Future of Afghanistan, HC 413, para 150 Back
166
Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, Operations
in Libya, HC 950, para 55 Back
167
Defence Committee, Eleventh Special Report of Session 2010-12,
Operations in Libya: Government Response to the Committee's
Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1952, p 8 Back
168
Rt Hon Tony Blair speech on the "Doctrine of International
Community", 24 April 1999. Available at: http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=279 Back
169
Ev w52 Back
170
Ex w14 Back
171
Ev w52 Back
172
Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2009-10, The Comprehensive
Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better
peace, HC 224, para 41 Back
173
Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards
the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197, paras
76 Back
174
Defence Committee, Tenth Special Report of Session 2013-14, Towards
the next Defence and Security Review: Part One: Government Response
to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, HC 1175,
pp 10-11 Back
175
Ev w3 Back
176
Ev w3 Back
177
Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2009-10, The Comprehensive
Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better
peace, HC 224, para 158 Back
178
Defence Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, Operations
in Afghanistan, HC 554, para 135 Back
179
Defence Committee, Eighth special Report of Session 2010-12, Operations
in Afghanistan: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth
Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1525, p 24 Back
180
Ev w19 Back
181
Ev w3 Back
