6 Lessons from Afghanistan
National
Lessons Study
76. Following a campaign that was so protracted and
costly in both casualties and expenditure of resources, it is
important for the public to understand what has been achieved
in our engagement in Afghanistan. We asked the Secretary of State
for Defence what plans the MoD had for a comprehensive review
of our involvement in Afghanistan. He replied:
Once the campaign is over, it will clearly be
appropriate to look at a strategic level across the campaign as
a whole to see what lessons need to be learned in addition to
those thrown up by the short-term and medium-term processes. I
would expect that we would do that, but the time to do it will
be when the campaign is completed.[72]
He explained that the terms of reference for a future
review of the campaign had not yet been scoped and he invited
us to make recommendations about what a post-campaign review should
cover.[73]
77. We consider that it would be appropriate for
an independent national lessons study into Afghanistan to be commissioned
by the Government. It should receive input from all departments
of state concerned, and take evidence from all those engaged and
affected by the campaign.
78. We recommend that the study should include
a balanced review of the successes and setbacks of the campaign,
identifying lessons from the tactical to the strategic, clearly
distinguishing the pre-2006 section of the campaign from activities
in Helmand from 2006 onward. It should describe the translation
of national policy, within an international context, into military
operations and development activities and consider whether all
instruments of national power were harnessed and orchestrated
to best effect in order to meet the objectives of the UK Government
and the international community. It should also explore the collective
experience of operating within the extended ISAF international
coalition.
79. More specifically, the study should set out
what the political ends were, how they changed during the course
of the campaign, and judge whether the ways and means, diplomatic,
economic and military, were sufficient during the course of the
campaign. The study should review whether the national decision-making,
military command and governance arrangements for the campaign
were appropriate, and whether they could be improved for the future.
80. Furthermore the study should analyse how public
perceptions were captured, understood and considered by policy
makers and what measures were taken to shape public understanding
as the conflict moved through its various phases over a decade
or more. The study should examine how public perceptions and understanding
became largely shaped by a range of factors outside the Government's
control, including developing social media. The study should also
examine how plans to gain public understanding and support in
the UK, in Afghanistan and amongst ISAF and other partner nations
were determined and deployed.
Official History
81. In our report Towards the Next Defence and
Security Review: Part One, we recommended that the Ministry
of Defence, in close conjunction with the Cabinet Office and National
Security Secretariat, should initiate the writing of official
histories of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and of other conflicts
since the end of the Cold War; review how the history function
is being undertaken by all three Services and by the Ministry
of Defence as a whole.[74]
82. In its response, the Government agreed that there
was value in cross-Government learning of lessons from history
and cross-Government input into Official Histories, but gave no
specific commitments to address our recommendations.
83. We remain firmly of the view that the Ministry
of Defence should commission work to write the narrative of operations
in Afghanistan as an essential precursor to an official history
that should follow in future years. While the official history
can wait, as typically these are written 10-20 years after the
campaign concerned, the narratives should not.
84. The Ministry of Defence, alongside other departments
of state, needs to invest in its history and lessons functions
if our successors are to make better informed policies and strategic
plans. A relatively small investment could have a significantly
beneficial impact on future planning.
85. As the Afghan Presidential election process
will not be concluded as this report is published, the Status
of Forces Agreements remain unsigned and the withdrawal of UK
combat forces incomplete, we will continue to monitor the situation
in Afghanistan and may well report further before the end of this
Parliament.
72 Q187 Back
73
Qq188-189 Back
74
Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part One,
HC 197, para 76 Back
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