Deterrence in the 21st Century

Written evidence submitted by Dr Andrew Futter & Dr Benjamin Zala,

University of Leicester

1. This submission addresses the call for evidence on "the different levels of deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, deterrence though conventional forces, the link between the two, and the significance of ballistic missile defence." While much of our evidence is US-centric, the closeness of the US-UK relationship and the inevitable knock-on effects of changes in the US defence posture for the United Kingdom, mean that current policy trends in the US will form a significant part of the strategic debate in the UK as we look to the future.

2. Summary: The vast majority of the public and scholarly debate about nuclear deterrence in recent years has focused on the relationship between existing deterrence doctrine and the renewed push towards a nuclear weapons-free world. Yet the increasing importance of strategic conventional weapons - namely long-range conventional strike and missile defence technology - has been largely overlooked. In particular, the link being made by the Obama administration between strategic conventional weaponry and nuclear weapons reductions has important implications that need to be considered carefully.

3. Unilateral advances in such US conventional capacities may incentivise Washington to reduce its nuclear arsenal but they are likely to have the opposite effect on other nuclear-armed states, which will feel increasingly vulnerable. In the medium-long term, conventional weapons imbalances may hinder progress in getting all nine nuclear weapon states on the path of abolition. In the short term this trend has the potential to jeopardise strategic stability, particularly in regions such as Northeast Asia. There is a strong, and problematic, link between nuclear and conventional weapons created by the way that nuclear weapons act as the ‘great equalizers’ in global strategic relations: i.e. lowering the impact of conventional weapons imbalances between potential rivals.

4. Background: Over a number of years, the Obama administration has made moves to reduce the role played by nuclear weapons in the US defence posture, at least in part to help facilitate the achievement of a nuclear weapons-free world. A central component of the administration’s plan (but often overlooked in wider discussions about the pros and cons of nuclear disarmament) is the gradual shift to a far greater reliance upon advanced conventional weaponry in US defence policy, specifically through a larger role for ballistic missile defences (BMD), advanced conventional strike weapons such as the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) programme, and sophisticated command, control, and monitoring capabilities.

5. The imperative behind this move is that the administration hopes to foster the domestic conditions favorable for further US nuclear reductions – thereby reigniting the push towards nuclear abolition internationally – while at the same time placating domestic critics concerned about a weakening of US security and of the US’ global role. From the point of view of the Obama administration, an increased role for advanced conventional weapons will allow it to reduce its own nuclear stockpile, signaling to other nuclear powers its intent to eventually disarm. This move was illustrated in the administration’s 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review.

6. PGS and BMD: The two main pillars of this approach are the offensive PGS capabilities and the defensive BMD programme. The PGS system is essentially an attempt to create a capability for a rapid precision missile strike across the globe using conventional warheads. The idea, in its simplest form, is to mount conventional warheads (rather than nuclear ones) on long-range missiles (although other means of delivering the warheads are also being examined, such as boost glide systems, and even armed drones). In principle, this would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere in the world in as little as an hour.

7. The US BMD programme is a complex global network of radars, satellites and missiles used to identify, track and intercept incoming missiles aimed both at the US homeland, US allies, and US troops in theatres around the world. Despite the public image of an administration less convinced of the virtues of BMD than its predecessor, the administration has supported levels of BMD funding far higher than that under Reagan, Bush senior, or Clinton. Indeed, during Obama’s first term in office, an ambitious and flexible BMD plan for the defense of Europe was unveiled; the very wide-ranging Ballistic Missile Defense Review was produced, outlining the administration’s decision to push ahead with BMD around the globe; and finally, US negotiators fought hard to keep limitations on BMD out of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) signed with Russia in April 2010.

8. The problem: While the idea of increasing the role of advanced conventional weaponry as a component of US national security thinking and practice is not new, Obama is the first president to strongly link these plans with the goal of pursuing a world free from nuclear weapons. However, the administration’s domestic policy focus must also take into consideration the international impact of the disarmament agenda on the major military fault lines in key US nuclear relationships. When examined in this context, the Obama administration’s plan to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons through – at least in part – a greater role for advanced conventional weaponry in order to foster larger nuclear reductions appears unlikely to succeed at best; and likely to derail long-term progress at worst.

9. The inescapable problem is that US superiority in advanced conventional weaponry already exists, making it very difficult for any potential rival (let alone an adversary) to agree to work toward a nuclear-free world when such a move – already made difficult by existing conventional imbalances – will magnify US power. The close link between nuclear reductions and increases in conventional capabilities essentially works to decrease US vulnerability in a nuclear disarmed world, while at the same time increasing the vulnerability of its current or future rivals and adversaries.

10. Global concerns: Despite the fact that there are still many obstacles to the full and effective deployment of BMD and PGS systems in their most ambitious incarnations, the overall trend towards a greater reliance on these weapons systems creates concern in the capitals of other nuclear powers. Increasing constraints on the US defence budget that are likely to place limits on continued conventional development, particularly on PGS, in the short-term, are insufficient to counter the image of a future nuclear disarmed world defined by overwhelming US conventional superiority. In short, future uncertainty and vulnerability are more important factors for Moscow and Beijing than whether a particular component of advanced conventional weaponry is funded in this year’s defence budget.

11. Thinking beyond nuclear weapons: The central problem for the United States as it attempts to use the growth of unrivalled U.S. conventional military capabilities and major improvements in missile defenses to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons is that the equalising effect of nuclear weapons cannot be wished away. As such, it may well be more useful for the Obama administration to think beyond the current focus solely on nuclear weapons reductions as a means of ensuring global security, and instead toward much more nuanced agreements covering a much wider range of weaponry. Although this will be more difficult than focusing explicitly on numbers of nuclear weapons, it is arguably the only way to build trust with nuclear rivals to the extent needed to make deeper nuclear reductions possible.

12. If including conventional programs in future strategic arms limitations negotiations (not just with Russia) proves too difficult, then Washington will face a choice between dramatically scaling back the deployment of PGS and significantly delaying the deployment of BMD, or suspending efforts at further nuclear reductions altogether.

13. Timing: is key to addressing the ways in which BMD research and deployment act as a barrier to multilateral nuclear disarmament. Indeed, President Reagan’s statement to President Gorbachev at the 1986 Reykjavik summit that the Strategic Defense Initiative deployment could come after the elimination of nuclear missiles was an important conceptual point that few observers have noted. Many of the concerns expressed, particularly by Russia and China, about BMD could be countered by aligning the timetables of deployment with nuclear reductions to ensure that the shield is only lifted after the sword has been buried. Deterrence may be a far from perfect strategy, but it is far better than one side achieving effective impunity by maintaining a nuclear arsenal and a large-scale BMD system at the same time.

14. However such assurances still do not address the longer-term concern about US conventional superiority in a nuclear disarmed world, and therefore a short-term focus on the timing of BMD deployment should not be thought of as a long-term solution in which limitations will be unavoidable.

15. Arms control: In relation to the PGS system in the United States and other long-range conventional offensive systems being developed by others, while confidence building measures can be useful in the short term, over the medium-long term, given the United States’ existing conventional superiority, there is no alternative to arms control measures.

16. Two options are available immediately. The first is to include such weapons in efforts to renew the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Russian concern over BMD in Europe was one of the drivers of Moscow’s decision to suspend the treaty in 2007 and the inclusion of PGS in future discussions could be used as tool for reinvigorating negotiations.

17. The second option is to widen future US-Russian talks on a follow on to the recent Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (New START) to include non-nuclear strategic weapons including those intended under the PGS programme. Such efforts would serve to reinforce the link between nuclear and advanced conventional weapons but in a way that reduces both rather than increasing one in order to reduce the other.

18. Regional dialogue: A renewed focus on regional dialogue on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament will also allow for more opportunities to highlight and discuss the problem of intended and unintended consequences of advanced conventional weapons programmes. For example, the main intention behind US, Japanese and South Korean development of missile defence capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region is to counter potential threats from North Korea and cement the deterrence link with United States. However, the significant but unintended effect of this is to make China far less likely to join multilateral efforts to reduce its nuclear arsenal. The same is true in relation to Russia’s concerns over US and NATO defences primarily aimed at countering Iranian missiles, and Pakistan’s concerns over India’s burgeoning system that is only partly aimed at countering Pakistani missile threats (and some analysts claim is actually more directed towards a potential Chinese threat).

19. Public debate: At the very least, a far greater level of public debate is needed in relation to the growing link between strategic conventional weapons and nuclear arsenals. The Committee would be advised to include some discussion in its report from this inquiry of these issues in order to help raise their profile in public discussions around nuclear weapons and defence strategy. Given the seemingly technical nature of the subjects involved and the relative lack of public knowledge that programmes such as PGS even exist, the Committee could play an important role here.

20. The British Government should use the avenues presented by its close diplomatic and military relationship with the United States to raise the issues discussed above with defence and foreign policy officials in Washington. Doing so will help in highlighting the global implications of the growing nuclear-conventional link in US defence policy.

21. UK defence policy: While the majority of these dynamics are playing out outside of the United Kingdom, the general trend toward advanced conventional capabilities will become increasingly important for UK security planning – not least in decisions over resource allocation and Trident replacement.

22. Specifically, these developments are likely to effect the United Kingdom in two main ways; (1) while nuclear weapons and traditional notions of deterrence, such as that adopted by the United Kingdom, are unlikely to disappear anytime soon, these Cold War axioms are increasingly being challenged, and it seems likely that the future nuclear order will be more nuanced as we look forward – this could begin to cast doubt on the efficacy of a UK deterrent posture based solely on nuclear retaliation; (2) equally, the growth in advanced conventional capabilities is likely to make any push for multilateral nuclear reductions more difficult (as explained above), and undermine the goal of global zero.

23. As a result, any UK non-proliferation and disarmament agenda must be cognisant of the impact of diversifications in US (and increasingly other powers’) nuclear thinking and policy toward advanced conventional capabilities. We hope that the Committee will encourage the Government to address these issues in the updated National Security Strategy to be released in 2015.

Notes:

These issues are discussed in more detail in Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala, "Advanced US Conventional Weapons and Nuclear Disarmament: Why the Obama Plan Won’t Work", The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2013, pp. 107-122. A copy of the article has been included as an attachment to this submission.

For specific examples in current public documents that make the link between advanced conventional weaponry and nuclear reductions see:

· US Department of Defense, ‘‘Nuclear Posture Review Report’’ (April 2010), pp. 6-7, 15-16, 25, 32, 45.

· US Department of Defense, ‘‘Quadrennial Defense Review Report’’ (February 2010), p. 14.

· US Department of Defense, ‘‘Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report’’ (February 2010), p. 23.

· Executive Office of the President, "Statement Of Administration Policy H.R. 2219 - Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2012" (June 2011), p.1.

Authors:

Andrew Futter is a Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester specialising in strategic studies and nuclear weapons and is the author of "US Missile Defence and National Security: Normalisation and Acceptance after the Cold War" (Routledge: 2013).

Benjamin Zala is a Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester specialising in great power politics and security issues and has published in journals such as The Nonproliferation Review and the RUSI Journal.

September 2013