Deterrence in the 21st Century

Written evidence from the Nuclear Information Service

 

1. N uclear Information Service (NIS) is a not-for-profit, independent information service which works to promote public awareness and debate on nuclear weapons and related safety and environmental issues (see http://nuclearinfo.org for more information). Our research work is supported by funding from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust.

2. NIS welcomes the Defence Committee's inquiry into 'Deterrence in the 21st Century' and welcomes the opportunity to give evidence to the committee. Our evidence deals mainly with nuclear deterrence and the UK's nuclear deterrence doctrine, although many of the points we discuss will apply to the broader concept of deterrence.

The concept of deterrence

3. The concept of deterrence is largely based on theory rather than empirical evidence. Its logic is based on mathematical game theories and is underpinned by a number of assumptions – most significantly, that players will act rationally. A model of deterrence will reflect values and political judgements about the world view and intent of potential adversaries, the capabilities of the deterrer and their adversaries, and the vulnerability to attack of both parties. A broad range of factors will contribute to a deterrent effect – economic, political, and cultural - and not just issues concerning military force.

4. Deterrence is not an objective science and its success cannot be guaranteed. The logic of deterrence was questioned by a range of critics during the Cold War and historical examples illustrate cases where deterrence has failed in maintaining security (see paragraph 8 below). There is an absence of firm evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of deterrence and, unfortunately, deterrence does not provide a guarantee of security or act as an 'insurance policy' against an uncertain future. If a deterrence model breaks down in a particular situation, the consequences are likely to be both unintended and serious.

5. A deterrent approach to security is usually a component of a 'control paradigm' to security – an attempt to maintain the status quo through military force and control insecurity without addressing its root causes [1] . In our view, such an approach is self-defeating in the long term, and a new approach based on a 'sustainable security paradigm' is needed.

6. During the Cold War a common understanding of what deterrence was between 'East' and 'West' led to a certain degree of continuity in superpower relations – although not without significant dangers. The Cold War was neither stable nor predictable, representing a highly dangerous stand-off with serious risks of either an inadvertent or deliberate nuclear exchange. Since the end of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence has no longer been a defining feature of relations between the major global powers, which are gradually beginning to work together as strategic partners. At most, deterrence acts as a hedge against a severe breakdown in relations between global powers at some time in the future. Whether such a breakdown is likely, and the mechanisms through which it might happen, are matters which are usually skipped over by proponents of nuclear deterrence. The costs and benefits of providing the deterrent hedge have not been assessed against the costs and benefits of addressing other security threats which may be more plausible and immediate.

7. In other respects, deterrent relationships can be expected to become more complex as asymmetries between actors, their capabilities, and their intentions widen. The common knowledge and understanding which underpinned deterrent relationships between the superpowers during the Cold War is likely to be replaced by a range of more complex, uncertain, and ambiguous relationships.

The limitations of nuclear deterrence

8. The limits of deterrence may be illustrated by the following examples, where international crises and aggression were not prevented despite the doctrine of nuclear deterrence:

ñ Post-war Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe during the 1940s and 1950s despite the then US monopoly on nuclear weapon technology, and continuing Soviet control of Eastern Europe until the 1990s.

ñ The North Korean invasion of US-backed South Korea in 1950.

ñ The Sino-Soviet border war between two nuclear-armed states in 1969.

ñ The military defeat of the US and China, both nuclear-armed, by North Vietnam in the 1970s.

ñ The Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982.
The invasion of US-backed Kuwait by Iraq in 1991 and subsequent Scud missile attacks against nuclear-armed Israel.

ñ The Indo-Pakistani war of 1999, again between two nuclear-armed states.

ñ The 9/11 terrorist outrages in the USA.

ñ The use of chemical weapons in the current Syrian civil war in defiance of international law and norms.

These examples illustrate failures in the concept of deterrence and highlight the impracticality of using nuclear weapons as a credible deterrent threat, given the immense consequences that would result from their use.

9. Nuclear weapon postures continue to rely on the deterrent approach, even though it cannot be assumed that the deterrence model will continue to operate in the same way as it did during the Cold War or be understood in the same way by new players in the international security landscape. The international Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, led by Hans Blix, concluded that "even though governments frequently invoke deterrence as a rationale for retaining nuclear weapons, its relevance has sharply diminished if not completely vanished. It originated in the effort to avert the danger of war in a bipolar nuclear world that no longer exists. Invoking it in a very changed world tends to keep mistrust alive and inhibit the closer international cooperation necessary to address common problems, including the threats of nuclear proliferation and catastrophic terrorism" [2] .

10. Writing in the Wall Street Journal in January 2007, former secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Senator Sam Nunn, and former Secretary of State George Shultz unequivocally stated their view that nuclear deterrence poses significant risks and is an unsound base upon which to build long-term security. Warning of the "tremendous dangers" posed by nuclear weapons, they concluded that: "The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats for other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective." [3] The four statesmen made the case that the international community would not be able to indefinitely restrain the proliferation of nuclear technology, manage relations between nuclear armed states, and secure fissile materials, resulting in an imperative need to eliminate nuclear weapons.

11. Despite the 'control paradigm' approach to international security taken by the UK, the US, and the 'West', it is becoming increasingly difficult for these powers to retain control over events. The possession of nuclear weapons will be unlikely to guarantee security if the current nuclear order breaks down and the number of nuclear-armed states in the world increases.

The UK's nuclear deterrent posture and Trident

12. In our view, the UK's Trident nuclear weapons system provides the nation with very limited security benefits yet is potentially a driver for the future proliferation of nuclear weapons.

13. The government's National Security Strategy, published in 2010, assesses an attack on the UK or its Overseas Territories by another state or proxy using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons as merely a 'Tier Two' threat, stating that "A CBRN attack on the UK by a state was judged to be low likelihood but high impact" [4] . Europe remains one of the safest parts of the world, with the vast majority of European nations feeling no need to develop their own nuclear weapons to guarantee security. According to NATO, "the threat of general war in Europe has virtually disappeared" [5] . If the UK is not under strategic threat, what are the nation's nuclear weapons intended to deter against?

14. The reasons the government considers that the UK needs to retain its nuclear weapons were outlined in the 2006 White Paper on Trident replacement [6] and are as follows:

15. Reason 1: To deter against the re-emergence of a major direct nuclear threat to the UK or our NATO allies, and prevent major war which threatens the British state. The government accepts that the UK currently faces no such threat and has not done so since the early 1990s. The only nations which could pose such a threat to the UK in the foreseeable future are Russia and possibly China. However, there has been a positive trend in the UK's and the European Union's relationships with both these countries since the end of the Cold War.

16. Russia is not the Soviet Union and NATO leaders have expressed the desire to work towards a strategic partnership with Russia [7] . Former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told the Russian media in 2001 that:  "I don't go to bed at night worrying about the Soviet Union attacking Europe through Germany any more. The Soviet Union is gone. I don't worry about the threat of a ballistic missile attack from Russia … Our relationships have been changed dramatically over the last decade. It is time to acknowledge that fact and address how best to go forward" [8] . Sir Michael Quinlan, former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence and an expert on nuclear deterrence, wrote that "even if grounds for unease about Russia's internal evolution intensify, it is hard to imagine that country re-emerging as a military threat to the political freedom of the countries of the European Union" [9] .

17. China's priorities over the next few decades will be to promote economic development and integrate into global economic and political systems on its own terms, but as a 'good neighbour'. Chinese foreign policy and military interests are focused on what China defines as its 'core interests' based around state sovereignty and territorial integrity. China has rapidly become integrated into the global market economy and financial system, and despite its growing international influence has shown no evidence of a desire to reshape the international order or establish its own power blocs [10] .

18. The possibility that Russia or China would at some time over the next fifty years pose a direct military threat to the UK represents an unlikely and exceptionally worst case scenario. A military confrontation with the 'West' involving either of these powers would be highly damaging to their development and economies. Tensions will be inevitable at certain times, but it is difficult to see how the UK's nuclear weapons could play any role in resolving such tensions. It is time for the government to accept that Russia and China do not pose a military threat to the UK and that they are now becoming our economic and strategic partners.

19. Reason 2: To deter against the use of weapons of mass destruction by a rogue state during a regional intervention in which UK forces were involved, allowing the UK to continue to be able to intervene militarily around the world without fear of 'nuclear blackmail' or coercion. We find it difficult to see how UK nuclear weapons could make any difference in a scenario involving a rogue state armed with weapons of mass destruction. Firstly, there is no evidence that attempts at nuclear blackmail aimed at influencing military or political action have ever been successful [11] . Secondly, if the survival of a rogue regime armed with weapons of mass destruction was genuinely under threat, military intervention would be an unpredictable high-risk option, with a disproportionate risk that the regime might use its weapons in a last-ditch attempt to survive. The UK's nuclear weapons would not provide a deterrent effect under such circumstances and would not act as a reliable 'nuclear umbrella' to support a conventional attack.

20. Reason 3: To deter against state-sponsored acts of nuclear terrorism. It is unlikely that conventional deterrence theories would apply to terrorism and the calculations of terrorist groups and their sponsors. In the event of a nuclear terrorist attack, the UK would have to be able to prove with absolute certainty that the suspected state sponsor had provided nuclear materials and expertise to terrorists with the intention that they would be used to attack the UK for any retaliation against the suspected state sponsor to be justified. The threat of nuclear retaliation in such a situation – which could be expected to indiscriminately kill thousands of innocent civilians, making it unlawful and counterproductive – is barely credible and if exercised, would almost certainly play into the hands of terrorists by mobilising international opinion dramatically against the UK.

21. Reason 4: To act as an insurance against emerging threats to the UK's vital interests and the uncertainties and risks of the future. It should be remembered that insurance does not prevent unwelcome events from happening, but merely provides compensation to mitigate against them. The best that nuclear weapons can do is allow the UK to retaliate or take revenge against a potential – but improbable – nuclear attack or invasion. Such an event would require an aggressor to suddenly emerge and take action against the UK under circumstances where NATO's conventional defences could not be brought into play - a remotely unlikely scenario.

22. The emerging threats which look likely to threaten the UK over the first half of this century are of a nature which military responses and a deterrent approach cannot address. Threats posed by climate change, pandemic diseases, shocks to financial markets, and extremism have both their roots and solutions in a complex mix of environmental, economic, social, and political factors. Future conflicts are likely to be 'hybrid' conflicts at the regional or sub-regional level, blending war, terrorism, and insurgency, in which there is no conceivable role for nuclear weapons and which deterrence cannot prevent. Such threats are far more likely than an existential military threat challenging the survival of the British state. It makes sense to allocate security resources to address threats that can realistically be anticipated rather than against a remote contingency.

23. The UK's nuclear deterrence doctrine makes the assumption that nuclear weapons will automatically and unproblematically ensure that potential enemies will be deterred from taking aggressive action against the nation. In reality, the situation is far more complex. A deterrent will not work if an enemy does not consider it credible or relevant to its interests, or is absolutely determined to act aggressively, or thinks it can control the risks or survive an attack. The apparent security provided by a nuclear deterrent is, when analysed critically, exposed as an illusion.

Deterrence as a driver for the proliferation of nuclear weapons

24. The adoption of a nuclear deterrence posture by nuclear-armed states such as the UK is a driver for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The principle of nuclear deterrence can be used by any state that feels under threat, regardless of any legal obligations under the NPT. The logic and principles of nuclear deterrence are universally applicable, and do not just apply to the nuclear weapon-states recognised in the NPT.

25. Despite the government's claims that the programme to replace the Trident nuclear weapons system will not undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the decision to embark on the programme sends out a powerful message that the logic of nuclear deterrence is seen by the UK as a 'fact of life' in international politics and is therefore a legitimate form of state behaviour which other states can also adopt. It indicates that the UK sees nuclear weapons as a permanent feature of the international security environment and has little confidence in efforts to eliminate them globally. In the words of Mohammed El Baradei, formerly Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Britain cannot credibly "modernise its Trident submarines and then tell everyone else that nuclear weapons are not needed in the future" [12] . The House of Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs took a similar view in its 2009 report 'Global Security: Non-Proliferation', concluding that "the decision to renew the UK's Trident system is perceived by some foreign states and some among the British public as appearing to contradict the government's declared commitment to strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime" [13] . The general 'insurance policy' nature of the UK's rationale for retaining nuclear weapons – rather than in response to any specific security need or strategic threat – further serves to reinforce the message to others that nuclear weapons will be an essential capability in an uncertain future world.

26. Trident replacement can do nothing other than reinforce perceptions that nuclear weapons are valuable and desirable security assets, and promote the logic of nuclear deterrence in international politics. The eventual result will be the erosion of confidence in the NPT and a weakening of its legitimacy and effectiveness. In our view the only legitimate alternative is for the UK to reject the logic of nuclear deterrence and take measures to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in its security posture. Such steps - undertaken before the next NPT Review Conference in 2015 by a member of the United Nations Security Council, one of the pioneers behind the original atom bomb project, and one of the NPT depositary states - would be a turning point in regenerating momentum towards achieving a world without nuclear weapons and bolstering the NPT itself, which is coming under increasing strain [14] .

Alternatives

27. Nuclear weapons are not a substitute for the stability provided by good relations between nations in a just, rules-based international framework. Over recent years actions undertaken by the UK, such as involvement in the invasion of Iraq without a legal mandate from the United Nations and moving towards modernising its nuclear arsenal regardless of its NPT disarmament commitments, have, if anything, served to undermine rather than reinforce such a framework.

28. Rather than a security model based on the 'control paradigm' – seeking to maintain the status quo and keep the lid on security problems through use of military force rather than addressing the root causes of problems, we consider that the UK should move towards adopting a 'sustainable security' approach to addressing international conflicts [15] . This would require tackling the root causes of security threats – for example, by taking co-operative steps to reduce competition for resources and mitigating climate change; addressing legitimate political grievances and tackling poverty; and moving towards demilitarisation and disarmament. Military operations should gradually shift in emphasis towards peacebuilding and reconstruction, rather than offensive combat operations.

29. Such an approach to international security issues should go hand in hand with, domestically, steps to improve resilience and local self-sufficiency – accepting that government cannot protect against all kinds of threat and preparing to withstand some damage. Preparations to improve national resilience are in themselves both a form of deterrence and a means of making British society a less attractive target for aggressors.

30. A gradual shift along these lines away from the control paradigm of security and the associated deterrence culture is both possible and desirable. It would require the government to accept that the UK does not need nuclear weapons or a major military presence to be a leading global power, and to invest instead in diplomacy, conflict resolution, and development as a means of addressing security concerns and remaining an influential activist nation at the centre of world events. More specifically, by taking steps to demonstrate to the world that it no longer considers nuclear weapons necessary to guarantee its security – for example, by stepping down from a posture where nuclear weapons are constantly deployed at sea - the UK would be making a major contribution to help tackle risks arising from the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

October 2013