2 The Government's role at Rio+20
'The Future we want'
8. Over 190 countries agreed the conclusions
document of the Rio+20 Summit, The Future We Want. It emphasised
the importance of making progress towards sustainable development
globally and set out principles and processes to help achieve
that goal. The 49-page document reaffirmed previous international
commitments (the Rio Principles and Agenda 21 agreed at the original
Earth Summit in 1992 and the Johannesburg Plan for Implementation
agreed at the 'Rio+10' Summit in Johannesburg in 2002) and set
out renewed global priorities.
9. An agreement that Sustainable Development
Goals (paragraph 34) should be developed was seen as one of the
major achievements of last year's Summit, but there was less progress
on the green economy (paragraph 28) than expected. Although it
was one of the two planned main themes of the Summit, the conclusions
document states only that a green economy is "an important
tool" for achieving sustainable development, rather than
setting firm requirements for it to be at the heart of sustainable
development.[9]
10. The written evidence we received after the
Summit was almost universal in its criticism of the conclusions
document. WWF believed that the "Rio+20 conference
failed to deliver the systemic solutions needed to effectively
address interlinked global social, environmental and economic
problems".[10] Progressio
thought that there were "few new or ambitious commitments
and no targets or deadlines with which to hold governments to
account: The agreement reached in Rio+20 is not likely to inspire
the level of change required".[11]
The Alliance for Future Generations was disappointed that the
Summit did not agree new or innovative solutions and policies.[12]
11. The Chartered Institute of Environment Health
believed that "the text imagines time that we do not have:
Global issues are 'recognised', 'acknowledged' and 'noted', yet
this recognition is not transformed into action".[13]
On a more positive note, Stakeholder Forum concluded that although
Rio+20 had not been the "coordinated leap to the future that
was called for", it had "given sustainable development
new hooks from which to hang future work".[14]
12. In November 2011, the originally scheduled
date for the Summit was moved to avoid a clash with the Queen's
Diamond Jubilee that would have made it difficult for Commonwealth
leaders to attend. International Institute for Environment and
Development (IIED) believed the timing of the Summit was partly
to blame for its failures: "Rio+20 was 'anniversary driven',
and there was too much emphasis on the legacy from 1992 and not
enough on articulating an agenda that responded to the key challenges
of 2012".[15] A
strong analytical framework to underpin deliberations was missing
(the original Rio summit discussions were based on the results
of the 1987 Brundtland Commission[16])
and the 'green economy' concept was "poorly explained and
introduced and provoked suspicion and hostility where it could
have generated enthusiasm and momentum".[17]
The 2012 US presidential election campaign and the Eurozone crisis
were seen as diverting attention from Rio. WWF believed that the
"international political will to support [the shift to a
green economy] is currently absent" and that a "major
brake" on progress at the Rio+20 Summit was a view that the
financial crisis should be solved first.[18]
13. IIED judged that the "level of participation
from heads of government and other leading figures was very low"
and that "the Summit process failed to engage a wide audience
around the world and significantly spur commitment and action
...".[19] Most governments
sent environment or development ministers, but their ministerial
counterparts from finance, planning and business were "few
and far between". Heads of large corporations, on the other
hand, were "ubiquitous in Rio".[20]
14. Stakeholder Forum identified a perhaps more
fundamental hurdle, in that "the balance of power both around
and within the United Nations" had "changed very significantly
with the great expansion of influence of China, India, Brazil
and other emerging economies, and the relative decline of influence
of Europe (and of the UK within it) and the USA". This new
balance of power in the UN "was not in general in favour
of radical action on sustainable development".[21]
The poorer countries of the 'South' were:
on the whole interested above all in the traditional
development agenda of poverty eradication and the help they need
from the North to achieve development goals; while the emerging
economies are very reluctant to contemplate any binding commitments
on restraining unsustainable production and consumption while
they regard themselves as having a lot of development still to
do, and while for the most part the more fully developed countries
have made such modest progress themselves.[22]
15. The host nation's approach to deliberations
was also criticised. Greenpeace believed that the outcome document
was "watered down and agreed before heads of state and government
even got on their planes".[23]
IIED concluded that "the Brazilian government's rather cynical
eleventh hour 'take it or leave it' text for the outcome document
provided a short-term diplomatic solution but not a viable long
term basis for shared action and commitment".[24]
Similarly, WWF believed that its role as part of the UK official
delegation was a missed opportunity "in large part due to
the unexpectedly early closure of the negotiating text, which
meant that there was little of substance on which to engage during
the [Summit itself]".[25]
The Global Sustainability Institute believed that the conclusions
document was "completely inaccessible to the public".[26]
16. The Deputy Prime Minister told the House
shortly after returning from the Summit:
Was this summit an unqualified success on all ...
fronts? No, it was not, but few would have expected it to be.
But we did make progress on the key areas that the UK sees as
the priority for sustainable development and green growth. ...
[27]
Later he told us that the conclusions document was
"not as ambitious as we had hoped it would be" but that
"the Conference took steps in the right directionmost
saliently on agreement to develop SDGs, promotion of corporate
sustainability reporting, GDP-plus and achieving global recognition
of the green economy for the first time ever".[28]
He told the Liaison Committee in February 2013 that:
The traditional social and economic development agenda
should be properly married to issues of sustainability. ... The
Rio+20 exercise, flawed though it was in many respects, is none
the less an important step in trying to bring those two things
together.[29]
And he told us in April 2013 that:
Rio+20 set the direction and renewed commitments
towards achieving more sustainable development. Progress is being
driven forward by the whole of the Government on these.[30]
Government preparations for the
Summit
17. In its response to our Preparations for
the Rio+20 Summit report, the Government stated that it saw
"Rio+20 as an opportunity to make critical progress"
on the "global growth agenda, and to address the linked challenges
of climate change, sustainable development, natural resources
use and poverty reduction".[31]
Defra told us that the Government had actively taken part in European
meetings coordinating a common position within the EU, and had
participated in the preparatory meetings and informal negotiations
that took place at the United Nations. Caroline Spelman, then
the Environment Secretary of State, had a personal as well as
ministerial commitment to the Rio process. She told us just before
the Summit that the UK was "seen as a leading country in
the world in terms of preparations for the Rio+20 Summit"
and perceived as a "bridging country" due to its willingness
to surmount the gap between developing and developed countries'
positions.[32]
18. Some of our witnesses, on the other hand,
considered that the UK had put forward proposals for the Summit's
initial text ('zero draft') of the conclusions document that reflected
a low level of expectation for the Summit, and which the International
Institute for Environment and Development judged had "no
innovative ideas or ambitious proposals".[33]
Tom Bigg from IIED noted that the UK contribution to the zero
draft was essentially a re-presentation of the Government's earlier
submission to our Green economy inquiry,[34]
and therefore had a "primarily domestic focus" rather
than addressing the wider Rio+20 agenda.[35]
IIED believed that the Government had had "an unusually low
profile" during the Summit preparations and at the event
itself.[36] Christian
Aid thought that the UK delegation "played a low-key role"
in the UN negotiations in the run up to the Summit, particularly
when compared to previous Summits where the UK had played a much
more instrumental role in developing the conference agenda.[37]
Derek Osborn from Stakeholder Forum told us that:
the UK limited its objectives too narrowly, too early.
It could have been more ambitious in trying to tackle the whole
sustainable economy agenda in the international scene, and trying
to demonstrate more about how it is pushing that agenda forward
... We did not really have a powerful enough argument about what
the UK and Europe are doing in practice, and across the board
on sustainable development, to take it to the international agenda.[38]
19. In our report on Preparations for the
Rio+20 Summit we recommended that a 'special envoy' should
be appointed, to be "charged with bringing together Government
thinking on the Rio+20 agenda from across departments but also
acting as a focal point for discussion with and between civil
society groups, schools, businesses and individuals".[39]
Defra told us in January 2012 that they had been working with
ministers from several departments on the Rio agenda,[40]
and in February 2013 the Deputy Prime Minister told the Liaison
Committee that in preparation for the Summit he had worked "very
closely" with the DfID and Defra secretaries of state.[41]
Such cross-cutting working was apparently not externally evident.
Owen Gibbon from WWF argued that the UK "didn't have a strategy
for Rio that was cross-governmental" and that "one
of the reasons we were not as effective is because we did not
have a cross-departmental strategy, which would involve the likes
of the FCO, DECC, and DfID, but also crucially the Treasury and
BIS".[42] Stakeholder
Forum believed that the machinery of cross-Whitehall cooperation
had not been transparent and that Defra had been "largely
left on its own to handle the process". WWF highlighted a
"lack of integration" in Government between its approach
to Rio+20 and the G20 Summit held in Mexico a few days beforehand.[43]
20. As part of its engagement with civil society
and business, Defra organised two discussions in October 2011
and invited Aviva Investors, Unilever, Oxfam and WWF to be part
of the official UK delegation to the Summit. Progressio praised
the Government's engagement with UK NGOs before the Summit.[44]
Defra had engaged with Aviva Investors from September 2011 to
discuss corporate sustainability reporting (paragraph 41), and
Aviva told us that the work it had been doing as part of the Corporate
Sustainability Reporting Coalition "was pushed forwards by
[Caroline Spelman][and] she continued to do that at Rio".[45]
WWF told us that they too had had good engagement with Defra and
DfiD, although the organisation's role was not defined "until
quite late in the day, and even then it was quite vague".[46]
21. Defra, which took the lead
in coordinating the Government's preparations for the Rio+20 Summit,
consulted businesses and NGOs and brought some into the official
delegation. It allowed the Government at the Summit to demonstrate
a better understanding of the agenda than it would otherwise have
been able to do, but the businesses and NGOs were not an integral
part of the process of formulating the Government's approach to
the Rio agenda. With the Rio+20 Summit now behind us, the Government
should establish permanent mechanisms to continue its engagement
on the sustainable development agenda and post-Rio commitments
with a wider range of NGOs and businesses. That continuing
engagement should also bring in civil society groups and the public,
particularly to help shape the UK's contribution to the Sustainable
Development Goals over the next two years (paragraph 34).
Leadership of the UK official
delegation
22. The UK's official delegation to the Summit
was led by the Deputy Prime Minister and included the then Defra
Secretary of State, officials from five departments, Scottish
and Welsh Government environment ministers, and business and NGO
representatives. Over a hundred heads of state and government
attended Rio+20. In our Report on the Preparations for the
Rio+20 Summit we had recommended that the Prime Minister attend,
but he did not.
23. Sha Zukang, the UN Secretary-General for
Rio+20, said a week before the Summit that he did not think the
absence of the US President, the German Chancellor and the UK
Prime Minister would affect the final document because those countries
would be "well represented at a high level". Caroline
Spelman denied that the Prime Minister's absence would show any
lack of commitment on the part of the Government and pointed to
the difficult timing of the Rio meeting as one of the reasons
why the Prime Minister would not attend.[47]
Many of our witnesses nevertheless criticised the Prime Minister's
absence.[48] Globe International
argued that the relatively late decision that the Deputy Prime
Minister would attend the Summit meant "it was very hard
for him, given the time before Rio, to stamp a clear direction
that he may have wished to take. By not having the Prime Minister
go, that meant that the preparatory phase was not as clear as
it could be."[49]
We wanted to ask the Deputy Prime Minister about his role as head
of the delegation in Rio, and it is regrettable that he declined
to give formal oral evidence to us (paragraph 6).
24. On the other hand, by the time of the Summit
there was little for prime ministers or heads of state to do.
The Global Sustainability Institute thought that "the clear
signal from the Summit was that there is no real commitment from
governments",[50]
and IIED believed that the Summit "had potential to be much
more significant if leadership and ambition from key governments
had been evident from the outset" but that lack of commitment
from international leaders had then become "a self-fulfilling
prophecy".[51] The
Deputy Prime Minister told the Liaison Committee that he "certainly
found in Rio that the Brazilian chair at the time was quite keen
to push to a pre-arranged agreementreasonably enough from
their point of viewprior to delegates even arriving in
Rio".[52] Globe
raised the question: "if [the Prime Minister] had gone, how
satisfied would he have been in going and turning up to a deal
that had been put to [the leaders] three days before?"[53]
25. It is regrettable that the
Prime Minister did not attend the Rio+20 Summit. There might have
been a case for the Deputy Prime Minister attending in his place
on the grounds that no treaty or other firm legal commitments
were in prospect, and it is arguable whether the Brazilian diplomacy
or the outcomes of the Summit would have been any different had
the Prime Minister gone. However, the Prime Minister's absence
meant that the Government failed to take advantage of the opportunity
to demonstrate its commitment to the sustainable development agenda
not just internationally but also at home in the UK.
9 The Future We Want, op cit, para 56 Back
10
Ev 33 Back
11
Ev w25 Back
12
Ev w3 Back
13
Ev w31 Back
14
Ev 26 Back
15
Ev 31 Back
16
Preparations for the Rio+20 Summit, op cit, para 1 Back
17
Ev 31 Back
18
Ev 33 Back
19
Ev 31 Back
20
ibid. Back
21
Ev 26 [Stakeholder Forum] Back
22
ibid. Back
23
Greenpeace press notice, 22 June 2012 (http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/press/releases/Greenpeace-Press-Statement-Rio20-Earth-Summit-a-failure-of-epic-proportions/). Back
24
Ev 31 Back
25
Ev 33 Back
26
Ev w1 Back
27
HC Deb, 26 June 2012, col 161 Back
28
Deputy Prime Minister's letter to Committee Chair, 15 November
2012 (not published) Back
29
Uncorrected oral evidence before the Liaison Committee, 5 February
2013, HC 958i, Q3 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmliaisn/uc958-i/uc95801.htm).
Back
30
Ev 48 Back
31
Fifth Special Report, HC 1737, op cit Back
32
Q 3 Back
33
Ev 31 Back
34
A Green Economy, HC 1025, op cit, Ev 109-118 Back
35
Q 55 Back
36
Ev 31 Back
37
Ev w11 Back
38
Q 52 Back
39
Preparations for the Rio+20 Summit, HC 1026, op cit, para
59 Back
40
Ev 44 Back
41
Uncorrected oral evidence before the Liaison Committee, 5 February
2013, HC 958-i, Qq 1 and 4 Back
42
Q 53 Back
43
Ev 33 Back
44
Ev w25 Back
45
Q 55 [Steve Waygood] Back
46
Q 56 [Owen Gibbons] Back
47
Qq 1-2 Back
48
Ev w6 [Earth Community Trust]; Ev w31 [Chartered Institute of
Environmental Heath]; Ev 31 [IIED] Back
49
Q 54 [Adam Matthews] Back
50
Ev w1 Back
51
Ev 31 Back
52
Uncorrected oral evidence before the Liaison Committee, 5 February
2013, HC 958-i, Q 16 Back
53
Q 54 [Adam Matthews] Back
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