Environmental Audit CommitteeWritten evidence submitted by the Global Sustainability Institute, Anglia Ruskin University
Executive Summary
1. The Rio+20 Summit did not achieve the aims and objectives from which it was conceived.
2. The UK Government, alongside European colleagues, was seen to lead to debate and set the agenda across sustainability in particular commitment to development aid and climate change targets.
3. The UK Government did not show this leadership at Rio+20.
4. The UK Government should now re-take a leadership role and clearly articulate a Green Economic vision and ensure this is led by the Cabinet Office in partnership with the Treasury.
Introduction
5. The Global Sustainability Institute at Anglia Ruskin University is a research institute focussing individual behaviour change set against the context of global sustainability challenges—in particular resource challenges. We are a member of the Green Economy Coalition (www.greeneconomycoalition.org) and were the first UK University to sign the Higher Education Sustainability Decleration for Rio+20 (http://rio20.euromed-management.com/Declaration-for-HEI.pdf).
6. Over the past 10 years global economic growth linked to constrained availability of critical resources has led to a substantial price rise for most energy sources. In addition climate change impacts are being felt faster and at a larger scale than is predicted by climate models leading to substantial price rises in food as well as record weather events leading to extensive flooding or drought. The uncertainties associated with such a rapid change in global commodities also leads to volatile prices.
7. The Rio+20 Summit was a key opportunity for political leaders to agree a strong narrative for the direction that our economy should take—it was a launch platform for the green economy.
8. Unfortunately the timing of the Summit came during an election year in the USA and prior to leadership changes in China making it very difficult for either country to demonstrate strong commitment.
9. The UK had no such excuse and showed a lack of leadership by not sending the Prime Minister.
10. The clear signal from the Summit was that there is no real commitment from governments.
11. The two key audiences that needed to engage with the outcomes of Rio were business and the public—both to understand and see clear commitment to a future green economy narrative. Business so that it would invest and innovate for this future and the public so that they could support a vision and buy into the political and societal changes that this requires.
How well the Rio declaration—“The Future We Want”—matched the actions that were needed
12. The Future We Want mainly commits governments to reaffirming existing commitments. It does this in an opaque way in a document that is completely inaccessible to the public. It commits to developing Sustainable Development Goals which, on the surface, will rewrite the Millenium Development Goals and make them simpler to achieve. Therefore this could be seen as a step backwards.
13. While some smaller commitments were agreed it is difficult to see how they can make a substantive global difference while the underlying economic driver for political change is still business-as-usual (built on neoclassical economic principles).
14. Commitments are required in international aid, economic policy, research and development policy, industrial policy, education policy, healthcare policy, energy policy, transport policy, security strategy, justice and legal frameworks, financial policy and resilience policy.
The role played by the UK Government in the run up to, and during, the Summit
15. In the run up to the Summit the UK showed global leadership in the narrative around the aims and ambitions. It supported the European position and made this strong.
16. It then undermined it’s position by refusing to send the Prime Minister and, more importantly, by changing and back tracking on key policies led by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. For example, changes to the UK Feed-in-Tarriff (while necessary because of badly designed policy with a lack of market-response pricing built in from the start) has undermined international investment confidence and public confidence in the UK Government (and wider) commitment to cleaner energy.
17. The Treasury is the most important department to engage in the Summit as the outcomes are all about taxation policy, economic policy and financial policy. The Summit was again seen as purely an environmental issue with an element of poverty thrown in.
What role the UK Government should now play internationally in taking forward the Rio agenda, including on the Sustainable Development Goals and through the Prime Minister’s co-chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General’s “High-level Panel of Eminent Persons to advise on planning for post-2015”
18. The UK should now engage the Treasury on developing the Sustainable Development Goals. The UK should take global leadership and work with the other economic and finance departments of other countries to develop a simple narrative on Goals that deliver a new economic strategy and narrative.
19. The post 2015 planning should highlight the increasing systemic risk that economies face given emerging market growth, increased competition for global commodities and increased demand for an equitable distribution of these commodities.
20. This includes restructuring critical global institutions such as the World Bank to create more flexible mechanisms for them to engage in financial markets to develop the frameworks around which private sector capital can be attracted.
21. The panel should also highlight common policy frameworks which underpin future strategies for green economic growth including short term support for new technology (for example feed-in-tariffs), eliminating fossil fuel subsidies while focussing support on pro-poor energy access, achieving a price on carbon and realigning economic policies to support future green growth. See Capital Markets Climate Initiative (CMCI) Investment Grade Policy report—CMCI was set up by Greg Barker MP, Minister for Climate Change (http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/tackling/international/cmci/cmci.aspx)
22. In addition a clear commitment to managing the risks associated with global resource constraints (either from limited supply or from increased demand led by econonomic growth in emerging markets) should be put in place. This requires a much more interventionist set of policies and may necessitate strong industrial policy that is coordinated globally.
23. Existing policy intended to manage risk, in particular in the finance sector (such as Solvency II and Basel III) should be examined to ensure that while they may manage past risk (the risks we have already encountered) they do not hinder the change that is needed to unlock solutions to global policies. For example, restrictions on investment into long term illiquid assets could restrict investment into new “green” infrastructure projects.
How well the UK Government’s policies and initiatives match the commitments and calls-for-action set out in “The Future We Want” declaration, the areas in which the Government has more to do, and where the Government’s priorities should lie
24. The UK Government has good bold ambition that meets some of the objectives in The Future We Want including a commitment to international aid and climate change action through the UK Climate Change Act.
25. However these long term and strategic commitments are not supported by a clear and consistent set of policies that would enable delivery of these commitments.
26. For example, UK Department for International Development requires larger capacity to ensure that aid funding is spent in the best way on projects at all scales. UK commitment to international climate finance should not substitute for international development aid commitments (it should be in addition to the 0.7% aid commitment—this was the intention at the Copenhagen Summit but has since been ignored).
27. Climate targets do not deliver emission reductions and a whole scale review of economic policy with a potential focus on new industrial policy is needed to ensure these targets are met.
What part greater informed public debate and wider engagement with the Rio issues needs to play
28. The Future We Want is not a public friendly document. A clear narrative for the future we want is critical to engage the public so potentially difficult, or at the very least big changes, can be supported and understood. The UK Government should prioritise creating a shared vision with detailed economic risk management policies put in place as a matter of urgency.
29. The UK Government could call for an independent commission to be set up that removes itself from short term politics to recommend a set of coherent global policies to enable a green economy. Governments (in particular economic departments) should commit to engaging in this process in a serious manner by making it a legally binding process.
30. Alternatively political leaders should engage directly in this process (possibly as part of the G20 Summits) and not leave it to civil servants who do not have the necessary mandate to compromise and be bold in their political decisions.
31. The public wants wellbeing and stable access to the resources they need. The future we want should deliver this and explain this is what it will deliver.
23 July 2012