4 Responses
The role of industry
42. As noted in our previous Report it is the responsibility
of food retailers to ensure the integrity of their supply chains.
The FSA said:
Food businesses are responsible for ensuring
that the food they supply meets food safety and labelling requirements.
Businesses, including producers, processors and retailers are
responsible for ensuring there is effective traceability of food
through the food chain and are expected to carry out some testing
of products. Specifically retailers are responsible for the quality
of products they sell and should take steps to seek assurance
of their suppliers' processes.[72]
43. Mr Fairbairn of Freeza Meats, a UK-based processed
meat producer, told us he verified the assurances of his suppliers
through a questionnaire, an audit, and whether they had EU approval
to trade. Of these, he said the questionnaire and the EU approval
were the most important.[73]
Mr Finnerty of ABP Foods told us that although Tesco had specified
seven suppliers of beef for its products, agents at the Silvercrest
factory had gone outside this specification, in breach of contract.
He said ABP had thought that they were "buying from suppliers
who were approved by the British Retail Consortium"[74]
44. Peter Kendall of the NFU said that retailers
had focused too much on price, at the expense of quality: "the
notion that you can get eight burgers for £1 and not be cutting
corners has been proved to be one of the real stumbling blocks
of this entire process. You just cannot do it". [75]
Freeza Meats confirmed this:
one would have to pursue the cheapest possible
product one can get, in view of the price movement in the raw
material that we use [...]The price of that, I can say, has doubled
in the past two and a half years, driven to a degree by the desinewed
issue, but probably more so by the weak economy over here. [76]
45. As a result of the crisis FSA thought that retailers
would now exercise much greater diligence in checking their suppliers.[77]
Tesco had previously told us they would use only British and Irish
beef in all their products, including their frozen and value burgers,
and that they would carry out regular DNA testing for horse and
other contaminants at no extra cost to the consumer.[78]
46. As already noted, retailers have a clear responsibility
to ensure the products they sell are accurately labelled. While
some retailers may have been misled, those serving large sectors
of the market need to 'up their game' and verify with greater
accuracy the assurances of their suppliers. There must be regular,
detailed tests on all meat or meat-based ingredients which form
part of a processed meat product. We welcome the commitment of
some supermarkets to carry out DNA tests on meat products. We
recommend that this be made compulsory for large food retailers,
with appropriate penalties imposed for those who fail to do so.
A summary of these test results should be published on the retailer's
website. The cost of this testing must be borne by the relevant
companies as part of their due diligence and should not be passed
on to the consumer.
EU PROPOSALS FOR SUPPLY CHAINS
47. The main aim of the EU's five-point action plan
is to "strengthen the enforcement of food chain rules"
(from horse passport legislation to hygiene and labelling requirements)
so as to restore consumer confidence in Europe's supply chain.
The plan includes:
· measures to increase the rapid exchange
of information between Member States in cases of food violations
which may constitute a fraud—current processes for sharing
information apply mainly to serious risks;
· a co-ordinated testing programme and follow-up
action;
· improving co-ordination and control of
the movement of horses across the EU;
· a proposal to ensure that financial penalties
for food fraud or other violations of food law are at a level
which is dissuasive and higher than the economic gain expected
from the fraud; and
· extending mandatory origin labelling on
all types of meat used as an ingredient in foods.[79]
Mr Heath welcomed the proposals and was keen to make
progress on them. However the next discussion will not be until
the July Agricultural Council.[80]
48. The EU proposals are welcome, although still
at an early stage and not likely to be discussed until the July
Agriculture Council meeting. The proposals should ensure improved
sharing of information between Member States which will make the
identification of food fraud in complex supply chains easier.
We particularly welcome the proposal that penalties for those
seeking to defraud consumers should be higher than the economic
gain expected from the fraud. However, legislation will not deter
fraudsters unless all Member States are prepared to use proportionate
enforcement powers to back it up.
The role of the FSA
49. In our previous Report we examined the role of
the FSA. We made two main observations. The first relates to the
changed remit of the FSA after the 2010 machinery of government
changes, the second to the powers of the FSA in relation to retailers.
We discuss each of these further in this Report.
REMIT OF THE FSA
50. The Food Standards Agency is a non-ministerial
Government department set up in 2000 to protect the public's health
and consumer interests in relation to food across the UK.[81]
In 2010, as a result of machinery of government changes, the
remit of the FSA was changed. The FSA described its role as follows:
Responsibility for food authenticity is shared
between the FSA and Defra, working in close collaboration. The
respective roles of the two departments [Defra and the Department
of Health] in England were set out in 2010 following Machinery
of Government changes. Defra has responsibility for food labelling
and food composition policy where this is not related to food
safety. This includes a food authenticity programme. The FSA is
responsible for investigating incidents, including misleading
labelling and food fraud and for liaison between central and local
government.[82]
In February we said that the FSA's diminished role
had led to a lack of clarity about where responsibility lay, and
this had weakened the UK's ability to identify and respond to
food standards concerns.[83]
51. The Government disputed this conclusion and replied
that its response had been "swift and effective, with clear
joined-up working between Government departments, local authorities
and the European Commission." It also said the "FSA
took the lead, responding quickly and decisively when alerted
by the Food Safety Authority of Ireland to its findings."[84]
However, the report on the FSA's response to the crisis has since
concluded that there was initial hesitation on the part of the
FSA and some confusion among the public and retailers about who
was in charge of the response because of the 2010 changes. Indeed,
the arrangements for managing the incident changed as it became
clear that this was not a food safety but a food labelling problem.[85]
While we reiterate our earlier comments that policy is rightly
the responsibility of Ministers, the initial hesitation and confusion
in this incident leads us to question whether the FSA should be
one step removed from the Government departments it reports to
so as to enable a swifter response when a major incident occurs.
52. The Scottish Government is in the course of consultation
with a view to bringing forward legislation to create a stand-alone
body in Scotland for food safety and standards, feed safety and
standards, nutrition, food labelling, meat inspection policy and
operational delivery. The Scottish Government view is that the
new food body would be able to focus on questions of diet and
obesity which are "unique and complex" in Scotland and,
secondly, that "advice on food safety, nutrition and labelling
should be independent and transparent and should be provided by
an organisation which should remain at arm's length from central
government."[86]
53. The FSA should consider whether it is performing
as a robust regulator of industry. Evidence suggests that the
FSA's testing regime was not sufficiently innovative or forward-looking
to pick up the horse contamination—it was the Irish authorities
who tested for horse DNA and informed the UK subsequently. The
Association of Public Analysts told us that the food testing system
in place in England could not have picked up the contamination.[87]
(We discuss this system later on.)
54. In addition, the FSA did not respond pre-emptively
with its own tests but waited for the FSAI to confirm conclusively
the presence of horsemeat and DNA in beef products six weeks after
the initial communication. It was then another three weeks before
the European authorities were officially informed of the situation.[88]
55. A 2012 capability review of the FSA found many
positive things to say about the organisation, its leadership,
strategy and delivery of objectives.[89]
It did not challenge the remit of the FSA, but it did highlight
the need for better communication with external stakeholders about
the role of the FSA in the broader food and public health agendas
in the aftermath of the machinery of government changes and the
proposal to create a separate Scottish food body. In particular,
the capability review questioned the effectiveness of the FSA's
working across Whitehall departments and with other Government
bodies and the devolved Administrations. The more recent final
report on the FSA's response to the horsemeat issue also comments
on the need for better communication about its role.[90]
56. The FSA is a regulator of the food industry and
has good links with the two Government departments it answers
to. On both occasions when we have called the Minister for Agriculture
to give evidence, he has been accompanied by FSA staff. This close
relationship provides FSA with direct access to Ministers. On
the other hand, it could be argued that a more arm's-length relationship
might better enable the FSA to question policy decisions.
57. The FSA's primary stakeholder is, rightly, consumers.
There should never be any suspicion that it is too close to industry:
instead, it should be seeking to expose the failings of industry
where these occur. Its physical presence in meat plants in the
UK should ensure visible and evidence-based oversight of the slaughter
and hygiene there. However since many meat products are imported,
it must rely on routine food sampling by local authorities to
monitor the integrity of the supply chain. This would be strengthened
if it were to put more resources into monitoring and improving
its links with these local authorities. The capability review
also commented that the FSA needed to understand better the impact
of reduced budgets on local authorities and improve its engagement
with them.
58. We reiterate our previous conclusion that,
while Ministers are properly responsible for policy, there was
a lack of clarity as a result of the machinery of government changes
about where responsibility lay for the response to the horsemeat
discovery. This initial confusion in the early days of the discovery
was unhelpful and there should be better communication about the
FSA's role. Greater clarity about the role of the FSA in major
incidents is also needed. The Government should consider whether
this might be achieved by reverting to the pre-2010 position enabling
the FSA to be one step removed from the Government departments
it reports to. This would enable a swifter response by the FSA
when a major incident occurs.
59. Within its current mandate, the FSA must become
a more efficient and effective regulator of industry. The FSA
must be independent of industry: it must not be, or be seen to
be, beholden to industry. The FSA must serve primarily the interest
of consumers in having safe and accurately labelled food products.
This also means the FSA must be more innovative and vigilant about
its testing regime, and it must build better working relationships,
where information is shared earlier, with relevant partners in
the UK and Europe.
POWERS IN RELATION TO INDUSTRY
60. In our previous Report we suggested that the
FSA be given the powers to compel industry to undertake testing
when needed and for industry to be obliged to report the results
of its own tests to the FSA. The Government response said it would
give this consideration, and this point has now been made in the
interim report on the FSA's response to the crisis.[91]
However the author of this report, Professor Pat Troop, is minded
to set up collaborative and voluntary agreements for sharing test
results rather than introducing new legislation.
61. The NFU representative, Peter Kendall, told us
it would support increased powers for the FSA depending on how
the burden of reporting fell:
if there is a sensible, proportionate manner
of doing that, then there is a lot to be said for that. We are
running commercial businesses, and what I don't want to do is
to saddle the whole industry with more bureaucracy and red tape.
[...] we need to have the right threat of spot checks, proportional
checks on people, without creating an enormous bureaucracy through
a very competitive industry.[92]
62. If the FSA is to become a more effective regulator
of the food industry, it must be given greater powers in relation
to this large and growing sector. It should be given the powers
to compel retailers to carry out spot checks and tests where necessary—on
both the label and the physical content of the meat—and
all test results, whether mandated by the FSA or industry itself,
should be reported back to the FSA. In this way the FSA can have
a better picture and greater oversight of the industry it is watching
over. We do not believe this objective can be met by voluntary
agreement alone.
72 Environment Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Eighth
Report of Session 2012-13, Contamination of Beef Products,
HC 946-II Back
73
Q 352 Back
74
Q 79 Back
75
Q 176 Back
76
Q 351 Back
77
Q 503 Back
78
Environment Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of
Session 2012-13, Contamination of Beef Products, HC 946-II
Back
79
Ev 109-10 Back
80
Q 656 Back
81
Food Standards Agency, Capability Review, October 2012 Back
82
Environment Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of
Session 2012-13, Contamination of Beef Products, HC 946-II
Back
83
Environment Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of
Session 2012-13, Contamination of Beef Products, HC 946 Back
84
Contamination of Beef Products: Government response, pp
4-5 Back
85
Pat Troop, Findings: FSA Response, 5 June 2013 and reiterated
in the final Report: Review of FSA Response to incident of
Contamination of beef Products with horse and pork meat and DNA,
28 June2013. Back
86
The Scottish Government, A Healthier Scotland: Consultation
on creating a new food body, 28 February 2013 Back
87
Q 285. The review of the FSA also notes that "the possibility
of this adulteration had not been considered, not just by the
FSA." Professor Pat Troop, Review of FSA response to the
incident of contamination of beef products with horse and pork
meat and DNA, 28 June 2013. Back
88
Q 524, on 8 February 2013 Back
89
FSA, Capability Review, October 2012 Back
90
Professor Pat Troop, Review of FSA response to the incident
of contamination of beef products with horse and pork meat and
DNA, 28 June 2013 Back
91
Pat Troop, Findings: FSA Response, 5 June 2013 Back
92
Q 169-72 Back
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