5 European Union business on the floor
of the House
148. Given the crucial nature of the primacy
question and the impact of EU legislation on the electorate through
the European Communities Act 1972, the floor of the House is where
key EU business should be debated, thereby creating the opportunity
for the widest cross-section of Members to take part. It is also,
as Peter Knowles, Director of BBC Parliament, commented "the
way in which most people will have encountered the work of this
Committee."[148]
We note that several debates on documents we have recommended
for the Chamber this year have been over-subscribed, and short
speech limits imposed.[149]
149. Dr Auel observed that the UK had been "ranked
quite low" compared to the French Assemblée Nationale
and the German Bundestag in terms of time spent in plenary;[150]
and many of the Members who responded to our survey (44%), and
stakeholders (80%), thought that more time should be taken on
European Union business on the floor. Others, for example Martin
Horwood MP, took a different view, telling us:
I would not support giving this Committee more time
on the Floor of the House; it gets quite a lot already. In a sense,
the whole point is to try to get it away from these generalist
committees and into more specialist and policy-informed hands.[151]
150. Over recent years the number of debates
on the floor of the House on European documents has increased,
although a significant proportion of that increase has arisen
from new procedures and practices such as Reasoned Opinions and
opt-in debates. For example, in the 2012-13 Session four of the
ten debates on the floor were on Reasoned Opinion or opt-in motions,
and in the long 2010-12 Session the proportion was greater: eight
out of 19.
Debates on EU Documents on the
floor of the House
151. The ESC does not currently have the power
to refer documents directly for debate on the floor of the House.
When we believe a document warrants a floor debate, we have to
wait for the Government to arrange it. Formally, the document
stands referred to a European Committee (debates in these Committees
are covered in a later Chapter of this Report).
152. There is an understanding that the Government
will make time available for a floor debate if we so recommend.
However, there have been problems with long delays and recently
we have had something of a war of attrition with HM Treasury in
particular, which at one point had a series of floor debates outstanding.
One particular debate on the Commission's Blueprint for a
deep and genuine EMU and the President of the European Council's
report Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, which
we made clear raised significant issues concerning the primacy
of the UK Parliament, took five months to schedule and only took
place on the floor of the House following direct representations
by the Committee to the Prime Minister. Even then, it was combined
with a significant debate on the unrelated subject of the Financial
Transaction Tax.
153. We note in this context the Minister for
Europe's view that:
As to formal debates on scrutiny, I have consistently
taken the view that they need to be done as early as possible.
The dilemma that business managers always face is that there are
a limited number of parliamentary hours in the week, and there
is a lot of competition for time, particularly on the floor of
the House. I have always taken the view that, in principle, the
sooner the better.[152]
154. We welcome the Minister's view that debates
should take place "as early as possible". While we
acknowledge the role of business managers, it is clear that Ministers
in all Departments have responsibility for and are accountable
for the timing of debates on their documents and for making decisions
on whether to accept our recommendation that particular documents
should be debated on the floor of the House.
155. Several witnesses said that we should have
the power to refer documents directly for floor debate, as was
the situation until the early 1990s. Those in favour of such
a 'right to refer' included the Fresh Start Project[153]
and Chris Heaton-Harris MP and Robert Broadhurst.[154]
The Minister for Europe, however, rejected the idea, commenting:
I think a question arises: if the Committee has the
right to insist on a floor debate, then whose time does it take?
While I have not put this to colleagues in Government, I am pretty
confident that the collective response would be that for this
or any Committee there cannot be the untrammelled right to simply
take Government time for a debate on the floor of the House.[155]
156. In our view this statement is wrong. It
must be remembered that many of the documents we refer for debate
are legislative proposals which will have direct effect on the
citizens of the United Kingdom, and wouldif enacted through
domestic legislationbe the subject of an Act of Parliament.
Time spent on such debates cannot be equated with, for example,
backbench business, or with the recommendations of a Departmental
Select Committee report, however important these two types of
business undoubtedly are.
CONCLUSION
157. We have reflected carefully
on consideration of European Union business in the Chamber, as
it is the most high-profile aspect of the House's scrutiny process.
We therefore propose a set of recommendations in order to make
time on the floor of the House better-used, and to make Ministers
more accountable for their decisions.
158. Firstly, there is a
strong case for adopting some of the procedures used for opt-in
debatesnamely a prior commitment by the Government to arrange
a floor debate for measures which attract particularly strong
Parliamentary interest (without prejudice to any recommendations
we may make) across all types of EU business. The measures likely
to be subject to these commitments could be announced by way of
a Statement following consultation with this Committee, and could
tie into the more systematic consideration of the Commission Work
Programme we propose later in this Report.
159. We propose that the
Government should undertake to make time available in the House
within four sitting weeks of a Committee recommendation for a
floor debate (unless the Committee has for any reason waived this
requirement or has recommended a more urgent timescale).
160. We further recommend
that the format of House debates should follow that of a European
Committee the debate should begin with a short explanatory
speech by the Chairman or a nominated member of the ESC, before
the Minister first makes a statement and responds to questions,
and then moves the motion; the total length of such a debate would
be no more than two and a half hours.
161. When we put this to the Minister he gave
a positive though non-committal response:
I can see the case for doing that. It would mean
more time being used than at present. I do not want to give a
firm view this morning. It sounds to me like the sort of thing,
if the Committee includes it in its report, I would look at with
an open mind and take to colleagues and discuss with them.[156]
162. In the case of a Reasoned
Opinion we note that the Procedure Committee recommended in 2011
(with particular reference to European Committees) that:
It is evident that the present
situation, in which a Minister must move a motion for a reasoned
opinion whether or not the Government supports that motion, is
confusing and misleading for Members and for the public. Since
it is the European Scrutiny Committee which recommends that the
House should consider a motion for a reasoned opinion, it would
be logical for that motion to appear in the name of the Chair
of the European Scrutiny Committee or in the name of another member
of the Committee acting on its behalf. The difficulty at present
is that Standing Order No. 119 refers, in paragraph 9, to a motion
'of which a Minister shall have given notice'. We recommend that
paragraph 9 of Standing Order No. 119 be amended by inserting,
after 'Minister', 'or, in the case of a motion for a reasoned
opinion under Protocol (No. 2) to the Lisbon Treaty, a member
of the European Scrutiny Committee'.
We fully agree with this recommendation,
and take the view that it should apply, modified as necessary,
to debates on Reasoned Opinions on the floor of the House.
163. We also support the
introduction of a procedure "for an appropriate number of
MPs to table a motion challenging the [European Scrutiny] Committee's
decision [not to refer a document for debate] and force a vote
on the floor of the House" originally made in a 2007 paper
by the think-tank Politeia written by Theresa May MP. We note
that the paper commented that "the procedure should be a
last resort and be limited to serious issues that are in the national
interest". In our view the threshold for such a procedure
should be reasonably high. Where such a motion is tabled, it
should impose the scrutiny reserve on the relevant EU document
until the House has come to a resolution on the matter.
A NATIONAL VETO AND DISAPPLICATION
OF EU LAW
164. Finally, and linking back to the comments
we made at the beginning of this Report about the ongoing debate
on the role of national parliaments within the EU, we recommend
that the option should be available for this Committee to recommend
to the House a form of national veto on EU legislation in particular
circumstances. We recall that the White Paper The United Kingdom
and the European Communities, published in July 1971, (following
which the House of Commons gave a Third Reading to the European
Communities Bill, on division, by 301 votes to 284), stated:
The Community is no federation of provinces or countries.
It constitutes a Community of great and established nations,
each with its own personality and traditions. The practical working
of the Community accordingly reflects the reality that sovereign
Governments are represented round the table. On a question where
a Government considers that vital national interests are involved,
it is established that the decision should be unanimous.
...
All the countries concerned recognise that an attempt
to impose a majority view in a case where one or more members
considered their vital national interests to be at stake would
imperil the very fabric of the Community. [157]
165. Ministers of the UK Government have recently
proposed the introduction of some form of collective 'red card'
or 'emergency brake', for new legislation. The Minister for Europe
explained that:
We thought it was right to bring forward the idea
that we should go beyond the yellow card and propose an outright
power of veto. If a given number of National Parliaments around
the EU said that a certain Commission proposal should be blocked,
the Commission simply would not be able to review it and decide
to resubmit but would have to take it off the table. It is not
something the British Government have yet formally adopted as
a policy, but it is an idea we have put out that we think needs
serious consideration. [158]
166. He made it clear to us that the Government
had in mind that this card should not be playable unilaterally:
"The Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister and I have been
proposing not that a power of veto should be accorded to a single
national parliament but a development of the process that is in
the Lisbon treaty ... we should give consideration to giving National
Parliaments above a certain threshold an outright power to block
a Commission initiative."[159]
167. In our view, such a development is no substitute
for Parliamentary sovereignty. Once the principle of a form of
veto has been conceded, it is logical to explore the many ways
in which it could be deployed. With regard to EU legislation,
the three important questions are: what should the threshold for
such a veto be, what effect should it have if deployed (across
the EU or just in the country or countries concerned) and should
it apply to existing as well as new legislation?
168. We raised these questions with some of our
witnesses, in particular Professor Damian Chalmers of the LSE,
and author of a recent paper entitled Democratic Self-Government
in Europe Domestic Solutions to the EU Legitimacy Crisis
that advocates a form of unilateral red card for national parliaments.
He summarised his views as follows: Article 4(2) TEU, particularly
the obligation it contains that the EU "shall respect the
essential State functions" of its Member States, puts into
doubt the principle of supremacy of EU law and the monopoly of
the Court of Justice on its interpretation. Accordingly, Professor
Chalmers stated, the primary purpose of EU law is to respect
the democratic identity of its Member States. Consistent with
this, the great majority of constitutional courts of the Member
States consider that national constitutional provisions have primacy
over EU law, demonstrated, for example, by the decisions of the
constitutional courts of Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic.
169. In Professor Chalmers' view, where a national
electorate wishes its legislators to disapply a provision of EU
law (for reasons not limited to subsidiarity) it should be entitled
to do so. A procedure for consulting other national parliaments
would then have to follow a national decision to disapply. His
central thesis was that national parliaments, as the embodiment
of the democratic identities of their Member States, should be
given a more powerful say in what the EU legislates on.[160]
170. We conclude that there
should be a mechanism whereby the House of Commons can decide
that a particular EU legislative proposal should not apply to
the United Kingdom. The House's view could only be expressed
prior to the adoption of the measure at EU level: but if such
a motion was passed the UK Government would be expected to express
opposition to the proposal in the strongest possible terms, including
voting against it.
171. We further conclude
that parallel provision should be made to enable a decision of
the House of Commons to disapply parts of the existing acquis.
This, we acknowledge, would require an Act of Parliament to disapply
the European Communities Act 1972 in relation to specific EU legislation.
There have been several Private Members' Bills over recent years
endorsing the principle of disapplication which have sought to
achieve this, and amendments to the same effect were proposed
in both Houses to the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill in
2006, which were whipped by the then official opposition. Such
a development would be much more legally complex and controversial,
but we were taken by the logic of the arguments of Professor Chalmers
questioning the supremacy of EU law, and we look forward to the
Government's detailed response to this proposal.
172. Closely related to this issue, and potential
"notwithstanding" provisions, the week before formal
agreement of this Report there was considerable coverage in the
media of comments by Mr Justice Mostyn concerning the applicability
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the UK in the High Court
case of R (AB) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.[161]
Mostyn J stated that he was surprised that, as a result of a 2011
preliminary ruling of the ECJ,[162]
the Charter was now legally binding in the UK as he "was
sure that the British government (along with the Polish government)
had secured at the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty an opt-out
from the incorporation of the Charter into EU law and thereby
via operation of the European Communities Act 1972 directly into
our domestic law".
173. He continued:
The constitutional significance of this decision
can hardly be overstated. The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated
into our domestic law large parts, but by no means all, of the
European Convention on Human Rights. Some parts were deliberately
missed out by Parliament. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union contains, I believe, all of those missing parts
and a great deal more. Notwithstanding the endeavours of our political
representatives at Lisbon it would seem that the much wider Charter
of Rights is now part of our domestic law. Moreover, that much
wider Charter of Rights would remain part of our domestic law
even if the Human Rights Act were repealed.
174. These comments, although not legally binding,
have called into question whether the full range of rights provided
by the Charter apply to the UK or, as the Government considers,
only those fundamental rights already existing in EU law. The
ruling by the ECJ referred to by Mr Justice Mostyn was in response
to a preliminary reference from the UK Court of Appeal and Irish
High Court. The questions of interpretation referred to the ECJ
concerned Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation which provides
the criteria to establish which Member State is responsible for
examining an asylum claim and the application of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, specifically to the UK. In particular the
Court of Appeal asked whether answers to the preliminary ruling
questions should "be qualified in any respect so as to take
account of" Protocol (No. 30) on the application of the Charter
to Poland and to the United Kingdom.
175. The ECJ found that the Protocol does not
exempt the UK from the obligation to comply with the Charter nor
prevent its courts from ensuring compliance with the Charter.
In doing so it noted that in the proceedings before the Court
of Appeal, the Government had accepted that, in principle, the
fundamental rights set out in the Charter could be relied on as
against the United Kingdom, and that the purpose of the Charter
Protocol was not to prevent the Charter from applying to the United
Kingdom, but to explain its effect.
176. We have taken a longstanding interest in
the application of the Charter in the United Kingdom. At the
time of the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty and Protocol (No
30), our predecessors expressed doubts about the level of protection
offered by the Protocol, particularly in respect of preliminary
rulings by the ECJ on the Charter. The then Committee considered
that these would be still be binding on the UK because of its
existing Treaty obligations, notably the duty of sincere co-operation
under the then Article 4(3) TEU.[163]
It concluded:
In our view, the only way of ensuring that the Charter
does not affect UK law in any way is to make clear, as we have
already suggested that the Protocol takes effect 'notwithstanding
the Treaties or Union law generally'.[164]
177. More recently the Committee Chairman
was granted an Urgent Question in the House on 19 November. We
hold a related documentthe Report on the Commission's 2012
Annual Report on the Charter on Fundamental Rightsunder
scrutiny. We have noted as part of the scrutiny process on that
Report that to date the Government has expressed a very general
view that the Charter only applies when the Member State is implementing
EU law and also only to the extent that the rights under the Charter
already apply as a matter of ECJ fundamental rights case law.
But it has said little of detail on the impact of ECJ preliminary
rulings on the Charter on UK law. Given these recent profound
developments we will hold an oral evidence session with the Justice
Secretary on the implications of this judgment.
178. Our predecessor's suggestion for reinforcing
the Protocol was not followed by the then Government. As a consequence,
the Protocol appears to offer little safeguard from the application
of the entirety of the Charter to the UK when applying EU law,
as confirmed by the ECJ in the judgment above. This, we argue,
is a direct consequence of Sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities
Act 1972, shows some of the potential weaknesses of the European
scrutiny system in the House of Commons and might be said to provide
support for the suggestion that there should be a Parliamentary
power to disapply EU legislation.
European Council meetings
179. Historically there were regular opportunities
for the wider membership of the House to debate the latest developments
in the EU around the time of European Council meetings. Until
2010 there were set-piece pre-European Council debates, which
ceased when the Backbench Business Committee was created. Some
of the Members who gave evidence to us thought that these debates
should be reinstated.[165]
Others were a little more cautious, for example Chris Bryant MP,
who commented:
I just wonder ... Having, I think, in my 12 years,
been to every one, and having heard your single transferable speech
immediately before my single transferable speech ... There should
certainly be an annual one, and it should be presented by the
Prime Minister I have always thought thatin the
Chamber, which should be on the Commission's work programme, but
I wonder whether the quarterly ones should be in Westminster Hall
and take one of the slots on a Tuesday or Wednesday afternoon.[166]
180. We recommend that there
should be an opportunity for Members in the Chamber to air issues
in advance relating to forthcoming European Council meetings,
and rather than a debate, we recommend that this should be timed
to coincide with a session of Oral Questions on European Union
matters (see later in this Report chapter).
POST-EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENTS
181. It remains the House's clear expectation
that the Prime Minister should make an oral statement to Parliament
about the outcome of a European Council. When this did not happen
in March 2013, and a Written Ministerial Statement was made instead,
an Urgent Question was granted by the Speaker to our Chairman.
We followed this up by an exchange of letters with the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister's letter to us of 23 April concluded that
"it is my intention that I will usually update the House
by an Oral Statement following European Councils."[167]
182. We will monitor the provision
of Oral Statements following European Councils closely. While
we note that the three European Councils since the Prime Minister's
letter have been the subject of an oral statement by the Prime
Minister, in two cases the statement also included another subject
(on 3 June 2013, events in Woolwich; on 2 July 2013, Afghanistan).[168]
Given that the dates of the European Councils are known
well in advance, we recommend that the dates of European Council
oral statements should also be set well ahead and given to the
House by means of a Written Ministerial Statement three times
a year. The statement on the European Council should be self-standing.
Oral Questions on EU matters
183. We heard evidence in favour of the reintroduction
of a special session of oral questions on EU matters. Special
sessions on "EEC matters" ended in 1985; according to
a PQ of 22 March 1985, this was under a temporary arrangement
following "representations from hon. and right hon. Members
and consultations between the usual channels".[169]
The arrangements for Overseas Development questions (also a "standalone
slot") were not affected by this change. The next FCO questions,
and therefore the first with EEC matters included, took place
on 24 April 1985. It was followed by a series of points of order
from Members, including the following representations from Eric
Deakins MP:
On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I wish to
draw your attention, in case it has escaped your notice, to the
fact that this is the first occasion of the use of the new experimental
system under which the 20-minute slot traditionally allocated
to European Community questions has been absorbed into the overall
hour for Foreign and Commonwealth Office questions ...
I make no complaint about the fact that on this occasion
only three European Community questions were reached, instead
of the normal seven, eight, or nine which would have been reached
under the previous system, but I wish to inform you that this
change, which was announced by the Leader of the House just before
Easter, on a Friday, in a written parliamentary answer
it having been agreed between the usual channelsdoes not
reflect the feelings of a large number of Opposition Members.
I cannot speak for Conservative Members ...
The Leader of the House should take note of the fact
that at the end of the experimental period we shall expect to
be consulted not merely by our own usual channels but by him,
perhaps in a debate on the subject, so that we can make our views
absolutely clear. It is wrong that the new questions system should
apply to an organisation such as the European Community, which,
unlike South Africa, the countries of central America or the countries
of eastern Europe, has the power to tax and legislate for the
British people. We should have a separate slot to enable us to
question Ministers on those matters.
And Eric Forth MP:
Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
Can you advise the House of the length of the experimental period
for EEC questions? As we are about to enter a crucial period of
major decisions being taken on the EEC, it would be regrettable
if hon. Members were denied the opportunity to ask questions on
Common Market matters because such questions are now subject to
the usual ballot rather than to the certainty of the previous
system. Can you say for how long the experiment is likely to run?
[170]
184. On 7 November 1986, and again in response
to a PQ, the Lord Privy Seal confirmed that the experiment "following
consultations with the usual channels" would be made permanent
and "will take effect with the introduction of the new questions
roster".[171]
185. Gisela Stuart MP,[172]
Chris Bryant MP[173]
and Andrea Leadsom MP[174]
all spoke in favour of reintroducing a special session of oral
questions on EU matters, though Martin Horwood MP did not support
it. [175]
Theresa May MP, at that time Shadow Leader of the House, also
spoke favourably about the idea in February 2008.[176]
Peter Knowles, Director of BBC Parliament stated:
the idea around having dedicated Europe Questions
taken on the floor of the House ... Given the increasing focus
on Europe, for the reasons you have given, Mr Chairman, I could
see that a regular Europe Questions slot on the floor of the House,
in terms of my output, would be really useful.[177]
186. The Minister for Europe, however, noted
significant potential difficulties "The problem with
this idea is that it would only work on the basis of European
Ministers plural, because, as the Committee knows, every Government
Department has European responsibilities".[178]
The Minister suggested Westminster Hall as a compromise,[179]
but this was rejected in terms by Gisela Stuart MP, [180]
and we share her view.
187. Given the profound increase
in the transfer of competences to the EU and the pressure for
greater integration it is now time to give all Members of the
House a regular opportunity to question Ministers specifically
on European Union matters. We conclude that a session of oral
questions (including a session of topical questions) to the Minister
for Europe on EU matters, including other Ministers in a cross-cutting
form, should be introduced, and that this should take place on
the floor of the House, timed to coincide with the run-up to a
European Council meeting. We note the comments by the Minister
for Europe about the range of issues which could be covered, but
see no reason why Ministers from other Departments could not accompany
the Minister for Europe during these sessions. If necessary,
the Questions for each session could be themed depending on the
matters to be discussed at the European Council.
Commission Work Programme
188. This year we recommended the Commission
Work Programme for debate on the floor of the House (rather than
European Committee) - a successful debate with contributions from
a number of Select Committee Chairs.[181]
During our visit to the Hague we saw how the Work Programme has
been used to provide a means for their sectoral and the European
Affairs Committee to prioritise proposals for scrutiny during
the year. We make separate recommendations relating to enhanced
scrutiny of the Commission Work Programme later in this Report.
We expect this to become a regular fixture in the annual scrutiny
of EU business and an important 'forward look' by the House to
forthcoming EU proposals.
DRAFT REVISED STANDING ORDER AND
RESOLUTION RELATING TO BUSINESS ON THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE
16. (1) The Speaker shall put the questions necessary to dispose of proceedings under any Act of Parliament or on European Union documents (as defined in Standing Order No. 143 (European Scrutiny Committee)) not later than one and a half hours after the commencement of such proceedings, subject to the provisions of Standing Order No. 17 (Delegated legislation (negative procedure)).
(2) For proceedings on a European Union document (as defined in Standing Order No. 143, other than those to which paragraph (11) of Standing Order No. 119 applies) the Speaker may permit a member of the European Scrutiny Committee to make a brief statement of no more than five minutes, at the beginning of the debate, explaining that committee's decision to refer the document or documents.
(3) The Speaker may permit Ministers of the Crown to make statements and to answer questions thereon put by Members, in respect of each motion relative to a European Union document or documents referred by the European Scrutiny Committee of which a Minister or, in the case of a motion for a reasoned opinion under Protocol (No. 2) to the Lisbon Treaty, a member of the European Scrutiny Committee, shall have given notice; but no question shall be taken after the expiry of a period of one hour from the commencement of the first such statement: Provided that the Speaker may, if he sees fit, allow questions to be taken for a further period of not more than half an hour after the expiry of that period.
(4) Following the conclusion of the proceedings under the previous paragraph, the motion referred to therein may be made, to which amendments may be moved; and, if proceedings thereon have not been previously concluded, the Speaker shall interrupt the consideration of such motion and amendments after a period of two and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on the document, and shall then put forthwith successively
(a) the question on any amendment already proposed from the chair; and
(b) the main question (or the main question, as amended).
(5) Business to which this order applies may be proceeded with at any hour, though opposed
New resolution on European scrutiny: opt-in and Schengen opt-out debates, timing of debates and notice of motions
(1) In the case of parliamentary scrutiny of opt-in and Schengen opt-out decisions in relation to new proposals from the Commission, the House notes the commitments made by successive Governments in the Ministerial Statements of 9 June 2008 and 20 January 2011.
(2) That this House agrees that debates on European Union documents referred by the European Scrutiny Committee should take place in a timely manner, and, more specifically, that the Government should undertake to make time available in the House within four sitting weeks of a Committee recommendation for a floor debate (unless the Committee has for any reason waived this requirement or has recommended a tighter timescale). The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to a Committee recommendation for a debate in EU Document Debate Committee.
(3) That this House agrees that any motion tabled following a debate in EU Document Debate Committee for consideration without debate on the floor of the House should appear in the European business section of the Order Paper for at least one sitting day before it is put on the main Order paper for decision, so that Members have the opportunity to consider whether or not to table amendments.
|
148 Q 200 Back
149
See for example the debate on CAP reform on 18 June 2013 (HC
Deb, col 774 [5 minute limit]) and the debate on a Reasoned
Opinion relating to the gender balance on corporate boards on
7 January 2013 (HC Deb, col 70 [5 minute limit]). Back
150
Q 116 Back
151
Q 289 Back
152
Q 517 Back
153
Ev w1, para 1(i) Back
154
Ev w14, para 24 and Q 310 Back
155
Q 16 Back
156
Q 526 Back
157
Home Office, The United Kingdom and the European Communities,
Cm 4715, July 1971, paras 29 and 30; HC Deb 13 July 1972
vol 840 cols 1862-988 Back
158
Q 478 Back
159
Q 480 Back
160
See Volume II of this Report, Ev 146. The reference in para 171
is to HC Deb, 16 May 2006, col 945; HC Deb, 10 July 2006,
col 509. Back
161
[2013] EWHC 3453 (Admin) available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2013/3453.html Back
162
C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S.
v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E. v
Refugee Applications Commissioner, 21.12.201, available at
http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2011/C41110.html Back
163
Third Report of Session 2007-08, European Union Intergovernmental
Conference: Follow-up Report, HC 16-iii. See the then Committee's
conclusions on "The red line in relation to the Charter of
Fundamental Rights", pages 11-12. Back
164
HC (2007-08) 16-iii, para 42 Back
165
Q 258 [Gisela Stuart MP]; Q 300 [Martin Horwood MP; Andrea Leadsom
MP] Back
166
Q 300 Back
167
Ev w40 Back
168
HC Deb, 3 June 2013, col 1233; HC Deb, 2 July 2013, col 751 Back
169
HC Deb, 22 March 1985, cols 622-623W Back
170
HC Deb, 24 April 1985, vol 77 cols 875-9 Back
171
HC Deb, 7 November 1986, cols 646-7 Back
172
Q 260 Back
173
Q 290 Back
174
Q 301 Back
175
Q 301 Back
176
HC Deb, 7 February 2008, col 1189 Back
177
Q 239 Back
178
Q 17 Back
179
Q 18 Back
180
Q 260 Back
181
HC Deb, 7 January 2013, col 27 Back
|