8 Our assessment of the Government's
reasons for rejoining 35 measures: measures for the exchange of
information
201. In this chapter we assess measures relating
to the exchange of information that the Command Paper indicates
the Government wishes to rejoin.
(27)
Council Decision 2000/642/JHA of 17 October 2000 concerning arrangements
between financial intelligence units of the Member States in respect
of exchanging information
OUTLINE OF INSTRUMENT
202. The purpose of this Decision is to build
upon Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 which permits cooperation
between contact points within Member States to retrieve reports
on suspicious financial transactions and to prevent and combat
money laundering. This Decision enables the improved disclosure
and exchange of financial information between Member States' Financial
Investigation Units (FIUs) in combating money laundering.
203. The obligations placed on Member States
are to:
- set up FIUs to receive disclosures
of financial information and to cooperate with any other FIUs
in other Member States (Article 1);
- ensure that FIUs are a single unit for each Member
State and correspond to the following definition: "A central,
national unit which, in order to combat money laundering, is responsible
for receiving (and to the extent permitted, requesting), analysing
and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of
financial information which concern the suspected proceeds of
crime or are required by national legislation" (Article 2(1));
- ensure that FIUs exchange, voluntarily or on
request, either under this Decision or existing or future Memoranda
of Understanding, any available information to investigate money
laundering (Article 2(1));
- ensure FIUs provide all relevant information
to the requesting FIUs (Article 4);
- ensure any refusal is appropriately explained
to requesting FIUs (Article 4(3);
- ensure receiving FIUs comply with any such restriction
as laid down by the transmitting FIUs, who may impose restrictions
or conditions on the use of the information, including security
measures (Article 5(4) and Data Protection Act (DPA) personal
data protection (Article 5(5));
- make provisions for the voluntary disclosure
scheme (Article 6);
- ensure the appropriate level of cooperation between
FIUs and that any SARs which are not compliant with the Decision
requirements will be superseded within two years of its coming
into effect (Article 9); and
- provide for, and agree on, appropriate and protected
channels of communication between FIUs.
THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW
204. The Government considers the measure to
have been implemented by administrative means in that it has established
an FIU which fulfils all of the above obligations. The UK FIU
is the sole competent authority for the purposes of the Council
Decision (see Article 2(1)).
205. If the UK were to decide not to participate
in this measure, there would be no requirement to repeal domestic
legislation. Nor is the UK dependent on this instrument to share
intelligence with other countries, as provisions in the Serious
Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCPA) 2005 allow for this. However,
without this instrument the UK may need MOUs or bilateral agreements
with other Member States to allow them to share intelligence with
the UK where their domestic legislation does not provide for such
cooperation.
206. The EU has funded and constructed a secure
ICT service known as FIU.NET for FIUs to exchange information.
The UK FIU routinely uses this service. It receives about 30 requests
per month from EU FIUs via FIU.NET and submits about 40 requests
on behalf of UK law enforcement agencies. Not all EU Member States
are members of FIU.NET. Reporting in 2010 indicated that 20 of
the 27 Member State FIUs (including the UK FIU) had joined FIU.NET.
207. The international standard body for anti-money
laundering (and counter-terrorist financing) is the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF). The UK is a member of FATF, but fewer
than half of EU Member States are members. The UK FIU could continue
to exchange information with other countries on a bilateral basis,
through the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units or through
FATF channels. It is unclear whether non-participation in this
instrument would prevent continued UK participation in FIU.NET.
However, it may be necessary to seek alternative practical arrangements
to ensure law enforcement cooperation continues between the UK
FIU and FIUs in other Member States.
208. If participation in FIU.NET ended and alternative
avenues of continuing cooperation were not quickly introduced
it might reduce law enforcement activity, with consequences for
the numbers of organised criminals brought to justice and the
scale of criminal assets recovered. The Government judges that
there may be a reputational risk to the UK if it were not to participate
in this measure, as non-participation may call into question the
UK's commitment to combating money laundering at both a national
and international level.
209. There could be additional administrative
costs and burdens, should the UK find it necessary to establish
bilateral agreements with some or all Member State FIUs. It is
difficult to predict exactly what these might be, or the extent
to which they could be offset against any possibility of savings
resulting from not needing to contribute financially to on-going
FIU.NET subscriptions, development or replacement.
210. Overall, the Government considers the economic
impacts of non-participation in this measure to be negligible.
211. As with most mechanisms for exchange
of information between EU Member States this is an administrative
measure which does not interfere with procedural or legal rules
— there has been no need for implementing legislation. The
Government's evidence suggests that the measure has increased
the UK's ability to combat money-laundering, which is often a
transnational crime; that although alternative arrangements exist,
these are likely to require further bilateral cooperation measures
to be effective, which might reduce law enforcement capacity unless
put in place quickly; and that relying on alternative arrangements
may incur reputational risk and further financial expense.
212. However, we note that in evidence on
the block opt out given to the House of Lords European Union Committee,
the Association of Chief Police Officers said the following about
the information exchange covered by this Council Decision if the
UK were to opt out of the measure: "It is likely that this
could maintained [sic] on a police to police basis or via the
Swedish Framework Decision [Council Decision 2006/960/JHA]. We
share this kind of information with many other non-EU states without
any problem".[109]
213. We ask the Government to confirm that
opting back in to this EU measure could put at least some activities
of the UK FIU under the full jurisdiction of the Court of Justice,
given Article 2 of the Decision in particular defining the tasks
of an FIU.
(69) Council Framework Decision
2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of
information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities
of the Member States of the European Union
SUMMARY OF INSTRUMENT
214. This Framework Decision seeks to simplify
the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement
authorities in EU Member States for the purposes of conducting
criminal investigations or criminal intelligence operations. It
provides a systemised (standard form to be used) and time bound
(eight hours) process for the exchange of information between
Member State's law enforcement agencies. The instrument is also
known as the 'Swedish Initiative'.
215. Article 8 of this instrument puts limits
on how another Member State can use the information exchanged;
these limits cannot be more stringent than the limits in force
in the Member State sharing the information. The Decision sets
out that all requests for information exchange are to be made
in line with the data protection law of the requesting State.
TRANSPOSITION INTO NATIONAL LAW
216. The UK has implemented this Framework Decision
through "existing legal provisions" supported by Home
Office Circular 30/2008.
THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW
217. In the UK, data protection is regulated
and enforced by the Data Protection Act, and includes international
and domestic transfers of data. In the UK and in other Member
States, this instrument is only used as a last resort or when
time or a case requires it, as there are other information exchange
practices available to national law enforcement agencies. In urgent
cases, police would expect the intelligence to be exchanged much
more quickly than the eight hours afforded by this instrument.
218. The use of forms to exchange information
under this Framework Decision allows for uniformity across the
EU and acts as a prompt for a minimum standard of information.
There is no overriding requirement on law enforcement to use the
form and use in the UK is minimal. The only area where there is
a requirement to use the form is as a result of the fulfilment
of obligations arising from measure 2007/845/JHA concerning Asset
Recovery (measure 73 on the list, directly below). As a consequence,
the Asset Recovery Office (ARO) makes regular use of the form
for outgoing inquiries. In 2011, there were 271 outbound requests
made from AROs through the Swedish Initiative. In theory, AROs
could utilise the CARIN Network,[110]
however the CARIN Network does not give the time-bound response
afforded by the Swedish Initiative.
219. There is a risk that, should the UK not
participate in this measure and push to use CARIN, other Member
States may face difficulties as they prefer the Swedish Initiative.
220. The Government considers the economic impacts
of non-participation in this measure to be negligible.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS
221. This instrument engages rights under the
Charter and Convention but there are numerous safeguards in place,
according to the Government. For example, Article 8 of this Framework
Decision states that: 1) the use of information and intelligence
which has been exchanged directly or bilaterally shall be subject
to the national data protection provisions of the receiving Member
State (i.e. the Data Protection Act 1998 in the UK); 2) personal
data processed in the context of the implementation of this Framework
Decision shall be protected in accordance with various Council
of Europe instruments, such as the Convention on the Protection
of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data 1981; 3) information and intelligence provided may be used
by the competent law enforcement authorities of the Member State
to which it has been provided solely for the purposes for which
it has been supplied (with a few exceptions); and 4) the providing
competent law enforcement authority may impose conditions on the
use of the information and intelligence by the receiving competent
law enforcement authority.
222. Article 1(4) of this instrument also ensures
that this instrument does not impose any obligation on the part
of the Member States to provide information and intelligence to
be used as evidence before a judicial authority, nor does it give
any right to use such information or intelligence for that purpose.
223. Overall therefore, the Government believes
that this instrument strikes the appropriate balance between fast
and efficient law enforcement cooperation and agreed principles
and rules on data protection, fundamental freedoms, human rights
and individual liberties.
(73) Council Decision 2007/845/JHA
of 6 December 2007 concerning cooperation between Asset Recovery
Offices of the Member States in the field of tracing and identification
of proceeds from, or property related to, crime
SUMMARY OF INSTRUMENT
224. This instrument obliges Member States to
set up or designate national Asset Recovery Offices (ARO) to facilitate,
through cooperation, the tracing and identification of the proceeds
of crime and other crime related assets by exchanging information
and best practice. Requests for information between AROs are regulated
by set time limits:
- eight hours for urgent requests
for information and intelligence when it is held in a database
that is directly accessible by law enforcement, as mandated by
Article 4 of Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA (the Swedish
Initiative).
- one week for non-urgent requests for information
and intelligence when it is held in a database directly accessible
by law enforcement; and
- two weeks in all other cases.
THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW
225. The UK is compliant with the Council Decision
having created an Asset Recovery Office (ARO) within the Serious
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).
The ARO also processes non-EU requests (including through Egmont
Group requests and Camden Assets Recovery Interagency Network
(CARIN) channels). The ARO will be carried over into the National
Crime Agency.
226. The majority of inbound and outbound requests
for financial intelligence are conducted through the ARO arrangement.
In 2012, there were 72 ARO inbound requests from Member States
for assistance on asset recovery and only five such requests from
non-Member States through CARIN. In the same year, there were
277 ARO outbound requests to Member States and 66 to non-Member
States through CARIN. Whilst requests could be conducted with
some Member States on a non-ARO, law enforcement to law enforcement
basis (e.g. Germany), the Government judges that this might be
more difficult for other Member States who rely on the ARO system
as a legal gateway for issuing and receiving information requests.
227. Were the Government to exercise the opt-out
and not rejoin this measure, Member States would continue to exchange
information and intelligence and cooperate with the UK in the
pursuit of criminal finances. It does not believe there would
be a requirement to repeal any domestic legislation. The Government
expects that exchange of information and intelligence would continue
as was the case before the instrument took effect in 2007.
228. The Government considers the economic impacts
of non-participation in this measure to be negligible.
229. We consider measures 69 and 73 together,
as it is clear that the Swedish initiative is used in the UK primarily
by the Asset Recovery Office for outgoing requests. The Government
says that, should the UK not participate in this measure and push
to use CARIN,[111]
other Member States may face difficulties as they prefer the Swedish
Initiative. But in relation to this Decision the Government says
that, were it to exercise the opt-out and not rejoin the measure,
Member States would continue to exchange information and intelligence
and cooperate with the UK in the pursuit of criminal finances.
Without the benefit of further information these two statements
appear contradictory. We ask the Government to provide a clearer
and more detailed explanation of why it is in the national interest
to opt into these two measures.
230. Any determination of whether it is in
the national interest to opt back into the Swedish initiative
(upon which the ARO Decision largely relies) should pay special
attention to the fact that that measure obliges the provision
of information and intelligence to the law enforcement authority
of another Member State, upon that authority's request, for the
purposes of a criminal investigation that authority is carrying
out. This obligation is subject, under Article 10 of the Framework
Decision, to a right to refuse to provide information where there
are "factual reasons" to assume that it would "harm
the essential national security interests of the requested Member
State". If the UK opts back into the Swedish initiative,
the extent of this obligation to provide information, and the
protection afforded by Article 10, will ultimately be for the
CJEU to determine.
(18) Joint Action 98/700/JHA
of 3 December 1998 concerning the setting up of a European Image
Archiving System (FADO)
SUMMARY OF INSTRUMENT
231. FADO is a computerised archive containing
images and textual information relating to falsified and authentic
identity documents such as passports, identity cards, visas, residence
permits and driving licences. It was devised and financed by the
EU as a direct result of this Joint Action. The system took many
years to develop and became fully operational in late 2005. A
public-facing website (PRADO) exists which has a mechanism through
which the public can see limited information relating to falsified
and authentic identity documents. This website would be available
to the UK regardless of participation in FADO.
THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW
232. The UK has supported the FADO database and
its development as a tool for the detection of falsified documents
and the exchange of information between Member States on authentic
and falsified passports, ID cards and residence permits. FADO
is used regularly by government agencies and Departments in the
UK.
233. Access to FADO is largely funded by the
EU. Ongoing annual running costs to the UK are around £40,000
per year.
234. If the UK did not participate in FADO it
would still exchange some paper documents with other Member States
but this is unlikely to be as comprehensive. The UK does not have
an equivalent database to FADO. Alternative agreements on exchanges
of information with other Member States would be required to create
a domestic equivalent with the same level of information, and
development may take several years.
235. Norway, Switzerland and Iceland have access
to FADO.
236. The UK has implemented this measure through
administrative means. If the UK were to decide not to participate
in this measure, no domestic legislation would need to be repealed.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS
237. It is up to each Member State to provide
information concerning genuine and false documents. The UK decides
what information to provide to ensure that the processing can
comply with pre-existing data protection rules and fundamental
rights principles. The Government considers that these instruments
comply with the principles of fundamental rights.
238. From the Government's evidence we conclude
that the European Image Archiving System database is a
useful tool used regularly by UK agencies for the detection of
falsified documents; that alternative arrangements would allow
the UK to exchange documents with other Member States; but that
without an equivalent database such arrangements would be time-consuming
to establish and less comprehensive in scope.
(93) Council Framework Decision
2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on the organisation and content
of the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record
between Member States
(94)
Council Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment
of the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in
application of Article 11 of Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA
SUMMARY OF INSTRUMENTS
239. This Framework Decision and Decision require
Member States to inform each other about convictions of EU nationals
in another Member State and permit Member States to request the
previous convictions of individuals from the Member State of nationality.
240. The Framework Decision sets out the legal
requirements concerning the transfer of information. The Decision
states that information shall be transmitted electronically and
establishes the system for doing so.The Framework Decision requires
each Member State to set up one or more Central Authority. In
cases involving criminal proceedings, the requesting Member State
must provide any information held in national records. In cases
that are not criminal proceedings the requested Member State need
only provide the information its national law allows.
241. The Framework Decision requires replies
to requests involving criminal proceedings to be made in ten days,
THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW
242. The UK expects to designate the existing
Central Authority, which is the UK Central Authority for the Exchange
of Criminal Records based at the ACPO Criminal Records Office
(UKCA-ECR).
243. Criminal Record Exchange through these measures
has allowed much more information to be obtained on EU offenders
in the UK and on UK nationals convicted elsewhere in the EU. This
has allowed the police to build a fuller picture of offending
by UK nationals and allowed the courts to be aware of previous
offending by EU nationals being prosecuted in the UK. The previous
convictions can be used for bail, bad character and sentencing
as well as by the prison and probation service when dealing with
the offender once sentenced.
244. In the Government's response to the Home
Affairs Select Committee's call for evidence, it cites two examples
of how ECRIS has affected the outcome of criminal prosecutions:
- In the case of 'GA', a Romanian
national who was accused of raping a prostitute and a vulnerable
female adult, previous conviction information revealed that he
had a conviction for rape in Romania. An application to use the
previous conviction as bad character evidence was accepted by
the trial judge. On being sentenced to an indeterminate prison
sentence with a recommendation that he served at least 11 years
in jail, the judge remarked on the similarity of his previous
conviction with this offence. Without ECRIS, UK authorities would
have been unaware of GA's offending history. The previous offence
was not only influential on the sentence but was also, the Government
believes, significant in securing the conviction.
- The case of a UK national, 'W', who was convicted
in France for importing indecent images of minors for further
publication. W was sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment,
of which one year was suspended. W had no previous UK criminal
record and, without ECRIS, UK authorities would not have known
of W or his previous conviction. This knowledge allowed him to
be placed on the UK Sex Offenders Register and so become subject
to monitoring in the UK.
245. The UK has implemented this measure through
administrative means. If the UK were to decide not to participate
in these measures, there would be no requirement to repeal domestic
legislation.
246. The direct cost of running the UKCA-ECR
is £750,000 per annum; and implementation costs for ECRIS
are £250,000.
247. Article 22 of the 1959 Council of Europe
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters is the default
legal agreement should the UK cease to participate in the measures.
The 1959 Convention provides that convictions of non-nationals
should be sent to the country of nationality at least once a year
and allows letters of request, issued by prosecuting authorities
(in England and Wales the Crown Prosecution Service) to be made
for previous convictions of EU nationals being prosecuted in the
UK.
248. If Member States are unwilling to revert
to paper methods, the amount of information received in response
to requests concerning EU nationals being prosecuted in the UK
and on UK nationals convicted overseas is likely to decrease.
In addition, it is likely that results would be received more
slowly as there are no time limits set down in the 1959 Convention.
249. In its response to the Home Affairs Select
Committee's call for evidence the Government amplifies its concerns
with alternative arrangements. Under the 1959 Convention the UK
did not send any notifications to other Member States detailing
convictions of their nationals in the UK, nor did it send any
requests to other Member States for the previous convictions of
their nationals being prosecuted in the UK. It received very few
requests for the previous convictions of UK nationals being prosecuted
in another Member State and relatively few conviction notifications
for UK nationals. By contrast, since May 2012 France alone has
sent 1909 notification message to the UK and the UK has sent 887
notification messages to France.
250. Similarly, Irish authorities have reported
that approximately 12,000 criminal offences are committed in Ireland
by UK nationals each year, some of which are serious offences.
The Framework Decision requires the Irish authorities to inform
the UK of these offences and they are exchanged electronically
under the arrangements implemented by the Decision. Under the
1959 Convention the UK was not notified of such convictions.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS
251. These messages engage the right to respect
for private and family life and to the protection of personal
data. They do this because the information being transmitted has
the potential to affect an individual's private life and because
the information transmitted is sensitive personal data.
252. Any engagement with these rights must be
justified in accordance with the following: the interference must
be provided for by law and respect the essence of the particular
right in question; and the interference must comply with the requirements
of necessity, proportionality and the pursuit of a legitimate
objective.
253. The Framework Decision states that information
received about an individual being prosecuted in another EU Member
State should only be used for the purposes for which it was obtained
or for preventing an immediate and serious threat to public security.
This, in the Government's view, constitutes a legitimate objective.
254. The Government considers that criminal record
exchange for bail, bad character and sentencing, as well as by
the prison and probation service, constitutes a legitimate objective
255. In addition, information is only transmitted
through the offices of a central authority in each Member State.
The central authority is able to mediate between prosecutors and
other Member States to ensure that information is only requested
for legitimate purposes under the Framework Decision. The Government
considers that these safeguards satisfy the requirements of necessity
and proportionality.
256. From the Government's evidence, and the
evidence given by enforcement and prosecution authorities to the
House of Lords opt-out inquiry, we conclude that these measures
have allowed more information to be obtained on EU offenders in
the UK and on UK nationals convicted elsewhere in the EU, which
has obvious benefits for bail hearings, prosecutions and probation
and prison services. But we ask the Government to say whether,
were Member States to comply with Article 22 of the 1959 Council
of Europe Convention by sending an annual list to concerned Member
States of non-nationals who had been convicted, and by responding
to information requests, the previous regime would have provided
an effective mechanism to achieve the same ends as these EU measures.
257. We note the Government says the UK "expects
to designate" the existing Central Authority as the competent
authority under the Framework Decision. We ask the Government
to clarify whether both measures are fully implemented in the
UK; and if not, when they will be.
(90) Council Framework Decision
2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal
data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation
in criminal matters
SUMMARY OF THE INSTRUMENT
258. The purpose of the Framework Decision is
to encourage the cross-border exchange of law enforcement information
by establishing a common level of privacy protection and a high
level of security when Member States exchange personal data within
the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
It applies to "competent authorities", which in the
UK includes police, the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)
and many government Departments. The Framework Decision relates
only to personal data processed in the framework of police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters and it aims to balance
the rights of data subjects with the need to protect the public.
TRANSPOSITION INTO NATIONAL LAW
259. The UK has implemented this Framework Decision
through the Data Protection Act 1998.
THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW
260. Participation in this instrument could enhance
the UK's reputation as it signals commitment to data protection
in the area of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters.
261. While the Data Protection Act 1998 transposed
the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (a former First Pillar
measure), the UK chose to extend its scope to cover all processing
of personal data. As such, domestic legislation was already compliant
with this Framework Decision prior to its adoption. The UK therefore
meets the standards of the Framework Decision as a matter of domestic
law and would continue to do so if we were to decide not to participate
in this instrument. However, by not participating in this instrument,
there is a risk that the UK may not be able to exchange personal
data in this area with other Member States.
262. The European Commission published a proposal
for a Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive on
25 January 2012, which will repeal and replace this Framework
Decision. The draft Directive, which will legally bind the UK
when adopted (although a Schengen-building measure, the Government
did not exercise its right to opt out of it),[112]
is currently subject to negotiations in the Council. Depending
on when these negotiations conclude, this Framework Decision may
no longer be within the scope of the 2014 decision.
263. Current Government analysis estimates the
economic impacts of non-participation in this measure to be negligible.
264. The Government's fundamental rights analysis
mirrors that of the above two proposals.
265. The Lisbon Treaty brought data processing
in what was the Third Pillar into the scope of the Community method
(QMV, co-decision and the jurisdiction of the Commission and Court
of Justice.) Accordingly, the draft Directive which will replace
this measure is based on Article 16 TFEU, rather than within the
JHA provisions of Title V TFEU. The UK no longer has a right to
opt out of the replacement Directive. Pending the conclusion of
the negotiations on the draft Directive it would lead to legal
uncertainty in the processing of personal data were the UK to
opt-out of this Framework Decision. We ask the Government to
provide a specific assessment of the potential effects of full
Court of Justice jurisdiction on the Framework Decision.
(100) Council Decision 2009/917/JHA
of 30 November 2009 on the use of information technology for customs
purposes (Customs Information System)[113]
SUMMARY OF THE INSTRUMENT
266. This Council Decision establishes a "Customs
Information System" (CIS) and permits customs law enforcement
services in Member States to use these electronic information-sharing
services to assist each other in combating customs crimes, such
as smuggling of drugs, weapons and tobacco.
267. For the purposes of the Council Decision,
CIS is an umbrella term for the CIS database and the customs files
identification database ('FIDE').
268. Customs services and agencies with responsibilities
for criminal investigations can enter and view data, including
personal data, for the purpose of sighting and reporting, discreet
surveillance, specific checks, and strategic or operational analysis.
Data on the system falls into the following categories: commodities;
means of transport; businesses; persons; fraud trends; availability
of expertise; items or cash detained, seized or confiscated. Nominal
data is only included if there are real indications that the person
has committed, is committing or will commit serious contraventions
of national laws; and cash data for the purpose of strategic or
operational analysis only.
THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW
269. These information systems support Member
States' activity under the Naples II Convention, which is the
general legal base under which Member States' customs authorities
and related agencies co-operate and communicate with each other
in real-time on customs criminal matters. For example, asking
each other to put suspected consignments of drugs or weapons under
surveillance, carrying out joint operations and investigations,
and communicating operational information.
270. There is no other secure information-sharing
system that connects the same users and stores the same information.
There are some alternative information exchange services, covered
by the Naples II Convention, but their scope and coverage is not
as extensive as CIS. There are some long-established information
exchange services (accessible via the same portal as CIS) and
a secure email system that rely on the Naples II Convention, rather
than CIS. If the UK decided not to participate in this measure
but continued to participate in the Naples II Convention, it could
continue to use these.
271. European Commission records show, as of
31 August 2012, the total number of active cases on the CIS database
was 302, up from 259 a year earlier. The UK was responsible for
26 of the entries in 2011 and 18 in 2012. The number on FIDE was
1,735, up from 274 a year earlier. The UK has not yet included
any data on FIDE.
272. CIS and FIDE are fully funded by the European
Commission. This is because the systems used under this Decision
are technically similar to CIS and FIDE systems that exist (under
different legislation) for information-sharing on matters of EU
competence, such as combating customs duty fraud. Though the Commission
provides technical support for all the associated systems, the
user populations are partitioned and the Commission cannot view
or use data shared under this Decision.
273. The UK has implemented this measure through
administrative means. If the UK were to decide not to participate
in this measure, no domestic legislation would need to be repealed.
274. From the Government's evidence, it concludes
that CIS plays a valuable role in combating customs offences and
that there is no alternative that is as effective. We ask the
Government to say what mechanisms UK customs law enforcement services
use to share information with their counterparts in non-EU States,
and how well these mechanisms work.
109 See the written evidence submitted by ACPO at
para 10, p. 24, under the heading "[Third Pillar Measures]
that have no impact on policing whether we opt back in or not". Back
110
The Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network (CARIN) is an informal
network of contacts dedicated to improving cooperation in all
aspects of tackling the proceeds of crime. Specifically, CARIN
aims to increase the effectiveness of members' efforts in depriving
criminals of their illicit profits through cooperative inter-agency
cooperation and information sharing. The CARIN permanent secretariat
is based in Europol headquarters at the Hague. Back
111
See footnote 110. Back
112
See the Written Ministerial Statement of 9 June 2012 confirming
this decision. Back
113
Lead Department is HM Revenue and Customs. Back
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