2 Further amendments to EU restrictive
measures against the Syrian regime
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| Council Decision amending Council Decision 2012/739/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria
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| Legal base | Article 29 TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 7 May 2013
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| Previous Committee Reports | HC 86-xxxv (2012-13), chapter 4 (13 March 2013); also see (34309) — and 34310 — : HC 86-xiii (2012-13), chapter 27 (17 October 2012); (34101-3) — : HC 86-xi (2012-13), chapter 26 (5 September 2012); (34024) — and (34025) — : HC 86-vi (2012-13), chapter 10 (27 June 2012) and (33974) 10751/12: HC 86-vi (2012-13), chapter 3 (27 June 2012); (33768) — and (33769) — : HC 428-lvi (2010-12), chapter 7 (27 March 2012); (33711) — , (33712) — and (33705) 6604/12: HC 428-lii (2010-12), chapter 20 (29 February 2012); (33635-7) — : HC 428-l (2010-12), chapter 12 (8 February 2012); (33515) — and (33516) — : HC 428-xliv (2010-12), chapter 15 (14 December 2011); (33213) — and (33214) — : HC 428-xxxviii (2010-12), chapter 19 (19 October 2011); (33160) 14410/11 and (33168) — : HC 428-xxxvii (2010-12), chapter 20 (12 October 2011); (33072) 13474/11 and (33073) 13475/11: HC 428-xxxv (2010-12), chapter 16 (7 September 2011); (33101) — , (33102) 13640/11, (33103) 13643/11: HC 428-xxxv (2010-12), chapter 19 (7 September 2011); (32933-36) —: HC 428-xxxi (2010-12), chapter 11 (29 June 2011); and (32747) — and (32748) —: HC 428-xxvi (2010-12), chapter 11 (11 May 2011)
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| Discussion in Council | 28 February 2012
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | For debate on the Floor of the House (decision reported on 13 March 2013)
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Background
In its 1 March 2013 Fact Sheet, the European Union describes its
response to the crisis in Syria thus:
"The European Union has responded decisively
to the violent repression of anti-government protests in Syria,
which began in March 2011. The EU called for an end to the deteriorating
situation in Syria and the unacceptable levels of violence, which
continue to cause suffering to millions of Syrians and destruction
of infrastructure and cultural heritage.
"The EU strongly urged the regime to stop targeting
civilians, halt airstrikes and artillery attacks, and calls for
an immediate end to all violence. The EU remains deeply concerned
by the spill-over effects of the Syrian crisis in neighbouring
countries and reiterates its attachment to the sovereignty, independence
and territorial integrity of Syria.
"The EU has condemned in the strongest terms
the widespread human rights violations, which according to the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry may amount to
crimes against humanity. It has also condemned several times actions
aimed at inciting inter-ethnic and interconfessional conflict.
The EU further called on the regime to free political prisoners,
in particular peaceful activists, women and children.
"As the violence and repression continued, the
EU decided to introduce restrictive measures to increase pressure
on the government of President Bashar al-Assad. In total, 21 sets
of restrictive measures have been introduced since the beginning
of the crisis (see annex for an overview). The EU has called consistently
for President Assad to step aside and make way for a peaceful
transition, along the lines of the action plan adopted by the
League of Arab States (LAS)."[4]
2.1 We reproduce the overview referred to therein
at the Annex to the chapter of our most recent Report on this
Council Decision. Scrutiny of the original Council Decision 2011/782/CFSP
and other related Council Decisions and Council Regulations is
detailed in our previous Reports.[5]
The latest Council Decision
2.2 The EU's restrictive measures against the
Assad regime in Syria were (via this Council Decision) extended
for a further three months (until 1 July 2013) and amended, to
enable Member States to provide the Syrian opposition with non-lethal
equipment and technical assistance to protect civilians.
2.3 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 7 March
2013, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) explained that
this Council Decision would thus allow:
— the
sale, supply, transfer or export of non-lethal military equipment
or equipment which might be used for internal repression for the
protection of civilians or for the Syrian National Coalition for
Opposition and Revolutionary Forces (SNC) intended for the protection
of civilians; and
— the provision of armoured non-combat
vehicles to the SNC intended for the protection of civilians;
and allow provision of technical assistance, brokering services
and other services for the SNC intended for the protection of
civilians.
2.4 He also says that the Council had issued
a declaration to:
— clarify
that the EU accepted the SNC as legitimate representatives of
the Syrian people;
— reiterate that, under the Common Position
2008/944/CFSP (CP944), Member States retained discretion over
the transfer of military technology and equipment, and likewise
that CP944 did not prohibit Member States from operating more
restrictive national policies;
— reminded each Member State of its obligation
under CP944 to circulate to other Member States, in confidence,
an annual report on its exports of military technology and equipment;
— agreed that the implementation of the
exemptions would be reviewed before the 1 June 2013 rollover date;
and
— confirmed that the accompanying Council
Decision did not set a precedent for other EU arms embargos.
2.5 In his statement of 6 March 2013, the Foreign
Secretary (Mr William Hague) set out the rationale for these changes
in greater detail.[6]
With regard to what was now to be offered to the Syrian opposition,
he said:
"On Thursday, we finalised with our European
partners a specific exemption to the EU sanctions to permit the
provision of non-lethal military equipment and all forms of technical
assistance to the Syrian National Coalition where it is intended
for the protection of civilians.
"This is an important advance in our ability
to support the opposition and help save lives. Such technical
assistance can include assistance, advice and training on how
to maintain security in areas no longer controlled by the regime;
on co-ordination between civilian and military councils; on how
to protect civilians and minimise the risks to them; and on how
to maintain security during a transition. We will now provide
such assistance, advice and training.
"We intend to respond to the opposition's request
to provide equipment for search and rescue operations and for
incinerators and refuse collection kit to prevent the spread of
disease. We will help local councils to access funds and equipment
to repair electricity and water supplies to homes, and we will
respond to the opposition's request for further water purification
kits and equipment to help civilian political leaders operate
and communicate.
"We will also now provide new types of non-lethal
equipment for the protection of civilians, going beyond what we
have given before. In conjunction with the National Coalition,
we are identifying the protective equipment that will be of most
assistance to them and likely to save the most lives. I will keep
the House updated, but it will certainly include, for instance,
armoured four-wheel drive vehicles to help opposition figures
move around more freely as well as personal protection equipment
including body armour."[7]
Our assessment
2.6 As both the Minister (in his letter of 8
March, in which he apologised for the override in this instance)
and the Foreign Secretary (in his statement) noted, these negotiations
were protracted and continued up to the deadline — and given
the context, this was not surprising. In these circumstances
and on this occasion, we did not object to scrutiny having been
overridden. But if the House was not to be told about such changes
prior to the event, then it needed to be told as much as possible
afterwards.
2.7 In the first instance, we said that if the
Minister was to rely upon a declaration (c.f. paragraph 2.5 above),
then he should provide a copy of it along with his Explanatory
Memorandum and the Council Decision.
2.8 Secondly, a number of other questions arose:
- what was the equipment —
other than armoured non-combat vehicles — that might otherwise
"be used for internal repression" and was to be provided
"for the protection of civilians or for the Syrian National
Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces (SNC) intended
for the protection of civilians";
- what were the prior limitations to the types
of assistance that could be provided to the opposition and the
amendments needed to effect these; what support was already permissible
under the existing terms of the embargo; what protections were
in place to prevent the diversion of support to extremists in
Syria; and what the best way was to define and refer to the Syrian
National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces (c.f.
the third tiret of paragraph 2.11 below).
- A propos the Foreign
Secretary's statement:
—
what the "new types of non-lethal equipment" were that
he said would be provided for the protection of civilians, going
beyond anything provided hitherto;
— once it had been determined, what protective
equipment was to be provided that, in the view of the National
Coalition, "will be of most assistance to them and likely
to save the most lives";
— how the use of any and all of the equipment
provided was to be monitored, so that it was not misused or did
not fall into the hands of groups for which it was not intended
(the Foreign Secretary having referred only to "best endeavours"
and adverse impact on any such further assistance if this were
to happen).
2.9 Given these questions and the evident level
of interest among Members, we concluded that a debate on the Floor
of the House, for an hour and a half, was appropriate. We recommended
that it should take place as soon as possible. We asked the Minister
to respond to our questions and to set out the Government's latest
thinking about the way forward when opening the debate.
The Minister's letter of 7 May 2013
2.10 The Minister for Europe writes further to
the Foreign Secretary's Statements to Parliament on 15 April[8]
and 6 May with an update on the Government's policy on the EU
Syria arms embargo, as follows:
"I share the Committee's grave concern at the
growing catastrophe in Syria and the substantial humanitarian
consequences and security risks facing the region. In one recent
week alone, another 100,000 people fled Syria, bringing the refugee
total to its current level of over 1.3 million. Millions more
are feeling the effects of Assad's violent oppression.
"As the Foreign Secretary has set out, the Government's
priority is a political settlement to the conflict. However,
the prospects of an immediate diplomatic breakthrough are slim.
We cannot stand by while the situation in Syria continues to
deteriorate at an ever more rapid pace. That is why the Government
has significantly increased its humanitarian assistance to Syria
and neighbouring countries; and why we are stepping up our non-lethal
assistance to the Syrian National Coalition, as a means of increasing
pressure on the Assad regime to enter negotiations on a political
settlement. We will ensure that any Government assistance is
a necessary, proportionate, and lawful response to a situation
of extreme humanitarian suffering and that there is no practicable
alternative. The government's diplomatic efforts on Syria and
practical assistance are mutually reinforcing, and should not
be seen as alternative strategies.
"THE IMPACT OF THE SYRIA CRISIS ON NATIONAL
SECURITY
"The conflict is precipitating a growth of extremism
in Syria which poses current and future risks to UK national security.
As the conflict has progressed, violent Islamist groups have
been gaining ground in Syria and have attracted a large number
of foreign fighters of all nationalities, including a substantial
number of UK citizens. The overall number of foreign fighter
travelling to Syria is greater than for all other arenas of jihad
combined. The Government's support for the moderate opposition
is aimed at countering the rise of extremist groups within the
opposition.
"INFORMING PARLIAMENT ON DEVELOPMENTS IN HMG
POLICY ON SYRIA
"HMG's policy on Syria has been consistent in
not ruling out any options for resolving the crisis in Syria.
We have to be prepared to do even more to help to save lives.
Our policy on Syria cannot be static in the face of this growing
calamity.
"As the Foreign Secretary said to the House
on 15 April, the UK Government has taken no decision that we would
like to send arms to the Syrian opposition. However, the UK and
France argue that we will need further amendments to the EU arms
embargo, or even to lift it altogether. As things stand, we need
greater flexibility if we decide that urgent action is necessary,
for example in response to a specific incident or continued grave
deterioration on the ground, or to create the conditions for a
successful political transition."
2.11 The Minister concludes by referring to the
great importance that he says he attaches to his responsibilities
towards Parliament, including ensuring that the Committee has
the opportunity to scrutinise these sorts of decisions; saying
that, although he unfortunately had to override scrutiny on this
Council Decision and the accompanying implementing Regulation,
he is grateful for the Committee's understanding on this matter;
and noting that the debate "will provide a good opportunity
for Members to look at our policy on this important issue."
Conclusion
2.12 We leave it to whichever Foreign Office
Minister speaks on behalf of the Government in the debate on the
Floor of the House to explain why it will have taken at least
two months to schedule a debate that we recommended should take
place as soon as possible after our meeting on 13 March.
2.13 Though the Minister continues to reiterate
his commitment to ensuring that the Committee can do its job,
we note that we have yet to receive an Explanatory Memorandum
on the implementing Council Regulation of 18 April, which would
have enabled the Minister to provide answers to at least some
of the questions raised in our previous Report.
2.14 We consider this chapter of our Report
to be relevant to the debate that we recommended on 13 March.
2.15 In the meantime, we shall retain the
document under scrutiny.
4 Council Factsheet, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/128379.pdf. Back
5
See headnote. Back
6
See HC Deb, 6 March 2013, cols. 961-983; available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130306/debtext/130306-0002.htm. Back
7
HC Deb, 6 March 2013, col.
963. Back
8
See the Annex to this chapter of our Report. Back
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