18 EU Special Representative for the
Southern Mediterranean region
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| Council Decision extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean region
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| Legal base | Articles 31(2) and 33 TEU; QMV
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 13 June 2013
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (33915) —: HC 86-iv (2012-13), chapter 20 (14 June 2012); and also (32981) —: HC 428-xxxiii (2010-12), chapter 12 (13 July 2011); (32588) 7592/11: HC 428-xxiii (2010-12), chapter 9 (5 April 2011) and (32815) 10794/11: HC 428-xxix (2010-12), chapter 2 (8 June 2011)
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| Discussion in Council | June 2013
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
18.1 EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are appointed to represent
Common Foreign and Security Policy where the Council agrees that
an additional EU presence on the ground is needed to deliver the
political objectives of the Union. They are established under
Article 33 of the Treaty on the European Union and are appointed
by the Council. Their purpose is to represent the EU in troubled
regions and countries and to play an active part in promoting
the interests and the policies of the EU.
18.2 An EUSR is appointed by Council through the
legal act of a Council Decision. The substance of his or her mandate
depends on the political context of the deployment.[77]
Some provide, inter alia, a political backing to an ESDP
operation; others focus on carrying out or contribute to developing
an EU policy. Some EUSRs are resident in their country or region
of activity; others work on a travelling basis from Brussels.
18.3 All EUSRs carry out their duties under the authority
and operational direction of the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR; Baroness Catherine
Ashton). Each is financed out of the CFSP budget. In addition,
Member states also contribute regularly through, for example,
seconding some of the EUSR's staff members.[78]
The EUSR for the Southern Mediterranean region
18.4 The post was created in 2011 on the back of
two joint Commission/HR Communications, first on the Southern
Neighbourhood and, secondly, on European Neighbourhood Policy.
The central notion in both is a more incentive-based approach
based on greater differentiation — "more for more"
in which those that go "further and faster" in their
reforms would receive greater support, while those who do not
follow agreed reform plans would have their support reallocated.
How this would work in reality, plus doubts as to whether more
funding was really needed (as opposed to more effective spending)
was why the Committee recommended the second of these joint Commission/HR
Communications for debate in European Committee B. [79]
18.5 At the same time, recognising the political
pressure to move ahead, the Committee concluded that the appointment
of this new EUSR made obvious sense and that the proposed incumbent
appeared to be well-suited to the challenges that would come with
the job. He was (and still is) Mr Bernardino Leon: a Spanish
diplomat of more than 20 years experience who had devoted much
of his career to the Arab world; had worked in Libya and Algeria
and been personal adviser to the EU Special Representative for
the Middle East Peace Process; and had also been Spain's Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs (PUS-equivalent), Secretary-General
at the Spanish Prime Minister's Office and the Spanish G20 Sherpa.
Mr Leon was known to his UK counterparts and, in the estimation
of the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington), had the skills,
experience and credibility to be an effective EUSR for the Southern
Mediterranean region.[80]
18.6 A year ago, the Minister gave Mr Leon a good
report. At that time, the budget for 2012-13 had yet to be agreed:
the Minister said that, at this time of austerity and budget cuts,
he was working to ensure that the EUSR gave maximum value for
money, and accordingly arguing for a reduction in the proposed
total of €1,070,000.[81]
The draft Council Decision
18.7 The draft Council Decision extends the mandate
of Mr Bernardino Leon for a further twelve months from 30 June
2013.
18.8 The mandate covers Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria
and Tunisia, and focuses on enhancing the EU's political dialogue
with these countries and improving the EU's effectiveness, presence
and visibility in the region in the wake of the "Arab Spring."
The Government's view
18.9 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 13 June 2013,
the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) endorses the extension
of the mandate of EUSR Leon until June 2014.
18.10 He continues his comments as follows:
"His work is consistent with the UK's objectives
of supporting political and economic reform in the Middle East
and North Africa. We are pressing his team to demonstrate value
for money in a time of austerity, and to cooperate effectively
with other parts of the EU in a coherent regional strategy.
"The EUSR's objectives agreed in June
2012 were: to enhance the EU's political dialogue with Southern
Mediterranean countries, especially those undergoing political
transition; to support political reform and democratic transition;
to enhance the EU's effectiveness and visibility in the region;
and to establish close coordination with local, regional, and
international partners.
"His mandate was: to dialogue with governments,
international organisations, civil society and other relevant
interlocutors; to maintain close contact with all parties involved
in regional democratic transition, fostering stabilisation and
reconciliation; to contribute to better coherence, consistency
and cooperation between the Union and Member States' (MS) activities
towards the region; to promote coordination with international
partners in support of reform, especially by assisting the EU
High Representative for Foreign Affairs in the work of Task Forces
and follow-up meetings; and to contribute to the implementation
of EU human rights policy in the region.
"The mandate of the EUSR for the Southern Mediterranean
region is consistent with the UK's objectives in the region.
The UK's Arab Partnership initiative is supporting political and
economic reform in the Middle East and North Africa. HMG has committed
£110 million to the Arab Partnership Fund over 2011-2015
to support political and economic reform across the region. Under
our 2013 G8 Presidency, the UK is also working through the G8
Deauville Partnership[82]
to support open economies and inclusive growth in the MENA region.
"The proposal for mandate renewal currently
being considered essentially retains the same objectives and mandate
of the EUSR as for the previous year.
"EUSR Leon's work falls under the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP is the overarching framework
for EU relations with its neighbours, including those in the Southern
Mediterranean. Following a 2011 review of the ENP, it is now more
focused on incentivising political and economic reform. Support
targets partners who make the most progress on reform, in line
with the 'more for more' principle. Since 2011, the EU has given
political support on behalf of 27 MS, over €4bn in financial
support, and has offered negotiations on free trade agreements
(which have begun with Morocco) and mobility partnerships. The
revised ENP is, on the whole, a valuable mechanism through which
the UK supports regional political and economic reform.
"Overall, the UK assesses that EUSR Leon
has played a significant role in implementation of the revised
ENP, and hence in supporting political and economic reform in
the region. One complaint previously often heard in the region
regarded the complex network of EU interlocutors. The EUSR role
has provided a single point of contact, helping to develop relations
with the new political leaderships in the region and increasing
the visibility of the EU's work there.
"He has also worked in tandem with other actors,
thereby increasing the EU's influence and effectiveness. He has
been working in challenging circumstances, often with political
actors with very little experience, and assessment of his achievements
should be viewed in that context.
"With regards to the specific objectives of
the EUSR's mandate, the first — enhancing the EU political
dialogue with the countries of the Southern Mediterranean
— was a priority objective for the UK. Leon has effectively
raised the profile of the EU in a busy schedule of high-level
meetings with regional interlocutors. The most high-profile of
these meetings were the EU Task Forces he arranged in Tunisia,
Jordan and Egypt, chaired by Baroness Ashton and the respective
Head of State. The Task Forces offered a public forum for the
partner country to set out its reform plan, after which the EU
announced what bilateral support it would provide. The Task Forces
also acted as a donor co-ordination platform to leverage offers
of support from different parts of the EU (various Commission
Directorates-General, the European Investment Bank, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and MS). In the build-up
and during these Task Forces Leon showed himself to be an effective
operator, and they have significantly increased the visibility
of the EU in the region.
"The next objective was supporting political
reform and democratic transition. Leon principally sought
to do this through high-level messaging, and has communicated
privately and publicly the need for inclusive political processes,
respect for human rights, and the importance of economic reform.
By engaging with an impressively wide range of actors, including
members of the government and opposition, and representatives
of civil society, he has also emphasised the importance of inclusivity
in the EU's approach. The Task Forces, by outlining the full range
of EU support available, have helped to increase the EU's leverage
with partners as we stress the importance of reform.
"His third objective was to enhance the EU's
effectiveness and visibility in the region. We assess he has
complemented the EU's support for reform through the ENP, and
raised EU profile in the region. This has been achieved to some
extent due to effective use of communications techniques. In particular,
the Task Forces have had a significant public impact on the ground.
By raising EU profile, and contributing to the re-set of EU-Southern
Mediterranean relations which followed the 2011 review of the
ENP, Leon has supported UK objectives in the region.
"Leon's final objective was building co-operation
with local partners, regional and international organisations.
Leon has been active in working with the major IFIs, specifically
the European Investment Bank, European Bank of Reconstruction
and Development and the International Monetary Fund. He has also
engaged widely with civil society, as well as the Union for the
Mediterranean. This has helped the EU to leverage greater support
for partners and ensured coordination in our approach.
"Since Leon's appointment, progress of the democratic
transitions in the Southern Mediterranean has not been linear,
and there remain significant challenges to be overcome. We engage
closely with EUSR Leon to discuss how he might increase his effectiveness
to respond to these challenges, particularly in terms of consistent
messaging around conditionality of EU support. We have argued,
for instance, that with hindsight the timing of the EU-Egypt Task
Force could have been changed to maximise the EU's leverage.
"There does also remain more work to be done
in ensuring maximum coordination between the EUSR and MS. However,
these are difficult issues, and EUSR Leon and his team do frequently
discuss their approach with the Council and the UK bilaterally."
18.11 All in all, the Minister supports the extension
of the mandate of EUSR Leon until June 2014, and says that he
and his officials will continue to work closely with him to support
ongoing political and economic reform in the MENA region —
such reform being key to a more stable and prosperous future for
the region.
18.12 Turning to the budgetary aspects, the Minister
says:
"A budget of €945,000 for twelve months
has been proposed, an increase of €5,000 on last year's budget
equivalent to a rise of 0.5%. This is due to a slight increase
in missions' costs, due to a higher number of flights within Europe
to meet interlocutors, as well as an increase in the contingency
fund. At this time of austerity and budget cuts, we are working
to ensure that the EUSR gives maximum value for money.
"After extensive negotiations on the budget
resulting in a decrease from what the EU initially proposed —
due to maintaining the EUSR's financial officer as a part-time
position rather than full-time as proposed — and only a
very slight increase overall, HMG is now content with the budget.
The budget will be found from within the existing CFSP allocation,
and will not therefore entail additional costs for the UK."
18.13 The Minister provides details of the draft
budget (which are at the annex to this chapter of our Report),
and says that he has "reserved final approval of the budget
until confirmation of the date of a discussion of horizontal issues
around EU Special Representatives", but does not expect that
it will now change.
Conclusion
18.14 We are grateful to the Minister for all
the evidence that he has provided to demonstrate the validity
of his continuing positive assessment of Mr Leon's work, and about
the proposed budget for the next twelve months.
18.15 We commend him and his officials for having
driven down the cost of the 2012-13 budget, and for continuing
to hold the line with regard to the one for the year to come.
18.16 We now clear the Council Decision.
Annex: Detail of Proposed Budget:~
"Personnel expenditure = €604,276.70:
a decrease of 0.7% on last year's budget line. The budget covers
the salaries of the EUSR, and 1.5 members of administrative staff.
It also covers the daily allowances of three Political Advisors
seconded by EU institutions/ MS, and insurance for the EUSR and
travelling members of the team. The salary level of the EUSR was
not open to challenge in the negotiation of the individual mandate,
but salary levels for EUSRs in general will form part of future
horizontal negotiations.
"Missions = €220,770: an increase
of 0.5% on last year's budget line. It covers transport, per diems
and accommodation. 63 missions for the EUSR and his team are foreseen
to the Southern Mediterranean Region, 63 to Europe for consultations
with MFAs, and 6 missions to the USA for possible discussions
in Washington and under the framework of the UN. An increase in
the budget for flights reflects strong international appetite
for discussion of Arab Spring issues, and the EUSR's need to engage
with a wide variety of interlocutors.
"Running expenditure = €68,790:
a decrease of 21% on last year's budget line. It covers costs
for areas such as office support, equipment and supplies, IT services,
office rent, interpretation, training, security services, financial
and audit costs.
"Capital expenditure = €6,750: an
increase of 242% on last year's budget line. It is for purchase
of communication, security and office equipment. The increase
is due to purchases of office furniture, IT equipment and security
items. The UK questioned the EEAS on the need for this increase,
and we were informed the items were necessary to the EUSR's work.
"Representation = €6,000: 29% less
than last year's budget line. €500/month is covered in the
budget for additional representation costs.
"Contingencies = €38,413: a 97%
increase on the previous year. This contingency reserve can only
be used with prior written approval by the EU Commission."
77 Article 33 TEU says that "The Council may,
on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, appoint a special representative
with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues. The special
representative shall carry out his mandate under the authority
of the High Representative." Article 31(2) TEU provides
for his or her appointment to be adopted, not by unanimity as
is normally the case with decisions relating to the EU's external
action and common foreign and security policy, but by QMV. Back
78
For full information, see eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm. Back
79
See headnote: (32815) 10794/11 : HC 428-xxix (2010-12), chapter
2 (8 June 2011). Back
80
See headnote: (32981) -: HC 428-xxxiii (2010-12), chapter 12
(13 July 2011). Back
81
See headnote: (33915) -: HC 86-iv (2012-13), chapter 20 (14
June 2012). Back
82
The Deauville Partnership provides support for the political and
economic transitions of the people in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco,
Libya, Jordan and Yemen. The Partnership includes the G8 countries
(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom,
and the United States), the EU and regional partners (Kuwait,
Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE). The Partnership also
includes international financial institutions and organisations.
The Islamic Development Bank is the rotating chairman of the IFI
platform that includes: the African Development Bank, the Arab
Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab Monetary Fund,
the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, the International Finance Corporation, the International
Monetary Fund, the African Development Bank, the OPEC Fund for
International Development, and the World Bank. See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/deauville-partnership. Back
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