4 The EU Special Representative (EUSR)
for the Horn of Africa
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| Council Decision amending Decision 2012/329/CFSP extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the Horn of Africa
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| Legal base | Articles 28, 31 ( 2 ) and 33 TEU; QMV
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 18 June 2013 and Minister's letter of 11 June 2013
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (33961) —: HC 86-iv (2012-13), chapter 24 (14 June 2012); also see (33367) —: HC 428-xliii (2010-12), chapter 21 (7 December 2011) and (33288) —: HC 428-xl (2010-12), chapter 11 (2 November 2011)
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| Discussion in Council | Before 31 June 2013
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Not cleared; further information requested
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Background
4.1 For these purposes, the Horn of Africa is defined as the
countries belonging to the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD)[12] — Djibouti,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda.
4.2 On 2 November 2011, the Committee cleared
a Council Secretariat paper that responded to Member States' concern
as to how the EU could respond coherently and cohesively to the
various threats from the region — particularly piracy —
and tackle their root causes. After analysing a number of inter-linked
challenges and the EU's current engagement with the area, the
paper proposed a Strategic Framework for the EU to achieve its
objectives of peace, stability, security prosperity and accountable
government in the Horn of Africa. The High Representative and
the European External Action Service, a new EUSR, EU Delegations
in the region, the Commission and Member States would work together
to implement this Framework.
4.3 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
supported the Strategic Framework, and also the proposed new EUSR,
who would work closely with the extant EUSR for Sudan and South
Sudan. Last December, the Committee cleared the Council Decision
establishing the new position, to which Mr Alexander Rondos (a
Greek diplomat with extensive experience in the Greek Prime Minister's
office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and international organisations,
including the World Bank, with experience in African matters and
who had worked in East Africa during his career) was subsequently
appointed.
4.4 The Minister said then that the new EUSR
would add significant value by:
— providing
coherence and coordination to the EU's Brussels and regionally-based
machinery. In Somalia, this would involve coordinating the various
strands of the EU's work, including on: the EU Training Mission
(EUTM); coordinating donor support to areas most affected by piracy;
wider support to the military efforts on piracy where EUNAVFOR
is the key player, and EU support for the African Union Mission
in Somalia (AMISOM);
— providing the EU with a regional perspective/approach
to the Horn of Africa (particularly important for Somalia where
the regional stakeholders hold a lot of influence);
— adding impetus to the EU's Horn of Africa
strategic framework;
— lobbying key international actors, including
non-traditional partners in the Gulf region and countries that
are active on, for example, counter-piracy (India, China, South
Korea);
— ensuring the EU played a full role in
regional stability and Somalia's Djibouti Peace Process by enhancing
the quality, intensity and impact of the EU's multi-faceted engagement
in the Horn of Africa;
— contributing to developing and implementing
a coherent, effective and balanced EU approach to the piracy issue,
encompassing all strands of EU political, security and development
action and be the EU's key interlocutor with the international
community, including the Indian Ocean region; and
— coordinating the EU response to any future
crises in the region.
4.5 A year ago, the Minister reported that Mr
Rondos had so far fully met his mandate, particularly with regard
to ensuring that the EU played a full role in regional stability
and Somalia's Djibouti Peace Process. The only significant change
to the new mandate was to establish a presence in Mogadishu; this
was politically important in order to maximise the EUSR's impact
with Somali interlocutors, and would be a precursor to establishing
a full European External Action Service compound in Mogadishu
International Airport in due course.[13]
Our assessment
4.6 We had no wish to hold up this straightforward
extension of an important mandate, and cleared the draft Council
Decision.
4.7 But we did so reluctantly. Once again, we
were presented with only a partial picture, since we were provided
with no financial information. As we had said with other EUSR
mandate renewals that were similarly deficient, this suggested
both a certain lack of "quality assurance" in the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, and an attitude on the part of the European
External Action Service that was reminiscent of its predecessors
in the Council secretariat — that even when matters were
straightforward, they could be left until the last moment because
Parliamentary scrutiny did not need to be factored into the relevant
timeline. This was, we said, unsatisfactory, and should not continue.
4.8 We therefore again asked the Minister to
inform us, when he furnished the relevant financial information
on this and the other relevant EUSR mandates, about what he was
doing to ensure that, in future, the EEAS provided draft EUSR
Council Decisions and the relevant financial information in good
time so that they could be properly scrutinised and, if any questions
do arise, they could be answered without unnecessary pressure
of time.[14]
4.9 We return to this issue later in the Conclusion
to this chapter of our Report.
The draft Council Decision
4.10 The draft Council Decision extends the
EUSR mandate, which expires on 30 June 2013, for four months,
to 31 October 2013.
The Government's view
4.11 The Minister professes himself fully supportive
of the EUSR, and continues his comments thus:
"Over the past 18 months EUSR Rondos has added
significant value to the EU's work in the region and is helping
to achieve UK policy objectives for the Horn of Africa through
a mandate that reflects UK policy goals, in particular, by:
a. "Providing coherence and coordination
to the EU's Brussels and regional machinery, in order to maximise
the EU's leverage on political, security and defence work in the
Horn of Africa. The focus has been on Somalia, and would continue
to be under any mandate extension, co-ordinating the various strands
of EU work, including on: the EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM);
coordinating donor support to areas most affected by piracy; wider
support to the military efforts on piracy where EUNAVFOR is the
key player; and EU support for the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM);
b. "Providing the EU with a regional perspective/approach
to the Horn of Africa. This is particularly important, given
the potential for any additional instability to have wider implications
across the Horn. It is also important for Somalia where the continuing
support of regional stakeholders will be critical if we are to
secure further progress in Somalia;
c. "Adding impetus to the EU's Horn of Africa
Strategic Framework, agreed November 2011, which sets out the
EU's approach to improving political stability, security and economic
growth in the region;
d. "Lobbying key international actors, including
regional and Gulf partners, as well as countries that are active
on, for example, counter-piracy (India, China, South Korea); and,
e. "Co-ordinating the EU response to regional
crises, as required by the EUSR's mandate.
"In addition, since the EUSR's mandate was last
considered in June 2012, the EUSR has led the EU response to several
significant changes in the Horn of Africa, including, but not
exclusively: the end of the political transition in Somalia with
a new, more effective Government; the change in political leadership
in Ethiopia following the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi
on 20 August 2012; and the election of Uhuru Kenyatta as President
of Kenya."
4.12 With regard to UK interests, the Minister
says:
"We judge that this position continues to be
politically important to the UK. Somalia is a high priority for
the UK. It is in the interests of Somalia, the region and the
wider international community, including the UK, that recent progress
in the country continues. The UK co-chaired the Somalia Conference
on 7 May 2013 with the Federal Government of Somalia. The EUSR
helps achieve UK objectives for the Horn of Africa region through
a mandate that reflects our policy goals.
"The EUSR's budget from 25 June 2012 to 30 June
2013 was €4.9 million. Of this, €2.7 million was earmarked
to pay for the establishment of an EU presence in Mogadishu International
Airport. However, the EUSR set up a lease agreement with the
UN for office space and accommodation which has led to substantial
savings. The High Representative has proposed a four month extension
of the EUSR's mandate, to be funded by the underspend, up to 31
October 2013. The European External Action Service (EEAS) has
confirmed that spending will continue along existing lines and
that the cost of the four-month extension will cost less than
the underspend. We continue to push for additional budgetary
information so that the Scrutiny Committees have all the necessary
information upon which they can make a decision. We are the only
Member State pushing for this information which demonstrates the
UK's strong commitment to good financial management and our close
scrutiny of EU spend. The EEAS have promised to provide further
details next week which we will pass on to the Scrutiny Committees
as soon as we receive it.[15]
4.13 Looking ahead, the Minister says:
"There will be a discussion and review of the
EUSR's mandate and budget in October which will take into account:
recent developments in the region; the outcomes of the EU-Somalia
Conference on Somalia in Brussels on 16 September, where a New
Deal Compact between Somalia and the international community will
be agreed; and the new responsibilities for Sudan and South Sudan
as the mandate for the EUSR for Sudan and South Sudan expires."
4.14 On the budgetary aspects in particular,
he says:
"The UK supports the no-cost extension of this
mandate by four months. We will carefully examine the detail
of the renewal in October, particularly in terms of the budget,
but also in relation to objectives after the EU Conference on
Somalia, and the new responsibilities for Sudan and South Sudan.
"
The Minister's letter of 11 June 2013
4.15 The Minister's letter relates to the issues
discussed in paragraphs 4.08 and 4.09 above. He writes thus:
"I am writing to let your Committee know of
plans to amend the mandates of nine of the current twelve EUSRs
that will end on 30 June 2013. Before writing, I wanted
to ensure we had made progress in the PSC, where we have been
arguing for changes to some of the proposals on EUSR mandates.
"On 3 May High Representative for Foreign Affairs
Baroness Ashton proposed changes to the current EUSR arrangements
for this year's round of mandate renewals. (Her letter is enclosed).[16]
I welcome the fact that Baroness Ashton is thinking seriously
about keeping EUSR mandates under close review and is willing
to flex them with respect to changing circumstances. My officials
have made clear it is vital that EUSRs represent value for money
and deliver tangible outcomes for the EU — and there should
be appetite for ending mandates when objectives have been achieved,
or EUSRs are not fulfilling mandates. We have therefore welcomed
the broad approach.
"However, these proposals were presented at
short notice and close to the mandate renewal date. In addition,
we and other Member States disagreed with some of the proposals
made, for example that certain EUSR mandates should not be renewed.
Baroness Ashton did, after due consideration, amend the proposals
and agreement on the final set was only reached in the PSC[17]
late on 7 June.
"I regret this delay in getting draft mandates
to you. My officials have made clear, on repeated occasions,
the need for all Council Decisions authorising mandate and budgetary
renewals to be scrutinised by your committees, and that the EEAS
should give you ample time for that. I intend to write to Baroness
Ashton once the mandate renewal process is completed, to comment
on the process for mandate renewals this year, and specifically
to remind her of the need to give Parliament enough time for scrutiny.
"On the substance of the mandate renewals, they
are currently under discussion by technical and legal experts
in Brussels, and you will shortly be receiving the relevant Explanatory
Memoranda. I am pleased to report that pressure from the UK has
resulted in reductions in proposed budgetary costs. We will continue
to ensure value for money in the coming days.
"You may recall that we have long pushed for,
and the EEAS has long promised, a horizontal review of EUSRs.
The PSC has now agreed that a discussion on EUSR policy shall
take place in October, including on the procedure for renewing
EUSR mandates. Further to that discussion the EEAS will make
a proposal for a review of EUSR guidelines."
Conclusion
4.16 We commend the Minister and his officials
once again for ploughing the seemingly lonely furrow of insisting
on budgetary discipline and transparency, and look forward to
receiving the further financial information that he is rightly
seeking.
4.17 The various detailed proposals in the
HR's letter to PSC Ambassadors are dealt with in separate EMs
on the EUSR mandates in questions. Here, we concentrate on the
general issues raised in her letter and the Minister's.
4.18 A further draft Council Decision will
be forthcoming in October. Given what has happened now and what
happened a year ago (c.f. paragraphs 4.07 and 4.08 above), it
is beginning to seem fruitless to ask that it be submitted in
good time and in sufficient detail for effective scrutiny. We
understand that the Minister has now written on no less than three
occasions to the HR about the need for timely submission of Council
Decisions such as these (and not only these, but on other matters
too, as the Minister will recall from other correspondence with
us) — all to no avail. As the HR herself notes, the Committee
is once again faced with nine mandate renewals and two further
new budgets, with no time for proper scrutiny.
4.19 We feel bound to say that the behaviour
of the EEAS is tantamount to regarding the scrutiny process, and
the House, with disrespect: contrary to their apparent perception,
CFSP is the prerogative of the Member States, and proper, prior
Parliamentary scrutiny of its manifestations is central to it,
not — as seems to be the EEAS view — a tiresome addendum
that can be taken for granted.
4.20 Why did the HR leave it until 3 May before
putting any proposals to the PSC? And what happened thereafter,
to make it unavoidable that a sufficient degree of agreement was
not reached until three weeks before most of the mandates, and/or
the budgets associated with them, were due to expire?
4.21 The Minister talks approvingly of the
HR "thinking seriously about keeping EUSR mandates under
close review" and being "willing to flex them with respect
to changing circumstances" — which we would have expected
to be standard practice. A year ago, a review was promised, which
was to be delivered by mid-2013. What has happened between last
summer and now?
4.22 Instead, there is to be "a discussion
on EUSR policy" in the PSC in October, including on the procedure
for renewing EUSR mandates, and then a "proposal" from
the EEAS "for a review of EUSR guidelines". All of
this sounds worryingly vague, and lacking any sense of urgency
or strategic focus. What is meant by these ambiguous formulations?
4.23 In light of these criticisms, we are
not content to clear the Decision from scrutiny.
4.24 We look forward to receiving a copy of
the Minister's promised letter to the HR. However, we would also
like the Minister to provide the answer to these other questions,
and to tell us what else he proposes to do — other than
writing this further letter — to bring it home to the EEAS
and its leader that this sort of conduct will simply not suffice
in future.
4.25 We will also question the Minister further
about parliamentary scrutiny of EUSR mandates when he comes to
give evidence on Thursday 4 July.
12 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental
Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was founded
in 1986. The IGAD mission is to assist and complement the efforts
of the Member States to achieve, through increased cooperation:
Food Security and environmental protection; promotion and maintenance
of peace and security and humanitarian affairs; and economic cooperation
and integration. For full information on IGAD, see http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/recs/igad.htm. Back
13
For the full background to the establishment of this new EUSR
role, see (33961) -: HC 86-iv (2012-13), chapter 24 (14 June
2012) referred to in the headnote. Back
14
Ibid. Back
15
See Annex 1 to this chapter of our Report for full information. Back
16
And is reproduced at Annex 2 to this chapter of our Report. Back
17
The PSC (or Permanent Security Committee ) consists of ambassador-level
officials from national delegations who, by virtue of article
38 TEU, under the authority of the High Representative and the
Council, monitor the international situation in areas covered
by the CFSP and exercise political control and strategic direction
of crisis management operations, as set out in article 43 TEU. Back
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