12 EU Special Representative in Bosnia
and Herzegovina
(35032)
| Council Decision amending Decision 2011/426/CFSP appointing the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina
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Legal base | Articles 28, 31 (2 ) and 33 TEU; QMV
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Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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Basis of consideration | EM of 12 June 2013
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Previous Committee Report | None; but see (33960) : HC 86-iv (2012-13), chapter 23 (14 June 2012) and (34725) : HC 86-xxxiv (2012-13), chapter 12 (13 March 2013): also (32951) : HC 428-xxxii (2010-12), chapter 17 (6 July 2011); (32579) : HC 428-xx (2010-12), chapter 8 (16 March 2011); and (31844), (31856-66) and (31884) : HC 428-i (2010-12), chapter 66 (8 September 2010)
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Discussion in Council | To be determined
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Committee's assessment | Politically important
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Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
12.1 EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are appointed to represent
Common Foreign and Security Policy where the Council agrees that
an additional EU presence on the ground is needed to deliver the
political objectives of the Union. They are established under
Article 33 of the Treaty on European Union and are appointed by
the Council. Their purpose is to represent the EU in troubled
regions and countries and to play an active part in promoting
the interests and the policies of the EU.
12.2 An EUSR is appointed by Council through
the legal act of a Council Decision. The substance of his or her
mandate depends on the political context of the deployment. Some
provide, inter alia, a political backing to a CSDP operation;
others focus on carrying out or contribute to developing an EU
policy. Some EUSRs are resident in their country or region of
activity; others work on a travelling basis from Brussels.[55]
12.3 All EUSRs carry out their duties under the
authority and operational direction of the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR; Baroness
Catherine Ashton). Each is financed out of the CFSP budget. In
addition, Member States also contribute regularly through, for
example, seconding some of the EUSR's staff members.
The EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina
12.4 The internationally brokered Dayton Agreement
ended the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It established
BiH as a state comprising two Entities, each with a high degree
of autonomy: the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation (FBiH).
It also designated the Office of the High Representative (OHR)
to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace
Agreement on behalf of the international community and coordinate
the activities of the civilian organisations operating in BiH.
12.5 The Peace Implementation Council (PIC)
55 countries and international organisations that sponsor and
direct the peace implementation process oversees all this.
The PIC Steering Board nominates the HR; the UN Security Council
(which approved the Dayton Agreement and the deployment of international
troops in BiH) then endorses the nomination. The Steering Board
also provides the HR with political guidance. The Steering Board
members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United
Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of the European Union,
the European Commission, and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference
(OIC), which is represented by Turkey. In Sarajevo, the HR chairs
weekly meetings of the Ambassadors to BiH of the Steering Board
members. In addition, the Steering Board meets at the level of
political directors three times a year. At the outset the HR
was "double-hatted" as EUSR.
12.6 The longstanding goal has always been for
BiH to work its way towards European accession. But things have
not gone according to plan. The BiH authorities need to deliver
five objectives (well established, approved by the PIC SB and
all previously recognized by BiH authorities as obligations) revolving
around creating a sustainable, multi-ethnic, democratic, law-based
State, and fulfil two conditions signing of a BiH Stabilisation
and Association Agreement, and a positive assessment of the situation
in BiH by the PIC SB based on full compliance with the Dayton
Agreement. Delivery or fulfilment of these "Five Objectives
and Two Conditions" has, however, proved elusive.
12.7 On 1 September 2011 Peter Sorensen was appointed
EUSR to BiH and also Head of the EU Delegation in BiH. At the
same time, the EUSR mandate was transferred from Valentin Inzko,
who retained the role of High Representative.
12.8 Our and our predecessors' consideration
of the process up to that point are set out in a number of previous
Reports.[56]
12.9 Although the EUSR mandate runs until 30
June 2015, the budget runs from June to June. Council Decision
2012/330/CFSP extended the budget until 30 June 2013. Our Report
outlines in depth the political context at that time.[57]
12.10 Our most recent Report under reference
concerned the renewal, for the second time, of contingency measures
designed to reinforce the EUSR role, so as to include not only
the ability to use the incentives provided by the EU accession
process but also the possibility of imposing restrictive measures,
such as travel restrictions and asset or funding freezes, against
local political troublemakers. Renewal reflected the continuing
lack of progress. Despite initial encouraging signs early in 2012,
the collapse of the governing coalition in June had stalled the
reform process. Progress on constitutional reform and agreement
of an EU coordination mechanism was now required before BiH could
move to the next stage of its EU process. BiH had missed several
deadlines agreed at a High Level Dialogue with the Commission
aimed at meeting the requirements for a credible EU membership
application. Similarly, there had been little progress on meeting
conditionality for NATO membership or the closure of the OHR.
There had continued to be an increase in provocative nationalist
rhetoric from the Republika Srpska questioning the sustainability
of the BiH state.[58]
The draft Council Decision
12.11 Against this background, this draft Council
Decision again amends Council Decision 2011/426/CFSP, so as to
provide the EUSR's budget from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014. It
continues to cover each of the elements of the EUSR mandate set
out below, viz. to:
offer
the Union's advice and facilitate the political process;
ensure consistency and coherence of Union
action;
facilitate progress on political, economic
and European priorities;
monitor and advise the executive and
legislative authorities at all levels of government in BiH and
liaise with BiH authorities and political parties;
ensure the implementation of the Union's
efforts in the whole range of activities in the field of the rule
of law and the security sector reform promote overall Union coordination
of, and give local political direction to Union efforts in tackling
organised crime and corruption, and in this context, provide the
HR and the Commission with assessments and advice as necessary;
without prejudice to the military chain
of command, offer the EU Force Commander political guidance on
military issues with a local political dimension, in particular
concerning sensitive operations, relations with local authorities
and with the local media. Consult with the EU Force Commander
before taking political action that may have an impact on the
security situation;
coordinate and implement the Union's
communication efforts on EU issues towards the public in BiH;
promote the process of EU integration
through targeted public diplomacy and EU outreach activities designed
to ensure a broader understanding and support from the BiH public
on EU related matters, including by means of engagement of local
civil society actors;
contribute to the development and consolidation
of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in BiH, in
accordance with the EU human rights policy and EU Guidelines on
Human Rights;
engage with relevant BiH authorities
on their full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY);
in line with the EU integration process,
advise, assist, facilitate and monitor political dialogue on the
necessary constitutional changes;
maintain close contacts and consultations
with the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other
relevant international organisations working in the country;
provide advice to the HR as necessary
concerning natural or legal persons on whom restrictive measures
could be imposed in view of the situation in BiH;
without prejudice to the applicable chains
of command, help to ensure that all Union instruments in the field
are applied coherently to attain the Union's policy objectives.
The Government's view
12.12 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 12 June
2013, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington), recalls that
in March 2011, the EU agreed a strategy for BiH that: in broad
terms, set out an enhanced EU presence in BiH, led by the EUSR,
with a focus on moving BiH towards its EU future; sets out the
three conditions for BiH's Stabilisation and Association Agreement
(SAA) to come into force; and retained the important safeguards
of the executive civilian mandate of the Office of the High Representative
(OHR) and the military executive mandate of the EU's peacekeeping
troops in Operation EUFOR Althea.[59]
12.13 The Minister says that, following his appointment
as EUSR on 1 September 2011, Peter Sorensen, has strengthened
the EU's visibility and political impact in BiH, taking the lead
in supporting BiH in EU-related matters:
"Sorensen is a respected and trusted interlocutor
who carries real weight with key Bosnian politicians from all
three constituent parties (Bosniak, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat).
His recent facilitation of talks aimed at amending the Constitution
to bring it into line with the European Convention on Human Rights
ended with no resolution in April. However, we believe the EUSR
mandate remains critical to galvanising BiH's leaders into making
the reforms needed to allow them to submit a credible application
for candidate status."
12.14 The Minister also notes that in line with
the EU strategy adopted in March 2011:
"the new EU presence has, to date, coexisted
successfully with the High Representative. The UK will continue
to insist that the Office of the High Representative (OHR) remain
in place (or is potentially "off-shored" located
outside BiH with its executive powers retained if the security
situation becomes sufficiently stable) until the set of five conditions
and two objectives (known as the '5+2') agreed by the international
community for the closure of the OHR are met. The Peace Implementation
Council (PIC) will continue to review progress against these '5+2'
at its regular meetings. An increase in the EUSR's resources
does not prejudice a future PIC decision regarding closure of
the OHR. Both the OHR and EUSR continue to work together effectively
on the ground and focus on complementary tasks."
12.15 The Minister also reiterates the Government's
support for the original Council Decision to strengthen the EU
presence in BiH:
"We believe it is important to maintain a balance
of incentives and deterrents to encourage EU-related reforms,
whilst retaining international safeguards such as the OHR and
EUFOR Operation Althea's executive mandate."
12.16 With regard to the proposed budget for
the next 12 months 5.4 million the Minister
says that this 2% increase on the previous budget of 5.25
million covers increased internal travel in BiH for the EUSR ahead
of the 2014 general election and enhanced outreach and media activity.
He notes that:
"The UK has challenged the proposed budget robustly.
There will be no increase in staff numbers or contingencies and
per diems will be reduced from October 2013. We will of
course continue to ensure that negotiations on the budget are
fully cogniscent [sic] of HMG's policy of opposing any overall
increase in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
budget and ensure value for money for the UK taxpayer."
Conclusion
12.17 On 11 June 2013, the EUSR issued the
following statement:
"Peaceful demonstrations are part of the
democratic political process and citizens have every right to
always make their voices heard. Public institutions must be accountable
every day of the year.
"Today's protest is an expression of a clear
demand from citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the institutions,
especially at state level, must put far more focus on solving
the priority issues. Not least among these is a permanent solution
at state level to a single reference number.
"It is now of vital importance that Bosnia
and Herzegovina's institutions work at full speed to resolve a
number of urgent issues. The accession of Croatia to the EU on
1 July 2013 presents important implications for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
These can only be dealt with by a fully functioning system at
all levels, especially the Council of Ministers and the BiH Parliamentary
Assembly. We therefore strongly urge institutional and political
leaders to meet the citizens' interest, constructively engage
and find solutions now."[60]
12.18 As implied by the Minister, this plainly
indicates that much still needs to be done to move the political
process in the right direction. The budget accordingly seems
appropriate, and the Minister and his officials are to be commended
for having restrained the proposed increase to a modest level.
12.19 We now clear the draft Council Decision.
55 For full information on all the EUSRs, see http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm. Back
56
See headnote: (32951) -: HC 428-xxxii (2010-12), chapter 17
(6 July 2011); (32579) -: HC 428-xx (2010-11), chapter 8 (16
March 2011); and (31844), (31856-66) and (31884) -: HC 428-i
(2010-11), chapter 66 (8 September 2010). Back
57
See headnote: (33960) -: HC 86-iv (2012-13), chapter 23 (14 June
2012). Back
58
See headnote: (34725) -: HC 86-xxxiv (2012-13), chapter 12 (13
March 2013). Back
59
On 2 December 2004 the European Union (EU) launched an EU-led
military operation in BiH - Operation EUFOR Althea, as part of
the Common Security and Defence Policy in support of BiH. The
UN Security Council authorized EUFOR Althea as a legal successor
to SFOR, the previous NATO led operation. Operation Althea's
job is to provide a military presence in order to contribute to
the safe and secure environment, deny conditions for a resumption
of violence and manage any residual aspect of the General Framework
Agreement for Peace in BiH (also known as Dayton/Paris Agreement).
At the moment, EUFOR deploys around 600 troops in theatre, which
are provided by 18 EU Member States, Albania, Chile, the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Switzerland and Turkey. See http://www.euforbih.org/
for full information on EUFOR Althea. Back
60
See http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/News.aspx?newsid=5749. Back
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