15 EU Special Representative for
the Middle East Peace Process
| (35061)
—
—
| Council Decision extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process
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| Legal base | Articles 28, 31(2) and 33 TEU; QMV
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 19 June 2013
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (32601) — and (32982) —: HC 428-xlviii (2010-12), chapter 23 (18 January 2012), HC 428-xxxv (2010-12), chapter 4 (7 September 2011), HC 428-xxxiii (2010-12), chapter 5 (13 July 2011) and HC 428-xxvi (2010-12), chapter 4 (11 May 2011)
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| To be discussed in Council | June 2012
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared; further information requested
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Background
15.1 EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are appointed to represent
Common Foreign and Security Policy where the Council agrees that
an additional EU presence on the ground is needed to deliver the
political objectives of the Union. They were established under
Article 18 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and are appointed by the
Council. Their purpose is to represent the EU in troubled regions
and countries and to play an active part in promoting the interests
and the policies of the EU.
15.2 An EUSR is appointed by Council through
the legal act of a Council Decision (formerly a Joint Action).
The substance of his or her mandate depends on the political context
of the deployment. Some provide, inter alia, a political
backing to a CSDP operation; others focus on carrying out or contributing
to developing an EU policy. Some EUSRs are resident in their country
or region of activity; others work on a travelling basis from
Brussels.
15.3 All EUSRs carry out their duties under the
authority and operational direction of the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR; Baroness
Catherine Ashton). Each is financed out of the CFSP budget. In
addition, Member States also contribute regularly through, for
example, seconding some of the EUSR's staff members.
The EUSR to Middle East Peace Process
15.4 The incumbent, Dr Andreas Reinicke, was
appointed in February 2012: a German diplomat with more than 25
years experience, who had devoted most of his career to the Middle
East, with deep and extensive knowledge about the Middle East
Peace Process, including earlier in his career being Head of the
Representative Office of the Federal Republic of Germany in Ramallah
and having held several other senior positions in the German Foreign
Ministry dealing with Near East affairs. His mandate runs until
30 June 2013.[71]
The draft Council Decision
15.5 The draft Council Decision extends Dr Reinicke's
current mandate for a period of 12 months, until 30 June 2014,
with a provision to review developments on the ground between
now and 31 December 2013.
15.6 The mandate will thus continue to be based
on the EU's policy objectives regarding the Middle East peace
process, including pursuing a comprehensive peace and a two-State
solution. This will involve providing an active and efficient
Union contribution to actions and initiatives aiming to achieve
a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, facilitating
and maintaining close contact with all the parties and other relevant
countries and international organisations, supporting peace negotiations
and contributing to the implementation of international agreements
reached.
The Government's view
15.7 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 19 June
2013, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) says that he
supports this approach.
15.8 The Minister continues his comments as follows:
"The future of the Middle East peace process,
and of the Quartet, will to a very large degree depend on the
outcome of current efforts. The High Representative has therefore
at this stage proposed to extend the mandate for twelve months,
with a review scheduled to take place before 31 December 2013.
This proposal aims to keep all options open when it comes to
the nature of the EU's engagement on the peace process after 2013.
"Efforts to re-launch the peace process, led
by the United States, are ongoing. The UK and the EU have been
pushing for these efforts for the past six months. The Foreign
Secretary and the EU High Representative have consistently expressed
the UK's and the EU's commitment to contribute to the ongoing
efforts to resume negotiations. We also continue to push for
the EU to pursue an active stance in support of efforts to re-launch
the peace process. Ending the mandate of the EU Special Representative
for the Middle East peace process at this time would send a contradictory
message about the UK and the EU's commitment to US-led efforts
and to a long-term, sustainable peace in the Middle East.
"The EU Special Representative for the Middle
East peace process also represents the EU in the preparatory meetings
for the Quartet, which may be called upon to play a more active
role in the event of progress on efforts to re-launch the peace
process.
"The work of the EU Special Representative for
the Middle East peace process is monitored through reports and
regular appearances at Political and Security Committee meetings,
most recently in April 2013. The EEAS also circulates reports
via Corespondance Europenne
of the EU Special Representative for the Middle
East peace process's visits to the region, most recently in May
2013. During his most recent visit, the EU Special Representative
for the Middle East peace process held meetings with key figures
from all relevant parties. However, the emphasis in such reports
tends to be on updates on the situation on the ground, rather
than reporting on objectives or work which is underway. The EU
Special Representative for the Middle East peace process was not
a key player in the EU's response to the Palestinian status upgrade
at the United Nations General Assembly in November 2012, despite
this being significant to the Middle East peace process. However,
the EU itself did not take an active role on this, as many individual
Member States made decisions at an early stage regarding their
position, so it is questionable as to what role he could have
played. The EU Special Representative for the Middle East peace
process maintains contact with officials working on Middle East
peace process policy in London and other EU capitals to develop
EU policy on the peace process.
"There is scope for the EU Special Representative
to play a more active role in driving development and implementation
of EU policy on the Middle East peace process, which we will continue
to encourage. However, this role and the engagement of the Special
Representative has been an important demonstration of EU and Member
States' commitment to progress on the peace process.
"The draft for the extended mandate provides
that the EU Special Representative for the Middle East peace process's
staff shall be co-located with the relevant European External
Action Service departments in Union delegations in order to ensure
coherence and consistency of their respective activities. The
government supports this approach. Foreign and Commonwealth officials
will also continue to work with the EU Special Representative
for the Middle East peace process and his office to develop and
refine EU policy on the Middle East peace process and the UK's
position with regard to this."
15.9 With regard to the Financial Implications,
the Minister says that the budget for six months is currently
calculated to be €506,500, stemming from the political decision
to renew the mandate for 12 months, but with a six month review
clause:
"We judge that a six month budget is favourable
as it allows us to better scrutinise consumption and push to amend
the budget down at the six month review, if appropriate."
15.10 The Minister's detailed breakdown and
analysis of the budget is at the Annex to this chapter of our
Report.
Conclusion
15.11 We have commented elsewhere on the
inconsistencies in the presentation of budgetary information regarding
all the mandate extensions we consider in this Report: in at least
one case, its absence suggesting an assumption on the part of
the EEAS that its proposals will all be accepted, only to find
itself caught off guard when it is reminded that Member States
may come to a different conclusion (c.f. the proposal for the
EUSR to Sudan and South Sudan).[72]
15.12 We also note that Dr Reinecke's appointment
was carried out by way of a Council Decision: whereas, in the
case of the new EUSR to Afghanistan, it would seem that we are
to be presented with a fait accompli — a situation
that we have asked the Minister to clarify.[73]
15.13 Our assumption is that the question
at issue is whether, all hopes to the contrary notwithstanding,
the next six months do not lead to any improvement on the ground,
and it becomes clear that having a separate EUSR to a still-stalled
MEPP can no longer be justified. We presume that the Minister
will inform the Committee of the outcome of the review, and his
views on its findings and recommendations.
- On that understanding, we now clear the Council
Decision.
71 For the full background to his appointment, see
the previous Reports referred to in the headnote. Back
72
(35054) -: See Chapter 7. Back
73
(35053) -: See Chapter 6. Back
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