16 EU training of Somali security
forces
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| Draft Council Decision amending and extending Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia)
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| Legal base | Articles 42 and 43 TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 28 May 2013
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| Previous Committee Reports | HC 86-xxv (2012-13), chapter 1 (19 December 2012); also see (31426) — : HC 5-xv (2009-10), chapter 8 (24 March 2010) and (31259) — : HC 5-vii (2009-10), chapter 2 (20 January 2010)
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| Discussion in Council | 20 December 2012 Agriculture and Fisheries Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Debated in European Committee B on 16 January 2013; further information provided
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Background
16.1 On 15 February 2010 the Council decided[39]
that the Union would conduct a military training mission, called
EUTM Somalia, in order to contribute to strengthening the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) as a functioning government serving Somali
citizens. EUTM Somalia's objective was to contribute to a comprehensive
and sustainable perspective for the development of the Somali
security sector by strengthening the Somali security forces through
the provision of specific military training, and support to the
training provided by Uganda, of 2,000 Somali recruits up to and
including platoon level, including appropriate modular and specialised
training for officers and non-commissioned officers. The full
background to its establishment and subsequent development, and
the Committee's consideration thereof, is set out in our previous
Reports.[40]
16.2 The mission is part of a wider, comprehensive
EU approach to Somalia, working with the wider international community.
The EU is also involved in EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, the
operation to tackle piracy off the coast of Somalia (of which
the UK provides the Operational Headquarters and the Operation
Commander), and EU CAP NESTOR aimed at increasing the capacity
of the region to tackle piracy themselves (for which the UK provides
a number of secondees).
The Council Decision of July 2011 amending and
extending Decision 2010/96 CFSP for another year
16.3 After evaluation of progress made in July
2011, the Council decided to extend it until December 2012 and
refocus: on command and control and specialised capabilities
and on the self training capabilities of the Somali National Security
Forces (SNSF), with the intention of transferring EU training
expertise to local actors. This was to be achieved through the
provision of military training to commanders and specialists up
to company level, and through training trainers, with a view to
transferring basic and specialist training expertise up to platoon
level under African ownership back to Somalia.
16.4 As explained in detail in our previous Reports,
these developments effectively moved ahead "under the radar",
as the Minister maintained that the information in it embodied
confidential information from the Crisis Management Concept (one
of the planning documents). A letter from the Minister in December
2011 belatedly provided some information about the Council Decision:
but it was never submitted for scrutiny.
The Council Decision of 20 December 2012
16.5 On 3 December 2012, the Minister wrote to
advise us that a fresh Council Decision was likely to be adopted
between 18-20 December 2012. The Minister went on to say that:
based on a review in late September, a fresh Crisis Management
Concept was now being drafted: all he could say at that point
was that he expected the proposal to be for a two-year mandate
extension; for the mission to relocate to Mogadishu; and to build
on previous junior officer training by shifting the focus to more
senior levels of the Somali National Security Forces. The Minister
undertook to write again once the Council Decision became available
for scrutiny.
16.6 In our response of 5 December 2012, we said
that we found it difficult to understand why this had arisen.
We noted that we had pointed out that, for several years now,
both we and our predecessor had made it clear that we relied upon
the FCO both to alert us at the earliest possible moment of this
sort of development and to avoid wherever possible situations
such as this where, in reality, proper prior scrutiny would now
be impossible — even if he were able to provide an Explanatory
Memorandum in time for the Committee's 19 December meeting, there
would be no opportunity to pursue any questions that might arise
prior to adoption by the Council.
16.7 We went on to say that, so far we could
see, we had not heard from the Minister on EUTM Somalia since
December 2011; we could not see why it was not possible for us
to have been provided with an update on the review process and
its outcome; nor why — his representations to the High Representative
and the EEAS about the need for proper scrutiny to be built into
EEAS timelines notwithstanding — the draft could not have
been provided sooner than a couple of weeks before the mandate
was due to expire. It seemed to us that once again, professed
commitments to scrutiny rang hollow.
The draft Council Decision
16.8 The draft Council Decision further amended
and extended Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP from 1 January 2013
to 31 March 2015.
16.9 With regard to the Financial Implications,
the Minister said that the budget for this Mission from its launch
until August 2011 was €4.8 million; for the period from 9
August 2011 until 31 December 2012, was also €4.8 million;
and for the next 27-month period, the reference amount was a further
€11.6 million. The increase in cost resulted predominantly
from the proposed move to Mogadishu in order to cover the more
complex nature of the activities and set up costs, including force
protection costs, investment costs and running costs (including
medical costs).[41]
16.10 In his further letter of 13 December 2012,
in response to our representations, the Minister said that scrutiny
was "an important part of open and transparent government
and .... the way of connecting British voters to EU decision-making."
He again insisted on his commitment to an effective scrutiny process.
The FCO had made a genuine and concerted effort to bring this
matter to our attention at the earliest opportunity. There were,
however, a number of factors that had unfortunately resulted in
the short timeline available for scrutiny:
"The situation in Somalia has been in flux,
with a new President elected in September and a Cabinet appointed
in November. The European External Action Service have told us
this has made their planning difficult. Throughout the autumn,
there have been continued and detailed negotiations amongst Member
States on the proposed changes to the Mission's mandate. This
included the Government seeking further detail from the EU on
issues such as the cost implications of the mandate changes (detail
essential for Parliamentary Scrutiny and UK agreement). Only
in the last week or so have we received sufficient detail from
the EU and reached provisional agreement on the way ahead for
the mission. The Council Decision could not have been drafted
until this point.
"Furthermore, the Committee would remember our
correspondence of July 2011 and December 2011 regarding this Mission
and the difficulties in providing classified documents to Parliament
for scrutiny. The September review of EUTM and the subsequent
Crisis Management Concept were once again classified documents,
so as per scrutiny procedures, they could not be submitted to
Parliament. We have therefore been unable to share a document
with the committee until we received the draft Council Decision
itself.
"FCO officials in Brussels have made representations
at all levels since September to push for an earlier receipt of
appropriate documentation as we were conscious of the timelines
for Parliamentary Scrutiny.
"Unfortunately we were still provided with the
documents at short notice, but we have nevertheless endeavoured
to provide the Committee with as much detail as we are able in
order for the scrutiny process to take place.
"It is regrettable that the Committee feels
that they may now not be able to satisfactorily scrutinise this
document. However, I would like to assure the Committee that
in this case the FCO did everything within our power to ensure
that these documents were provided to you with sufficient time
to allow the Committee to represent its views. We would again
make strong representations on this point to the European External
Action Service.
"Given the importance the Government attaches
to ensuring the continued success of this mission, which plays
a critical role in supporting the fragile security situation in
Somalia, I hope the Committee would give this matter its full
and urgent consideration. Whilst the outcome is far from ideal,
we have ensured that at a minimum, the Committee has sight of
this Decision in advance of agreement."
Our assessment
16.11 We found the Minister's response disappointing.
We felt that we did not need to be reminded of our responsibilities.
The matter was urgent only because the process hitherto had made
it so; and that process also limited the effectiveness of any
consideration that could be given to it. This was more than academic:
a mission that had begun with a short life in mind had now morphed
into one that would be, at least, nearly five years long, and
which — as it branched into security sector reform, and
political and strategic level mentoring that "ultimately"
might "support moves towards an exit strategy" —
already had at least some of the hallmarks of other such missions
that had expanded their original, limited role and proved costly
(this one would now cost at least €20 million), lengthy and
(c.f. those in the Democratic Republic of Congo) of doubtful effectiveness
(here, the Minister asserted that EUTM Somalia had been effective,
but provides no evidence). There might well be a compelling case
for this expansion, but the House was, we felt, not being given
the opportunity to examine it properly.
16.12 The Minister still did not explain why
we had not heard from him for over a year. We had never asked
for confidential documents to be deposited: on the contrary.
What we had requested, for several years was to be kept in the
picture: to be alerted when such a mandate extension was in prospect,
and to be given a broad outline of what its future shape was likely
to be. We could not see why the Minister could not had provided
this in September, nor how any confidential aspects of the review
would have been thus compromised. We did not regard "sight
of this Decision in advance of agreement" as something for
which, as the Minister implied, we should have been grateful.
16.13 Though too late ask the Minister further
questions before the Council Decision was to be adopted, we considered
that the House should nevertheless be given the opportunity to
hear more from him, as to: why he was able to provide no information
prior to his letter of 3 December; what he expected the mission
to have achieved in 27 months' time (there should be benchmarks
and review points); if he believed that it would then be wound
up; and, if not, what he then expected to happen. We accordingly
recommended that the draft Council Decision be debated in European
Committee B.
16.14 That debate took place on 16 January 2013,
and was combined with a similar "short notice" draft
Council Decision on a new military mission to Mali, EUTM Mali.[42]
The Minister's letter of 28 May 2013
16.15 The Minister provides an update on EUTM
Somalia and on a recent budget increase.
16.16 The Minister recalls that the mandate extension
(until 31 March 2015, which was agreed on 22 January 2013, following
the debate in European Committee B) will shift EUTM Somalia's
centre of operations to Mogadishu and increase the scale of its
operations, emphasizing Command and Control, training of the Somali
military trainers, and specialist training (such as in logistics
and communications). The Minister continues as follows:
"EUTM has been running for two years, training
Somali troops in Bihanga camp, Uganda. It has been operating
alongside US and Ugandan training of Somali troops. About 3000
Somali troops have been trained by EUTM so far. To date, EUTM
has been viewed as a success, providing high quality training
of Somali forces. Providing support for the development of the
security sector through the EU also represents good value for
money for the UK compared to bilateral support. The UK was also
among those Member States advocating a new EUTM mandate based
in Mogadishu.
"Advance units started to deploy to Mogadishu
from 7 May 2013. Plans for Force Protection, medical capability
and mission security are on schedule and continue to progress.
The EUTM HQ structure in Mogadishu is due to increase to 46 staff
(18 military, 4 medical and 24 security staff) by December 2013
and increase to 60 (14 more military staff) by March 2015. Given
the size of the Somali armed forces and the focus of the new mandate
we judge this staffing level to be justified.
"We currently provide two UK secondees to EUTM;
this should increase to five positions soon. The deployment of
UK personnel to EUTM Somalia is funded directly from the tri-departmental
(FCO, MOD, DFiD) Conflict Programme.
"Given our strategic interests in making progress
in developing the security sector and in supporting effective
CSDP interventions (and one of the main supporters of CSDP missions
generally), we believe that it is important to ensure that the
mission has sufficient resources to achieve its mandate. The
mission should also help deliver the security related outcomes
of the Somalia Conference in London on 7 May, specifically the
development of the Somali armed forces."
Budget background
16.17 The Minister says:
"Following the initial calculation of the EUTM
Somalia budget in December 2012, Mr Simmonds, Minister for Africa,
and I agreed the EUTM mission budget at €11.6 million to
cover common costs of the Mission and to allow the EUTM Operation
Commander to begin activity. This sum was referred to in the 'Financial
Implications' section of my Explanatory Memorandum dated 13 December
2012. In April 2013 the Operation Commander submitted a more detailed
proposed budget of €13.394 million (approximately £11.3
million) representing an increase of 15.4% on the initial estimate.
Although the EU said previously that €11.6 million would
be a maximum amount, we have closely scrutinised the new costs
and believe that they are justified. The revised UK contribution
(based on a cost share of 15.34%) will be some £1.741 million.
The cost to the UK for the FY 13/14 is estimated at £1.287
million. In 2012, the UK contribution to cover EUTM Somalia common
costs was £240,891, so this is a substantial increase in
the UK contribution. The UK funds its contributions to this operation
through the tri-departmental (MOD, FCO, DFID) peacekeeping budget,
which on current planning has sufficient capacity and flexibility
to absorb this relatively small increase.
"CSDP military operations are funded on the
basis of where the cost falls (i.e. to the Member State that deploys
the personnel). However, there are a number of common costs
(e.g. provision of HQ facilities, associated communication and
transportation costs, and commonly used port and medical facilities)
that cannot easily be allocated to one single nation. These
common costs are governed by the Athena mechanism (a committee
of EU Member State representatives who negotiate common costs
of EU military operations). The Athena Special Committee Meeting
on 26 April 2013 agreed the EUTM Somalia Budget subject to silence
procedure which ended on 2 May (allowing Mr Simmonds and me to
review these additional costs). At that meeting the UK challenged
a number of price increases (e.g. on armoured vehicles and salary
increases) and was the only Member State which did not approve
the budget increase immediately.
"REASONS FOR BUDGET INCREASE
"The increase to the proposed budget reflects
detailed work on preparing for the expansion and transfer of operations
to Somalia from the existing base in Uganda. A detailed break-down
of costs is attached (Annex A).[43]
"The increase is primarily due to the detailed
funding requirement of continuing the current EUTM structure in
Uganda, whilst establishing a new EUTM deployment into Mogadishu.
In addition, the significantly more challenging security environment
in Somalia compared with Uganda has required a revision in contractual
arrangements, in particular for improved Medical Support Services
capability and a medical evacuation system. New funds are required
for air transportation between Kampala and Mogadishu and there
is also an increase in the final price of two armoured vehicles,
due to a higher level of specification being required than originally
anticipated to provide the protection required.
"The 15% salary increase has been justified
due to an overall 40% increase in the cost of living over the
last three years (whilst the salaries of local engaged personnel
in Uganda have not increased since the start of Somalia operations
in 2010). The EUTM considered there was merit in retaining
the existing (trusted) staff rather than employing new personnel
for the remaining months of the Uganda operation and to employ
some of the existing (trusted) staff also in Mogadishu. New staff
will also be required in Somalia.
"The security and logistical challenges, as
well as a limited market from which to purchase goods and services
locally (including accommodation, offices, IT, communications),
also makes a significant difference to the overall costs of goods
and services.
"We will continue to monitor and to bear down
on costs, where appropriate, and evaluate results, including during
the next annual review. Based on this experience, I have asked
my officials to push for improvements in the process for EU budgeting
and forecasting of future requirements for EU military operations."
Conclusion
16.18 We consider three other CSDP missions
in this Report — in Mali, Niger, and the Horn of Africa.
All, to varying degrees, demonstrate challenges to the budgeting,
evaluation and forecasting process. It is notable, therefore,
that the Minister has pledged to seek the improvements described
immediately above, since the need is apparent.
16.19 We look forward to hearing more from
the Minister about his success in these areas at the time of the
next annual review (when he can explain why, unlike the other
CSDP missions, this one was not set up with an annual budget that
required endorsement via a Council Decision).
39 Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP of 15 February 2010
on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training
of Somali security forces. Back
40
See headnote. Back
41
See HC 86-xxv (2012-13), chapter 1 (19 December 2012), for full
information about the Council Decision. Back
42
The record of the debate is available at Gen Co Deb, European
Standing Committee B, 16 January 2013, cols. 3-24, and http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmgeneral/euro/130116/130116s01.htm.
For further information on EUTM Mali, see (34664) -, Chapter
17. Back
43
Reproduced at the Annex to this chapter of our Report. Back
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