Eight Report of Session 2013-14 - European Scrutiny Committee Contents


18   EU Integrated Rule of Law mission for Iraq

(35009)

Council Decision amending Decision 2010/330/CSFP on the European Union Integrated Rule of Law mission for Iraq EUJUST LEX — IRAQ

Legal baseArticles 28 and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
DepartmentForeign and Commonwealth Office
Basis of considerationMinister's letter of 27 June 2013
Previous Committee ReportsHC 83-v (2013-14), chapter 7 (12 June 2013); also see (33911) —: HC 86-vii (2012-13), chapter 13 (4 July 2012) and HC 86-iv (2012-13), chapter 9 (14 June 2012); (32849) — : HC 428-xxx (2010-12), chapter 15 (22 June 2011); (31693) —: HC 428-i (2010-11), chapter 60 (8 September 2010); (30633) —: HC 19-xviii (2008-09), chapter 18 (3 June 2009) and HC 19-xvii (2008-09), chapter 3 (13 May 2009)
Discussion in CouncilJune 2013
Committee's assessmentPolitically important
Committee's decisionCleared; further information requested

Background

18.1  EUJUST LEX-IRAQ is the EU "rule of law" mission that was established in 2005 to provide professional development opportunities for judges and others involved in developing and applying the rule of law, and to foster confidence, mutual respect and operational cooperation between the different branches of the Iraqi criminal justice system. Courses are designed to demonstrate international best practice and provide Iraqi officials with the skills required to carry out criminal investigations more effectively.

18.2  The full background to this mission and the previous Committee's consideration thereof is set out in our Reports under reference.[49]

18.3  At its first meeting in September 2010 the Committee cleared a Council Decision that altered the mandate in three ways:

—  it was extended for two years until 30 June 2012;

—  the mission's focus further shifted towards in-country training activities (although courses held in EU Member States were to continue); and

—  the mission's permanent presence within Iraq was to increase in line with the increased focus on in-country activities (five more staff in Baghdad; a new liaison office in the northern city of Erbil with 15 members of staff; four mission personnel in Basra, operating under the Baghdad office).

18.4  Two Council Decisions that the Committee cleared in 2011 increased EUJUST LEX's 2010-11 budget to €22.3 million and provided for a 2011-12 budget of a further €27.25 million. The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) said that the new budget would allow the mission to continue to deliver in-country training courses, facilitate better impact evaluation and increase Iraqi ownership of the training process. He emphasised that clear evaluation of these training courses would be a priority over the next 12 months, to demonstrate the impact of the mission's expansion in-country; and noted that, to reinforce the importance the UK placed on evaluation and ensure that it remained such a priority, a UK expert had been seconded as EUJUST LEX's head of evaluation.

18.5  The Committee commended the Minister's determination to improve the level and quality of the evaluation of EUJUST LEX's impact and looked forward to hearing more about this as and when any further mandate extension and/or budgetary increase proposals were put forward.

The 2012 Council Decision

18.6  The Council Decision covers the Mission's remaining 18 months. It was based on a strategic review, after which it had been agreed to give EUJUST LEX sufficient time "to enable it to implement a tighter, refocused mandate and make a positive impact on Rule of Law in Iraq" and "simultaneously prepare a proper exit strategy, in particular by building relations with the Iraqi Authorities to ensure a smooth transition to Iraqi ownership.... [which] will ensure that the investment and resources deployed to date will be more fully utilised as the mission moves towards closure." The Minister supported this new mandate which he said would strengthen efforts to: increase local ownership, including with co-funding in order to improve sustainability; and refocus its efforts on particular aspects of rule of law which were of most interest to the Iraqi authorities and which they wished to continue beyond 2014. The cost would be a further €27.15 million.

18.7  When it considered the Decision on 14 June 2012, the Committee:

  • noted that: with this latest budget, the EU would have spent some €118 million on EUJUST LEX; and given the Minister's (commendable, and commended) emphasis a year earlier on assessment of the Mission's achievements, it had hoped to have seen some concrete indications of such evaluation and not just a brief description of some of the activity;
  • asked for further details of: what evaluation had taken place in the past year of the impact and sustainability of the training provided, and about how the findings had been reflected in the strategic review concerning the evaluation; the cost of the UK's direct and indirect contribution thus far, for which it first asked in 2009; and what NATO training mission had been withdrawn at short notice, and why.

18.8  The Minister's detailed response was set out in our most recent previous Report on the Decision. As it provided all the information for which the Committee had asked, and raised no further questions at that juncture, the Committee cleared the draft Council Decision, with a final Report to the House.[50]

The further draft Council Decision

18.9  The mission is due to be closed on 31 December 2013.

18.10  The draft Council Decision, which we considered on 12 June, sets out a new €15,400,000 budget, covering the period from 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2014: €13,770,000 for the 2013 operational period plus €1,630,000 for the 2014 closure period. The additional funding will enable a small team to spend six months carrying out residual tasks such as organising the audit and closing accounts. The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington), provided a full range of supporting information, as set out in our previous Report and the annex to it.

18.11  The Minister recalled that closure — while right for the UK, though resisted by some other Member States back in 2012 — presents two broad challenges:

—  that the techniques instilled by EUJL become an enduring part of the Iraqi way of working; to achieve this, EUJL experts will hand over the responsibility for training to their Iraqi counterparts over the last six months of the Mission mandate; and

—  secondly, EUJL is the first CSDP mission to close in 2013 and the first to close since the establishment of a warehouse for CSDP materials; it is therefore important that the costs and process of winding up operations and salvaging or disposing of mission equipment and materials are closely monitored.

18.12  In his Explanatory Memorandum, the Minister said:

"Closure does not represent a verdict that EUJL has failed. In general the UK's attitude to CSDP missions is that they should be short-term operational tools which deploy to achieve well-defined objectives within finite timescales. Once their job has been done, we take the view that missions should close, liberating the resources which they consume for other purposes.

"However it is fair to say that closure does also reflect the fact that EUJL is an expensive and long-standing mission which — as our correspondence in 2012 reflected — has not always monitored the impact of its activities sufficiently closely. Our view in any case is that the situation in Iraq has much improved since the mission's launch in 2005 and that it is now more appropriate for security sector support to be delivered by more flexible development programmes than by an international deployment."

Our assessment

18.13   As the Minister suggested, there have been many exchanges between him and the Committee over the need for CSDP missions generally to be properly evaluated throughout their existence and to be wound up either when their job has been done or when it is plain that, for whatever reason, they are failing to deliver value for money. We were accordingly in sympathy with the broad thrust of his approach to the place of CSDP missions in the spectrum of EU external action.

18.14  We also thanked the Minister for his detailed exposition, and again commended him and his officials for their endeavours in ensuring that appropriate focus is given to winding up the mission in the most cost-efficient and effective fashion possible.

18.15  However, we were concerned over two matters. First, the Minister said nothing about a final cost-benefit review of the mission: what it had finally cost, what it had achieved over the past eight years, and what lessons it held for future such missions.

18.16  Secondly, the Minister rightly noted the importance of ensuring that the techniques instilled by EUJUST LEX-Iraq became "an enduring part of the Iraqi way of working"; and that to achieve this, complementary to the handover to Iraqi counterparts over the last six months of the Mission mandate, the European Commission was developing a long term development programme which was intended to carry forward EU Rule of Law engagement. However, he also said that only recently had he learned that there would be a gap between the Mission's closure and the start of the Commission's development programme.

18.17  Talk of the UK "pushing to manage the risk this presents", and of the EEAS consequently "exploring options for bridging activities, which includes coordinating with Member State activities" was, we felt, disturbing, since it sounded as though the EEAS had either taken its eye off this important ball or did not share the Minister's view of its role. Moreover, his remark that Member States "generally remain positive regarding Crisis Management Planning Department/CPCC work on managing the gap between EUJUST LEX Iraq closure and the DeVCo programme" did not sound like a vote of confidence.

18.18  In sum, this mission has cost a great deal of EU taxpayers' money. We did not know what it had achieved nor how the Commission and EEAS were going to ensure that its achievements were embedded and taken forward. We therefore asked if a final "VFM + lessons learned" assessment was to be performed (when, and by whom); and why, with so much lead time at their disposal, the Commission/EEAS had not properly prepared for the transition to local ownership and their own subsequent leadership role.

18.19  In the meantime, we retained the documents under scrutiny.[51]

The Minister's letter of 27 June 2013

18.20   The Minister says that the UK, along with Member States, is pressing the Commission for a final Lessons Learned and Value for Money report, to be conducted by end of 2013 and will continue to do so.

18.21  The Minister also says that: the final financial report on the mission, separate from that wider exercise, will give a full account of all technical and financial aspects related to the implementation of the mission, including a detailed narrative description covering the whole contract duration; an audit of account will also take place and that the auditor will produce an external audit report and certify the final financial statement. The purpose of the audit, the Minister says, is to certify that the financial documents submitted to the Commission comply with the financial provisions of this contract, that the expenditures declared are the actual expenditure and that all receipts have been declared.

18.22  He continues as follows:

"But the UK and other Member States are also seeking to ensure that a wider Lessons Learned exercise is conducted. As a result of UK pressure, the EEAS has established a mechanism for identifying and implementing the lessons learned from all CSDP activities. We will maintain the pressure to ensure that experience derived from EUJUST LEX and indeed all CSDP missions are applied for future mission planning."

18.23  Meanwhile, the Minister says, "it may be helpful to give a sense of the Government's own assessment of lessons learned, the achievements of this mission, and a cost/benefit analysis."

18.24  He does so as follows:

"LESSONS LEARNED — AND THE ROLE OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION

"The UK played a key role in convincing the Commission that a monitoring and evaluation methodology should be embedded in the mission's training activities from the outset. The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) capacities of the Iraqi Police Training and Qualifications Directorate will mean that good practice in monitoring and evaluation continues in the rule of law training after the EU mission leaves Iraq. The mission's evaluation officers exchanged M&E methods with international organisations including UNDP Iraq, USAID and the Red Cross, to improve the mission's assessment of outcomes and impacts.

"The UK is working hard to ensure that lessons learned in the course of this mission are conveyed to and considered by project implementers and their Iraqi counterparts following mission closure. We are also encouraging the EU to capture lessons learned to ensure that future EU CSDP missions deliver value for money as well as successful outcomes.

"In the UK Government's assessment, key lessons from the Iraq mission to consider for future missions include:

1.  "The value of co-locating the mission and EU delegation;

2.  "The importance of mission involvement in the selection of trainees;

3.  "The value added by co-ordinating political reporting with the delegation;

4.  "The importance of understanding the host cultural environment and the need to secure a Status of Mission agreement especially for launching a mission in a high-risk environment;

5.  "That mandates and budgets should realistically reflect the high security costs of working in difficult countries.

"MISSION ACHIEVEMENTS: UK ASSESSMENT

"Overall, I believe that it was right for the EU to offer Iraq substantial and sustained help to improve the Iraqi criminal justice system.

"EUJUST LEX has succeeded in bringing a critical mass of Iraq's Criminal Justice Sector leaders together to examine and debate international best practice. It has enabled Iraqi judges, police officers and penitentiary managers — men and women, from Sunni, Shiite, Kurd and other ethnic backgrounds to discuss important issues of rule of law important to their country's future in a safe, neutral and supportive environment.

"The technical assistance offered by the mission has complemented the efforts of others who have provided equipment and resources in this sector. The US Embassy, French Embassy and UNDP (operating from Amman) have cooperated well with the mission, and we have collectively avoided duplication of activities.

"The mission has also generated positive media coverage, giving a strong political signal of EU engagement to the Iraqi public and political class. Our Embassy's assessment is that Iraqis understand and appreciate this effort, and the investment for the future it represents.

"COSTS: UK ASSESSMENT

"If the budget under review here of Euros 15.4 million is approved, the EU will have spent Euros 118 million on EUJUST LEX during the full period of its operation. As of December 2012, the mission has run more than 500 courses and trained more than 5,700 senior law enforcement practitioners. Key achievements include delivering innovative activities such as training of an Iraqi law enforcement training cadre ("training the trainers"), mainstreaming human rights and gender issues into training, and increasing the frequency and quality of contacts at the highest level between the European experts working within the mission and Iraqi officials. I would like to highlight in particular three areas of concrete achievement that have made a difference to rule of law for Iraqis: the establishment of Rule of Law Committees; the delivery of a Police Federal Investigation Training course and the delivery of a penitentiary International Standards of Audit Programme. The mission also leaves behind bespoke training manuals, audit programs and other technical literature.

"EU SUPPORT TO IRAQ AFTER CLOSURE OF THE MISSION: COMMISSION AND EEAS PLANNING

"Your Committee's report of 12 June also raised the important matter of how the EEAS and the Commission are going to ensure that the mission's achievements are embedded and taken forward. Your Committee's report suggested that the Commission and EEAS had not properly prepared for the transition to local ownership, and to their playing a leading role in this field. They are preparing, but it is true, in our assessment, to say that the process could have been improved and we are now pressing for improvements to the plan for transitional activity after the mission closes. I detail these below.

"The Commission have produced plans for the mission's work to be taken on by Development instruments. Unfortunately, this planning took the Commission longer than they anticipated, and DG Development and Cooperation (DevCo) have designed an action planning document which will pick up certain strands of the EUJUST LEX mandate. However, Commission procedures mean that the activity outlined in that document is unlikely to come into effect until late in 2014. The Commission reported at the start of 2013 that a gap between EUJUST LEX and DevCo activities looked likely. The UK followed this up immediately by calling a meeting of likeminded Member States (MS) to explore options for addressing this gap, and requesting a Special Report from the EEAS to explore options for either limiting, or managing it.

"This ensured that the EEAS refocused on ensuring that the mission closes effectively, and their recent work to address the gap looks promising. They are exploring funding a core team to stay in-country and continue many of the activities of EUJUST LEX, until the DevCo programme starts.

"Funding options for bridging the transition are also being explored. Despite the Commission's claims that the Instrument for Stability (IfS) was not appropriate as it should not fund Mission exit, the UK and likeminded MS pushed back, and consequently funding from this instrument looks increasingly likely.

"Ultimately, the handover plans have not been developed in as satisfactory a way as we and other MS would have hoped, but we are pressing for them to be improved and we are encouraged by the EEAS recent progress on planning to bridge the gap."

Conclusion

18.25   We note that the Commission has, it seems, yet to be finally persuaded of the need for a final "Lessons Learned and Value for Money" report. We therefore ask the Minister to let us know what the position is before the Christmas recess, and what handover plans have been finally developed.

18.26  In the meantime, we thank the Minister for this further information, and especially for his own assessment of lessons learned, mission achievements and cost/benefit analysis. It is extraordinary that, even now, it seems that only as a result of UK pressure has the EEAS established a mechanism for identifying and implementing the lessons learned from all CSDP activities, and that the Minister feels that he must still maintain pressure to ensure that experience derived from EUJUST LEX and indeed all CSDP missions is applied for future mission planning. As our consideration of four other CSDP missions indicates, this is ever more necessary: so, too, the validity of the "key lessons" the Minister identifies — especially the importance of understanding the host cultural environment; the need to secure a Status of Mission agreement especially for launching a mission in a high-risk environment; and ensuring that mandates and budgets realistically reflect the high security costs of working in difficult countries. [52]

18.27  We now clear the Council Decision.





49   See headnote: (30633) -: HC 19-xviii (2008-09), chapter 18 (3 June 2009) and HC 19-xvii (2008-09), chapter 3 (13 May 2009). Back

50   See headnote: (33911) -: HC 86-vii (2012-13), chapter 13 (4 July 2012) and see HC 86-iv (2012-13), chapter 9 (14 June 2012). Back

51   See headnote: (35009) -: HC 83-v (2013-14), chapter 7 (12 June 2013). Back

52   See Chapter 17: (34664) - EU training of Malian armed forces; see Chapter 16: (34518) - EU training of Somali security forces; see Chapter 22: (35109) - The EU and the Horn of Africa; see Chapter 21: (35108) - The EU and the Sahel]. Back


 
previous page contents next page


© Parliamentary copyright 2013
Prepared 15 July 2013