21 The EU and the Sahel
| (35108)
—
—
| Council Decision amending Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Niger (EUCAP SAHEL NIGER)
|
| Legal base | Articles 28, 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration | EM of 27 June 2013
|
| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (34063) —: HC 86-viii (2012-13), chapter 18 (11 July 2012)
|
| Discussion in Council | Before 15 July 2013
|
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Cleared
|
Background
21.1 Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP established an EU civilian
Common Security and Defence (CSDP) Mission for Niger to build
the capacity of Nigerien security forces to fight terrorism and
organised crime. EUCAP Sahel Niger was launched in July 2012,
and is mandated for two years until July 2014. The budget for
the first year of the mission was set at €8,700,000. The
background and full details are set out in our Report under reference.[61]
21.2 As the first part of that Report recalls,
the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) had kept us informed
about the overall context and, then, the planning of the mission,
for the previous 18 months. As the Minister noted, a volatile
mix of state fragility, terrorism, organised crime, weapons proliferation
and a severe food crisis had focused international attention on
this largely ungoverned space. In March, a coup d'état
in Mali had resulted in armed Tuareg groups taking control of
northern Mali and declaring its independence. Some of these groups
had links to Al-Qa'ida and Boko Haram in Nigeria, posing a threat
to UK interests in the region. The region's problems included
chronic poverty, under-development and food insecurity resulting
in recurrent humanitarian crises, which impacted on women particularly
harshly; social conflicts; a low development rate; limited resources;
lack of states' capacity to provide basic services and protection
to the population; criminal and terrorist networks activities,
as well as local criminality and banditry.
21.3 But, the Minister noted, Niger had assets
and strengths; the political establishment in particular appeared
to be well informed and stable with a clear vision for the country.
President Issoufou of Niger, during recent meetings with the
Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the All Party Parliamentary
Group on Africa, had made it clear that his democratically-elected
Administration would do all it could to build stability and promote
security in the region. In recent months, his Government had taken
decisive steps to reposition the security forces into troubled
areas as well as in the capital. The security forces, in spite
of their lack of equipment, training and efficient organisation
systems, seemed to perform comparatively better than in other
countries of the region. Against this background, the mission
would have five main tasks:
— advise
and assist in the implementation of the security dimension of
the Nigerien Strategy for Security and Development at national
level (assessing gaps in capability and capacity and designing
a training strategy to address them; working to develop and upgrade
the interoperability and coordination mechanism within the "Service
Central de lutte contre le terrorisme" (SCLCT) to fight terrorism
by providing equipment and training);
— support the development of regional and
international coordination in the fight against terrorism and
organised crime, in particular by working with the "Collge
Sahélien de Sécurité" and other related
organisations;
— develop and implement adequate criminal
investigation training programmes utilising a "train the
trainer" approach in subjects such as forensics, interview
techniques, evidence handling, police tactics, human rights and
the rule of law;
— support the development of Nigerien Security
Forces resilience by developing a Human Resources strategy and
providing training in management issues; and
— contribute to the identification, planning
and implementation of projects in the security field.
21.4 As our earlier Report notes, from the outset
the Minister had stressed his determination to "work to ensure
that robust benchmarks, processes for monitoring and evaluation
and a clear exit strategy are embedded at the outset and that
this important mission represents good value for money."
Our assessment
21.5 We commended the Minister for having kept
us informed during the planning process and for having provided
a timely and full Explanatory Memorandum.
21.6 The rationale for the Mission was clear.
However, we noted that, even though it might be "one of
the smallest CSDP missions", it had moved from 60, then to
50, and now to 78 staff.
21.7 We also had no knowledge of what the effective
benchmarks and indicators of success were that the Minister was
confident had been put in place from the outset.
21.8 We also recalled that, at an earlier stage,
we had endorsed the Minister's reservations about the accelerated
planning process used in this instance becoming the norm and emphasised
the need to ensure that it did not endanger the establishment
of genuinely robust benchmarks, proper processes for monitoring
and evaluation and a clear, unambiguous end state and exit strategy.
21.9 There was also a need to avoid the adoption
of wording that, through haste or otherwise, was sufficiently
subjective for the mission to morph into an endless EU commitment.
At this juncture, we had no choice but to accept the Minister's
word that his officials' degree of engagement with the planning
process had indeed ensured that it remained rigorous, despite
the drive of speed. In the absence of any reference in his Explanatory
Memorandum, we had also to presume that the key elements of the
agreed end state remained as in an earlier letter — progress
towards effective control of Niger's territory by its security
forces and effective border control with neighbouring countries
— and that, by the same token, the exit strategy would hand
security programmes on to EU Delegations in the region or to other
international actors.
21.10 We had no wish to hold this up, and cleared
the Council Decision establishing the mission. However, we asked
the Minister, when the budget for the second year was submitted
for scrutiny, to address these issues, and thus to provide a report
outlining what effective benchmarks and indicators of success
had been applied, and how the mission had performed against them,
and what clear, unambiguous end state and exit strategy was then
in place.[62]
The draft Council Decision
21.11 This draft Council Decision extends the
current budget of EUCAP Sahel Niger for three months until 31
October 2013.
The Government's view
21.12 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 27 June
2013, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) explains that,
although the budget set a year ago is due to end on 15 July 2013,
the proposal to extend it thus "has been made possible, on
the one hand, because of understaffing during the first six months
of the Mission's activity, and on the other hand because of delays
in its project work in Niger."
21.13 The Minister continues as follows:
"At the end of April, the Mission estimated
that it would have used 44% of its total budget by mid-June leaving
an underspend of 56% or €4.8m, which given the planned increased
spending in the coming months is judged to be sufficient to cover
an additional three and a half months of the Mission's activity.
21.14 As to the reasons for the delays in its
project work, the Minister says:
"The launch of EUCAP Sahel Niger in 2012 was
accelerated at French request. Under the accelerated process,
two stages of planning that are normally discrete for Missions
of this kind — the development of a 'Concept of Operations'
and later an 'Operational Plan' — were merged. This meant
that the Mission arrived in the field with less guidance documentation,
and after a shorter pre-deployment period, than is normal. Little
work was carried out following the Technical Assessment Mission
(TAM) to further define with the Nigerien authorities what their
needs were, and as a result the planning documents did not fully
reflect these requirements.
"It was clear from an early stage that the mission
was struggling to achieve full operating capacity — a status
that was eventually attained in January 2013. This was due both
to slow recruitment (an EEAS responsibility) and low rates of
secondment of staff (a failure by Member States). Of the 50 international
experts that had been budgeted for, 17 were deployed in August
2012, 21 in September, 26 in October and November, 30 in December
and finally, in January operational capacity of 37 was achieved.
A large part of the Mission's budget underspend is therefore due
to this under-resourcing, with consequent savings on both per
diems and insurance.
"A further reason for the underspend is that
due to the rushed launch of the Mission, accommodation and office
space were not in use until November 2012, and the Mission operated
out of a hotel until suitable office space was found.
"Programme delivery has also been hampered due
to the lack of a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA)[63]
with the Nigerien Authorities. Projects are only now starting
to get off the ground, although some training has taken place.
"It is widely accepted that EUCAP Sahel Niger
has underperformed in its first year. In addition to the slow
build-up of the Mission, this underperformance can be attributed
to a worse than expected security situation, and the lack of buy-in
from the Nigerien authorities, with the Mission being used as
a pawn in local inter-Ministry rivalries. However, there are some
positive signs that this Mission has real potential to deliver
positive results and is therefore worth the UK's continued support.
21.15 Looking ahead, the Minister says:
"The SOMA is close to agreement, and once this
is in place we can expect local buy-in to improve, together with
the ability of the Mission to carry out its tasks. The Prime Minister
of Niger has recently indicated his support for the Mission and
has undertaken to create a steering board, which will be led by
himself and at which all relevant ministries will be represented.
This will ensure that the Mission has one docking-point with which
to agree and coordinate its actions.
"We understand that EUCAP Sahel Niger's staff
remain motivated and are preparing solid work plans under supervision
from Brussels. Assessments of the level and needs of the Nigerien
security forces have been carried out and based on these needs,
training activities are now underway. These are widely appreciated
by the Nigeriens and are perceived to be making a positive impact.
Training has so far taken place for the National Police, Gendarmerie
and the National Guard in the following subjects:
- "Crisis Management
- "Human Resources
- "Management of criminal enquiries
- "Crime Scene Preservation
- "Forensics
- "Intelligence collection and handling
- "Collaboration between Judicial Police and
Magistrates
"Good contacts have been made with regional
organisations working on Counter Terrorism, such as the College
Sahelien de Securite, the Joint Operational General Staff Committee
(CEMOC) and the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism
(CAERT) as well as with other EU projects such as CT Sahel, which
is funded by the EU's Instrument for Stability. There is therefore
potential for significant progress to be made on Objective 2 of
the Mission's mandate, relating to developing comprehensive regional
and international coordination in the fight against terrorism
and organised crime.
21.16 In response to the issues raised in our
earlier Report, the Minister says:
"In terms of the end-state, the Mission aims
to leave Niger with security conditions improved to a level where
the country is able to take on large-scale development projects,
with improved application of the rule of law and with plans and
equipment in place to be able to carry out security operations.
The exit strategy is based on developing local capacity and ownership,
supported by other EU instruments in the long term. To this end,
a strategic review process of the Mission will start in January
2014 and evaluation will be carried out to determine remaining
weaknesses."
21.17 Finally, the Minister notes that: a new
mission budget will be issued in the coming months to cover the
period beyond 31 October 2013 until the end of the Mission's mandate
on 31 July 2014; no information on the size of this budget is
available at the current time; but, once it is released, the new
budget will be submitted for Parliamentary scrutiny.
Conclusion
21.18 This is shaping up to be a case study
in how not to organise a CSDP mission. It has been politically
driven by the former colonial power (c.f. EUTM Mali, which we
consider elsewhere). What this has effectively meant is a year's
delay: as the Minister observes, because of the rushed launch
of the mission, little preparatory work was carried out with the
Nigerien authorities to define their needs properly.
21.19 The failure of prior assurances from
the local political leadership (c.f. paragraph 21.3 above) to
materialise has plainly not helped. But that failure inevitably
casts doubt on the indication of support and undertaking now given
by the Nigerien prime minister. When the next EM is submitted,
we shall expect a full report on whether the "one docking
point" has been set up, and what difference it has made.
21.20 What is more, failings here are far
from unique. This is by no means the first mission that Member
States have agreed to set up, and then not played their part,
by not seconding the relevant staff. We would accordingly like
him also to update us on the secondment of staff by Member States
and recruitment by the EEAS in October.
21.21 Lack of local buy-in is also not peculiar
to this mission — see the latest report on the EU Mission
on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP
NESTOR), which we consider elsewhere in this Report.[64]
21.22 So far as the end-state and exit strategy
is concerned, the wording used by the Minister could have been
applied as easily to the ISAF deployment in Afghanistan as to
this mission: in other words, rather than the unambiguous, tightly-defined,
end-state and exit strategy the Committee advocated, it is effectively
open-ended unless one or more Member States disagree. Given the
underperformance thus far, it is almost inevitable that there
will be strong pressure to extend the mandate beyond the middle
of 2014.
21.23 The Minister has also still not provided
any information on what the effective benchmarks and indicators
of success are that he was confident had been put in place from
the outset. When he submits his next EM in October, we ask again
that he sets them out and indicates how they will inform the strategic
review process to which he refers.
21.24 In the meantime, we clear this Council
Decision.
61 See headnote. Back
62
See headnote: (34063) -: HC 86-viii (2012-13), chapter 18 (11
July 2012). Back
63
Status of forces agreements (SOFAs) and status of mission agreements
(SOMAs) are bilateral or multilateral treaties that define the
legal position of military forces and civilian personnel deployed
by one or more states or by an international organization in the
territory of another state with the latter's consent. They normally
deal with such issues as the entry and departure of foreign personnel,
the carrying of arms, taxation, the settlement of claims, and
the modalities for the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction
over members of the visiting force or mission. Back
64
(35109) -: see Chapter 22. Back
| 
