Twelfth Report of Session 2013-14 - European Scrutiny Committee Contents


2   Safety of nuclear installations

(35063)

11064/13

+ ADDs 1-4

COM(13) 343

Draft proposal presented for the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee under Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty, for a Council Directive amending Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations

Legal baseSee para 2.4 below
Document originated13 June 2013
Deposited in Parliament20 June 2013
DepartmentEnergy and Climate Change
Basis of considerationEM of 2 July 2013
Previous Committee ReportNone, but see footnotes
Discussion in CouncilSee para 2.4 below
Committee's assessmentPolitically important
Committee's decisionNot cleared; further developments awaited

Background

2.1  Although the responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations rests with Member States and licence holders, Article 30 of the Euratom Treaty provides for the establishment of basic standards for protecting the health of workers and the general public against ionising radiation, and these are set out in Council Directive 96/29/Euratom. Also, after a subsequent case in the European Court of Justice had ruled[5] that the Community also shared competences with the Member States in areas covered by the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Council eventually adopted, after much tortuous discussion,[6] Directive 2009/71/Euratom.

2.2  This establishes a Community framework for the safety of nuclear installations. In particular, it requires Member States to have a national legislative, regulatory and organisational framework which establishes responsibilities for the adoption of national safety requirements, the provision of a system for the licensing of nuclear installations, and of a system of nuclear safety supervision, and enforcement actions. Member States must also establish a competent regulatory authority which is functionally separate from any other body concerned with nuclear energy; such a body must be given the resources necessary to fulfil its obligations and licence holders should be required to demonstrate compliance with national safety requirements, with this being verified through assessment and inspections. Member States must also have in place arrangements for the education and training of staff with nuclear safety responsibilities; ensure that relevant information is made available to workers and the general public; and provide regular reports to the Commission on the implementation of the Directive.

2.3  Although the overall safety record of the 140 or so nuclear power plants within the EU is good, the European Council decided in March 2011, in the wake of the Fukushima accident, that these should each be subjected to a "stress test", and that the EU should review its nuclear safety legislative framework in the light of the lessons to be learned from that accident. The Commission subsequently set out its conclusions in a Communication[7] on October 2012, which said that the lessons learned from Fukushima and from the stress tests needed to be reflected in the legislative framework, notably as regards the differences between Member States and the gaps in managing key safety issues. In particular, it said that the Nuclear Safety Directive should be amended as regards its procedures and framework, the role and means of regulatory authorities, openness and transparency, and monitoring and verification.

The current proposal

2.4  The Commission has now produced this draft Council Directive, which it has presented to the European Economic and Social Committee for comments, and which (we understand) will then be submitted to the Council in the autumn as a formal proposal under Articles 31 and 32 Euratom. The Commission also says that the proposed amendments would improve the current regulatory framework by:

  • strengthening the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities;
  • enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters;
  • strengthening existing principles, and introducing new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire lifecycle of nuclear installations;
  • reinforcing monitoring and exchange of experiences, by establishing a European system of peer reviews; and
  • establishing a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonised nuclear safety guidelines.

The Government's view

2.5  In her Explanatory Memorandum of 2 July 2013, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department for Energy and Climate Change (Baroness Verma) says that, as the proposal has yet to be formally put to the Council, there are no immediate impacts on current UK legislation, but that, should one be presented as drafted, there could be a need to change the UK's nuclear safety regime. She adds that it will also be necessary to ensure that the competences of the Member States in this area are respected, and that the degree of prescription in the proposal could result in restrictions on the ability of Member States to act in accordance with national circumstances, with some regulatory safety decisions being taken centrally by the Commission, rather than by national nuclear safety regulatory authorities.

2.6  The Minister says that the Government's position is that safety remains a top priority, with measures being in place to ensure that the lessons are learnt from the Fukushima accident, and its view is that the focus of the Commission and Member States should be on ensuring the proper implementation of the current Nuclear Safety Directive. However, she says that, where there is robust evidence to support the need for change, the Government will work with the Commission and other Member States to ensure that the EU nuclear safety regime is appropriately enhanced, but she cautions that, notwithstanding the Commission's wish to be seen to be taking firm and swift action, the proposal fails to demonstrate sufficient evidence to support the need for legislative changes. Instead, it would add considerable detail and prescription to the existing arrangements, and restrict the scope for interpretation and implementation, and would hence appear to be inconsistent with the role of Member States as contemplated by Article 33 of the Euratom Treaty in relation to implementation of Directives.

2.7  More specifically, the Minister comments that the proposal would result in an increased role for the Commission in relation to peer reviews of Member States' nuclear safety regimes and performance, giving it in practice the power to decide which areas or topics are to be peer reviewed, should Member States not agree this themselves, as well as the power to oversee and drive the implementation of actions by Member States following these reviews. She comments that this would appear to be politically, rather than safety, driven.

2.8  She also notes that, although the proposal seeks to ensure the independence of national nuclear safety regulators — which is welcome in principle, and is in line with the measures being taken to establish the UK regulator (the Office for Nuclear Regulation) as a statutory corporation — the proposal as drafted could undermine the principle which it is trying to achieve. For example, it confuses the lines of accountability for nuclear safety between regulators and national Governments, and also appears to make national regulators accountable to the Commission (which, by design or by accident, undermines the principle of regulatory independence and the effectiveness of national nuclear safety regulators). Consequently, this point in particular will need to be addressed in order for the proposal to be acceptable.

2.9  The Minister says that the Government will therefore work with the Commission and other Member States to seek to ensure that, before the proposal is considered for adoption by the Council, it is amended so that any new legislative requirements are evidence-based, do not extend existing Commission competences, and have the desired effect of putting in place proportionate measures which are consistent with the concept of seeking continuous improvements to nuclear safety.

Conclusion

2.10  As we understand it, this is a draft Council Directive, which, in the light of the reactions of the European Economic and Social Committee, will be followed by a formal proposal to the Council in the autumn, and we would expect that document to provide the main focus for scrutiny. However, as this draft covers an area of some importance, and contains a number of elements over which the Government has considerable reservations, not least about the enhanced powers it would give to the Commission, we are drawing it to the attention of the House. We are also holding it under scrutiny until such time as the formal proposal has been tabled.



5   Case C-29/99 Commission v. CouncilBack

6   (24577) 8990/3: see HC 63-xxix (2002-03), chapter 8 (10 July 2003), HC 42-iii (2003-04), chapter 3 (17 December 2003), HC 42-xxiii (2003-04), chapter 4 (16 June 2004) and HC 19-iii (2008-09), chapter 3 (14 January 2009), (24951) 12386/04: see HC 42-xxxiii (2003-04), chapter 7 (20 October 2004) and HC 19-iii (2008-09), chapter 3 (14 January 2009), (30232) 16537/08: see HC 19-iii (2008-09), chapter 3 (14 January 2009) and HC 19-xx (2008-09), chapter 4 (17 June 2009). Back

7   (34290) 14400/12: see HC 86-xvi (2012-13), chapter 1 (24 October 2012). Back


 
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