44 EU assistance to the Palestinian Authority
| (35034)
—
—
(35035)
—
—
| Council Decision on the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)
Council Decision amending and extending Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP on establishing a European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah)
|
| Legal base | Articles 28, 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 28 June 2013
|
| Previous Committee Reports | HC83-vi (2013-14), chapter 17 (19 June 2013); also see (34006) — and (34007) — : HC 86-v (2012-13), chapter 15 (20 June 2012); also (33517) — and (33518) —: HC 428-xliv (2010-12), chapter 16 (14 December 2011); (32749) —: HC 428-xxvi (2010-12), chapter 12 (11 May 2011) and (32230) —: HC 428-x (2010-12), chapter 20 (8 December 2010)
|
| Discussion in Council | June 2013
|
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Cleared; (decision reported on 19 June 2013);
further information provided and requested
|
Background
44.1 Following the 15 November 2005 Agreement on Movement and
Access for Gaza between Israel and the Palestinian Authority,
the EU established a European Security and Defence Policy Border
Assistance Mission at the Rafah crossing point between Gaza and
Egypt. Whilst active, EUBAM Rafah facilitated the crossing of
over 500,000 people and contributed to confidence building activity
between the parties related to border control and customs. However
following the Hamas takeover of the Gaza strip the mission has
not been opened since June 2007, and has been on standby ever
since.
44.2 An EU Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police
Support was established in January 2005, within the office of
the EUSR to the Middle East Peace Process: this consisted of four
police advisers seconded and funded by Sweden, Denmark, the UK
and Spain, a local office manager based in the PNA Ministry of
Interior in Ramallah, a liaison office in Jerusalem and a forward
office in the Palestinian Police HQ in Gaza. On 1 January 2006,
this was elevated to a full CSDP mission, with 33 staff and a
three-year mandate.
44.3 The full background, and the previous Committee's
and our consideration of subsequent annual mandate renewals and
budgets, are set out in our Reports under reference.[160]
The Council Decisions
44.4 As our previous Report relates, it was intended
to merge the two missions by June 2012 but Israel rejected this
proposal. EUBAM Rafah's operational element was relocated to Tel
Aviv to reduce costs; the overall number of staff for the mission
was reduced from 19 to five. The Minister for Europe (Mr David
Lidington) said that efforts to merge the two Heads of Mission
would continue.
44.5 The proposal now is to extend each mission's
mandate for 12 months. The EUPOL COPPS proposed budget is €957,000
for 12 months; the previous budget was €933,000. The EUBAM
Rafah proposed budget is €940,000 for 12 months; the previous
budget was €980,000. The Minister's detailed analysis of
both budgets is reproduced at the annex to our previous Report.
44.6 The Minister strongly supported the extensions.
He emphasised: the broader political situation, where the US,
and particularly Secretary of State Kerry, were investing heavy
political capital in making progress on Middle East Peace Process;
the Foreign Secretary's assessment that there was no more urgent
global priority in 2013 than the search for Middle East peace;
UK and EU commitment to doing all they could to support and advance
US efforts, and the potential of EU CSDP engagement in Israel
and the OPTs to play a substantive role in support. He also noted
that, alongside the main political track, Secretary Kerry was
also focusing on supportive economic and security measures, including
a plan to double the Palestinian economy through $4 billion of
private investment and a request to Mr Tony Blair, in his role
as Quartet Representative, to lead these efforts, which would
run in parallel with a renewed political process.
Our assessment
44.7 We again commended the Minister for his and
his officials' continuing efforts towards and success in maintaining
budgetary discipline, and were content to clear the Council Decisions.
44.8 We were less happy, however, about the Minister's
failure to provide any information either that substantiated the
various claims for EUPOL COPPS' achievements or about the strategic
review that he foresaw a year ago. On the latter, we now noted
that a further review was promised for next Spring. Yet the Minister
made no mention of the earlier review; nor did he suggest what
the options for EUBAM Rafah might be. What had transpired with
regard to last year's promised review? Was a merger still a possibility?
Or had this again been ruled out because of Israeli objections?
44.9 We therefore asked the Minister to respond to
our earlier request about measuring and assessing EUPOL COPPS'
achievements, and past and prospective strategic reviews.[161]
The Minister's letter of 28 June 2013
44.10 The Minister begins by noting that EUPOL COPPS
aims to assist the Palestinian Authority to develop all aspects
of its criminal justice system — from policing through to
imprisonment; and has gradually shifted focus from equipping counterparts
and providing immediate assistance, to institution and capacity
building.
44.11 The Minister continues as follows:
"EUPOL COPPS' most notable achievement has been
the development of the Jericho Police Training College. When
EUPOL COPPS began, the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) lacked basic
equipment for policing, such as vehicles, radios, shields, helmets
or uniforms, or have [sic] a legal basis for its work. EUPOL
COPPS worked to build the capacity of the Training College, including
helping to develop the training curriculum. Furthermore, the
Mission has developed a course in Instructional Techniques to
aid with the train the trainer aspect of the College. This work
has been instrumental in providing necessary equipment and training
to establish a professional and efficient Palestinian police service.
The effectiveness of the PCP is central to improving security
in the West Bank and to building the institutions of a future
Palestinian state.
"As well as establishing sustainable and effective
policing, EUPOL COPPS continues to support Palestinian capacity
building in security. This includes improving criminal justice,
through reforms made with the Palestinian Authority. EUPOL COPPS
provides strategic advice and expertise to the entire criminal
justice chain based on the mission's criminal justice action plan.
Specific EUPOL COPPS achievements in this field include:
a) "Promoted efficient processes within
the criminal justice sector with respect to human rights standards,
for example — the Mission provided significant input to
the Code of Conduct on the Use of Force and Firearms for Palestinian
Security Forces;
b) "Facilitated the signing of a Memorandum
of Understanding between the Palestinian Civil Police and Public
Prosecution as part of the project to improve cooperation between
the two. This is an important step towards constructing an end
to end rule of law strategy, from arrest to rehabilitation, which
helps to bring together coherently different Palestinian actors;
c) "Set up a joint programme with the UNDP
aimed at addressing internal police accountability, anti-corruption
and civilian oversight;
d) "Helped to create and advise the Programme
Steering Committee in order to improve project prioritisation
and coordination, and closely monitor progress towards the Palestinian
Civil Police objectives;
e) "Was the main provider of support to
the Anti-Corruption Commission."
44.12 Turning to the question of Strategic Reviews,
the Minister says;
"The Strategic Review of both missions was due
in November 2012, but in the event was only presented to Member
States in April 2013, with discussions to agree the outcome concluded
in June 2013. The UK judged that the Strategic Review was not
adequate for decision making about the future of the missions.
It lacked an assessment of the impact the missions had on the
ground, as well as further assessment of the missions' strategic
impact to date, and the extent to which they have delivered wider
strategic EU MEPP objectives. We made this clear in discussions
in Brussels, leading to Member States agreement that: 'the Strategic
Review might have benefited from a development of more strategic
options...'"
44.13 Regarding the mooted possibility of merging
the two missions, the Minister says:
"Following the decision in May 2012 to relocate
EUBAM Rafah to Tel Aviv to reduce costs there has been no further
discussion on merging both missions. A merger continues to not
be possible at this time given the Israeli opposition to such
a move. We do not see a role for EUBAM Rafah outside of Gaza
in connection with EUPOL COPPS as this would be unacceptable for
the Israelis, whose support is imperative for the success of EUPOL
COPPS."
44.14 The Minister then says that, following the
six-monthly reviews of both missions in May 2013, Member States
agreed that the EEAS would revise the operations planning documents
for EUPOL COPPS to reflect the agreement that the mission would
focus on:
- "re-calibrating its efforts
to the more strategic level, without compromising its current
contribution at the tactical level;
- "addressing remaining deficiencies in the
Palestinian police and criminal justice sectors;
- "enhancing its engagement with the PCP at
the level of West Bank districts so as to consolidate strategic
interventions and reform already introduced at the central level."
44.15 The Minister also says:
"It was also noted that a more systematised
modus operandi, based on the programmatic approach and in compliance
with the existing civilian CSDP benchmarking methodology will
be applied to the mission from the 1st July. We will
continue to encourage the mission to develop concrete operational
objectives against which to measure progress."
44.16 Looking ahead, the Minister says:
"Whilst EUPOL COPPS is performing well, we remain
concerned over what EUBAM Rafah can offer. The UK made our concerns
clear during discussions on the Strategic Review and we worked
to achieve a further strategic review in early 2014, which just
considers EUBAM Rafah. This extension of the mission mandate
will allow the EU to both maintain support for the ongoing Gaza
ceasefire talks and wider US efforts to resolve the conflict.
If EUBAM Rafah has not been activated by this stage, we expect
the review to consider options for closure or reactivation: as
it is currently mandated; in an enlarged state covering other
borders; or with a changed mandate. These options will be considered
as part of a comprehensive approach by the EU in Gaza."
44.17 Finally, regarding the cost of each mission,
the Minister says that:
— "EUBAM
Rafah was launched on 25 November 2005, and to date has cost the
EU €23,520,000, with € 940,000 budgeted for the period
from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014;
— "Since
EUPOL COPPS was launched on 14 November 2005, the Mission has
cost the EU € 50,330,000, with a budget of € 9,570,000
for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014."
Conclusion
44.18 We thank the Minister for this further
information which, finally, provides some evidence of what one
of these missions, EUBAM COPPS has achieved in return for an investment
of some €60 million.
44.19 We note that, with regard to the other,
the Minister remains concerned as to its continuing viability.
We would therefore like him to write to us early next year with
details of the outcome of the further review of EUBAM Rafah and
his views on its implications for the mission's future.
44.20 At the same time we would like him to tell
us about the comprehensive EU approach in Gaza to which he refers,
and what stage it has reached. Our assumption is that, like the
EU comprehensive approach to Syria that we consider elsewhere
in this Report,[162]
it will be in the form of a depositable document (we ask him to
inform us now if this is in any way in doubt).
160 See headnote. Back
161
See headnote: HC 83-vi (2013-14), chapter 17 (19 June 2013). Back
162
See (35105) 11482/13, Chapter 2 of this Report. Back
| 
