Documents considered on 11 September 2013 - European Scrutiny Committee Contents


16 EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights~

(32123)

10817/10

Council Decision authorising the Commission to negotiate the Accession Agreement of the European Union to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)

Legal baseArticle 6(2) TEU and Protocol (No 8); Article 218(8) TFEU, unanimity; consent
DepartmentMinistry of Justice
Basis of considerationMinister's letters of 14 February, 27 March, 15 April, 9 May and 16 August 2013.
Previous Committee ReportsHC 86-xxix (2012-13) chapter 4 (23 January 2013), HC 428-xiv (2010-12) chapter 6 (26 January 2011).
Discussion in CouncilNot applicable
Committee's assessmentLegally and politically important
Committee's decisionNot cleared; further information awaited

Background

16.1 An outline of the history, scope and substance of the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) was provided in our first Report[37] on this document. For the purposes of this Report, we reiterate that prior to the Council's approval of the draft Agreement (which must be unanimous as required by Article 218(8) TFEU), it has always been anticipated the Commission would apply to the Court of Justice ("ECJ") for an Opinion, pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, on whether the "agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties". The Article requires that where the "Opinion is adverse, the Agreement envisaged may not enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised". Additionally, prior to Council approval of the Agreement, EU Internal Rules, regulating at EU-level certain necessary internal arrangements for EU and Member State participation in the Council of Europe, need to be agreed, initially within the Council's Working Party on Fundamental Rights, Citizen's Rights and Free Movement of Persons (FREMP).

Ministers' letters since our last Report

16.2 Since our last Report on this document, the Secretary of State has written to us on four occasions to keep us informed of the progress in the accession process: letters of 14 February, 27 March, 15 April and 9 May 2013. We deferred reporting the substance of these letters to the House in the expectation that, following the provisional agreement of the Accession Agreement within the "47+1" group (confirmed in the Secretary of State's letter of 15 April), that a proposal for the EU Internal Rules would follow shortly afterwards (since the agreement of Member States secured on the former was contingent on agreement of the latter) and that a Ministerial evidence session could be held to encompass both. However, it is now apparent from the letter of 16 August from the Minister of State for Policing and Criminal Justice (Damian Green) that the next step in the process has become the Commission's referral of the draft Accession Agreement to the ECJ for an Opinion.

LETTER OF 14 FEBRUARY 2013

16.3 In this letter the Secretary of State reported to us on the progress of the accession negotiations, both internal and external to the EU. He informed us of the latest meeting of the Council of Europe working group (47+1) which took place from 21-23 January and said that the next round of negotiations were scheduled for 2-5 April. Internal EU negotiations were also to take place in the interval.

16.4 On the subject of concern to us, EU Member States voting "en bloc" in the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the Secretary of State responded by saying that:

    "Negotiations are ongoing on the issue of voting in the Committee of Ministers. Although consensus has not yet been reached, a compromise which seeks to address concerns about the impact of any potential EU bloc vote is on the table. All participants at Strasbourg have committed to returning to the next round of negotiations with workable options for "final resolutions" to this question. The detail will depend largely on how the Council of Europe Secretariat elaborates its initial proposals, which are expected "well in advance" of the next round of negotiations, and on the outcome of Internal EU discussions on the response to be presented at that round in April."

16.5 He also noted our intention to hold an evidence session before the conclusion of negotiations and said that he was happy to appear before us if that would assist.

Our response of 27 February 2013

16.6 We thanked the Secretary of State for his helpful update and noted his willingness to assist the Committee by giving evidence. We also asked him for a further update, after the April session, on changes to the draft Accession Agreement, including any new compromise proposals on "en bloc" voting. We requested him, in due course, to give us ample notice of the timing of the conclusion of those negotiations as well as of the emergence of a proposal on the Internal Rules.

LETTERS OF 27 MARCH AND 15 APRIL 2013

16.7 The first letter, in which the Secretary of State informed us that there might be provisional agreement of the Accession Agreement at the 3-5 April meeting of the "47+1" group and that the Government had been working to protect national interests in negotiations on voting rights, was quickly superseded by the second (particularly important because of the intervening Easter recess). In this second letter, he confirmed that there had indeed been provisional agreement on the Agreement but that this was strictly "in principle" only and subject to negotiations on the rest of the accession package, including EU Internal Rules and the approval of the ECJ which he anticipated would be sought before the summer recess.

16.8 On the question of voting rights in the Committee of Ministers, the Secretary of State said that good progress had been made and a compromise achieved which "carefully balances the impact of a potential EU bloc vote" by:

  • limiting the EU right to vote to those decisions made under a power conferred by the ECHR itself (where the EU has a legitimate say), including relating to the formation of judges, supervising the execution of friendly settlements and of judgments, requests to the European Court of Human Rights for advisory Opinions and the adoption of Protocols to the ECHR; and
  • denying the EU a right to vote on broader Council of Europe business (where Member States will want to represent their own interests, something that the UK strongly argued for).

Our response of 17 April 2013

16.9 In our letter of 17 April, we requested to be kept informed of further progress towards accession, in particular the negotiations on the Internal Rules. We said we found the Secretary of State's explanation of the nature of the compromise achieved on proposals governing EU voting rights in the Committee of Ministers helpful but that it would be of interest to us to know, as negotiations on the Internal Rules progressed, if they would also address the issue of "en bloc" voting. We also asked for clarification of the expected scrutiny process for the Internal Rules so that we could plan the timing of a Ministerial evidence session on both those and the provisional Accession Agreement.

LETTER OF 9 MAY 2013

16.10 The Secretary of State, in response, confirmed that the Government was still waiting for a Commission proposal on the Internal Rules, saying that once received, the proposal would be deposited in Parliament and subject to Committee scrutiny procedures in the normal way. He then discussed the broader "accession package", to which, he said, a number of additional Parliamentary scrutiny processes would apply. He gave, as an example, the need for Parliamentary approval for the Accession Agreement, pursuant to section 10(4) of the EU Act. He added that the Internal Rules were also "likely" to need EU Act approval, but that "the precise process will depend on the legal base, which will not be clear until the Commission presents its proposal."

Our response of 21 May 2013

16.11 We thanked the Secretary of State for his clarification of the scrutiny process for the EU Internal Rules. We said that, as we were now minded to wait until after the publication of the Commission's proposal on the Rules for him to give evidence before us on both that proposal and the provisional text of the Accession Agreement, we would appreciate as much notice as possible of when the Commission would be proposing the Rules.

LETTER OF 16 AUGUST 2013

16.12 The Minister of State for Policing and Criminal Justice (Damian Green) now writes to inform us that the Commission has referred the "provisionally agreed Accession Agreement" to the ECJ "for an Opinion on the Agreement's compatibility with the EU Treaties" pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU and he encloses with his letter a copy of the "Request for an Opinion",[38] together with a copy of the negotiation report[39] (itself containing the text of the draft Accession Agreement and explanatory report).

16.13 He explains that Member States are able to intervene in the "process to offer their comments on the points raised, or to put before the Court additional points on the Accession Agreement's compatibility with the EU Treaties." The Minister says that the UK intends to intervene and would welcome any comments we wish to make in advance of the deadline for submissions (15 October).

Our assessment of the Commission's Request

16.14 We are mindful of the timing constraints arising from the deadline for submission of the UK's intervention and the party conference recess. So, in reviewing the Commission's Request for an Opinion, we have limited our comments to:

  • areas of prior concern which we have previously identified and
  • those aspects of the Accession Agreement which the Commission earmarks for inclusion in the EU Internal Rules or which we consider should be the subject of the Internal Rules.

16.15 The main areas of prior concern are:

  • the implications of the EU and Member States caucusing and voting "en bloc" in the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe;
  • the possibility of the EU acceding to more protocols to the ECHR than its individual Member States (or EU accession undermining Member States' existing derogations from or reservations to the ECHR);
  • the process for attributing responsibility as between the EU and Member States in the co-respondent procedure; and
  • the possible use of the ECHR control mechanisms by the EU against EU Member States ( and to a lesser extent, vice versa).

16.16 Before addressing the Request itself, we set out below the key features of the provisional Accession Agreement:

  • a limited accession which will include the ECHR and only the Protocols signed up to by every EU Member State i.e. the First Protocol (including protection of possessions and right to education) and Sixth Protocol (abolition of the death penalty), though there will be scope for the EU to accede to more Protocols post accession;
  • the election of an EU judge to the ECtHR (European Court of Human Rights), eligible to sit on all cases not just limited to those relating to the EU;
  • the provision of a mechanism to enable the EU or a Member State to join proceedings in a co-respondent capacity before the ECtHR, particularly where a Member State is being held to account for acting in pursuance of EU law;
  • the provision of an accelerated procedure to enable the ECJ to assess the compatibility of EU law with the ECHR where the EU is a co-respondent to a case, though this assessment will not be binding on the ECtHR (termed "prior involvement of the ECJ");
  • the creation of special voting procedures to accommodate the EU's participation in the work of the Committee of Ministers in the Council of Europe, to facilitate coordination of EU and Member State action in certain respects but also to protect the other 20 contracting parties from being automatically overruled by a bloc vote by the "EU 28"; and
  • the entry into force of the Agreement three months after ratification by all Council of Europe contracting parties and by the EU.

OVERVIEW OF THE "REQUEST FOR AN OPINION"

16.17 The Commission's Request is divided into two main sections: an Introduction and an Assessment.

Introduction

16.18 In the Introduction the Commission:

  • gives an overview of the scope, content and the "control" and decision-making mechanisms of the ECHR (the ECtHR and the Committee of Ministers);
  • explains the nature of the legal relationship between the EU and the ECHR (as clarified by Article 6(3)TEU[40] and Opinion 2/94[41] of the ECJ);
  • sets out the history of the accession process;
  • provides an overview of the draft Accession Agreement (highlighting those key provisions which are needed to change the ECHR system to allow for EU accession); and
  • states the "desirability" of obtaining the court's Opinion "in the interests of legal certainty" (despite its belief that the draft Accession Agreement satisfies all requirements of EU primary law).

16.19 The overview of the draft Accession Agreement itself is divided into four parts, dealing with the nature of amendments to the ECHR which will be needed to:

  • subject the EU to the substantive obligations imposed by the ECHR, including its "control machinery" referred to above;
  • reflect the fact that the EU is not a state but a regional organisation;
  • allow for the EU not being a member of the Council of Europe; and
  • preserve the effectiveness of the "control machinery" with respect to the EU.

Assessment: Admissibility

16.20 The Assessment is divided into two further sections: "Admissibility" and "Substance". In the "Admissibility" section, the Commission draws on the requirements for admissibility set out in the ECJ's Opinion 2/94[42] and says that:

  • sufficient information has been provided to the Court to enable it to opine (comprising the draft Accession Agreement and the "accompanying instruments"[43] that have been agreed by negotiators); and
  • the draft Agreement is "envisaged" within the meaning of Article 218(11) TFEU as clarified by Opinion 1/94[44] (because the EU has not yet finally expressed its consent to the proposed Accession Agreement and there is no need for the EU's Internal Rules to have been finalised before the ECJ's Opinion is sought).

16.21 This last assertion requires further explanation, particularly as it was not expected that the Commission would seek the ECJ's Opinion prior to the agreement and publication of the EU Internal Rules. The Commission concedes that the "actual participation by the Union in the judicial control machinery established by the Convention will require not just the entry into force of the Accession Agreement, but also the enactment of a number of provisions internal to the Union ('the internal provisions')" for dealing with issues such as the election of an EU judge to the ECtHR and the prior involvement of the ECJ. However, it argues that:

    "in assessing whether an Agreement that has not yet been concluded by the Union is 'envisaged' there is no reason to consider the stage reached in enacting whatever provisions may be necessary at Union level in order to regulate questions relating to the legal position of the Union as a future party to the Agreement".[45]

16.22 The Commission supports this conclusion with the following reasoning:

  • the Internal Rules will just be subsidiary to the Accession Agreement which they will be "grafted onto" and "seek to implement at Union level";[46]
  • it is therefore appropriate that before advancing the process of agreeing the Rules, the EU institutions have legal certainty that the content of the draft Agreement itself is compatible with the Treaties; and
  • in any event, it is always possible that the ECJ could arrive at a finding of compatibility with the Treaties which is conditional upon Internal Rules being enacted with "a specified content".

16.23 We deal further with the Commission's approach to the Internal Rules in the Request and the seeking of an Opinion prior to the publication of the Rules in both our analysis of sections of the Request and in our overall Conclusion. At this point we simply say that we regard this as a significant area of concern, given the ECJ's finding in Opinion 2/94 that it must be given sufficient information on such:

    "arrangements by which the Community envisages submitting to the present and future judicial control machinery established by the Convention."[47]

Assessment: Substance

16.24 The "Substance" section first comprises an overview of the EU "Legal Framework" for accession which principally resides in Article 6(2) TEU and the protocol relating to it, Protocol No 8. The Commission states that Article 6(2) imposes a legal obligation on the EU institutions to seek to conclude an Accession Agreement, which is mirrored by the obligation of the Member States to facilitate this by virtue of the principle of sincere co-operation (Article 4(3) TEU). The Commission also rehearses the conditions set out in Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Protocol regarding the content of the Accession Agreement in addition to requirements set out in ECJ Opinions 1/91[48] and 1/00[49] regarding the need for respect for the autonomy of the EU legal order. The Commission then structures the rest of its assessment of the compatibility of the draft Accession Agreement with the Treaties with reference to these conditions as headings.

16.25 Since the 2011 evidence session, we have frequently pursued the issue of how co-ordinated voting has progressed during negotiations[50] and, separately whether the issue would also be covered by Internal Rules.[51] We note the Commission is silent as to whether the process by which a co-ordinated position is to be reached at EU level will be the subject of its Internal Rules; an unwelcome silence given the expectation of the former Secretary of State and ourselves that they should be.

CONCLUSION

16.26 Several of our prior concerns (for example, the question of arrangements for co-ordinated voting and inter-party proceedings as regards the possibility of the EU bringing an action against a Member State in Strasbourg) are either only partially addressed by the draft Accession Agreement or not at all, largely because they require some prior agreement between the EU and Member States at EU level as to how those forms of participation in the ECHR mechanisms are to be arranged and organised. They should therefore be the subject of Internal Rules and yet, throughout the entire Request, the Commission only makes very general mention of the need for Internal Rules in relation to the issue of the candidature for the office of EU judge at the ECtHR,[52] the procedure for the prior involvement of the ECJ[53] and the co-respondent mechanism.[54]

16.27 The importance of such Internal Rules is highlighted by the provisional nature of the Accession Agreement; its adoption being contingent on satisfactory agreement of the EU Internal Rules, as "part of a series of internal political and procedural steps required before the final adoption of the instruments", in the words of the EU Representative recalled in the final "47+1" negotiation report.[55]

16.28 Given that the Member States regard the draft Accession Agreement as conditional upon the content of the Rules, we consider that the Commission has been somewhat precipitate and premature in seeking the Opinion of the ECJ on the draft Agreement only. Such is the degree of conditionality placed upon the draft Agreement, that in the absence of published draft Internal Rules on which Member States have at least been consulted, we do not agree with the Commission's conclusions on Admissibility. We do not think sufficient information has been provided to the Court in compliance with Opinion 2/94[56] or that the Agreement is "envisaged" within the meaning of Article 218(11) for being too inchoate and uncertain.

16.29 The inter-relationship between the draft Agreement and Internal Rules is so crucial that, depending on what agreement is eventually reached on the Internal Rules by Member States, the draft Agreement may need to be re-opened and re-negotiated in the Council of Europe. To be "envisaged", such that all that remains in the process is "consent", implies a level of completion, finality and certainty of the draft Agreement which does not exist in the present case.

16.30 To ask the ECJ to speculate on the content of Internal Rules, in particular, to specify conditions for the draft Rules as the Commission suggests, might be argued to be an abuse of the balance of institutional powers. The ECJ is a judicial body. Asking it to perform a quasi-legislative function (or even a pre-legislative, policy-making executive function) in relation to the content of prospective EU legislation as opposed to asking it to perform a judicial "review" is, in our view, incompatible with Articles 13(2),[57] 16(1),[58] 17(2)[59] and 19 TEU.[60] It also risks usurping the legislative process.

16.31 In addition, we consider that the Commission has not provided the level of information required by Opinion 2/94[61] as it fails to identify all areas where there is a need for an internal rule — the prime example being the question of how common, coordinated positions are to be achieved between the EU and Member States concerning the remedial action and voting stance to be taken in relation to an adverse judgment in co-respondent proceedings. Those areas it does identify, it addresses on far too general a level.

16.32 Finally, whilst we are disappointed that the draft Accession Agreement affords, in principle, the option for the EU to accede to more ECHR protocols than the Member States, we are reassured by the safeguard of the need for unanimous Council approval of such a step.

16.33 We thank the Minister for updating us on these recent developments.

16.34 We support the UK's decision to intervene in the Commission's Request for an Opinion of the ECJ. We are grateful to the Minister for the opportunity to provide comments on the Commission's Request in advance of the UK's submission. Our comments are set out above. We ask the Minister in due course to say to what extent he agrees with our concerns.

16.35 We also request the Minister to:

  • provide an estimate of when the ECJ may deliver its Opinion;
  • clarify whether discussions on the Internal Rules in FREMP are continuing regardless, and if so, to keep us informed of any developments; and
  • provide us, in due course, with a summary of the points raised in the Government's intervention.

16.36 In the light of these significant developments, we invite the Secretary of State for Justice to appear in person before us as soon as possible after the Conference Recess.

16.37 In the meantime, the original document deposited (the draft Council Decision 32123; 10817/10) remains under scrutiny.


37   See headnote: HC 428-xiv (2010-12) chapter 6 (26 January 2011). Back

38   Dated as being accepted by the ECJ on 1 August 2013. Back

39   http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1(2013)008rev2_EN.pdf. Back

40   Article 6(3) TEU: "Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law". This Article consolidated existing case law of the ECJ including Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, and Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491). Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, para 41 Back

41   [1996] ECR I-1759: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61994CV0002:EN:PDF.

The ECJ held, post the Maastricht Treaty but prior to Amsterdam, that EU accession to the ECHR would entail substantial change in the then Community system for the protection of human rights in that it would entail the entry of the Community into a distinct international institutional system as well as integration of all the provisions of the Convention into the Community legal order. The Court said that such a modification of the system for the protection of human rights in the Community, with equally fundamental institutional implications for the Community and for the Member States, would be of constitutional significance. It would therefore be such as to go beyond the scope of Article 235 of the EC Treaty, and consequently could be brought about only by way of Treaty amendment. The Court accordingly held that as Community law then stood the Community had no competence to accede to the Convention. Back

42   See note 5. Back

43   These instruments are not described in the Commission's Request but are the instruments which appear as Appendices to the Final Report to the CDDH of 10 June 2013(47+10(2013) 008: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1(2013)008rev2_EN.pdf. These are Appendix II (Draft declaration by the European Union to be made at the time of signature of the Accession Agreement), Appendix III (Draft rule to be added to the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements in cases to which the European Union is a party), Appendix IV (Draft model of memorandum of understanding between the European Union and X [State which is not a member of the European Union] and Appendix V (draft explanatory report to the draft Accession Agreement: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1(2013)008rev2_EN.pdf. Back

44   [1994] ECR I-5267: see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&numdoc=61994V0001&lg=en.

The ECJ stated that "The Court may be called upon to state its Opinion pursuant to Article 228(6) of the Treaty at any time before the Community's consent to be bound by the Agreement is finally expressed. Unless and until that consent is given, the Agreement remains an envisaged Agreement. Consequently, there is nothing to render this request inadmissible". Back

45   P.23 of the Request, para 60. Back

46   P.23 of the Request, para 61. Back

47   See note 5, para 20. Back

48   [1991] ECR I-6079. Back

49   [2002] ECR I-3493. Back

50   See headnote: our letter of 21 November 2012 as referred to in our second Report: HC 86-xxix (2012-13) chapter 4 (23 January 2013) to which the current Secretary of State for Justice responded in his letter of 17 December 2012. Back

51   See also our letter of 17 April 2013 at para 17 of this Report chapter. Back

52   See para 177, p.59 of the Request. Back

53   See para 150, p.51 of the Request. Back

54   See paras 108-110, p.36 of the Request. Back

55   See note 3. Back

56   See note 5. Back

57   Article 13(2) TEU states: "Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them. The institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation". Back

58   Article 16(1) TEU states: "The Council shall, jointly with the European Parliament, exercise legislative and budgetary functions. It shall carry out policy-making and coordinating functions as laid down in the Treaties". Back

59   Article 17(2) states: "Union legislative acts may only be adopted on the basis of a Commission proposal, except where the Treaties provide otherwise". Back

60   Article 19 prescribes the judicial functions of the ECJ. Back

61   See note 5. Back


 
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