9 Space policy
| (34738)
6952/13
+ ADDs 1-2
COM(13) 107
| Draft Decision establishing a space surveillance and tracking support programme
|
| Legal base
| Article 189(2) TFEU; co-decision; QMV
|
| Department
| Business, Innovation and Skills
|
| Basis of consideration
| Minister's letter dated 17 March 2014
|
| Previous Committee Reports
| HC 86-xxxviii (2012-13), chapter 3 (17 April 2013), HC 83-iii (2013-14), chapter 4 (21 May 2013) and HC 83-xxx (2013-14), chapter 1 (29 January 2014)
|
| Discussion in Council
| 14 April |
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important
|
| Committee's decision
| Cleared |
Background
9.1 In its April 2011 Communication
Towards a space strategy for the European Union that benefits
its citizens the Commission set out proposals for a space
policy and said a specific industrial policy was necessary to
deliver greater competitiveness on the world stage, independence
for specific sub-sectors such as launchers and the development
of the market for space products and services.[38]
9.2 In a February 2013 Communication
the Commission, building on the areas highlighted in the 2011
Communication, set out five specific objectives for a space industrial
policy:
· to establish a coherent and
stable regulatory framework;
· to further develop a competitive,
solid, efficient and balanced industrial base in the EU and support
SME participation;
· to support the global competitiveness
of the EU space industry by encouraging the sector to become more
cost-efficient along the value chain;
· to develop markets for space
applications and services; and
· to ensure technological non-dependence
and an independent access to space.
9.3 Underpinning these objectives were
37 specific proposals divided into six work streams, including
supporting establishing and operation of an EU space surveillance
and tracking (SST) service.[39]
9.4 In February 2013 the Commission
also published this draft Decision, which would establish an SST
support programme for the EU. In support of the proposal the Commission
said that:
· space-based systems play
a fundamental role in everyday life and are critical to the economy
and security;
· there is a need to protect
EU space infrastructure accordingly; and
· in order to mitigate the
growing risk of collisions amongst satellites and orbital debris,it
is necessary to identify and monitor space objects in an increasingly
congested and contested orbital environment, in order to ensure
the safety, security and sustainability of the space operations
upon which there is critical dependency.
9.5 The programme the Commission envisaged
would aim to establish a SST capability in the EU with emphasis
on:
· exploitation of existing
sensors (optical and radar) to survey and track space objects;
· establishment and operation
of a function to process and analyse SST data to support risk
assessment involving collision avoidance in orbit and re-entry
of objects into the Earth's atmosphere; and
· setting up and operation
of a SST function to support spacecraft operators and public authorities.
9.6 The Commission said that:
· the level of funding proposed
for the SST support programme, €10 million (£8.34 million)
per annum, was relatively modest and should be drawn from other
programmes provided for in the MFF framework for 2014-20;
· it envisaged providing support
and oversight for the development of services, but did not intend
to invest in new SST sensors, relying upon the coordination of
existing sensors, owned and operated by the Member States;
· those Member States wishing
to participate in the programme would need to demonstrate ownership
of SST sensors or capabilities and services and adequate resources
to operate and deliver them and to provide a plan for engagement
in the SST programme;
· it anticipated a coordinating
role and funding for the EU Satellite Centre (EU SatCen) based
in Torrejón, Spain; and
· information generated in
the framework of the SST programme would be managed and exchanged
in accordance with data security and governance rules, which would
likely reflect similar existing measures developed by the EU SatCen
for handling sensitive remote sensing data products.
9.7 When we last considered this matter,
in January, we heard that:
· no substantive negotiations
on the draft Decision had taken place between June and November
2013;
· negotiations had begun on
the basis of a Presidency text which presented the SST support
programme as a framework activity instead of a programme, withfunding
allocated rather than drawn from perceived beneficiary programmes
including Galileo and Copernicus;
· with the support of the Commission,
the Greek Presidency was pushing for an agreement on the proposal
within the current European Parliamentary period;
· during substantive negotiations
in the Council's Space Working Group in January, the Government
negotiating team had secured significant improvements for the
UK in redrafting the Commission's draft text to reflect the Government's
major policy and security concerns;
· since the latest version
of the Council draft text was marked Limité, we
could not report on it in any way which would bring detail contained
in the text into the public domain;
· the Government continued
to seek a solution wherein the EU SST support activity would be
delivered by national entities comprising sensor and data centres,
deriving SST information from observation data and releasing services
in the form of collision warning, in-orbit breakup detection,
and re-entry estimation, and delivering services via the EU SatCen
(which was currently performing a similar role for delivery of
Earth observation services);
· it believed this operational
approach enabledit to address security concerns over release of
sensitive orbit data and related information;
· its position on security
and the respective roles of capable Member State entities was
well aligned with the major SST players in the EU;
· its biggest policy concern
had related to previous references to the Internal Security Fund,
of which the UK team had successfully negotiated deletion in the
latest Council text, though references remain in the European
Parliament text; and
· informal trilogue negotiations
were underway and might lead to rapid agreement.
9.8 We noted that we had said previously
that we wished to have an account of the progress in Council working
group negotiations on the various issues which had been drawn
to our attention. However, apart from the issue of the Internal
Security Fund, we could not discern clear enough information in
the latest account of developments about assured success on the
other issues. So, if the Government was likely to want clearance
from us at short notice, it needed to let us know soon where matters
stood on:
· clarity on governance and
management of the system in order to ensure that EU aspirations
were practicable and deliverable;
· verification that the new
functions proposed for the EU SatCenwere compatible with its current
competencies and capabilities;
· retention of Member State
ownership of the overall EU SatCen product;
· robust data security; and
· a cap on programme expenditure.
9.9 In connection with the last point
we were unclear as to what "presenting the SST support programme
as a framework activity instead of a programme, with funding allocated
rather than drawn from perceived beneficiary programmes including
Galileo and Copernicus" meant, particularly in relation to
Multiannual Financial Framework limits.
9.10 In connection with the comments
about the Limité status of the draft, we noted that
it represented an apparently significant development in the Council's
activity as a legislator. We observed that this secretive approach
to considering legislation hardly enhanced democratic legitimacy
and referred the Minister to the comments we had made on the Limité
status of the final draft of the Directive on the European Investigation
Order.[40] We asked the
Government to convey this observation to the Presidency and the
Commission and to report back to us.
9.11 Meanwhile the document remained
under scrutiny.[41]
The Minister's letter of 17 March 2014
9.12 The Minister for Universities and
Science, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (Mr David
Willetts), tells us now that the latest version of the proposal,
of which he sends us a Limité copy, with a repeat
of his earlier caveat, was approved by Coreper on 29 January and
that this is being reviewed by jurists-linguists in anticipation
of approval by the plenary of the European Parliament this month
and subsequent ratification by the Council.
9.13 The Minister then addresses the
questions we asked, saying first, on the issue of the clarity
on governance and management of the system to ensure that EU aspirations
are practicable and deliverable, that:
· the proposal recognises that
the SST service will be delivered through a consortium of Member
State entities, exploiting existing national assets and agreeing
the nature of level of service and most notably the security of
SST data and information;
· both Ministry of Defence
and UKSpace Agency officials have been working with their international
counterparts, who will contribute to this service, and are reassured
that the envisaged service is possible with existing assets and
that national control of those assets will provide the necessary
oversight/control of activities; and
· Ministry of Defence and UKSpace
Agency officials visited the EUSatCen in January and can confirm
that its demonstrated expertise in SST is compatible with the
envisaged functions it would perform in support of national entities.
9.14 The Minister then tells us that
Member States will retain control of the data, information and
product made available to the EUSatCen for onward transmission
to third parties and that this information may be enhanced by
EUSatCen (for example, risk assessment of over-flight of territories
by uncontrolled objects tailored to civil contingency entities
in Member States).
9.15 On data security the Minister continues
that:
· this is addressed through
appropriate risk management structures, identified in Recital
21, and provided for in Article 9; and
· the mechanisms for achieving
this are well understood and already implemented at national level
within Member States, which will be able to reflect this experience
through the consortium and the formal management processes of
the EUSatCen.
9.16 Next, on the issue of funding,
the Minister says that:
· a new legal structure was
created under which interested Member States with necessary expertise/infrastructure
could enter into a consortium to receive funding from the Commission;
· funding would be allocated
by the relevant funding programmes, such as Horizon 2020 and Copernicus,
from within their current MFF allocations; and
· a notional budget of €70
million (£57 million) has been estimated for the envisaged
activities and will be limited by the allocations made from the
contributing programmes that will benefit from the SST service.
9.17 The Minister also reports that
the UK negotiating team has been successful in removing all references
to an Internal Security Fund in the text, thereby avoiding involvement
of Justice and Home Affairs and the potential triggering of a
UK opt-in.
9.18 On the point regarding the use
by the Commission of a Limité restriction on texts
provided to us, the Minister says that this cross-cutting issue
is being addressed separately by Cabinet Office Ministers.
9.19 Finally the Minister says:
"As the House of Commons retains
parliamentary scrutiny on this proposal, I am writing to bring
you up to date on developments and to seek scrutiny clearance
from you as we embark on the final phases of adoption of the text."
Conclusion
9.20 We thank the Minister for these
clarifications and, having no more questions to ask, now clear
the document.
9.21 However, we remain concerned
at the use of Limité texts by the Council when acting
as legislator. We repeat that a secretive approach to considering
legislation hardly enhances democratic legitimacy. So we ask the
Minister to confirm that he fulfilled our earlier request to convey
this observation to the Presidency and the Commission and we look
forward to hearing from Cabinet Office Ministers the Government's
view on this matter.
38 (32660) 8693/11 + ADDs 1-6: see HC 428-xxvi (2010-12),
chapter 1 (11 May 2011) and Gen Co Debs, European Committee
C, 23 May 2011, cols. 3-14. Back
39
(34737) 6950/13: see HC 86-xxxviii (2012-13), chapter 3 (17 April
2013) and HC 83-iii (2013-14), chapter 4 (21 May 2013). Back
40
See (33597) 18918/11: HC 83-xxviii (2013-14), Chapter 1 (22 January
2014). Back
41
See headnote. Back
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