8 A European Union maritime security
strategy
| (35857)
7537/14
JOIN(14) 9
| Joint Communication: For an open and secure global maritime domain — Elements for a European Union maritime security strategy
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| Legal base | —
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| Document originated | 6 March 2014
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| Deposited in Parliament | 11 March 2014
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 4 April 2014
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (35417) —: HC 83-xxiv (2013-14), chapter 2 (11 December 2013) and (35234) 12773/13: HC 83-xxiv (2013-14), chapter 5 (11 December 2013)
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| Discussion in Council | 26-27 June 2014 European Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Not cleared; further information requested
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Background
8.1 The 19-20 December European Council held the first thematic
debate on defence since the coming-into-force of the Lisbon Treaty.
The agenda was based on three "clusters":
· Cluster
1: Increase the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP;
· Cluster
2: Enhance the development of capabilities; and
· Cluster
3: Strengthen Europe's defence industry.
8.2 Two documents were produced in order to prepare
the discussion:
· the
EU High Representative's Report: "Baroness Ashton's Report
On The Common Security And Defence Policy Ahead Of The December
2013 European Council Discussion On Defence"; and
· a
Commission Communication: "Towards a More Competitive and
Efficient Defence and Security Sector".
8.3 They were thoroughly scrutinised by the Committee
during the autumn of 2013,[26]
and debated in European Committee on 14 March 2014. [27]
8.4 Paragraph 9 of the European Council Conclusions
reads thus:
"New security challenges continue to emerge.
Europe's internal and external security dimensions are increasingly
interlinked. To enable the EU and its Member States to respond,
in coherence with NATO efforts, the European Council calls for:
· "an
EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework in 2014, on the basis of a proposal
by the High Representative, in cooperation with the Commission
and the European Defence Agency;
· "an
EU Maritime Security Strategy by June 2014, on the basis of a
joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative,
taking into account the opinions of the Member States, and the
subsequent elaboration of action plans to respond to maritime
challenges;
· "increased
synergies between CSDP and Freedom/Security/Justice actors to
tackle horizontal issues such as illegal migration, organised
crime and terrorism;
· "progress
in developing CSDP support for third states and regions, in order
to help them to improve border management; and
· "further
strengthening cooperation to tackle energy security challenges."[28]
The Joint Communication
8.5 Against this background, the Commission says
that, depending as it does on open, safe seas and oceans and faced
with a wide array of maritime threats and risks the EU:
"is under pressure to do more, to act quicker
and with fewer resources, by strengthening cooperation between
different sectors and national authorities. As the internal and
external dimensions of maritime security are increasingly interlinked,
a shared unity of purpose and effort by all involved is necessary
to achieve coherence between sector-specific and national policies
and to enable civil and military authorities to react effectively
together."
8.6 Thus, an EU Maritime Security Strategy would:
"facilitate a strategic, cross-sectoral
approach to maritime security. EU coordination and the development
of further synergies with and amongst Member States, and cooperation
with international partners should be the starting point in line
with existing treaties and legislation, as well as the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the cornerstone
of that approach.
"Such a strategy would not seek to create
new structures, programmes or legislation, but would strive to
build upon and strengthen existing achievements. Consistency with
existing EU policies should be ensured."[29]
PURPOSE OF THE STRATEGY
8.7 The Commission/EEAS identify a series of key
strategic security interests and multi-faceted threats:
INTERESTS
· The
prevention of conflicts, the preservation of peace and the strengthening
of international security through engagement with international
partners;
· The
protection of the EU against maritime security threats including
the protection of critical maritime infrastructure;
· Effective
control of the Union's maritime external borders to prevent illegal
activities;
· The
protection of the global EU supply chain, the freedom of navigation,
right of innocent passage of ships flying the flags of EU Member
States and the safety and security of their seafarers and passengers;
and
· The
prevention of illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing.
THREATS
· Territorial
maritime disputes, acts of aggression and armed conflict between
States;
· The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
· Maritime
piracy and armed robbery at sea;
· Terrorism
and other intentional unlawful acts against ships, cargo and passengers,
ports and port facilities and critical maritime infrastructure,
including cyber-attacks on information systems;
· Cross-border
and organised crime including trafficking of arms, narcotics and
human beings, as well as IUU fishing;
· Potential
consequences of illegal discharges or accidental marine pollution;
· Potential
impacts of natural disasters, extreme events and climate change
on the maritime transport system and the maritime infrastructure;
and
· Conditions
at sea and in the coastal zone that weaken the potential for growth
and jobs in the marine and maritime sectors.
8.8 The Commission/EEAS also note the complexity
of existing political instruments and the "myriad of actors
and legislation" involved at EU and national levels: the
strategy should therefore be "inclusive, comprehensive and
build upon existing achievements".[30]
8.9 The Commission/EEAS set out four strategic objectives:
· Make
best use of existing capabilities at national and EU level;
· Promote
effective and credible partnerships in the global maritime domain;
· Promote
cost efficiency; and
· Enhance
solidarity among Member States.
ORGANISING THE EU RESPONSE
8.10 The Commission/EEAS propose four cornerstone
principles:
· A
cross-sectoral approach: all partners — civil, military,
industry — need to cooperate better;
· Functional
integrity: no change of mandate, responsibilities or competences
for each stakeholder: focus on which specific functions or tasks
can be better achieved by working together;
· Maritime
multilateralism: the EU "is stronger, and its interests are
better protected, when speaking with one voice to international
partners"; and
· Respect
for rules and principles: especially full compliance with UNCLOS.
8.11 The Commission/EEAS then set out detailed "better
cooperation" proposals:
· external
action: externally, citing EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta in deterring
piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Regional Cooperation Agreement
on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia; and
internally, including ensuring "a coordinated approach on
maritime security issues in international fora" and regular
"'EU-flagged' maritime exercises with third countries";[31]
· maritime
awareness, surveillance and information sharing: including by
end-2014 all Member State civilian and military authorities sharing
information via the European Border Surveillance System;[32]
· capability
development and capacity building: including identifying "capability
areas and technologies that could benefit from harmonisation"
and exploring "the added value of EU-owned, managed or leased
dual-use capabilities" in "maritime surveillance";[33]
· risk
management, protection of critical maritime infrastructure and
crisis response: including the Commission and HR taking "initiatives
on enhanced civil-military and cross-border cooperation for crisis
response and contingency planning" and "proposing EU
requirements governing the use of PCASPs[34]
to ensure a common standard";[35]
and
· maritime
security research and innovation, education and training: including
the Commission and HR establishing "a joint civil-military
agenda for maritime security research" and "a network
for knowledge and competence development".[36]
8.12 Looking ahead, the Commission/EEAS will work
with the Council on "a more detailed roadmap"; noting
also the need for strong support and commitment from the other
"key players", i.e., the private sector and research
establishments.
The Government's view
8.13 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 4 April 2014,
as well as recalling the December European Council Conclusions
and those of the 19 November 2013 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions
on defence,[37] the Minister
for Europe (Mr David Lidington) says that a European Union Maritime
Security Strategy (EU MSS) was "an implied task of the EU
Integrated Maritime Policy,[38]
to which the UK was a signatory in 2007", but that there
had been "limited discussion on the proposal due to internal
difficulties in agreeing a proposed Joint Communication between
the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission".
8.14 The Minister says that the Government supports
the concept of an EU MSS as a means to improve coherence across
policy and activity within the EU's institutions, and between
the EU and its Member States:
"The UK, with its dependency on the maritime
domain, would benefit from a stream-lined and holistic EU approach
to this issue. In addition to providing structure to the activities
of the EU, this strategy could positively influence individual
Member States' efforts. Some Member States are waiting for the
publication of the EU MSS before developing their own Maritime
Security Strategies.
"In contrast, the Government has already
developed a National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS), which
sets out threats and priorities in both the UK and international
maritime domains. The NSMS is due to be published imminently.
This, along with the UK's recent declaration of an Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), means that the UK is well-placed to shape the detail
of a future EU MSS."
8.15 The Minister then says that, while the principles
of a EU MSS reflect the priorities that will be set out in the
NSMS, such as the primacy of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, there are a number of areas where he will
continue to seek assurance that the EU's strategy will remain
complementary to the greater detail and focus of national strategies.
8.16 He continues as follows:
"The EU MSS should seek to reflect more
fully other similar strategies that have been or are being developed,
such as the NATO Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS).[39]
"Furthermore, while the introduction to
the Joint Communication provides assurances of the need to avoid
seeking new structures or legislation, some of the subsequent
text in the Joint Communication appears to contradict this principle.
The Government continues to be clear on the UK's long standing
position of not supporting new structures or legislation. We are
also clear that the EU MSS must not seek to undertake activity
where the EU does not have competence."
8.17 The Minister then looks at maritime security
and CSDP:
"The EU has played a leading role in maritime
security in the Horn of Africa with two CSDP missions —
EU Naval Force Somalia and EU CAP NESTOR — preventing Somali
piracy and helping to build regional maritime capacity. However,
we believe the Joint Communication perhaps puts too much weight
on these achievements. While we recognise that lessons could be
learned from the fight against piracy off the Horn of Africa,
the situation that has been encountered in this one region is
not uniform to other regions."
8.18 With regard to the threats identified by the
Commission/EEAS, the Minister says:
"We believe there should be more rigorous
risk analysis behind the maritime security threats identified
in the Joint Communication, as well as some potential solutions
to those threats. It is unclear whether the inclusion of
'regional maritime disputes' would include territorial disputes
between Member States e.g. the UK and Spain in relation to Gibraltar
or disputes over EEZ delineation which have normally been regarded
as bilateral issues. Furthermore, while the Joint Communication
recognises the global importance of sea lines of communication,
there is little detail on specific challenges associated with
key maritime choke points, such as the Strait of Hormuz."
8.19 The Minister then notes that the Government
also has concerns about proposals in the area of Privately Contracted
Armed Security Personnel (PCASP), whereby the Joint Communication
proposes that the EU should "seek mandatory standards
for PCASPs":
"It is not yet clear how the European Commission
intends to do this. However, preliminary discussions indicate
that in the absence of the International Maritime Organisation
mandating the industry standard ISO PAS 28007, the Commission
will consider doing so at the EU level. While we do not expect
the Commission to propose legislation in this area quickly, the
UK and a majority of Member States have expressed reservations
about the Commission's claims of exclusive competence in this
area."
8.20 Turning to the question of exploring "the
added value of EU-owned, managed or leased dual-use capabilities
in an area of critical capability such as maritime surveillance
for the benefit of Member States", the Minister says:
"We have been consistently clear to the
EU institutions, including in the Conclusions from the December
2013 European Council on Defence, that we believe it is for EU
Member States to develop, own or operate dual use military capabilities. The
Government would need to be convinced of the benefits of any EU-owned
civilian capabilities in the maritime field and will continue
to make this clear as the EU MSS develops. Where EU funding is
available for developing a capability, most likely through the
EDA, the UK will insist that intellectual property is retained
by the Member States involved."
8.21 The Minister then says:
"It could be viewed that the Joint Communication
implies that all EU Member States have equal membership across
the many lines of activity relating to the strategy. In reality,
of course, some significant differences in approach exist, such
as in regard to the Schengen agreement. This is another issue
that will require clarification. There is also reference made
to 'speaking with one voice'. Clearly, this may not always be
appropriate and we will continue to speak as an individual Member
State if necessary."
8.22 The Minister then turns to the notion in the
Joint Communication that "'EU flagged' maritime exercises
should be planned with third countries in the context of a CSDP
operation or mission in order to improve the EU's visibility in
the global maritime domain", and says:
"We do not support the case for 'EU flagged'
exercises simply on the grounds that they would provide greater
EU visibility. There are a range of international maritime exercises
already, particularly through NATO, and it is not clear what value
EU exercises might add. Whilst there may be room for EU involvement
in international maritime exercises (with NATO for example), we
will continue to make clear that such exercises are a matter for
EU Member States and will consider on a case-by-case basis, with
the UK's preferred framework for maritime exercises continuing
to be through NATO. In line with the approach taken to the
development of the EU's Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, we will
press for clarification that CDSP missions are only to be considered
as one of many options, and not a default response."
8.23 Looking ahead, the Minister says:
"We will continue to press for appropriate
revisions to ensure that the planned EU MSS addresses the concerns
raised above and results in a considered and relevant strategy
that reduces duplication in current EU activity relating to maritime
security and complements the UK's NSMS."
8.24 More generally, the Minister notes that:
"The Greek Presidency has initiated a drafting
process using the existing Friends of the Presidency (Integrated
Maritime Policy) committee, which will meet regularly in Brussels,
as well as drawing on the output of a range of other Council working
groups. The EU's overall intention is to agree the EU MSS
at the European Council on 26/27 June 2014.
"There is widespread support from EU Member
States for the principles highlighted in the Joint Communication
and the need to work within existing structures and legislation. Some
Member States are calling for the strategy to be 'operationalised'
ahead of the June European Council; some feel that the references
to CSDP could be strengthened, particularly the role of navies.
Some Member States would also like to see a clearer priority
of geographic areas, particularly the Gulf of Guinea."
Conclusion
8.25 The Minister raises sufficient areas of
concern, in a sensitive area, for it to be very likely that we
shall in due course recommend that the proposed Strategy is debated
prior to the June European Council.
8.26 In the first instance, however, we would
be grateful if the Minister would write to us with whatever revised
version of the Joint Communication emerges from the Working Party
discussions, along with his assessment of the extent to which
his concerns have been alleviated and the extent to which UK objectives
would be served by it.
8.27 More generally, we would like the Minister
to explain clearly what value such an EU MSS will add to the NATO
Alliance Maritime Strategy to which he refers.
8.28 We note the Minister's references to "assurances
of the need to avoid seeking new structures or legislation"
and to "some of the subsequent text in the Joint Communication
[appearing] to contradict this principle". At this juncture,
we are unaware (because the Minister is not specific) whether
his concerns include the notions of the Commission and HR ensuring
"a coordinated approach on maritime security issues in international
fora such as the G8, the UN, IMO, ILO, NATO, the African Union
and its sub-regional organisations, the Union for the Mediterranean,
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and with third
countries", and taking "initiatives on enhanced civil-military
and cross-border cooperation for crisis response and contingency
planning."[40]
When he writes to us, we would therefore like the Minister to
identify the text in question and clarify how it has been addressed
in the Working Party process, and also to say what he thinks of
the two notions outlined above.
8.29 At that time, we would like the Minister
also to:
· elaborate
on what he means by "internal difficulties in agreeing a
proposed Joint Communication between the European External Action
Service (EEAS) and the European Commission"; and
· explain
what consultations have taken place on the Strategy with what
the Commission/EEAS rightly recognise as "key players",
i.e., the private sector and research establishments.
8.30 We wish to receive this further information
no later than Friday 29 May.
8.31 In the meantime, we shall retain the document
under scrutiny.
26 See (35417) -: HC 83-xxiv (2013-14), chapter 2 (11
December 2013) and (35234) 12773/13: HC 83-xxiv (2013-14), chapter
5 (11 December 2013) and the reports referred to therein. Back
27
The record of the subsequent European Committee is available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmgeneral/euro/140312/140312s01.pdf
(Gen Co Deb, European Committee B, 14 March 2014, cols.
3-24). Back
28
The full Council Conclusions are available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf. Back
29
JOIN(14) 9, p.2. Back
30
JOIN(14) 9, p.4. Back
31
JOIN(14) 9, p.8. Back
32
On 2 December 2013 the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)
became operational. According to the relevant Commission press
release, EUROSUR will make an important contribution to saving
lives of those who put themselves in danger to reach Europe's
shores, and equip the EU and its Member States with better tools
to prevent cross-border crimes, such as trafficking in human beings
or trafficking in drugs, and detect and provide assistance to
small migrant boats in distress; the backbone of EUROSUR is formed
by "national coordination centres", via which all national
authorities with a responsibility for border surveillance are
required to cooperate and to coordinate their activities, with
information on incidents occurring at the external land and sea
borders, the status and position of patrols as well as analytical
reports and intelligence being shared via "national situational
pictures" among these national authorities. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1182_en.htm
for full details. Back
33
JOIN(14) 9, p.10. Back
34
Privately contracted armed security personnel. Back
35
JOIN(14) 9, p.11. Back
36
JOIN(14) 9, p.12. Back
37
Available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/20131126_council_conclusions_en.pdf. Back
38
According to its website, the EU's Integrated Maritime Policy
seeks to provide a more coherent approach to maritime issues,
with increased coordination between different policy areas; and
focuses on: issues that do not fall under a single sector-based
policy e.g. "blue growth" (economic growth based on
different maritime sectors); and issues that require the coordination
of different sectors and actors e.g. marine knowledge. See http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/index_en.htm
for full information. Back
39
Available at http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110318_alliance_maritime-strategy_CM_2011_23.pdf. Back
40
JOIN(14) 9, p.8. Back
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