13 The EU and the Gulf of Guinea~
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18099/13
JOIN(13) 31
| Joint Communication: Elements for the EU's Strategic Response to the Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea
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| Legal base
| — |
| Department
| Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration
| Minister's letter of 26 March 2014
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| Previous Committee Reports
| HC 83-xxxv (2013-14), chapter 15 (5 March 2014) and HC 83-xxx (2013-14), chapter 7 (29 January 2014); also see (35595) — and (35696) 17859/13: HC 83-xxvi (2013-14), chapter 9 (8 January 2014)
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| Discussion in Council
| 17 March 2014 Foreign Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment
| Politically important
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| Committee's decision
| Cleared; further information requested (decision reported 8 March 2014)
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Background
13.1 This Joint Communication, Elements
for the EU's Strategic Response to the Challenges in the Gulf
of Guinea (a 6000 km coastline from Senegal to Angola, including
the islands of Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, covering
two geographical, political and economic regions) sets out an
EEAS/Commission proposal for a "Comprehensive Approach"
to the primary challenges faced in the region, especially in the
maritime domain. It is designed to serve as the basis for a Strategic
Framework.
13.2 The Commission/EEAS posit three
distinct types of threat:
— those that take place uniquely
at sea, including illegal fishing, illicit dumping of waste, and
piracy and armed robbery at sea;[60]
— those that come from sea
onto land, primarily trafficking of narcotics, arms, counterfeit
goods and, often in the other direction, of human beings; and
— threats to sea-based economic
activity from land, particularly to the offshore oil and gas industry,
including hostage-taking, theft ("bunkering"), and criminal
acts in ports.
13.3 It proposes general areas for action
rather than specific programmes. It is based on three principles:
partnership with the countries and organisations in the Gulf of
Guinea region; a comprehensive approach integrating security,
development and governance issues; and applying lessons learned
from other strategies.
13.4 The Minister for Europe (Mr David
Lidington) described both the EU Comprehensive Approach (which
is now the keystone of CSDP, and the subject of a full-blown Commission
Communication that the Committee considered earlier this year)[61]
and tackling maritime criminality in the Gulf of Guinea as UK
priorities. The analysis, conclusions and broad actions proposed
in the Joint Communication were in line with UK objectives and
he was content with them as a basis for the Strategic Framework.
13.5 The Minister also outlined some,
"albeit relatively minor", concerns, which he aimed
to resolve through discussions at the COAFR Working Group. We
therefore asked the Minister to write to us once the document
had been finalised, outlining the changes that had been made and
his views thereon, and prior to its adoption as the new Strategy.
13.6 In the meantime, we retained the
document under scrutiny.[62]
13.7 In his letter of 28 February 2014,
the Minister said that the EU had been "been receptive to
our concerns" and reflected them in the changes to the document.
In particular:
— the language in the first
draft was "too forward leaning on the prospect of a new mission
before sufficient work had been done to establish the best way
to support current programmes"; the paper was now clear that
there were a number of options to be explored before a CSDP mission
was considered;
— the most recent draft now
referenced the lessons learned from the EU's Horn of Africa Strategy,
and the assertion regarding the potential for kidnapping attacks
to develop into a piracy business model similar to that seen in
Somali, for which there was no evidence, had been removed;
— the strategy had now been
altered to better emphasise that EU activity should be in support
of African leadership and implementing the ground-breaking "Code
of Conduct Concerning the Prevention and Repression of Piracy,
Armed Robbery against Ships and Illegal Maritime Activities in
West and Central Africa", which was adopted by Gulf of Guinea
Heads of State in Yaoundé on 24-25 June 2013; and
— the initial analysis separating
maritime criminality into three distinct threats had been altered
to reflect the inter-linkages between the crimes and promote the
holistic approach.
13.8 Overall, the Minister said:
"We continue to believe that
this strategy is a positive step for the EU as it seeks to address
maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea through greater international
co-ordination and support to an African-led solution. This approach
is consistent with the UK's own Strategy to Address Maritime Security
off Africa's Western Seaboard, and will bring greater coherence
to both the EU and individual Member States' engagement in the
Gulf of Guinea."
Our assessment
13.9 With no mention of a proposed new
CSDP mission in the Minister's EM, or in the document itself,
it seemed that, during the Working Party discussions, the EEAS
had nonetheless sought to insert the idea — e.g., a naval
CSDP mission on the lines of Operation ATALANTA, which has been
battling piracy off the Horn of Africa for some years —
in the Strategy paper itself. However, we were reassured, for
the time being at least, in that it seemed that other (unspecified)
options were to be considered before any such proposal is taken
forward. We were therefore content to clear the Joint Communication.
13.10 However, we asked the Minister,
after the Foreign Affairs Council, to provide the Committee with
a copy of the final Strategy Framework paper and of the Council
Conclusions, and any further views he might have as to how well
they met UK objectives and concerns; and to indicate the nature
of the mission proposed by the EEAS and what the other options
referred to above were.
The Minister's letter of 26 March 2014
13.11 The Minister encloses a copy of
the 17 March FAC Conclusions[63]
and of the strategy, and comments thus:
"I am pleased to report that
the final documents reflect many of the UK's key objectives, including
African leadership for a sustainable solution and the importance
of international co-operation. The strategy does not propose
specific missions; it suggests possible courses of action and
seeks to guide the development of future missions. This overarching
guidance will be of benefit in the EU's efforts to co-ordinate
its work in the region. Any subsequent proposals would be decided
upon in the usual way."
13.12 With regard to our query about
the other options that may be explored prior to the consideration
of a CSDP mission, the Minister says:
"There is not a standard list
of options that would precede such consideration due to the specific
circumstances of each proposal. However, we would expect full
deliberation to be given to other EU instruments such as the Instrument
for Stability before agreement to a CSDP mission. The European
Commission and EEAS recognise that CSDP missions are not the only
option available."
Conclusion
13.13 The final Strategy is very
much as outlined earlier by the Minister. It underlines the commitment
from individual states and the regional organisations at the Yaoundé
Summit to work together and with international partners to develop
regional maritime security in its widest sense. The strategy is
also be seen in the context of the future EU Maritime Security
Strategy.[64]
It should be based on three principles:
— partnership with the
Gulf of Guinea countries and close coordination with their regional
organisations and other international organisations active in
the region;
— ensuring that security,
development and governance issues are integrated into a comprehensive
and integrated approach; and
— applying the lessons
learnt from EU strategies in other regions of Africa, especially
the EU Sahel and Horn of Africa strategies.
13.14 It concludes thus:
"Our level of ambition, albeit
broad and encompassing the full range of economic, social, governance,
security and development challenges, is the right approach at
this stage. It will be wise to concentrate where the EU can have
the most effect. Post-Yaoundé there is an opportunity to
lever support to the regional African-led coordinating platforms
that are developing. Ultimately, this strategic framework will
allow us to better judge and plan the EU's work with its partners
in the Gulf of Guinea in a more coherent way. Increasing the EU's
focus now on coordinating better will have significant effects
on security, investor confidence, prosperity, livelihoods, the
environment, and energy supplies." [65]
13.15 It remains to be seen if the
EU is able to follow its own prescription, and whether in particular
the "the regional African-led coordinating platforms"
upon which the EU sets such store are able to respond appropriately.
13.16 In the meantime, we bring this
further information to the attention of interested Members, and
conclude our consideration of the Strategy thus far.
60 The Commission/EEAS note that International law
differentiates between "piracy" - incidents which take
place in international waters - and "armed robbery at sea"
- incidents which take place in territorial waters. Back
61
See headnote: (35595) - and (35696) 17859/13: HC 83-xxvi (2013-14),
chapter 9 (8 January 2014). Back
62
See headnote: HC 83-xxx (2013-14), chapter 7 (29 January 2014). Back
63
See p.11 of the Council Conclusions, which are available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141614.pdf. Back
64
Which we considered at our meeting of 30 April: see (35857) 7537/14:
HC 83-xlii, chapter 8 (30 April 2014). Back
65
For the full text of the Strategy, see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141582.pdf. Back
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