Eighteenth Report of Session 2013-14 - European Scrutiny Committee Contents


5   Financial assistance for non-eurozone Member States

(a)

(34077)

12201/12

COM(12) 336

(b)

(34657)

5477/13


Draft Regulation establishing a facility for providing financial assistance for Member States whose currency is not the euro


ECB Opinion on a draft Council Regulation establishing a facility for providing financial assistance for Member States whose currency is not the euro (CON/2013/2)

Legal base(a) Article 352 TFEU; consent; unanimity

(b) ¯

DepartmentHM Treasury
Basis of considerationMinister's letter of 3 October 2013
Previous Committee Reports(a) HC 86-xi (2012-13), chapter 15 (5 September 2012) and HC 86-xxxviii (2012-13), chapter 7 (17 April 2013)

(b) HC 86-xxxv (2012-13), chapter 13 (13 March 2013) and HC 86-xxxviii (2012-13), chapter 7 (17 April 2013)

Discussion in CouncilNot known
Committee's assessmentLegally and politically important
Committee's decisionNot cleared; further information requested

Background

5.1  Council Regulation (EC) 332/2002 established a medium term financial assistance facility for Member States whose currency is not the euro, known as the EU balance of payments facility. Decisions to grant such financial assistance, by way of conditional loans, are made by the Council and the total of loans outstanding may not exceed €50 billion (£41.8 billion).

5.2  In June 2012 the Commission presented this draft Regulation, document (a), seeking to develop the facility, primarily in four ways:

  • introducing two new instruments ¯ enhanced conditions credit lines (ECCL) and precautionary conditioned credit lines (PCCL) to the facility, which can currently provide a "loan or appropriate financing facility";
  • specifying the form of monitoring to apply throughout a programme and potential suspension of programme and other EU funds resulting from non-compliance with programme conditionality ¯ this includes eliminating duplicate reporting requirements under the European Semester and for countries under the Excessive Deficit and the Macro-economic Imbalances Procedures;
  • increasing the involvement of relevant institutions (European Parliament, European Central Bank (ECB), European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)) in the agreement, surveillance and progress of programmes; and
  • simplifying and codifying existing activation procedures, not provided for in the current Regulation.

5.3  The total amount available would remain unchanged, with decision making remaining with the Council.

5.4  In this Opinion, document (b), the ECB shows itself broadly supportive of the draft Regulation and does not highlight any areas of real concern.

5.5  When, in September 2012, we considered the draft Regulation, although acknowledging the Government's support for the intentions of the proposal, we noted that it was considering the implications for the UK. Most importantly, we assumed that the Government was considering the implication of the use of Article 352 TFEU for the provisions of Section 8 of the European Union Act 2011. So before considering the matter further we asked to hear about the outcome of those considerations.

5.6  When, last March, we considered the ECB Opinion we noted that:

  • the Government had not commented directly on the Opinion; and
  • it had told us that there was currently no agreed timetable for the draft Regulation and that the Irish Presidency work programme did not include any reference to it.

5.7  We said that we assumed that the response to our earlier requests in relation to the draft Regulation would take into account any relevant aspects of the ECB Opinion.

5.8  Last April we heard that:

  • the timetable had still not been agreed and there was no indication that the dossier was to be taken forward in the near future;
  • there was also as yet, no clarity on the read across to the Banking Union proposals that would influence the draft Regulation;
  • we would have an assessment of the proposal and the Government's position on it, taking into account relevant aspects of the ECB Opinion, when the issue was to be taken forward; and
  • given the legal base of Article 352 TFEU, the proposal, as and when it proceeds, would require not only unanimous support from the Member States in the Council but also an Act of Parliament.

5.9  We, while noting this latest information, looked forward to having in due course an assessment of the draft Regulation and the Government's position on it, taking into account relevant aspects of the ECB Opinion. Meanwhile the documents remained under scrutiny.[19]

The Minister's letter

5.10  The then Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Greg Clark) tells us that the Lithuanian Presidency has indicated that it intends to progress the draft Regulation during its Presidency, with the aim of reaching a Council General Approach by the end of the year.

5.11  The Minister therefore now gives us details of the Government's position on this proposal. First, recalling that the draft Regulation would introduce the possibility for financial assistance to be available in the form of precautionary credit lines, a PCCL or an ECCL, similar to the precautionary instruments already available from the IMF, the Minister says that:

  • these precautionary programmes would allow Member States meeting a set of pre-qualification eligibility criteria to access a credit line with lighter conditionality than that of a full macroeconomic adjustment programme;
  • precautionary programmes can provide a safety net to help countries, with sound economic fundamentals but moderate vulnerability, to cope with adverse shocks in order to prevent a crisis from occurring or deepening;
  • their availability would complement the crisis resolution function of traditional programme types with more effective tools for crisis prevention;
  • precautionary programmes also avoid the stigma sometimes associated with more traditional programme types;
  • countries would be encouraged to make approaches for assistance in a more timely fashion, reducing the risk of contagion in order to help prevent a deeper, more damaging, crisis developing;
  • the Government has welcomed the reforms to the IMF's precautionary credit lines in recent years, as the IMF's lending frameworks need to be flexible enough to deal with individual country problems and systemic shocks, while providing the right incentives for countries to adopt sound policies in the good times; and
  • the proposed introduction of the PCCL and ECCL would allow the EU to provide precautionary assistance alongside the IMF.

5.12  The Minister says secondly that:

  • the proposal as currently drafted extends the participation of the ECB beyond what has been the practice under the existing Regulation;
  • this role is not justified in the case of those Member States who do not intend to adopt the euro and have no obligation to do so — in negotiations the Government will seek for it to be removed; and
  • the ECB itself in its Opinion argued that it should have less involvement than envisaged in the draft Regulation — in addition, it is important that arrangements for the monitoring of any financial sector conditionality included in a programme, such as stress tests or assessment of supervisory capacity, are consistent across Banking Union Member States and those Member States that are not part of the Banking Union.

5.13  Next the Minister says, with respect to the roles of other institutions, that:

  • it is the established practice for EU balance of payments assistance to be provided alongside an IMF programme and for the Commission and IMF to cooperate on programme design and monitoring (with the involvement of the ECB for Denmark, Latvia and Lithuania); and
  • having considered the role foreseen for the ESAs and the European Systemic Risk Board, the Government believes they have useful expertise in the areas identified by the draft Regulation and that the proposal is consistent with the existing remit of those bodies.

5.14  The Minister also comments that it is important that throughout the negotiations the role established for the Council in the existing Regulation is preserved.

5.15  Finally the Minister reminds us that the draft Regulation is not only subject to unanimity, but, being based on Article 352 TFEU, would require, for the UK, an Act of Parliament.

Conclusion

5.16  We are grateful to the Minister for this explanation of the Government's view of the substance of the draft Regulation, on which we have no further questions to ask. However, we should be grateful for an indication soon, given the Presidency's intention to seek a General Approach before the end of the year, of the Government's timetable for the Bill which will need to be enacted before the Government can acquiesce in adoption of the draft Regulation.

5.17  Meanwhile both documents remain under scrutiny.





19   See headnote. Back


 
previous page contents next page


© Parliamentary copyright 2013
Prepared 24 October 2013