23 The EU and the Horn of Africa: Regional
Maritime Capacity Building
| (35429)
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| Draft Council Decision amending Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR)
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| Legal base | Articles 28, 42 (4) and 43 (2) TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration
| EM of 30 October 2013 |
| Previous Committee Report
| None; but see (33835) —: HC 428 lviii (2010-12), chapter 11 (25 April 2012) and (35109) —: HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter (3 July 2013); also see (33741) —: HC 428-liv (2010-12), chapter 13 (14 March 2012) and (33759) —: HC 428-lv (2010-12), chapter 8 (21 March 2012)
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| Discussion in Council
| Prior to 15 November 2013
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| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision
| Cleared; further information requested
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Background
23.1 European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia
— Operation Atalanta was established on 8 December 2008,
via Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, as an EU Naval Force
to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. It is the first EU
maritime operation and aims to protect World Food programme humanitarian
deliveries and to deter and disrupt pirate attacks on other vulnerable
shipping.
23.2 The EU Training Mission for Somalia (EUTM Somalia)
was launched on 7 April 2010. Its objective is strengthening the
Somali Security Forces through the provision of specific military
training.
23.3 These missions are part of a wider, comprehensive
EU approach to Somalia, together with the wider international
community, to promote peace and stability in Somalia, improve
local governance, health and education and encourage political
reconciliation. The wider background is set out in our Reports
under reference.
23.4 On December 2011, Foreign Affairs Council conclusions
on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) included the following:
"The Council welcomes the concrete steps by
the High Representative to counter interconnected security threats
in the Horn of Africa, particularly piracy, in the context of
the EU strategic framework for the Horn of Africa and in view
of establishing further synergies amongst the various CSDP initiatives
in the region. To underpin this effort, the Council has agreed
to revert in early 2012 to the issue of extending the mandate
of EUNAVFOR ATALANTA until the end of 2014, and will approve the
Crisis Management Concept for a civilian CSDP mission with military
expertise to strengthen regional maritime capacities in Somalia
and in the wider Horn of Africa region."[75]
Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP and our assessment
23.5 We considered what became Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP
at our meeting on 25 April 2012. The Report of that meeting contains
the full background to the establishment of EUCAP Nestor, including
activation of the EU Operations Centre for the Horn of Africa
and the extension of the mandate and area of operation of EUNAVFOR
ATALANTA.[76]
Our assessment
23.6 We thanked the Minister for having kept the
Committee well informed during the preparatory stages of this
mission, which seemed to have been thoroughly done and to fit
well into the overall EU and international endeavour to combat
a palpable menace.
23.7 Operationally, we endorsed the importance that
the Minister attached to the mission remaining focused on delivering
its specified objectives effectively. It was also, as he noted,
a positive step that the mission was time-limited, and had a defined
exit strategy — though the evaluation process would need
to guard against subjectivity in the words that the Minister used
to define it (with the intent that it "will no longer be
required once its host countries have adopted more effective legal
and policing counter-piracy techniques") leading to pressure
towards making it somewhat more open-ended. The contribution
of British Embassies and High Commissions in the region to the
regular EAS reports to which he referred would, we felt, thus
be particularly important; the unanimity required for any extension
without an equally well-founded basis was a further safeguard.
The previous Council Decision amending Council
Decision 2012/389/CFSP and our assessment
23.8 This Council Decision extended the 12 month
budget by four months to 15 November 2013. The Minister said
that NESTOR had "dramatically under spent" the €22.88
million budget allocated to cover its operations between July
2012 and July 2013: its expenditure up to 6 June 2013 being €3.385
million; and that the main reason was "that large premises
and operations anticipated in Kenya and Tanzania have not yet
been established." He described the notion embodied in the
draft Council Decision as "a reasonable and pragmatic proposal
given the large underspend to date."
23.9 The reason why "large premises and operations
anticipated in Kenya and Tanzania" had not yet been established
was, the Minister explains, because both Kenya and Tanzania wished
to be offered heavy equipment (such as coastguard vessels) whereas
"EEAS's consistent position has been that NESTOR is a framework
for transfer of skills and expertise, not of equipment".
His assessment was that "once this position — and the
value of NESTOR's offering — is entirely understood, Kenya
and Tanzania will wish to participate".
Our assessment
23.10 Although the Minister did not say so, we presumed
that the four-month extension had been chosen with a further review
in mind. We therefore made it clear that we expected the Minister
then to be able to demonstrate that the mission had a reasonable
prospect of achieving its objectives, and spending the remaining
85% of its budget effectively: or to be explaining how the mission
was to be scaled down so that its objectives were more realistic
and capable of timely and cost-effective realisation.
The draft Council Decision
23.11 The draft Council Decision approves a budget
for the final eight months of the mission's mandate (16 November
2013-15 July 2014) of €12 million.
23.12 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 30 October
2013, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) notes that
extension to November 2013 notwithstanding (i.e. the first 16
months of the mandate), the budget will not have been fully spent
by mid-November.
23.13 The Minister says that the following table
compares the two budgets on a like-for-like percentage basis:
| Budget Header
| Budget for Nov 2013-July 2014
(Euros)
| change in cost per month
%
|
| Personnel | 5,248,386
| 17 |
| Missions Expenditure |
937,520
| 60 |
| Running costs | 2,581,704
| 27 |
| Capital expenditure |
1,377,150
| -39 |
| Representation | 16,000
| 78 |
| Projects | 1,616,000
| -18 |
| Contingencies | 223,240
| 280 |
| TOTAL
| 12,000,000
| 5
|
23.14 He comments on the budget as follows:
"This comparison is offered in a spirit of transparency,
but is in fact of limited analytical value. The tasks which NESTOR
set itself in 2012 are very different to those it has been able
to undertake and different again to those planned for 2013-14.
So there are few valid points of comparison. A few aspects of
mission planning are worth highlighting:
"The mission feels it has gained real traction
in Somalia. Many more staff than originally anticipated have been
based in Djibouti so as to travel readily to Mogadishu and elsewhere.
The forward plan anticipates more of the same;
"Operations planned for Nairobi and Dar es Salaam
have not been possible. The UK wishes to retain the option of
working in those capitals in the future;
"Work in the Seychelles is in a steady state,
but the mission's coordination and impact could be improved.
"The mission's new personnel plan envisages
a reduction in the mission's seconded personnel from 89 to 69
and an overall headcount reduction from 176 to 158. The reason
for the increased personnel budget, despite the reduced headcount
is that staff will be more highly graded and will attract higher
pay for working in more dangerous environments.
"Missions Expenditure covers the travel
costs of mission staff. As set out above, the mission intends
to travel to Somalia a great deal more than was planned in early
2012. The mission's plan anticipates forty such trips per month.
This increase in travel to an expensive destination has driven
a sharp percentage rise in this budget header.
"As one would expect for a mission in its second
year, the capital expenditure budget is much reduced on
year one. The mission still wants to acquire vehicles, IT, communications
equipment and premises for its operations in Djibouti, the Seychelles
and Kenya.
"The Representation budget is small.
Two thousand Euros per month seems reasonable for a mission dealing
with five host governments.
"Projects spend has been reduced, but
remains a large amount. However the mission needs to retain the
capacity to deliver useful activities with its hosts. Its ability
to direct resources towards developing capabilities is a key part
of its attractiveness — current and potential — to
its host states.
"The contingencies budget can only be
drawn upon with permission."
The Government's view
23.15 The Minister recalls his Explanatory Memorandum
of 20 April 2012 and earlier correspondence with the Committee,
which he says "set out the reasons why it matters",
and states that "Those remain intact".
23.16 He continues as follows:
"Piracy in the Horn of Africa remains a cause
of damage to the global economy, amounting to an estimated £6
billion last year. NESTOR seeks to develop a sustainable and locally-owned
response.
"The volume of piracy has fallen by 80% between
2011 and 2012 and not a single merchant vessel has been successfully
hijacked in 2013.
"We cannot attribute much of that reduction
to NESTOR's work as the mission has not yet delivered enough results
to be having such a valuable impact. I am inclined to say that
the reduction is mostly attributable to the military counter-piracy
missions in the Horn — ATALANTA, CTF 151, and Ocean Shield
— improved application of Best Management self protection
measures by the shipping industry, the utilisation of privately
contracted armed personnel, and perhaps to improvements in government
in Somalia, albeit from a very low base.
"However it is not sustainable to maintain fleets
in the Horn indefinitely. Doing so is hugely expensive. Nor can
we accept indefinitely the additional costs which piracy and efforts
to counter it impose on global trade in the form of lost goods,
delays to shipping, ransoms paid and additional security. A sustainable
solution to piracy can only result from measures taken by Indian
Ocean states to police their waters, combat, arrest and prosecute
pirates and address the root causes of piracy, which are chiefly
poverty and lawlessness in Somalia.
"So the case for an operation such as NESTOR,
which costs roundly one thousandth of EU and NATO military programmes,
remains intact.
"The mission has, however, had difficulty delivering
readily the results we wish for. Kenya and Tanzania remain only
arms-length participants in the mission's work. These states have
not agreed formal partnership arrangements with the Mission, though
the mission has engaged with them, for example by hosting counter-piracy
events in Nairobi. We hope that Kenya and Tanzania will become
more involved with NESTOR in future; that is certainly the intention
of the EEAS and the Head of Mission.
"Elsewhere the mission has delivered results
in Djibouti, Somalia and the Seychelles. This delivery has been
at times patchy and work in Somalia has been handicapped by the
obvious security risks of deploying staff there. The mission has
had to adapt its operations so as to achieve what is possible
in each country which was not always what was anticipated in the
Operational Plan. Staff have been moved to where they can operate
best, though such movements have obviously consumed time and resources.
We are encouraged by the work to date of Etienne de Poncins, who
took charge in July with a commitment to improve dialogue with
the EEAS and Member States. The UK's secondees to the mission
have secured a good reputation for their expertise, though our
determination to keep them safe, by ensuring that short deployments
to Somalia are securely managed, has at times restricted the work
they can do.
"As there have been issues with NESTOR, it is
reasonable to ask whether it is worth continuing with it. My answer
to that question is positive. The threat which NESTOR is addressing
is real and its strategy can help to rid us of the excessive costs
of piracy in the long-term. It may be that we need to persevere
with this for some years to achieve the results we need. But officials
will of course be engaging closely with NESTOR's strategic review,
due around the turn of the year to ensure that the mission is
tightly focused and that the resources it requires are constrained,
well-managed and used effectively. We will of course keep Parliament
informed of developments."
Conclusion
23.17 Compared with where we began — with
the Minister emphasising the importance he attached to the mission
remaining focused on delivering its specified objectives effectively,
the time limit and a clear exit strategy — the situation
thus far continues to be deeply discouraging. What is plain is
that, thus far, EUCAP NESTOR has made little discernible contribution
to a sustainable solution — or if it has, then the Minister
tells us nothing about it. The mission may feel that "it
has gained real traction in Somalia", but does the Minister:
and if so, in what ways that are consistent with its mandate,
objectives and deliverables?
23.18 Moreover, we see once again the EU establishing
an expensive mission — €35 million thus far —
without first ensuring that all of those whom it is supposed to
benefit are committed to it. As he notes, Kenya and Tanzania
still "remain only arms length participants" who have
yet to agree the formal agreements without which such missions
remain severely constrained (c.f. and Niger).[77]
23.19 Encouragement is taken from the appointment
of a new Head of Mission, half-way through the period of operation,
which reinforces, of course, the earlier implication that the
previous Head of Mission had been found wanting. This is also
not unprecedented with such missions. Much is being made of
the EU's "Comprehensive Approach". But it is no good
if that strategic framework is being undermined by a failure properly
to address the essentials — clear, prior local buy-in embodied
in a written agreement, good mission leadership from the outset
— when it comes to implementation.
23.20 Instead, what we see in this instance is
the ground being laid for what was intended to be time-limited
becoming an exercise with which "we need to persevere with
this for some years to achieve the results we need" —
which would seem to prejudge the outcome of the strategic review
due later this year or early next. Again, such "mission
creep" is far from unique (c.f. EUTM Mali[78]
and EUTM Somalia,[79]
which we also considered on 3 July).
23.21 We clear the Council Decision only because
the mission is established until July 2014 and needs a budget
until then.
- However, in doing so, we ask the Minister
to deposit the strategic review in due course and provide his
views on it; then to show what actual results have been delivered
against objectives; and also to address some of the general principles
that are being called into question by this mission's lack of
achievements thus far.
75 See para 10 of http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st17/st17991.en11.pdf. Back
76
See (33835) -: HC 428 lviii (2010-12), chapter 11 (25 April 2012);
also see (33741) -: HC 428-liv (2010-12), chapter 13 (14 March
2012) and (33759) -: HC 428-lv (2010-12), chapter 8 (21 March
2012). Back
77
See (35108) -: HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 21 (3 July 2013). Back
78
See (34664) -: HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 17 (3 July 2013). Back
79
See (34518) -: HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 16 (3 July 2013). Back
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