1 Safety of nuclear installations
| (a)
(35063)
11064/13
+ ADDs 1-4
COM(13) 343
(b)
(35408)
15030/13
+ ADDs 1-4
COM(13) 715
|
Draft proposal presented for the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee under Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty, for a Council Directive amending Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations
Draft Council Directive amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations
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| Legal base | Articles 31 and 32 Euratom; consultation; QMV
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| Document originated | (b) 17 October 2013
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| Deposited in Parliament | (b) 22 October 2013
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| Department | Energy and Climate Change
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 5 November 2013
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| Previous Committee Report | (a) HC 83-xii (2013-14), chapter 2 (17 July 2013)
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| Discussion in Council | No date set, but see para 1.9 below
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | (a) Cleared
(b) For debate in European Committee A
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Background
1.1 Although the responsibility for the safety of nuclear
installations rests with Member States and licence holders, Article
30 of the Euratom Treaty provides for the establishment of basic
standards for protecting the health of workers and the general
public against ionising radiation, and these are set out in Council
Directive 96/29/Euratom. Also, after a subsequent case[1]
in the European Court of Justice had ruled that the Community
also shared competences with the Member States in areas covered
by the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Council eventually adopted
Directive 2009/71/Euratom.
1.2 This establishes a Community framework for
the safety of nuclear installations. In particular, it requires
Member States to have a national legislative, regulatory and organisational
framework which establishes responsibilities for the adoption
of national safety requirements, the provision of a system for
the licensing of nuclear installations, and of a system of nuclear
safety supervision, and enforcement actions. Member States must
also establish a competent regulatory authority which is functionally
separate from any other body concerned with nuclear energy; such
a body must be given the resources necessary to fulfil its obligations
and licence holders should be required to demonstrate compliance
with national safety requirements, with this being verified through
assessment and inspections. Member States must also have in place
arrangements for the education and training of staff with nuclear
safety responsibilities; ensure that relevant information is made
available to workers and the general public; and provide regular
reports to the Commission on the implementation of the Directive.
1.3 Although the overall safety record of the
140 or so nuclear power plants within the EU is good, the European
Council decided in March 2011, in the wake of the Fukushima accident,
that these should each be subjected to a "stress test",
and that the EU should review its nuclear safety legislative framework
in the light of the lessons to be learned from that accident.
The Commission subsequently set out its conclusions in a Communication[2]
on October 2012, which said that the lessons from Fukushima and
from the stress tests needed to be reflected in the legislative
framework, notably as regards the differences between Member States
and the gaps in managing key safety issues. In particular, it
said that the Nuclear Safety Directive should be amended as regards
its procedures and framework, the role and means of regulatory
authorities, openness and transparency, and monitoring and verification.
1.4 It accordingly produced in June 2013 a draft
Council Directive (document (a)) for comments by the European
Economic and Social Committee, which it said would apply to all
stages in the lifecycle of nuclear installations, and improve
the current regulatory framework by:
- strengthening the role and
effective independence of the national regulatory authorities
by setting out benchmark criteria and requirements;
- enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters
by placing obligations on regulatory authorities and licence holders
to provide information and involve the public in any decisions;
- strengthening existing principles, and introducing
new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing
specific technical issues across the entire lifecycle of nuclear
installations, such as their siting, hazard assessment and design
review;
- reinforcing monitoring and exchange of experiences,
by establishing a European system of peer reviews, with the Commission
having the power to intervene where it regards a Member State's
response as unsatisfactory; and
- establishing a mechanism for developing EU-wide
harmonised nuclear safety guidelines.
1.5 As we noted in our Report of 17 July 2013,
the Government said that, should a proposal as drafted be put
to the Council, it would be necessary to ensure that the competences
of the Member States in this area were respected, and that the
degree of prescription in the proposal could result in restrictions
on their ability to act in accordance with national circumstances,
with some regulatory safety decisions being taken centrally by
the Commission, rather than by national authorities.
It added that safety remained
its top priority, with measures being in place to ensure that
the lessons are learnt from the Fukushima accident, and that the
focus of the Commission and Member States should be on ensuring
the proper implementation of the current Nuclear Safety Directive.
However, it said that, where there was robust evidence to support
change, it would work with the Commission and other Member States
to ensure that the EU nuclear safety regime is appropriately enhanced,
but that, notwithstanding the Commission's wish to be seen to
be taking firm and swift action, the proposal demonstrated insufficient
evidence to support the need for legislative changes. Instead,
it would add considerable detail and prescription to the existing
arrangements, and hence appeared to be inconsistent with the role
of Member States as contemplated by Article 33 of the Euratom
Treaty in relation to implementation of Directives.
1.6 More specifically, the Government commented
that the proposal would result in an increased role for the Commission
in relation to peer reviews of Member States' nuclear safety regimes
and performance, including the power to oversee and drive subsequent
implementation by Member States, and that this appeared to be
politically, rather than safety, driven. It also noted that, although
the proposal sought to ensure the independence of national nuclear
safety regulators, it could undermine that aim, in that it confused
the lines of accountability for nuclear safety between regulators
and national Governments, and also appeared to make national regulators
accountable to the Commission, this therefore being a point to
which particular attention would need to be given for the proposal
to be acceptable.
1.7 We noted that this was a draft Council
Directive, which was likely to be followed by a formal proposal
later in the year, and that we would expect the latter document
to provide the main focus for scrutiny. However, as the draft
dealt with an area of some importance, and contained a number
of elements over which the Government had considerable reservations,
not least about the enhanced powers it would give to the Commission,
we decided to draw the document to the attention of the House,
but to hold it under scrutiny until such time as the formal proposal
was tabled.
The current document
1.8 As foreshadowed, the Commission has now adopted
its earlier draft as a formal proposal for a Council Directive
(document (b)), and, as the Explanatory Memorandum of 5 November
2013 from the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department
for Energy and Climate Change (Baroness Verma) makes clear, that
document hence gives rise to very much the same considerations
for the UK. In particular, the degree of prescription, and the
extent to which the measure would encroach on matters properly
falling within the competence of Member States, remain matters
of considerable concern. She also comments that the impact assessment
provided by the Commission does not provide a fully balanced assessment
of events following the Fukushima incident, in that it fails to
highlight the important fact that no nuclear power plant in the
EU has had to be closed down as a result of safety concerns, or
to demonstrate the benefits of the proposed change to the Nuclear
Safety Directive (simply stating, with little or no supporting
evidence, that the proposal will further mitigate against the
risk of nuclear accidents).
1.9 As regards timing, the Minister says that
high level discussions on the proposal have already begun, and
that the Commission, which sees this dossier as a priority, is
keen for it to be adopted before the end of the current Commission's
term of office.
Conclusion
1.10 It is clear that, despite whatever misgivings
the UK and other Member States may have expressed previously,
the Commission remains wedded to an approach which contains a
number of elements of significant concern, and that its formal
proposal would still impose unacceptable constraints on Member
States' freedom of action in an area of considerable political
and environmental importance. In view of this, we think that document
(b) raises issues which it would be right for the House to consider
at an early opportunity, and we are therefore recommending it
for debate in European Committee A. However, as document (a) has
now been overtaken by this latest proposal, we are clearing it.
1 Case C-29/99 Commission v. Council. Back
2
See (34290) 14400/12: HC 86-xvi (2012-13), chapter 1 (24 October
2012). Back
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