3 EU support for Governance in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
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| European Court of Auditors Special Report 9/2013: EU Support for Governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
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| Legal base | Article 287(4) TFEU; —
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| Department | International Development
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 31 October 2013
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (35105) 11482/13: HC 83-xiii (2013-14), chapter 2 and (35048) 10939/13: HC 83-xiii (2013-14), chapter 39 (4 September 2013); and (35106) —: HC 83-xvi (2013-14), chapter 8 (9 October 2013
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| To be determined |
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Not cleared; for debate in European Committee B
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Background
3.1 Under Article 287(4) TFEU, the European Court of Auditors
(ECA), via its Special Reports, carries out audits designed to
assess how well EU funds have been managed so as to ensure economy,
efficiency and effectiveness.[9]
European Court of Auditors Special Report No 9/2013
3.2 This Report outlines the findings and recommendations
emanating from the ECA's examination of the effectiveness of EU
support for improving governance in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC) over the period 2003-11, and the Commission's
response.
3.3 The ECA examined in particular EU support
for: the electoral process; justice; police; public financial
management reforms; and the decentralisation process. During this
period 1,344 million (£1,123 million) was spent overall on
development cooperation, largely from the 9th and 10th European
Development Funds (EDF).
3.4 The Report recalls that support for governance
is central to the 9th and 10th EDF cooperation strategies; good
governance being crucial for peace, stability and development.
The Report acknowledges, however, that the DRC is one of the most
fragile states in the world, and thus one of the most difficult
environments in which to deliver aid and promote development that
reaches and benefits the most vulnerable people.
3.5 The Court considers that EU support to governance
in the DRC is set in a generally sound cooperation strategy; addresses
the main needs; and has achieved some results. However, the Court's
main conclusion is that its effectiveness has been limited, and
progress has been slow, uneven and overall limited, with fewer
than half of the programmes delivering their expected results.
3.6 The Court concludes that: the Commission
took insufficient account of the fragile national context in designing
the programmes; risks were not adequately addressed; and programme
objectives, especially given the context, were at times far too
ambitious. The Court also expresses concern that conditionality
and policy dialogue were not used to their full potential.
3.7 The Court recommends that the Commission:
improves the EU's cooperation strategy with the DRC; better assesses
the risks in connection with the successful implementation of
programmes; establishes objectives that are achievable in the
national context; and strengthens the use of conditionality and
policy dialogue.
3.8 In its Replies, the Commission notes that
some projects were at a very early stage of implementation and
had consequently not delivered results; and accordingly contends
that partial, and not limited, results were achieved. The Commission
contends that the fragile context and risks were adequately taken
into consideration, and that it was the very fragility of the
national context that made it impossible to achieve programmes
as they had initially been designed. The Commission do not agree
that they should strengthen the use of conditionality and policy
dialogue, and ask that the timeline for assessing the effectiveness
of EU programmes takes proper account of the realities of working
in a fragile state.
The Government's view
3.9 In her Explanatory Memorandum of 31 October
2013, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department
for International Development (Lynne Featherstone) notes that
the DRC is one of the largest national recipients of EDF funding;
and that, with programming of funds under EDF10 now drawing to
a close, planning for EDF11 is beginning. She says that she
will look to ensure that the Commission takes on board lessons
learnt from this evaluation, and any others, when designing programmes
for the 2014-20 financial perspective.
3.10 She also notes that the Commission's "Agenda
for Change"[10]
is shaping the EDF11 programming process, including a concentration
on four focal sectors for each fragile state; the early indications
for the DRC being health, environment, roads and security sector
reform. The EDF Committee will, she says, facilitate scrutiny
of the EU approach to support for security sector reform programmes,
for which Committee approval is required.
3.11 The Minister then comments as follows:
"The UK recognises and welcomes the report's
findings. We are seriously concerned about the difficulties EU
projects are facing in achieving results in the governance sector
in the DRC, and have already expressed these concerns to the Commission
in country. The report's conclusions are sensible and the recommendations
are generally appropriate with regard to the overall EU strategy.
Recommendations to work on oversight institutions, such as the
DRC's supreme audit institution and Parliament and to ensure that
fraud and corruption are central to the approach of the EU are
welcome and especially important in the DRC context. We also recognise
the need to prioritise by sectors and areas. The UK will work
with the EU and other development partners to ensure complementarity
in our support. We have engaged with the EU through the coordination
groups, including on economic governance, to ensure EU programmes
work more effectively with our own in the DRC.
"The recommendations to ensure that risks are
embedded in the design of programmes and to ensure appropriate
policy dialogue are both fair. We also recognise the limit of
policy dialogue when political will is absent or weak. However,
the UK does not support the proposal to introduce more rigid conditionality
as part of the EU programme in the DRC. There is limited international
evidence of the effectiveness of strong conditionality. We agree
with the Commission's response on this matter which applies the
principles agreed internationally in 2011 for a 'New deal for
engagement in fragile states'. This involves agreeing clear, relevant
and realistic benchmarks and periodically assessing compliance
with these agreed benchmarks through constructive dialogue.
"We recognise that development programming and
aid delivery in the DRC is taking place under extremely difficult
circumstances. We agree with the recommendations that programme
objectives should be flexible, focussed and set realistic timeframes.
The Commission's response makes clear that their financial regulations
and timeframe limit flexibility. We will work with the EU to include
more flexibility in programmes at the outset. We do not agree
with the Commission's response that programmes were at an early
stage in implementation and that "delays as compared to the
initial timetables are mainly due to the fragility and post-crisis
situation in the DRC", as this is a central risk to all fragile
state programmes and should have been taken into account in programme
design.
"The UK will use opportunities in sector dialogue
at regional level, country level, and in the EDF Committee to
emphasise the importance of the Commission and External Action
Service promoting improved governance programmes in the DRC. The
UK is already engaging with the EU on the plans for the 11th EDF.
We support the Delegation's choice of sectors (health, environment,
roads and security sector reform). We have strongly encouraged
the Delegation to learn lessons from the audit, including setting
achievable objectives and developing realistic timeframes. We
have requested greater clarity on the EU's overall geographical
focus and the interplay between the different sector interventions
that are planned, which should ideally inform geographic targeting
at the provincial level.
"Finally, we have argued that the Delegation
should be more explicit on how political risks will be mitigated,
and how political economy issues which may hinder reform efforts
(incentives, corruption, transparency and accountability) are
taken into account."
Conclusion
3.12 There is a strong read-across between
this Court of Auditors' report and the three documents that we
reported on earlier that are referred to above. The first is
a Joint Commission/HR Communication that proposes a comprehensive
EU response to the Crisis in Syria once the fighting is over and
describes a number of areas in which the EU does or should focus
its efforts, and methods by which this will continue or could
be carried forward: we recommended that this should be debated
on the Floor of the House, especially as the question of whether
there will be single political entity with which the EU can engage
is moot.[11]
That debate has yet to take place.
3.13 At that same meeting, we also considered
a Commission Communication that examined the work of the EU to
support democratic governance, through two particular instruments:
the Governance Initiative (covering Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) countries) and the Governance Facility (European Neighbourhood
area).[12] In
commenting on it, the Minister (Lynne Featherstone) noted that
a number of shortcomings had reduced effectiveness thus far, including
short time-scales, limited local country ownership, inflexible
operating procedures and a lack of connection between the financial
incentives that each instrument provided and the broader policy
and political dialogue between the EU and partner governments,
notwithstanding that governance work supported by the EU emphasised
tailoring support to democratic governance to local context. The
Minister described the findings as a helpful contribution to on-going
efforts by DFID and the FCO to improve the impact and quality
of support to democratic governance, and said that the Commission
had learnt lessons from the approach taken by these instruments,
and taken steps to improve subsequent instruments that address
the shortcomings, particularly with regard to the new budget support
policy and modalities adopted by the EU in 2012; this included
an increased emphasis on the importance of policy dialogue on
the overall context for instruments such as budget support.
3.14 Although this report contained no new
policy proposals, nor revealed any serious shortcomings or major
breakthroughs, we nonetheless drew it to the attention of the
House because of its timing. In the "near neighbourhood"
(e.g., Belarus, Ukraine); in the countries of the "Arab Spring";
in Zimbabwe; in other ACP partner countries (e.g. Fiji), in post-conflict
Syria — in these and many other partner countries, the central
assumptions would no doubt continue to be put to the test. Would
the EU have any more success than hitherto in making conditionality
a reality, and genuinely linking funding to a "more for more"
approach? Was the political will of the authorities in partner
countries at all levels and their genuine commitment to reform
— obviously, as the Commission concluded, a prerequisite
for successful reform, particularly in sensitive areas such as
democratic governance — likely to be any more forthcoming
than hitherto?
3.15 In this instance, the Minister is somewhat
dismissive of conditionality ("there is limited international
evidence of the effectiveness of strong conditionality")
which we find surprising, given its centrality in the enlargement
process, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Cotonou Partnership.
3.16 But perhaps she is being realistic.
An earlier, related Court of Auditors' report examined EU activity
in Egypt up to September 2012. It focused on two key areas: human
rights and democracy, and public finance management (PFM) and
the fight against corruption. It also examined how the EU managed
the wider ENP cooperation framework with Egypt to achieve progress
in these areas. It found that overall the Commission and the
EEAS had not been able to manage EU support to improve governance
in Egypt effectively — in part due to the difficult conditions
they faced in Egypt but also due to various shortcomings in the
way they managed the process and the various programmes. On this
occasion, unlike his DFID colleague, the Minister for Europe (Mr
David Lidington) argued that that the EU's development aid would
be more effective with more rigorous use of conditionality, and
made much of the UK's role as one of the leading proponents of
the 2011 ENP restructuring: focused on building deep democracy,
with the scale of EU support now conditional on progress on building
and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law —
the guiding principle being "more for more", whereby
those making the most progress on reform will be rewarded, and
be incentivised to make further reform.
3.17 What made the Egypt report so important
in our estimation is that this challenge is only likely to get
bigger, e.g., in post-crisis Syria, in almost any "failing
state", as well as in most other parts of the EU's "near
neighbourhood". The key question in our eyes is: are EU,
and UK, interests served better by engaging and doing the best
possible, and recognising that the other partner's world view
is likely to be so dissonant as to make the "more for more"
approach more honoured in the breach than in the observance?
That is why we considered this question relevant to the debate
we recommended on the EU and post-crisis Syria.[13]
3.18 There is not only a seeming difference
between DFID and FCO Ministers on the role of conditionality.
We are also surprised that — given that security sector
reform is likely to be one of the four focal sectors in the years
to come — no mention is made of the work thus far of two
long-running and only partially effective civilian CFSP missions
— EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL RD Congo — about which
the Committee has reported extensively over several years.[14]
In our most recent exchange with the Minister for Europe in December
2012, he outlined how they are working towards "transitioning"
themselves out of existence, with their work to be taken over
by the Congolese authorities, where possible, and otherwise via
other EU instruments or other bilateral or international stakeholders.
The Minster said that this transition would be assisted by a
new government's professed willingness to move forwards on Security
Sector Reform — this after six years of endeavours by both
missions to do vital work in a deeply-troubled and strategically
important country in the face of great difficulties, but still
unable to demonstrate fully that the considerable expenditure
involved thus far had been worthwhile. We appear to have heard
nothing from him since then.
3.19 There is plainly a great deal of uncertainty
over the capacity of the EU to take this sort of work forward
in the DRC. There is an apparent difference of view between key
ministers on a central pillar of the EU's approach, viz., conditionality.
Challenges to the EU's overall approach to democratic governance
identified in the earlier Commission Communication are apparent
in this Court of Auditors' report as well as the one on Egypt.
Likewise differences of view between the Commission and the Court
over the weight to be attributed to key variables, and in this
instance between the Commission and the Minister (Lynne Featherstone).
It is thus not clear to us what the lessons are that the Minister
says are to be taken on board; nor therefore how they are to
be implemented, since the Commission would appear to disagree
with both the Court and her. All in all, we think that this report
should be debated in European Committee B. This will enable the
Government to address the issues and answer the questions that
arise.
3.20 We also consider that the earlier Commission
Communication and Court of Auditors' report on Egypt are relevant
to that debate.
9 See http://eca.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eca_main_pages/home
for full details of the ECA's work. Back
10
The EU's "Agenda for Change" was adopted in 2012. Its
central tenet is that future EU development aid spending should
target countries that are in the greatest need of external support
and where it can really make a difference, including fragile states.
Cooperation should take different forms for countries which are
already experiencing sustained growth or which have sufficient
resources of their own. EU assistance should focus on two priority
areas:
o Human rights, democracy and other
key elements of good governance, and
o Inclusive and sustainable growth for
human development.
The EU aims to help create growth in
developing countries so they have the means to lift themselves
out of poverty. Aid will therefore target particular areas: social
protection, health, education and jobs; the business environment,
regional integration and world markets; and sustainable agriculture
and energy.
See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news/agenda_for_change_en.htm
for full information. Back
11
See headnote: (35105) 11482/13: HC 83-xiii (2013-14), chapter
2. Back
12
The Governance Initiative (GI) was operational from 2007-09, with
a total value of €2.7 billion (£2.3 billion). The Governance
Facility (GF) was operational from 2007-09 with an allocation
of €300 million (£256 million). Back
13
See headnote: (35106) -: HC 83-xvi (2013-14), chapter 8 (9 October
2013). Back
14
EUSEC RDCongo is tasked to work in close cooperation and coordination
with other actors in the international community, in particular
the United Nations and its Stabilization Mission MONUSCO, to promote
integration of the different armed factions in the DRC, and assist
Congolese efforts to reconstruct the army. EUPOL RDCongo is a
police mission to support the Congolese National Police (PNC)
and the Ministry of Interior and Security in the implementation
of police reform; enhance the operational capacity of the PNC,
through mentoring, monitoring, advising and training; and support
the fight against impunity in the fields of human rights and sexual
violence). Back
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