18 The EU Operations Centre and the Horn
of Africa
| (35514)
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| Draft Council Decision amending and extending Decision 2012/173/CFSP on the activation of the EU Operations Centre (EU Ops Centre) for the CSDP missions and operation in the Horn of Africa
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| Legal base | Articles 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration
| EM of 26 November 2013
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| Previous Committee Report
| None; but see (33759) —: HC 428 lvii (2010-12), chapter 11 (18 April 2012) and HC 428 lv (2010-12), chapter 8 (21 March 2012);
(33367) —: HC 428-xliii (2010-12) chapter 21 (7 December 2011);
(33288)—: HC 428-xl (2010-12), chapter 11 (2 November 2011);
(26197) 16062/04: HC 38-iv (2004-05), chapter 12 (19 January 2005);
(22015) —, (22016) —, (22020) —: HC 28-iv (2000-01), chapter 2 (24 January 2001);
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| Discussion in Council
| 16 December 2013 Foreign Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision
| Cleared |
Background
18.1 The EU Military Staff (EUMS) was established
in 2001 to provide military support and expertise through the
EU Military Committee (EUMC) to the EU's Political and Security
Committee (PSC: the ambassador-level group of officials who manage
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, under the direction and
authority of the Council and the Secretary General/High Representative).
The detailed terms of reference of the EUMS, including role, tasks
and organisation, were set out in Council Decision 2001/80/CFSP,
which was cleared from scrutiny by the resolution following the
debate on the Floor of the House on 19 March 2001.[50]
18.2 In 2005, the then Committee considered a Council
Decision amending the terms of reference of the EUMS in the light
of agreement to set up a civilian/military cell (the Civ/Mil Cell;
a core of civilian and military planners within the EUMS) for
joint strategic planning, a non-standing Operations Centre, and
permanent liaison arrangements between the EUMS and NATO —
details of which were set out in the December 2004 Presidency
Report on the European Security and Defence Policy, which the
then Committee cleared on 19 January 2005. In commenting on this,
the then Minister for Europe (Mr Denis MacShane) said:
"The UK worked closely
with Partners and with the Secretariat and EUMS on the development
of these new planning capacities, namely: liaison arrangements
between the EUMS and SHAPE; a civilian/military cell within the
EU Military Staff; and facilities for an ad hoc operations centre,
which could be used in particular to run civilian/military missions.
This ensured that the proposals reflected the agreements reached
in December 2003 and would work effectively in practice. As the
report highlights, the civilian/military cell will enhance the
EU's capacity for the strategic planning of crisis management
operations, particularly when a joint civilian/military response
is needed. We see the civilian/military cell as a key new tool
in improving ESDP's efficiency and developing expertise in civilian/military
crisis management, looking particularly at conflict prevention
and post-conflict reconstruction. As the European Security Strategy
emphasises, this is an area where the EU is well placed to play
a growing role. The cell's work will also help in the planning
of civilian operations. The cell should be up and running as soon
as possible in 2005.
"The facilities for
an operations centre, which should be available by the end of
2005, will be used for missions only when no national headquarters
has been identified. It will not be a standing headquarters (Berlin
Plus[51]
will remain the option of choice for major ESDP operations and
national HQs the main option for autonomous military operations),
and can be activated only by a unanimous decision of the Council
on the basis of military advice. An operations centre would be
able to run military missions involving up to 2,000 troops; although
its real value is likely to be in running smaller civilian/military
missions. It could also be used for purely civilian missions.
"In parallel to the
development of EU facilities, the EU has put proposals to NATO
for [further] developing liaison arrangements between the EU and
NATO, to enhance cooperation, consultation and planning and to
contribute to the EU/NATO strategic partnership in crisis management.
This will involve an EU cell at SHAPE and NATO liaison arrangements
at the EUMS. This should be set up as soon as possible in 2005."
[52]
18.3 The Foreign Affairs Council on 1 December 2011
and 23 January 2012 endorsed activation of the EU Operations Centre
(Ops Centre) to:
— accelerate planning
for a new regional maritime capacity building (RMCB) mission to
support local efforts to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa;[53]
— aid coordination
with existing CSDP missions in the Horn (the naval counter-piracy
Operation ATALANTA and EUTM Somalia, whose objective is strengthening
the Somali Security Forces through the provision of specific military
training); and
— provide military
support to a Civilian Operations Commander (CivOpCdr) who would
lead RMCB.
Council Decision 2012/173/CFSP
18.4 This Council Decision sets out the terms of
activation of the Ops Centre. They were described in detail by
the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) in his Explanatory
Memorandum of 16 March 2012. As our Report noted, this activity
sat squarely within the recently created EU Strategy for the Horn
of Africa.[54]
18.5 The Minister explained that his goal would be
to ensure that the Ops Centre was supportive of a more comprehensive
approach to CSDP crisis management, which he believed its coordinating
role and focus on the CSDP Horn of Africa missions (rather than
more generally on CSDP missions) would accomplish. Moreover,
the Ops Centre mandate would be limited to 24 months; this would
allow it sufficient time to establish itself and respond to regular
performance reviews, which would ensure that Member States scrutinised
performance and the tasks set were accomplished. If, after two
years, the Ops Centre had not added the value envisaged, it could
be terminated while allowing the RMCB mandate to continue. A new
Council Decision would be required to extend its use.
Our assessment
18.6 No questions arose concerning the activation
of the Operations Centre. We accordingly cleared the Council
Decision, which we reported to the House because of the degree
of interest in the situation in the Horn of Africa.
18.7 However, we noted that the Minister had also
said:
"A Council Decision
isn't strictly necessary to activate the Ops Centre. But given
the novelty of its activation we pushed for a Decision to better
define its role."
18.8 We reminded him of his predecessor's statement
in 2004, that the Operations Centre "can be activated only
by a unanimous decision of the Council on the basis of military
advice". Though commendable, his having "pushed for
a Decision to better define its role" was, we felt, not the
point: CSDP missions must remain under firm Member State political
control, which was the purpose of a Council Decision — and,
presumably, of the Council Decision that the Minister said would
be necessary for any extension of the Ops Centre's mandate. We
therefore asked the Minister to explain why, even on this first
occasion of its activation, he considered that a Council Decision
was not "strictly necessary" (particularly as he did
for any extension); and if not, how he believed that such operations
would in future remain under the necessary political control from
the outset.[55]
The Minister's letter of 12 April 2012
18.9 The Minister responded as follows (his emphasis):
"As you rightly point
out, activation of the Operations Centre to conduct an
EU Common Security and Defence Policy mission or operation requires
the unanimous decision of the Council. However, in December,
the EU External Action Service considered the legal implications
of activating the Operations Centre to undertake a supporting
and coordinating role - not a conduct role. It concluded
that, in these circumstances, a Council Decision under Art 42(4)
of the Treaty of European Union was not necessary.
"I was very clear, however,
that a Council Decision on the activation of the Operations Centre
was essential due to the need for transparency, the novelty of
its activation, and to ensure strict parameters surrounded its
use. This also sets a helpful precedent of the necessity of a
Council Decision for the Operations Centre however it might be
used."
Our further assessment
18.10 Article 42(4) TEU[56]
says:
"Decisions relating
to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating
a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by
the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative
from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use
of both national resources and Union instruments, together with
the Commission where appropriate."
18.11 As such, what the EEAS seemed to regard as
the central consideration, i.e. whether the Operations Centre
is in charge of an operation or carrying out a supporting or coordinating
role, seemed to us immaterial. We were accordingly in full agreement
with the Minister's approach: it was consistent with both his
then predecessor's position in 2004 and with the necessity for
any use to be subject to proper parliamentary scrutiny via, as
the Minister rightly put it, "a Council Decision for the
Operations Centre however it might be used".[57]
The draft Council Decision
18.12 The draft Council Decision seeks to extend
the current mandate of the EU Operations Centre by one year from
March 2014 to March 2015.
The Government's view
18.13 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 26 November
2013, the Minister says:
"The proposed extension
maintains the same operating parameters; there is no increase
in personnel and the EU Operation Centre's current remit is unchanged.
The EU Operations Centre continues to have no conduct role."
18.14 The Minister then continues as follows:
"Since the activation
of the EU Operations Centre in March 2012, EUCAP Nestor has been
launched and EUTM Somalia and Operation Atalanta have continued.
There remains a requirement for the EU Operations Centre to continue
its support to these missions, particularly given: EUTM Somalia's
transition of activity from Uganda to Somalia; the fact that EUCAP
Nestor had a slower than expected start and continues to build
capacity to reach its full potential; and that Operation Atalanta's
mandate may be amended following its recent strategic review which
recommends an extension to December 2016. This is being considered
by Working Groups in Brussels and will be subject to parliamentary
scrutiny in due course."
18.15 The Minister then says that his goals for the
Operations Centre remain consistent:
"That it supports a
more comprehensive approach to crisis management. We believe that
its coordinating role has supported this objective;
"That its activity remains
time-limited and mission specific. The new Council Decision retains
focus on the same existing missions. Any extension beyond March
2015 would require a further Council Decision (and be subject
to scrutiny);
"Appropriately sized
and fit for purpose. We have used the review process to ensure
that the headcount does not exceed the current 16 slots."
18.16 The Minister then notes that: at the end of
the current mandate in March, the Head of the Operations Centre
(Dutch Naval Captain Ad Van Der Linde) will be replaced; his successor
will be appointed by (and report to) Political and Security Committee
following advice from the EU Military Committee; the UK does not
intend to put a candidate forward for this role, but will look
to retain a UK officer focused on Maritime Operational Planning,
and thereby maintain a UK presence in the EU Operations Centre
"ensuring that it remains focused on the above-mentioned
goals."
18.17 Finally, the Minister further notes that the
Operations Centre will not require additional resource from Member
States: "The EU Military Staff provides accommodation and
administrative support (such as IT systems). All members of Operations
Centre staff are provided on a voluntary basis by Member States".
Conclusion
18.18 Though no questions arise, we are drawing
this extension to the attention of the House for the same reasons
as before: the degree of interest in the situation in the Horn
of Africa and the wider issues for proper Member State scrutiny
of CSDP activity.
18.19 We now clear the Council Decision.
50 HC Deb, 19 March 2001, Col. 138-161. Also
see (22015) -, (22016) - and (22020) -: HC 28-iv (2000-01), chapter
2 (24 January 2001). Back
51
A comprehensive package of arrangements finalised in early 2003
between the EU and the NATO that allows the EU to make use of
NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations.
See http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/ for full details. Back
52
See headnote: (26197) 16062/04: HC 38-iv (2004-05), chapter 12
(19 January 2005). Back
53
Now known as EUCAP Nestor. Back
54
In December 2009, under the Swedish EU Presidency, the EU adopted
"An EU policy on the Horn of Africa - towards a comprehensive
strategy". The Horn of Africa is defined as the countries
belonging to the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
- Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan
and Uganda. As the Executive Summary notes at the outset, the
political evolution of the Horn of Africa over the past 50 years
has been unusually turbulent. Looking ahead, the EU's engagement
in the Horn of Africa will be supportive of a regional and country-level
environment conducive to peace, security and justice, of good
governance based on the democratic principles of inclusion, the
rule of law and respect for human rights, and of socio-economic
development based on the attainment of the Millennium Development
Goals with due consideration to equity, climate change and sustainable
livelihoods. Back
55
See headnote: HC 428-lv (2010-12), chapter 8 (21 March 2012). Back
56
The full text of which is available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF. Back
57
See headnote: (33759) -: HC 428-lvii (2010-12), chapter 11 (18
April 2012). Back
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