Documents considered by the Committee on 4 December 2013 - European Scrutiny Committee Contents


21 Stability and Growth Pact: Excessive deficit procedure

(a)

(35008)

COM(13) 381

(b)

(35014)

10563/13


(c)

(35017)

10476/13

+ ADD 1

COM(13) 391

(d)

(35018)

10483/13

COM(13) 385

(e)

(35019)

10485/13

+ ADD 1

COM(13) 393

(f)

(35023)

10549/13

+ ADD 1

COM(13) 382

(g)

(35024)

10550/13

C (13) 3338

(h)

(35086)

10484/13

COM(13) 383

(i)

(35087)

10486/13

+ ADD 1

COM(13) 394

(j)

(35088)

10487/13

+ ADD 1

COM(13) 396

(k)

(35089)

10488/13

+ ADD 1

COM(13) 388

(l)

(35090)

10489/13

COM(13) 387

(m)

(35091)

10490/13

COM(13) 386

(n)

(35092)

10545/13

COM(13) 390

(o)

(35093)

10546/13

+ ADD 1

COM(13) 384

(p)

(35094)

10548/13

COM(13) 392

(q)

(35100)

11421/13

COM(13) 294

(r)

(35477)

10567/13


(s)

(35478)

10558/13

(t)

(35479)

10559/13


(u)

(35480)

10560/13)


(v)

(35481)

10561/13


(w)

(35482)

10562/13


(x)

(35483)

10564/13


(y)

(35484)

10565/13


(z)

(35485)

10566/13


(aa)

(35486)

10569/13


(bb)

(35487)

10571/13


(cc)

(35572)

10572/13


Draft Council Decision establishing that no effective action has been taken by Belgium in response to the Council Recommendation of 2 December 2009

Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Slovenia


Draft Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Malta



Draft Council Decision abrogating Decision 2010/286/EU on existence of an excessive deficit in Italy


Draft Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Poland



Draft Council Decision giving notice to Belgium to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary in order to remedy the situation of excessive deficit


Commission Opinion of 29.5.2013 on the existence of an excessive deficit in Malta


Draft Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Spain


Draft Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Portugal



Draft Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Slovenia



Draft Council Decision abrogating Decision 2004/918/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in Hungary



Draft Council Decision abrogating Decision 2009/588/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in Lithuania


Draft Council Decision abrogating Decision 2009/591/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in Latvia


Draft Council Decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in Malta


Draft Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in France



Draft Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in the Netherlands

Commission Report: Malta: Report prepared in accordance with Article 126(3) of the Treaty


Council Decision abrogating Decision 2009/590/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in Romania


Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Malta

Council Decision abrogating Decision 2010/286/EU on the existence of an excessive deficit in Italy


Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Spain


Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Poland


Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Portugal


Council Decision abrogating Decision 2004/918/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in Hungary


Council Decision abrogating Decision 2009/588/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in Lithuania


Council Decision abrogating Decision 2009/591/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in Latvia


Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in France


Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in the Netherlands


Council Decision giving notice to Belgium to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary in order to remedy the situation of excessive deficit

Legal base(g) and (q) —

(a)-(f), (h)-(p) and (r)-(cc) Article 126 TFEU; —; QMV of Member States, except the addressee

Documents originated (a), (c) and (m)-(n) 29 May 2013

(q) 21 May 2013

Deposited in Parliament (a) 6 June 2013

(b) 20 November 2013

(c)-(f) 10 June 2013

(g) 11 June 2013

(h)-(p) 26 June 2013

(q) 21 May 2013

(r)-(bb) 8 November 2013

(cc) 29 November 2012

DepartmentHM Treasury
Basis of consideration EM of 18 November 2013
Previous Committee Report None
Discussion in Council 21 June 2013
Committee's assessment

Committee's decision

Politically important

Cleared

Background

21.1 The Stability and Growth Pact adopted by the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997 emphasised the obligation of Member States to avoid excessive government deficits, defined as the ratio of a planned or actual deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices in excess of a "reference value" of 3%.[60] Each year the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) issues an Opinion on the updated stability or convergence programme of each Member State.[61] These Opinions, which are not binding on Member States, are based on a recommendation from the Commission. The economic content of the programmes is assessed with reference to the Commission's current economic forecasts. If a Member State's programme is found wanting, it may be invited by ECOFIN, in a Recommendation, to make adjustments to its economic policies, though such Recommendations are likewise not binding on Member States. This whole procedure is essentially the Pact's preventative arm.

21.2 On the other hand, the Pact also endorsed a dissuasive or corrective arm involving action in cases of an excessive government deficit — the excessive deficit procedure provided for in Article 126 TFEU and the relevant Protocol. This procedure consists of Commission reports followed by a stepped series of Council Recommendations (the final two steps do not apply to non-members of the eurozone). Failure to comply with the final stage of Recommendations allows ECOFIN to require publication of additional information by the Member State concerned before issuing bonds and securities, to invite the European Investment Bank to reconsider its lending policy for the Member State concerned, to require a non-interest-bearing deposit from the Member State concerned whilst its deficit remains uncorrected, or to impose appropriate fines on the Member State concerned.

The documents

21.3 On 29 May, the Commission published its assessment of the progress made by the countries with respect to their excessive budgetary targets on the basis of the 2013 Spring Forecast and subsequent budgetary measures. Based on the updated forecast, the Commission issued a number of draft Recommendations or Decisions, related to fiscal policy, documents which were included as part of the broader Country Specific Recommendations. For a number of Member States, based on the Commission Recommendation, the Council then adopted, on 21 June, a revised excessive deficit procedure Recommendation. (Article 3(5) of Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97, allows the Council to adopt a revised Recommendation, if effective action has been taken and unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances occurred after the adoption of the initial Recommendation.) For other Member States Decisions were adopted abrogating the excessive deficit procedure. These Recommendation and Decisions, and some of the background to them, are summarised in the following paragraphs.

Italy — documents (d) and (t)

21.4 In December 2009, the Council, based on a recommendation from the Commission, addressed a Recommendation to Italy with a view to bringing Italy's excessive deficit situation to an end by 2012 at the latest. After peaking at 5.5% of GDP in 2009, Italy's general government deficit was steadily brought down and reached 3.0% of GDP in 2012, which was the deadline set by the Council. The improvement was driven by significant fiscal consolidation, while in 2012 interest expenditure was 0.8 percentage points of GDP higher than in 2009 and the composition of economic activity was tax poorer. The stability programme for 2013-17, adopted by the Italian government in April and endorsed by Parliament on 7 May, plans the deficit to decline slightly to 2.9% of GDP in 2013 and then fall to 1.8% of GDP in 2014. Based on a no-policy-change assumption, the Commission's 2013 Spring Forecast projects a deficit of 2.9% of GDP in 2013 and 2.5% of GDP in 2014. The debt-to-GDP ratio rose by 10.6 percentage points between 2009 and 2012, to 127%, also due to Italy's contribution to financial assistance to eurozone Member States. As cyclical conditions remain negative, the gross government debt is forecast to increase to 131.4% of GDP in 2013 and 132.2% in 2014 also due to the 2.5 percentage points of GDP settlement of trade debt arrears planned over 2013-14. In the view of the Council, the excessive deficit in Italy has been corrected and the procedure should, therefore, be abrogated. The Council recalls that, starting in 2013, which is the year following the correction of the excessive deficit, Italy should progress towards its medium-term objective at an appropriate pace, including respecting the expenditure benchmark, and making sufficient progress towards compliance with the debt criterion. 

Latvia — documents (m)-(z)

21.5 In February 2009, the Council, based on a recommendation from the Commission, addressed a Recommendation to Latvia with a view to bringing its excessive deficit situation to an end by 2012 at the latest. Latvia's general government deficit rapidly declined to 3.6% of GDP in 2011, following high deficits of 9.8% in 2009 and 8.1% in 2010, which was partly a result of measures to stabilise the financial sector. The reduction of the deficit reflected sizeable and broad-based fiscal consolidation implemented over 2009-11 as part of the economic adjustment programme, supported by balance-of-payments assistance and improving cyclical conditions. The adjustment programme was successfully completed in January 2012. The deficit declined further to 1.2% of GDP in 2012, better than the target of 2.1% set in the 2012 convergence programme and well below the 3% of GDP Treaty reference value. On the revenue side this reflected favourable cyclical conditions and improving tax efficiency, while expenditure growth remained substantially below nominal GDP growth. The 2013 convergence programme envisages that the headline deficit will be 1.1% of GDP in 2013, stabilising thereafter at 0.9% until 2016. The Commission's 2013 Spring Forecast projects that the deficit will remain broadly unchanged in 2013 at 1.2% and will decrease to 0.9% in 2014, thus staying well below the reference value of 3% of GDP. The general government debt stood at 40.7% of GDP in 2012. The 2013 spring forecast projects the debt to increase to 43.2% in 2013, as the government accumulates assets for large debt repayments scheduled for 2014-15 before declining again to around 40% in 2014, as these repayments take effect. In the view of the Council, the excessive deficit in Latvia has been corrected and the procedure should therefore be abrogated. The Council also recalls that, starting from 2013, which is the year following the correction of the excessive deficit, Latvia should ensure compliance with the requirements of the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact, including respecting the expenditure benchmark.

Lithuania — documents (l)-(y)

21.6 In May 2009, the Council, based on a recommendation from the Commission, addressed a Recommendation to Lithuania with a view to bringing its excessive deficit situation to an end by 2012 at the latest. Lithuania's general government deficit has been brought down to 3.2% of GDP in 2012 from a peak of 9.4% in 2009. This improvement was driven by expenditure consolidation measures, in particular a continued restriction of expenditure growth and favourable cyclical conditions. Since the deficit of 3.2% can be considered to be close to the 3% reference value and Lithuania's debt-to-GDP ratio is below the 60% of GDP reference value in a sustained manner, Lithuania is eligible for the Stability and Growth Pact provisions regarding systemic pension reform which allows the direct net cost of pension reforms to be taken into account when assessing the correction of the excessive deficit. The net costs of Lithuania's systemic pension reform have been confirmed by the Commission to be 0.2% of GDP in 2012, accounting for the excess over the 3% reference value. The deficit is set to remain below the reference value of 3% of GDP over the forecast horizon. Lithuania's 2013 convergence programme projects the deficit to fall to 2.5% of GDP in 2013 and to 1.5% in 2014, while the Commission's 2013 Spring Forecast projects the deficit to be 2.9% in 2013 and 2.4% in 2014, based on a no-policy-change assumption. The Council recalls that, starting from 2013, which is the year following the correction of the excessive deficit, Lithuania should progress towards its medium-term objective at an appropriate pace, including respecting the expenditure benchmark. In the view of the Council, the excessive deficit in Lithuania has been corrected and the procedure should therefore be abrogated. The Council also recalls that, starting from 2013, which is the year following the correction of the excessive deficit, Lithuania should ensure compliance with the requirements of the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact, including respecting the expenditure benchmark.

Hungary — documents (k) and (x)

21.7 In July 2004, the Council, based on a recommendation from the Commission, addressed a Recommendation to Hungary with a view to bringing its excessive deficit situation to an end by 2008 at the latest. The deadline for Hungary to correct its excessive deficit situation was subsequently postponed due to the severe economic downturn. In March 2012, the Council adopted a new Recommendation for Hungary to bring the excessive deficit to an end by 2012. The Hungarian authorities were asked to undertake, in particular, the following steps: to put an end to the excessive deficit situation by 2012 in a credible and sustainable manner, to undertake an additional fiscal effort of at least a half percentage point of GDP to ensure the attainment of the 2012 deficit target of 2.5% of GDP and to take the necessary additional measures of a structural nature to ensure that the deficit in 2013 remains well below the 3% of GDP threshold.

21.8 In May 2012, based on the 2012 convergence programme and further specification of the savings measures, the Commission concluded that Hungary had taken effective action regarding the correction of the excessive deficit. In particular, the general government deficit was expected to reach 2.5% of GDP in 2012 and remained well below the 3% of GDP Treaty reference value in 2013 as recommended by the Council in March 2012.

21.9 The Commission 2013 Spring Forecast and the assessment of additional corrective measures adopted on 13 May 2013 lead the Commission to conclude that: in 2012, on the basis of a considerable fiscal effort and thanks to one-off revenues amounting to three quarters of a percentage point of GDP; the general government deficit reached 1.9% of GDP; that the deficit is expected to remain below the Treaty reference value of 3% of GDP over the forecast horizon with a deficit of 2.7% and 2.9% in 2013 and 2014, respectively; that the cyclically-adjusted budget balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures, will stand at -0.75% and -1.5% of GDP in 2013 and 2014, and hence will be consistent with the Hungarian medium-term objective of -1.7% of GDP; and, finally, that the debt-to-GDP ratio will continue to decline, falling to 78.1% and 77.2% in 2013 and 2014, respectively, and remaining on a downward path thereafter.

21.10 Therefore, in the view of the Council, the excessive deficit in Hungary has been corrected and the procedure is to be abrogated. The Council also recalls that, starting from 2013, the year following the correction, of the excessive deficit, Hungary should maintain a fiscal stance in line with its medium-term objective, including respecting the expenditure benchmark, and make sufficient progress towards compliance with the debt criterion.

Poland — documents (e) and (v)

21.11 In October 2009, the Council, based on a recommendation from the Commission, addressed a Recommendation to Poland with a view to bringing its excessive deficit situation to an end by 2012 at the latest. The Commission's 2013 Spring Forecast projects the general government deficit at 3.9% of GDP in 2013 (against Poland's deficit target for 2013 of 3.5% of GDP) and, under a no-policy-change assumption, at 4.1% of GDP in 2014. Taking into account additional measures contained in the 2013 update of the Polish convergence programme, published after the cut-off date of the Spring Forecast, the forecast has been updated with the measures included in the convergence programme, which lead to a downward revision of the 2014 deficit to 3.7% of GDP. Public debt declined to 55.6% of GDP in 2012 from 56.2% of GDP in 2011, on the back of sizeable stock-flow adjustment. The Spring Forecast projects its increase to 57.5% of GDP in 2013 and, based on a no-policy change assumption, to almost 59% of GDP in 2014. The structural deficit decreased from 8.3% of GDP in 2010 to 5.4% in 2011 and 3.8% in 2012. The average annual apparent fiscal effort over the period 2010-12 is estimated at 1.5% of GDP.

21.12 When adjusted for the significant upward revision in potential output growth since the time when the Recommendation was issued and because of revenue unexpectedly growing at a lower rate than would have been implied by the GDP growth based on standard elasticities, the average annual adjusted structural effort (1.6% of GDP) exceeds the recommended average annual fiscal effort (1.25% of GDP) over 2010-12. In light of this, Poland has taken effective action and fulfils the conditions for the extension of the deadline for correcting the excessive general government deficit.

21.13 Therefore, based on the Commission assessment, the Council adopts the Recommendation that Poland should bring an end to the excessive deficit situation by 2014 at the latest; reach a headline deficit target of 3.6% of GDP in 2013 and 3.0% of GDP in 2014, which is consistent with an annual improvement of the structural balance of at least 0.8% and 1.3% of GDP respectively and rigorously implement the measures already adopted while complementing them with additional measures sufficient to achieve a correction of the excessive deficit in 2014 at the latest. The Council also establishes the deadline of 1 October 2013 for Poland to take effective action and to report in detail the consolidation strategy that is envisaged to achieve the targets.

Romania — document (r)

21.14 The Council Decision abrogating the existence of an excessive deficit in Romania confirms that it has successfully corrected the excessive deficit. Romania reduced its budget deficit from 9% of GDP in 2009 to just below 3% in 2012. A new precautionary programme is in place to support further consolidation efforts aimed at reaching the medium term objective of a structural budget deficit of 1% of GDP by 2015 and maintaining it thereafter, in line with the Stability and Growth Pact requirements.

Belgium — documents (a) and (f)

21.15 In October 2009, the Council, based on a recommendation from the Commission, addressed a Recommendation to Belgium with a view to bringing its excessive deficit situation to an end by 2012 at the latest. However, following elections in June 2010, Belgium was without a government for most of 2010 and 2011 and unable to pass a budget until December 2011. The general budget deficit decreased during that period, from 5.6% of GDP in 2009 to 3.9% in 2012, with the 2012 outturn deficit being higher than the 2.8% of GDP targeted under Belgium's 2012 budget, which was due in part to the recapitalisation of Dexia bank (equivalent to 0.8% of GDP) and the impact on the budget of lower-than-expected growth. Although structural measures implemented by the previous government reduced the structural balance by 0.5% in 2010, the absence of a 2011 budget led to an increase in the structural deficit of 0.1% of GDP. The budget for 2013 (and its subsequent amendments) announced by the new government from December 2011 decreased the structural deficit by 0.5%, implying a total structural tightening over the period 2010-12 of 0.9%, equivalent to 0.3% a year. This is below the 0.75% of GDP annual structural effort required by the Council's 2009 Recommendation.

21.16 On this basis the Council agrees that Belgium has undertaken no effective action to address its excessive deficit. Based on the Commission recommendation, the Council also agreed that Belgium shall put an end to the excessive deficit situation by 2013 and reduce the headline deficit to 2.7% of GDP in 2013, an improvement consistent with a reduction in the structural deficit of 1% of GDP in 2013. The budget for 2013 and its subsequent amendment are estimated by the Commission to have a structural impact of 0.75% of GDP in 2013 — as such, the authorities are required to introduce further structural measures with an impact in 2013 equivalent to 0.25% of GDP. Budgetary consolidation measures should secure a lasting improvement in the general government structural balance in a growth-friendly manner.

21.17 The Council also agrees that Belgium shall submit to the Commission, by 21 September at the latest, a report outlining the measures taken to comply with this Decision, further quarterly reports to the Commission, examining progress made in complying with this Decision, and a report by 31 December on the intended implementation of the first recommendation issued under the European Semester regarding the adoption of explicit coordination arrangements to ensure that budgetary targets are binding at federal level and sub-federal levels within a medium-term planning perspective and shall present structural measures for 2014 which ensure a sustainable correction of the excessive deficit and appropriate progress towards its medium-term objective.

Portugal — documents (i) and (w)

21.18 The Council Recommendation for Portugal alters the deficit targets contained in Portugal's assistance programme. The Commission finds that Portugal will not meet the budgetary targets established in the Council Recommendation of October 2012. The growth outlook for Portugal has weakened in the interim compared to that that underlined in that Recommendation. The Council may decide to adopt a revised Recommendation if "effective action has been taken and unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances occur after the adoption of the recommendation" and Portugal is found to have taken effective action that represents adequate progress towards correcting the excessive deficit in 2012 and 2013 within the limits specified by the Council in October 2012. Granting an additional year for the correction of the excessive deficit requires intermediate headline deficit targets of 5.5% of GDP in 2013, 4.0. % of GDP in 2014 and 2.5% of GDP in 2015, compared with targets of 4.5% of GDP in 2013 and 2.5% of GDP in 2014 associated with the Council 2012 Recommendation.

The Netherlands — documents (p) and (bb)

21.19 In October 2009, the Council, based on a recommendation from the Commission, addressed a Recommendation to the Netherlands with a view to bringing its excessive deficit situation to an end by 2013 at the latest. According to the 2012 Spring Forecast, the general budget deficit is projected to decline to only 3.6% of GDP in 2013 (from 4.1% in 2012), attributed to large consolidation measures (particularly on revenue but with some expenditure measures) which means the Netherlands is expected to miss the deadline to correct its excessive deficit. However, growth outturns over the period 2010-2013 have been far lower than the growth projections underlying the Recommendation, which was the Commission's 2009 Autumn Forecast. At the time, GDP was expected to growth by 0.25% in 2010 and 1.5% in 2011. While 2012 and 2013 were beyond the forecast horizon, the Recommendation was based on the assumption that growth would continue to improve after 2010 as the output gap closed. However, outturn growth was 1.6% in 2010, 1.0% in 2011 and -1.0% in 2012, falling considerably short of the projections of 2009 Autumn Forecast. The Commission's 2013 Spring Forecast projects growth to be -0.8% in 2013 and 0.9% in 2014.

21.20 In light of the changed economic outlook, the Commission assesses that the structural deficit declined by around 0.7% a year over 2010-2013, according to the Spring Forecast 2013. Taking into further consideration the decline in potential output since the Commission's recommendation was made, the Commission estimates that the average annual structural effort was 1.1% of GDP. This exceeds the structural effort recommended by the Council 2009 Recommendation. Therefore, the Council judges that the Netherlands fulfils the conditions for the extension of the deadline for correcting the excessive general government deficit and recommends a new deadline of 2014 for the Netherlands to correct its excessive deficit. It also recommends that the Netherlands reaches a headline deficit target of 3.6% in 2013 and 2.8% of GDP in 2014 and that it implements the multiannual measures already adopted with the 2013 budget, while standing ready to implement additional measures if needed to achieve a correction of the excessive deficit in 2014. Finally, the Council establishes the deadline of 1 October for the Netherlands to take effective action and to report in detail the consolidation strategy that is envisaged to achieve the targets.

France — documents (o)-(aa)

21.21 In April 2009, the Council, based on a recommendation from the Commission, addressed a Recommendation to France with a view to bringing its excessive deficit situation to an end by 2012 at the latest. In December 2009, the Council decided that unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances had occurred and, as a consequence, it recommended that France correct its excessive deficit by 2013 at the latest. The economic scenario is much worse than the one underpinning the December 2009 Recommendation and the cumulative budgetary impact of measures taken by the French government in 2010-2013 amounts to about 5.25% of GDP, that is 1.3% of GDP per year on average.  The Council judges that France fulfils the conditions for the extension of the deadline for correcting the excessive general government deficit. The Council therefore recommends that France should put an end to the present excessive deficit situation by 2015 at the latest, reach a headline deficit of 3.9% of GDP in 2013, 3.6% in 2014 and 2.8% in 2015, fully implement the already adopted measures for 2013 (1.5% of GDP) and specify, adopt and implement rapidly the necessary consolidation measures for 2014 and 2015.

Slovenia — documents (b) and (j)

21.22 In 2 December 2009, the Council decided that an excessive deficit existed in Slovenia and issued a Recommendation to correct the excessive deficit by 2013 at the latest. Slovenia was hit with unexpected adverse economic developments and the economy is in a double dip recession projected to last into 2014. The average annual adjusted structural effort between 2010 and 2013 is estimated at 1.1% of GDP, which is above the recommended average annual fiscal effort of 0.75% of GDP. The Council considers that Slovenia fulfils the conditions for the extension of the deadline for correcting the excessive general government deficit.

21.23 The Council therefore recommends that Slovenia should bring an end to the excessive deficit situation by 2015, reach a general government deficit target of 4.9% of GDP in 2013, 3.3% in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015, implement rigorously the measures already adopted and specify, adopt and implement new structural consolidation measures, on top of those already included in the Commission's updated 2013 Forecast.  The Council establishes the deadline of 1 October 2013 for Slovenia to take effective action. Furthermore, the Council establishes that the Slovenian authorities should accelerate the reduction of the headline deficit in 2014 and 2015 if economic or budgetary conditions improve and specify, adopt and implement structural consolidation measures which gradually decrease the current expenditure ratio to GDP. Finally, Slovenia should report on progress made on the implementation of these recommendations at least every six months.

Spain — documents (h) and (u)

21.24 In April 2009, the Council decided that an excessive deficit existed in Spain and issued a Recommendation to correct it by 2012 at the latest. In July 2012, the Council adopted a revised Recommendation giving Spain until 2014 at the latest to correct the excessive deficit. Spain's deadline for correction had previously been extended to 2013 by the Council on in December 2009. After a short recovery in 2011, the Spanish economy returned to recession in the first quarter of 2012. In July 2012, due to the unexpected worsening of the economy, the Council recommended that Spain should correct its excessive deficit by 2014, an extension of two years on the original Recommendation made in 2009.

21.25 At the time of the Council's last Recommendation, the Commission forecast GDP growth of -1.9% in 2012, -0.3% in 2013 and 1.1% in 2014. The latest Commission forecast is for GDP growth to be lower in 2013, at -1.5%, and 0.9% in 2014. Domestic demand is forecast to drop along with a continued slump in employment, both of which will have adverse impacts on government revenue. Once the lower than expected growth rates and revenue shortfalls are taken into account, the adjusted fiscal effort in 2013 stands at 2.5% of GDP which is in line with the Council's 2012 Recommendation.  Therefore, the Council judges that Spain fulfils the conditions for the extension of the deadline for correcting the excessive general government deficit and recommends that Spain puts an end to the present excessive deficit situation by 2016. The recommended intermediate headline deficit targets for Spain are now 6.5% of GDP in 2013, 5.8% of GDP in 2014, 4.2% of GDP in 2015 and 2.8% of GDP in 2016.

21.26 According to the Commission's 2013 Spring Forecast, if budgetary plans at all levels of government are implemented, no further measures will be required in 2013 to meet the deficit target of 6.5% of GDP. However, Spain should stand ready to take corrective action in case of deviations from budgetary plans. The authorities should reinforce the medium-term budgetary strategy with well-specified structural measures for the years 2014-16 that are necessary to achieve the correction of the excessive deficit by 2016. The Council establishes the deadline of 1 October for the Spanish government to take effective action and report in detail the consolidation strategy that is envisaged to achieve the targets.

Malta — documents (c), (g), (n), (q) and (s)

21.27 An excessive deficit procedure for Malta had been abrogated in 2012 after the government's deficit-to-GDP ratio was at 2.8% in 2011. But the general government deficit in Malta reached 3.3% of GDP in 2012, thus exceeding the 3%-of-GDP reference value of the Treaty. The general government gross debt stood at 72.1% of GDP in 2012. The Commission is of the opinion that an excessive deficit exists in Malta. Even though the deficit was close to the 3%-of-GDP reference value, the excess over the reference value could not be qualified as exceptional within the meaning of the Stability and Growth Pact. The increase in the deficit is not a result of a severe economic downturn, as real GDP growth was on average above 2% in 2010-11 and economic growth was positive in 2012 (0.8%). The Commission forecasts that the deficit will remain above 3% in 2013 (3.7%) and 2014 (3.6%). Therefore, based on the Commission recommendation, the Council decided on 21 June 2013 that an excessive deficit existed in Malta. It also recommended that Malta should put an end to the present excessive deficit situation by 2014, reach a headline general government target of 3.4% of GDP for 2013 and 2.7% of GDP in 2014, which is consistent with an annual improvement of the structural balance of 0.7% of GDP in 2013 and 0.7% of GDP in 2014, specify and rigorously implement the measures that are necessary to achieve the correction of the excessive deficit by 2014 and use all windfall gains for deficit reduction. The Council establishes the deadline of 1 October for Malta to take effective action and to report in detail the consolidation strategy that is envisaged to achieve the targets.

The Government's view

21.28 The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Nicky Morgan) says that these documents have no policy or budgetary implications for the UK and that the Government believes that Member States should take forward fiscal consolidation as a priority to reduce their deficit and support recovery. The Minister notes that measures under Article 126(7) TFEU can only be made public after the minutes of the particular Council meeting, in this case ECOFIN on June 21, have been adopted by Council and that the minutes were only signed off in October, leading to delayed deposit of the substantive documents.

Conclusion

21.29 Whilst clearing these documents we draw them to the attention of the House for the information they give about the economic situation of the Member States concerned.


60   This obligation does not apply to Member States, including the UK, whilst they remain outside the eurozone, but they are required to endeavour to avoid excessive deficits. Back

61   The 17 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain) that have adopted the euro have Stability Programmes, whereas the other 11 Member States (including the UK) produce Convergence Programmes. Back


 
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Prepared 11 December 2013