17 EU Special Representative for
the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia
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| Council Decision amending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia
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| Legal base | Articles 28, 31 (2 ) and 33 TEU; QMV
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 10 December 2013
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (35052) —: HC 83-vii (2013-14), chapter 14 (26 June 2013); also (33954) —: HC 86-iv (2012-13), chapter 22 (14 June 2012) and (32778) —: HC 428-xxxvi (2010-12), chapter 20 (14 September 2011)
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| Discussion in Council | 24 January 2014 Foreign Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared; further information requested
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Background
17.1 The EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus was
first appointed on 20 February 2006. He was tasked with supporting
the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
and the Council in: assisting Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia
in carrying out political and economic reforms; preventing conflicts
in the region and contributing to the peaceful settlement of conflicts,
including through promoting the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons; engaging constructively with main interested
actors concerning the region; encouraging and supporting further
cooperation between States of the region, including on economic,
energy and transport issues; and enhancing EU effectiveness and
visibility in the region. 18 months ago, the "Georgia Crisis"
mandate was transferred from that of EUSR to Central Asia. The
incumbent is Mr Philippe Lefort, a senior and experienced French
diplomat (most of whose career has been dedicated the Caucasus
and Russia, including as Ambassador to Georgia in 2004-2007).
The Council Decision
17.2 The Council Decision that we considered at our meeting
on 26 June 2013 extended Mr Lefort's mandate for a further year,
to 30 June 2014.
17.3 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
supported the mandate extension, again describing the South Caucasus
as of strategic importance to the UK and the EU, and provided
a full and further positive of Mr Lefort's performance over the
past 12 months (see our earlier Report for full details).[52]
Continued stability was, he said, also key for the UK's prosperity
and energy security goals, and of particular importance to BP
— the single largest investor in the Azerbaijan economy
investing more than £20 billion in the Shah Deniz gas field
alone; with a significant market position in Azerbaijan, operating
one of the largest oil fields, which is a cornerstone of the Azerbaijani
economy, and three of the four major oil and gas export pipelines;
part of the Shah Deniz Consortium (SDC), with a 25.5% stake; and
the current operator of the Shah Deniz I gas field, one of the
world's largest gas condensate fields. The Minister said that
the SDC were looking to invest substantially to extend the field
to supply gas to the EU and to expand the South Caucasus Pipeline
(Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey). Georgia would, he said, remain a
vital transit route for Azerbaijani oil and gas.
17.4 The political context was also as challenging
as ever. Over the past year, tensions were again heightened between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, and with Presidential elections due this
October in Azerbaijan, there was the possibility of unhelpful
rhetoric and nationalistic sentiment over Nagorno-Karabakh. Since
last October, there had also been a tense and difficult political
co-habitation between President Saakashvili and the government:
the next four months leading up to the Presidential elections
in October 2013 were likely to remain tense. The role of the
EUSR would be important to ensure that Georgian domestic political
concerns did not interfere with the Geneva Talks. Russia continued
to consolidate its military presence and "borderise"
the boundary between Georgia and the breakaway region (Abkhazia
and South Ossetia), taking an increasingly aggressive approach
in recent months. Given the proximity of Abkhazia to Sochi, Russia
was taking an activist approach on security issues in the run-up
to the 2014 Winter Olympics. Georgia's insistence on its territorial
integrity and commitment to NATO membership remained red lines
for Russia. There was a need for stability and continuity which
Phillipe Lefort in his role as EUSR could provide.
17.5 The Minister then noted that the Member
States and the High Representative had agreed that, though the
mandate should be renewed for one year, it should be reviewed
during Autumn 2013, with the review to be completed by 31 December
2013.
17.6 He continued as follows:
"The EU Political and Security Committee[53]
have stressed that these changes made to the format of the mandate
are not due to under performance. This six month period will
be used to assess how best to carry out the EU's role in the region.
While noting its support for the work of the EUSR for the South
Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, the UK welcomes this proposal.
We consider it is right to re-evaluate the way the EU engages
in the region, given the difficulty in getting traction and making
progress on the conflicts — for reasons predominantly outside
the control of the EUSR. The six month budget should not be seen
as prejudging the outcome of the review.
"Bilateral matters between the European Union
and Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia respectively will continue
to be handled by the European External Action Service and the
EU delegations in the three South Caucasus capitals. These include
matters such as negotiations on Association Agreements, Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, human rights, media freedom,
and domestic electoral reform. Both Georgia and Armenia are making
good progress on Association Agreements with the EU, and have
ambitious plans to initial them at the Vilnius Eastern Partnership
Summit in November 2013."
Our assessment
17.7 We were puzzled that — with a mandate
that was to be reviewed at the six-month point, and a six-month
budget — the mandate itself had been extended for a year.
We presumed that this was not in some way to avoid scrutiny of
the outcome of the review. We therefore asked that, when the
budget for the second six months was submitted for scrutiny, the
Minister's Explanatory Memorandum should include a full exposition
of the approach taken by the review, its outcome and how it had
informed whatever changes were put forward, and the Minister's
views thereon.
17.8 Timing was likely to be tight. We therefore
asked the Minister also to provide the Committee with a report
of the "emerging findings" in the late autumn, so that
it was not presented on the eve of the Christmas recess with what
was effectively a fait accompli, with no time to pose any
questions that might arise.
17.9 On the understanding that this would be
so, we cleared this further extension.[54]
The draft Council Decision
17.10 The draft Council Decision sets out a proposed
budget for the second six months of the current mandate.
THE EUSR'S BUDGET
17.11 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 10 December
2013, the Minister explains the budgeting exercise thus:
"The EUSR is paid for through the CFSP budget.
The 12 month budget for FY12-13 was €2,000,000. The
first six month budget for 2013-14 was increased to €1,050,000,
after the UK secured a reduction of €30,000. Officials in
London and Brussels pushed hard for the Commission to reduce costs.
Over this period, this represented an increase of 5% compared
to FY12-13.
"The second six month budget for 2013-14 was
proposed to again be €1,050,000. However, officials in London
and Brussels have fought hard for a reduction of the budget, and
received a decrease of €10,000. The budget now stands at
€1,040,000.
"As the budget has been split in half into two
separate six month budgets, some items had to be budgeted in both,
in case they were needed e.g. removal allowance (€14,000)
for the EUSR-SC and South Caucasus based employees and financial
liability insurance (€5,500). These two items are unlikely
to be spent and will therefore be returned to the CFSP budget
and spent on other external action. Each budget requires its own
audit, and therefore this second six month budget requires an
additional €15,000 in funding to be budgeted. Together these
items represent €34,000 and therefore a large part of the
€40,000 increase in the budget from 2013. We will push for
use of twelve month budgets with any future mandate renewals,
given the extra costs associated with six month budgets.
"Throughout the budget negotiations, the UK
was the only Member State to push for savings. If we had blocked
the budget and referred it to the Council of Permanent Representatives
(COREPER), we could have made a clear statement of our fiscal
prudence but there was no question that we would have been outvoted
through Qualified Majority Voting. Our scope to push for further
savings in the budget was therefore limited."
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
17.12 The Minister illustrates the strategic
significance of the region to the UK in the same terms as hitherto
(c.f. paragraph 17.3 above).
The Government's view
17.13 With regard to the EUSR himself, the Minister
says:
"The UK supports the work of the EUSR. The EUSR
has regular access to the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of
Armenia and Azerbaijan. He is able to relay the concerns of EU
member states to counter periods of rising tension and has delivered
messages of restraint including on the possible opening of Nagorno-Karabakh
airport. The EUSR also engages key stakeholders including in Moscow
and Ankara.
"The EUSR leads the EU's work in respect of
the conflicts in Georgia and makes frequent trips to Georgia,
including the breakaway regions, and is one of the co-chairs of
the Geneva peace talks. He also continues to have an advisory
role to the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM). This is important, as
it helps to ensure that the EU's work in Georgia is joined-up.
The EU continues to be the main international actor on the ground
in Georgia."
THE MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE EUSR'S MANDATE
17.14 The Minister says:
"The UK urged the EEAS to ensure that a review
take place in a timely manner in order to allow for the decision
and possible accompanying budget to be put to the Scrutiny Committees
before the Christmas Recess. In the event, the review took the
form of a discussion within the Political and Security Committee
in Brussels on 20 November. A budget for the second six month
period was first put before the Relex working group on 2 December."
The Government's view
17.15 The Minister comments thus:
"While the UK was in favour of the mandate continuing,
we were disappointed that a more thorough review did not take
place. We have made this point to the EEAS. As I have set out
in recent correspondence to both Committees,[55]
we continue to push, as part of the wider EEAS review process,
for improvements to the overall EUSR system."
Conclusion
17.16 This is further evidence of a disturbing
pattern which applies more generally to CFSP missions too, whereby
the UK ploughs a lonely furrow in its endeavours to introduce
and sustain even a semblance of effective budgetary discipline,
monitoring and evaluation. The leisurely pace taken by the EEAS
with regard to the mandate review is unexplained, and unacceptable.
Why did it take so long for any work to be done? And why, if
the six months starting in June were to be used to assess how
best to carry out the EU's role in the region, was the Minister
prepared to settle for no more than a PSC discussion that took
place only three weeks ago?
17.17 This plays into the wider question of the
EUSR's role as a whole. As the Minister notes in his letter to
the Committee, we have a shared concern over their grading and
remuneration. The UK's objectives may well be "the need
for a greater focus on efficiency, effectiveness and accountability,
as well as a reduction in EUSR grading from AD16 to 14, to tackle
the excessive salaries that you have highlighted as a key concern
for the Committee." But as we have seen here, in such areas
the UK rarely finds sufficient support to achieve such objectives.
Are we likely to find ourselves outvoted again?
17.18 The wider EUSR review also raises an even
wider question: the role of national parliaments. CSDP is the
responsibility of the Member States. It is not enough for the
Minister simply to be seeking what Member States are already entitled
to, i.e., "adequate time to review and revise mandates in
the light of the circumstances in which an EUSR deployment is
being considered": that goes without saying.
17.19 What national parliaments are also entitled
to is to scrutinise the outcome of this wider review before any
decisions are taken on its implementation — especially in
view of the endeavours of the European Parliament to involve itself
in the process. We once again ask the Minister to assure us,
in terms, that the review will be deposited with an Explanatory
Memorandum, for prior scrutiny, before any decisions on it are
taken.
17.20 We do not wish to see approval of the next
six months budget of this EUSR to be held up in the meantime.
We now therefore clear the document, and ask the Minister to
respond within ten working days to the other matters we raise
above.
52 See (35052) -: HC 83-vii (2013-14), chapter 14
(26 June 2013). Back
53
The committee of ambassador-level officials from national delegations
who, by virtue of article 38 TEU, under the authority of the High
Representative and the Council, monitor the international situation
in areas covered by the CFSP and exercise political control and
strategic direction of crisis management operations, as set out
in article 43 TEU. The chair is nominated by the HR. Walter
Stevens was appointed as Chair on 21 June 2013. He was then working
in the Headquarters of the EEAS, as Head of the Crisis Management
and Planning Directorate. He previously served as Permanent Representative
of Belgium to the Political and Security Committee and to the
West European Union. Back
54
See headnote: (33954) -: HC 86-iv (2012-13), chapter 22 (14
June 2012). Back
55
See the Annex to this chapter of our Report. Back
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