Twenty-eighth Report of Session 2013-14 - European Scrutiny Committee Contents


17   EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia

(35626)

Council Decision amending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia

Legal baseArticles 28, 31 (2 ) and 33 TEU; QMV
DepartmentForeign and Commonwealth Office
Basis of considerationEM of 10 December 2013
Previous Committee ReportNone; but see (35052) —: HC 83-vii (2013-14), chapter 14 (26 June 2013); also (33954) —: HC 86-iv (2012-13), chapter 22 (14 June 2012) and (32778) —: HC 428-xxxvi (2010-12), chapter 20 (14 September 2011)
Discussion in Council24 January 2014 Foreign Affairs Council
Committee's assessmentPolitically important
Committee's decisionCleared; further information requested

Background

17.1  The EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus was first appointed on 20 February 2006. He was tasked with supporting the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council in: assisting Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in carrying out political and economic reforms; preventing conflicts in the region and contributing to the peaceful settlement of conflicts, including through promoting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; engaging constructively with main interested actors concerning the region; encouraging and supporting further cooperation between States of the region, including on economic, energy and transport issues; and enhancing EU effectiveness and visibility in the region. 18 months ago, the "Georgia Crisis" mandate was transferred from that of EUSR to Central Asia. The incumbent is Mr Philippe Lefort, a senior and experienced French diplomat (most of whose career has been dedicated the Caucasus and Russia, including as Ambassador to Georgia in 2004-2007).

The Council Decision

17.2  The Council Decision that we considered at our meeting on 26 June 2013 extended Mr Lefort's mandate for a further year, to 30 June 2014.

17.3  The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) supported the mandate extension, again describing the South Caucasus as of strategic importance to the UK and the EU, and provided a full and further positive of Mr Lefort's performance over the past 12 months (see our earlier Report for full details).[52] Continued stability was, he said, also key for the UK's prosperity and energy security goals, and of particular importance to BP — the single largest investor in the Azerbaijan economy investing more than £20 billion in the Shah Deniz gas field alone; with a significant market position in Azerbaijan, operating one of the largest oil fields, which is a cornerstone of the Azerbaijani economy, and three of the four major oil and gas export pipelines; part of the Shah Deniz Consortium (SDC), with a 25.5% stake; and the current operator of the Shah Deniz I gas field, one of the world's largest gas condensate fields. The Minister said that the SDC were looking to invest substantially to extend the field to supply gas to the EU and to expand the South Caucasus Pipeline (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey). Georgia would, he said, remain a vital transit route for Azerbaijani oil and gas.

17.4  The political context was also as challenging as ever. Over the past year, tensions were again heightened between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and with Presidential elections due this October in Azerbaijan, there was the possibility of unhelpful rhetoric and nationalistic sentiment over Nagorno-Karabakh. Since last October, there had also been a tense and difficult political co-habitation between President Saakashvili and the government: the next four months leading up to the Presidential elections in October 2013 were likely to remain tense. The role of the EUSR would be important to ensure that Georgian domestic political concerns did not interfere with the Geneva Talks. Russia continued to consolidate its military presence and "borderise" the boundary between Georgia and the breakaway region (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), taking an increasingly aggressive approach in recent months. Given the proximity of Abkhazia to Sochi, Russia was taking an activist approach on security issues in the run-up to the 2014 Winter Olympics. Georgia's insistence on its territorial integrity and commitment to NATO membership remained red lines for Russia. There was a need for stability and continuity which Phillipe Lefort in his role as EUSR could provide.

17.5  The Minister then noted that the Member States and the High Representative had agreed that, though the mandate should be renewed for one year, it should be reviewed during Autumn 2013, with the review to be completed by 31 December 2013.

17.6  He continued as follows:

"The EU Political and Security Committee[53] have stressed that these changes made to the format of the mandate are not due to under performance. This six month period will be used to assess how best to carry out the EU's role in the region. While noting its support for the work of the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, the UK welcomes this proposal. We consider it is right to re-evaluate the way the EU engages in the region, given the difficulty in getting traction and making progress on the conflicts — for reasons predominantly outside the control of the EUSR. The six month budget should not be seen as prejudging the outcome of the review.

"Bilateral matters between the European Union and Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia respectively will continue to be handled by the European External Action Service and the EU delegations in the three South Caucasus capitals. These include matters such as negotiations on Association Agreements, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, human rights, media freedom, and domestic electoral reform. Both Georgia and Armenia are making good progress on Association Agreements with the EU, and have ambitious plans to initial them at the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit in November 2013."

Our assessment

17.7   We were puzzled that — with a mandate that was to be reviewed at the six-month point, and a six-month budget — the mandate itself had been extended for a year. We presumed that this was not in some way to avoid scrutiny of the outcome of the review. We therefore asked that, when the budget for the second six months was submitted for scrutiny, the Minister's Explanatory Memorandum should include a full exposition of the approach taken by the review, its outcome and how it had informed whatever changes were put forward, and the Minister's views thereon.

17.8  Timing was likely to be tight. We therefore asked the Minister also to provide the Committee with a report of the "emerging findings" in the late autumn, so that it was not presented on the eve of the Christmas recess with what was effectively a fait accompli, with no time to pose any questions that might arise.

17.9  On the understanding that this would be so, we cleared this further extension.[54]

The draft Council Decision

17.10  The draft Council Decision sets out a proposed budget for the second six months of the current mandate.

THE EUSR'S BUDGET

17.11  In his Explanatory Memorandum of 10 December 2013, the Minister explains the budgeting exercise thus:

"The EUSR is paid for through the CFSP budget. The 12 month budget for FY12-13 was €2,000,000. The first six month budget for 2013-14 was increased to €1,050,000, after the UK secured a reduction of €30,000. Officials in London and Brussels pushed hard for the Commission to reduce costs. Over this period, this represented an increase of 5% compared to FY12-13. 

"The second six month budget for 2013-14 was proposed to again be €1,050,000. However, officials in London and Brussels have fought hard for a reduction of the budget, and received a decrease of €10,000. The budget now stands at €1,040,000.

"As the budget has been split in half into two separate six month budgets, some items had to be budgeted in both, in case they were needed e.g. removal allowance (€14,000) for the EUSR-SC and South Caucasus based employees and financial liability insurance (€5,500). These two items are unlikely to be spent and will therefore be returned to the CFSP budget and spent on other external action. Each budget requires its own audit, and therefore this second six month budget requires an additional €15,000 in funding to be budgeted. Together these items represent €34,000 and therefore a large part of the €40,000 increase in the budget from 2013. We will push for use of twelve month budgets with any future mandate renewals, given the extra costs associated with six month budgets.

"Throughout the budget negotiations, the UK was the only Member State to push for savings. If we had blocked the budget and referred it to the Council of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), we could have made a clear statement of our fiscal prudence but there was no question that we would have been outvoted through Qualified Majority Voting. Our scope to push for further savings in the budget was therefore limited."

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

17.12  The Minister illustrates the strategic significance of the region to the UK in the same terms as hitherto (c.f. paragraph 17.3 above).

The Government's view

17.13   With regard to the EUSR himself, the Minister says:

"The UK supports the work of the EUSR. The EUSR has regular access to the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan. He is able to relay the concerns of EU member states to counter periods of rising tension and has delivered messages of restraint including on the possible opening of Nagorno-Karabakh airport. The EUSR also engages key stakeholders including in Moscow and Ankara.

"The EUSR leads the EU's work in respect of the conflicts in Georgia and makes frequent trips to Georgia, including the breakaway regions, and is one of the co-chairs of the Geneva peace talks. He also continues to have an advisory role to the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM). This is important, as it helps to ensure that the EU's work in Georgia is joined-up. The EU continues to be the main international actor on the ground in Georgia."

THE MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE EUSR'S MANDATE

17.14  The Minister says:

"The UK urged the EEAS to ensure that a review take place in a timely manner in order to allow for the decision and possible accompanying budget to be put to the Scrutiny Committees before the Christmas Recess. In the event, the review took the form of a discussion within the Political and Security Committee in Brussels on 20 November. A budget for the second six month period was first put before the Relex working group on 2 December."

The Government's view

17.15   The Minister comments thus:

"While the UK was in favour of the mandate continuing, we were disappointed that a more thorough review did not take place. We have made this point to the EEAS. As I have set out in recent correspondence to both Committees,[55] we continue to push, as part of the wider EEAS review process, for improvements to the overall EUSR system."

Conclusion

17.16   This is further evidence of a disturbing pattern which applies more generally to CFSP missions too, whereby the UK ploughs a lonely furrow in its endeavours to introduce and sustain even a semblance of effective budgetary discipline, monitoring and evaluation. The leisurely pace taken by the EEAS with regard to the mandate review is unexplained, and unacceptable. Why did it take so long for any work to be done? And why, if the six months starting in June were to be used to assess how best to carry out the EU's role in the region, was the Minister prepared to settle for no more than a PSC discussion that took place only three weeks ago?

17.17  This plays into the wider question of the EUSR's role as a whole. As the Minister notes in his letter to the Committee, we have a shared concern over their grading and remuneration. The UK's objectives may well be "the need for a greater focus on efficiency, effectiveness and accountability, as well as a reduction in EUSR grading from AD16 to 14, to tackle the excessive salaries that you have highlighted as a key concern for the Committee." But as we have seen here, in such areas the UK rarely finds sufficient support to achieve such objectives. Are we likely to find ourselves outvoted again?

17.18  The wider EUSR review also raises an even wider question: the role of national parliaments. CSDP is the responsibility of the Member States. It is not enough for the Minister simply to be seeking what Member States are already entitled to, i.e., "adequate time to review and revise mandates in the light of the circumstances in which an EUSR deployment is being considered": that goes without saying.

17.19  What national parliaments are also entitled to is to scrutinise the outcome of this wider review before any decisions are taken on its implementation — especially in view of the endeavours of the European Parliament to involve itself in the process. We once again ask the Minister to assure us, in terms, that the review will be deposited with an Explanatory Memorandum, for prior scrutiny, before any decisions on it are taken.

17.20  We do not wish to see approval of the next six months budget of this EUSR to be held up in the meantime. We now therefore clear the document, and ask the Minister to respond within ten working days to the other matters we raise above.


52   See (35052) -: HC 83-vii (2013-14), chapter 14 (26 June 2013). Back

53   The committee of ambassador-level officials from national delegations who, by virtue of article 38 TEU, under the authority of the High Representative and the Council, monitor the international situation in areas covered by the CFSP and exercise political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations, as set out in article 43 TEU. The chair is nominated by the HR. Walter Stevens was appointed as Chair on 21 June 2013. He was then working in the Headquarters of the EEAS, as Head of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate. He previously served as Permanent Representative of Belgium to the Political and Security Committee and to the West European Union. Back

54   See headnote: (33954) -: HC 86-iv (2012-13), chapter 22 (14 June 2012). Back

55   See the Annex to this chapter of our Report. Back


 
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Prepared 2 January 2014