7 The EU and the Gulf of Guinea
| (35684)
18099/13
JOIN(13) 31
| Joint Communication: Elements for the EU's Strategic Response to the Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea
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| Legal base
| — |
| Document originated
| 18 December 2013
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| Deposited in Parliament
| 23 December 2013
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| Department
| Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration
| EM of 21 January 2014
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| Previous Committee Report
| None; but see (35595) — and (35696) 17859/13: HC 83-xxvi (2013-14), chapter 9 (8 January 2014)
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| Discussion in Council
| 10 February 2014 Foreign Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment
| Politically important
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| Committee's decision
| Not cleared; further information requested
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Background
7.1 In its Executive Summary, the Commission/European
External Action Service (EEAS) note that States bordering the
Gulf of Guinea coastline face many of the challenges familiar
to countries throughout Africa. But the recent growth in threats
emanating from the lack of control over coastal waters and access
and security along the coast itself pose a particular challenge
to the states of the region. The consequences include growth
in criminal and terrorist activity, which also pose a growing
threat to the EU.
The Joint Commission/High Representative Communication
7.2 The geographic scope of this Joint
Communication spans a 6,000 kilometre coastline, from Senegal
to Angola, and including the islands of Cape Verde and Sao Tome
and Principe, covering two geographical, political and economic
regions: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS),
both of which are affiliated to the Gulf of Guinea Commission
(GGC) and the African Union (AU).
7.3 The Joint Communication reviews
the overall scale of the threat, the risks that it poses to the
coastal states and the EU, and the potential actions that the
EU, with the international community, could take to help those
states tackle the problem.
THREATS
7.4 The Commission/EEAS posit three
distinct types of threat:
— those that take place uniquely
at sea, including illegal fishing, illicit dumping of waste, and
piracy and armed robbery at sea;[32]
— those that come from sea
on to land, primarily trafficking of narcotics, arms, counterfeit
goods and, often in the other direction, of human beings; and
— threats to sea-based economic
activity from land, particularly to the offshore oil and gas industry,
including hostage-taking, theft ("bunkering"), and criminal
acts in ports.
Unchecked, these threats will grow to
the extent that both local and international interests will be
damaged.
SHARED AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN INTERESTS
7.5 The Commission/EEAS note the following
major interests that EU and the countries of the region have in
common:
— a long coast line, rich
in resources that are crucial both for local employment and consumption,
and for trade with Europe;
— the sustainability of all
maritime resources, including fisheries: a key concern for local
communities as well as European customers;
— secure global shipping lanes,
for commerce and trouble-free fishing;
— a significant proportion
of EU energy supplies come from this region, and both investors
and workers should be safeguarded from physical attack; and
— narcotics and other illegal
goods trafficked along the coast and across land borders are increasingly
damaging local communities and fuel problems in Europe.
7.6 The EU's overriding objective should
therefore be to help the states of the region — many of
them very fragile — to achieve peace, security and prosperity
through the successful and legitimate development of their economies
and their institutions, in line with both the African Peace and
Security Architecture (APSA) and overall EU policy; building political
consensus, enabling and respecting African ownership and synchronising
existing programmes in a comprehensive approach to regional development
and security. The Commission/EEAS argue that experience elsewhere
in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and the
Great Lakes, suggests that early preventive action, in close coordination
with the countries of the region and African regional bodies,
is much more cost-effective than a later cure; that experience
having also demonstrated the value of integrating all aspects
for greater cumulative effect; political, good-governance/anti-corruption,
security, institutional, economic, and development.
RESPONSE
7.7 The Commission/EEAS suggest that
the EU can mitigate these risks by helping states to strengthen
the rule of law and effective governance across the region, including
through improvements in maritime administration, law enforcement
activity by the police, navy, military, coastguard, customs and
immigration services.
7.8 As maritime boundaries are still
not fully delineated, inherently hard to police and entirely permeable,
strengthening cooperation between the coastal states and nascent
regional coordination mechanisms is seen as an essential starting
point. The EU can also support countries in the region to deliver
on their international obligations as flag and coastal states.
7.9 The Commission/EEAS accordingly
propose that the EU, including its institutions, Delegations and
Member States working in coordination with other international
organisations and local partners, adopt a comprehensive approach
focusing on four specific objectives:
— building a common understanding
of the scale of the threat and the need to address it among the
countries in the region and the international community;
— helping governments of the
region build robust institutions, maritime administrations and
capabilities to ensure maritime awareness, security and the rule
of law along the coast;
— supporting prosperous economies
in this region in line with national and regional development
strategies, to create employment and assist vulnerable communities
to build resilience and resist criminal or violent activities;
and
— strengthening cooperation
structures between the countries of the region and the regional
organisations to take the necessary actions to mitigate the threats
at sea and on land.
7.10 In his Explanatory Memorandum of
21 January 2014, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
says that (the Joint Communication having been published on 18
December): Member States were consulted in the first half of 2013
and Member States, including France and Germany, contributed non-papers
to influence the content; the UK "was heavily involved and
influenced both the document and the non-papers which fed into
it"; but "did not see any recent versions of this over
the last few months ahead of this version of the document being
circulated by the EU". Looking ahead, the Minister says
that the Joint Communication will be now be discussed at COAFR
and other relevant working groups, as decided at the Political
and Security Committee (PSC)[33]
on 21 January; following which it will become a Strategic Framework
and be presented to the 10 February Foreign Affairs Council for
Council decision.
The Government's view
7.11 The Minister describes tackling
maritime criminality in the Gulf of Guinea as a UK priority:
"The region is increasingly
important for international trade and energy security. Criminality
poses direct and indirect security implications for the UK and
EU: the region is becoming an increasingly-used route for narcotics
trafficking to Europe and for illegal migration and human trafficking;
weapons trafficking is contributing to violent crime and instability
in the region which in turn increases the threat of international
terrorism; and armed attacks against ships, including piracy,
present a risk to shipping operating in the region affecting UK
flagged vessels, companies and seafarers. These attacks are an
added obstacle to the increasing offshore oil industry and trade
hindering economic development in the region. Furthermore, illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing has significant food security,
stability and migration implications for the States in West and
Central Africa, the UK and EU."
7.12 The Minister says that the UK is
working proactively with the region to tackle these threats:
"We have adopted a tailored
approach, learning the lessons from piracy off the coast of Somalia
while recognising that the different and varied threats in the
Gulf of Guinea and the greater levels of regional capacity in
the region necessitate a distinct response."
7.13 The Minister then notes that the
UK maritime security strategy for the Gulf of Guinea "identifies
the importance of a holistic approach" to tackling maritime
criminality:
"We have focused on working
across the region on threats, developing synergies with other
workstreams to tackle transnational organised crime, and linking
to other efforts promoting good governance and economic development.
Our approach is based on supporting an African-led response, capacity
building work which builds on existing initiatives, sustainable
solutions and working in coordination with international partners
to avoid duplication. In particular, we have established an informal
technical level coordination group of international partners engaged
in maritime capacity building efforts in the region: the G8++
Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (FOGG). We are working in partnership
with regional States to provide training and expertise for example
through training facilities in Sierra Leone and Nigeria and the
provision of expertise to Sao Tome and Principe to develop a national
maritime strategy. We are also working through international organisations
to deliver judicial reform and encourage a multiagency approach
by supporting the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and
UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) programmes in the region."
7.14 The Minister then notes that:
— a number of European partners
engaged in capacity building work in West and Central Africa;
— the EU is also running various
workstreams and projects relating to maritime security and capacity
building work in the region (e.g., the Critical Maritime Routes
for the Gulf of Guinea technical capacity building project in
seven States across the region); projects to develop fisheries
and tackle Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported fishing; African
development programme and work to tackle transnational organised
crime;
— the EU was also instrumental
in work to tackle piracy off the coast of Somalia; and
— several member States are
looking for the EU to become more engaged with counter piracy
work in West Africa.
7.15 However, there is currently no
agreed maritime strategy setting out a comprehensive approach
to EU activities in this region which is limiting the effectiveness
of EU programmes — hence the Joint Communication.
7.16 The Minister continues his comments
thus:
"The Comprehensive Approach
is a UK priority and we particularly welcomed the importance placed
on this approach in Baroness Ashton's recent review of the EEAS.[34]
"This approach will look to
coordinate the EU activities to work in coordination and complement
existing initiatives and workstreams, which would ensure the EU
contribution to capacity building efforts is effective. The analysis,
conclusions and broad actions proposed in the Joint Communication
are in line with UK objectives and we are content with these as
a basis for the Strategic Framework. We endorse the principles
outlined in the document, namely African leadership, building
sustainable solutions, taking a holistic approach, tackling maritime
criminality on land, working with existing initiatives and coordinating
with international partners to avoid duplication. The Minister
endorses the four principal objectives (building a common understanding
of the scale of the threat and enhancing regional public messaging;
helping regional governments build capacity to ensure security
and rule of law; supporting development in the; and strengthening
cooperation structures between regional countries and organisations
and the international community: c.f. paragraph 7.8 above).
7.17 With regard to the discussions
at the PSC on 21 January and COAFR on 22 January, the Minister
says that he will press for further revisions to ensure that the
final Strategic Framework addresses his outstanding, "albeit
relatively minor", concerns, which he says relate to some
of the content of the analysis, rather than the proposed areas
for action:
· "The paper separates
the maritime threats into sections. We think this is somewhat
arbitrary given the linked nature of the threats and is inconsistent
with the holistic approach advocated in the paper;
· "The document suggests
there is potential for kidnapping attacks to develop into a piracy
business model similar to that seen in Somalia. There is no evidence
to support this assertion. Indeed, there are significant differences
with Somali-based piracy particularly the lack of governance and
capability in East Africa. We will seek to address this factual
inaccuracy in the paper. Other Member States share our analysis;
· "Greater emphasis should
be given in the Strategic Framework to encouraging the implementation
of the priorities outlined in the 'Code of Conduct Concerning
the Prevention and Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against
Ships and Illegal Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa'
which was adopted by Gulf of Guinea Heads of State in Yaoundé
on 24-25 June 2013.
· "The communication is
not specific about linkages with the EU Horn of Africa[35]
and EU Sahel[36] strategies,
nor lessons learned in these regions. It is important to understand
how the Gulf of Guinea strategy will affect maritime resources
and policy making attention in the Horn of Africa. It would
also be useful for the document to discuss whether proliferation
and trafficking through the Sahel is fuelling extremism and violence
in the Gulf of Guinea."
7.18 The Minister says: "We will
strengthen these areas through discussions at the COAFR Working
Group on 22 January ahead of the Council Conclusions on 10 or
23 February and thereafter".
Conclusion
7.19 We understand that the timescale
for further discussion is in fact somewhat more elastic, and that
the only actual deadline is agreement on the Strategy prior to
the 2-3 April Africa-EU Summit.
7.20 We should therefore be grateful
if the Minister would write to us once this document has been
finalised, outlining the changes that have been made and his views
thereon, and prior to its adoption as the new Strategy.
7.21 In the meantime, we shall retain
the document under scrutiny.
32 The Commission/EEAS note that International law
differentiates between "piracy" - incidents which take
place in international waters - and "armed robbery at sea"
- incidents which take place in territorial waters. Back
33
The committee of ambassador-level officials from national delegations
who, by virtue of article 38 TEU, under the authority of the High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and
the Council, monitor the international situation in areas covered
by the CFSP and exercise political control and strategic direction
of crisis management operations, as set out in article 43 TEU.
The chair is nominated by the HR. Back
34
For the Committee's consideration of the EU Comprehensive Approach,
see (35595) - and (35696) 17859/13: HC 83-xxvi (2013-14), chapter
9 (8 January 2014) at headnote. And for its consideration of
the HR's review of the EEAS, see (35271) -: HC 83-xxi (2013-14),
chapter 4 (20 November 2013). Back
35
Set out at the Annex to the 14 November 2011 Council Conclusions
on the Horn of Africa, which are available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126052.pdf. Back
36
Available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf. Back
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