13 A new approach to financing EU external
action
(a)
(33559)
18726/11
COM(11) 865
(b)
(33558)
18725/11
COM(11) 842
(c)
(33537)
18520/11
+ ADDs 1-2
COM(11) 838
(d)
(33529)
18429/11
+ ADDs 1-2
COM(11) 840
(e)
(33553)
18657/11
COM(11) 845
(h)
(33546)
18602/11
+ ADDs 1-2
COM(11) 839
(i)
(33536)
18505/11
+ ADDs 1-2
COM(11) 843
(j)
(33549)
18621/11
+ ADDs 1-2
COM(11) 844
(k)
(33526)
18450/11
+ ADDs 1-2
COM(11) 841
(l)
(33531)
18437/11
+ ADDs 1-2
COM(11) 846
|
Joint Communication: Global Europe: A New Approach to Financing EU External Action
Draft Regulation establishing common rules and procedures for the implementation of the EU's instruments for external action
Draft Regulation on the Instrument for Pre-accession (IPA II)
Draft Regulation establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation
Draft Regulation establishing an Instrument for Stability
Draft Regulation establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument
Draft Regulation establishing a Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries
Draft Regulation establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide
Draft Regulation establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
Draft Council Decision on relations between the European Union, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark
|
| Legal base | (a) —
(b-g) Articles 209(1) and 212(2) TFEU; QMV; ordinary legislative procedure;
(h) Articles 209(1) and 212(2) TFEU; QMV; ordinary legislative procedure;
(i) Articles 207 (2), 209(1) and 212(2) TFEU; QMV; ordinary legislative procedure;
(j) Articles 209(1) and 212(2) TFEU; QMV; ordinary legislative procedure;
(k) Article 203 of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (the "Euratom Treaty"); unanimity; ordinary legislative procedure;
(l) Article 203 TFEU; unanimity.
|
| Departments | Foreign and Commonwealth Office and International Development
|
| Basis of consideration | Ministers' letter of 4 February 2014
|
| Previous Committee Reports | HC 83-xxvi (2013-14), chapter 4 (8 January 2014), HC 83-iv (2013-14), chapter 5 (5 June 2013), HC 86-xxxiv (2012-13), chapter 2 (6 March 2013), HC 86-v (2012-13), chapter 6 (20 June 2012) and HC 428-xlviii (2010-12), chapters 8-12 and 15-19 (25 January 2012)
|
| Discussion in Council | 25 June 2012 General Affairs Council
|
| Committee's assessment | Legally and politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Cleared
|
Background
13.1 The multiannual financial framework (MFF) sets
out the EU budget's spending priorities. It lays down maximum
amounts ("ceilings") for each broad category of expenditure
("headings") for a clearly determined period of time
(of several years). It aims to ensure EU expenditure develops
in an orderly manner, within the limit of the EU's own resources.
13.2 The Joint Communication, "Global Europe:
A New Approach to Financing EU External Action" (document
(a)), sets out the EU's external strategic objectives; four broad
policy priorities (enlargement, neighbourhood, cooperation with
strategic partners and development cooperation); and a more differentiated
approach to partnerships and aid allocation, driven by the country
context, as a core principle.
13.3 The proposed Council Regulation 18725/11 (document
(b)) contains proposals for a set of simplified and harmonised
implementing rules and procedures applicable to:
· the four main geographic instruments —
the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), European Neighbourhood
Instrument (ENI), Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and
a new Partnership Instrument (PI);
· the three thematic instruments —
the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR),
Instrument for Stability (IfS) and Instrument for Nuclear Safety
Cooperation (INSC); and
· a revised EU-Greenland partnership.
13.4 Full details of all these documents, and the
history of the MFF negotiations on them, are set out in our previous
Reports, in particular our Report of 8 January.
13.5 In that Report we were given to understand that
a package acceptable to the Government had been agreed. We therefore
asked the Ministers to provide details, and to show how what had
been agreed regarding the use of Delegated Acts was consistent
with Article 290 TFEU.
13.6 We presumed that the European Parliament had
already given its first reading to this package at its Plenary
during the week in which the Ministers wrote their letter; meaning
that the next stage would the Council's first reading. We accordingly
again reminded the Ministers that we would need to receive the
revised versions of the texts of the individual financial instruments,
and of the simplified and harmonised implementing rules and procedures
applicable to those instruments, together with their views on
them, in sufficient time before that point was reached for questions
arising to be considered — if necessary via a debate.
13.7 In the meantime, we continued to retain the
documents under scrutiny.
13.8 We again drew this chapter of our Report to
the attention of the International Development Committee.[42]
The Minister's letter of 4 February 2014
13.9 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department
for International Development (Lynne Featherstone) provide further
detail on the individual regulations and the UK's position, and
enclose the texts of the individual regulations as they currently
stand.
13.10 They comment as follows:
"This has been a difficult and long process
but the UK successfully led the charge to maintain a tough negotiating
mandate. This was particularly important as we came closer to
the end of 2013 with the possibility of an agreement not being
reached; the UK successfully maintained unity on the Council's
negotiating mandate where other Member States were willing to
compromise on key priorities to avoid the risk that a delay meant
no external spend would be undertaken in 2014. Having taken the
negotiations to the very last moment the European Parliament (EP)
eventually conceded on many of its demands including their principal
request to achieve standalone delegated acts for programming.
Without the UK holding our position and persuading other Member
States to do the same we judge it is unlikely that the European
Parliament would have done this.
OVERVIEW OF THE USE OF DELEGATED ACTS
"The key horizontal UK priority for the new
instruments was to avoid the use of 'supplementing' or 'standalone'
delegated acts for decisions previously taken by Member States
in committees (under implementing acts). The EP's position was
that all country, regional and thematic strategic documents should
be classified as delegated acts. The UK strongly opposed this
on the grounds that these documents are part of the implementation
of the regulations, and are therefore subject to control by Member
States. The EP argued that their role of political oversight
meant that they should retain a veto on these documents through
classifying them as delegated acts. This became the key issue
in negotiations, and was the main reason for the delay.
"The UK led efforts to maintain Council unity
on this issue until, eventually, the EP agreed to seek a compromise
solution. The compromise that emerged was that delegated acts
would be restricted to amending some parts of the annexes to the
regulations. Therefore the EP would have no right of veto over
individual country or regional programming, its influence being
limited to proposing amendments to the broad priorities and themes
of the instrument. We do not expect this to be a common occurrence.
Whilst programming decisions are made regularly by the EEAS and
Member States, changes to the priorities and themes of instruments
are rare. If the Commission propose any at all, it will be for
obvious political or practical reasons which are unlikely to be
controversial either for the Council or the EP.
"The process for the use of amending delegated
acts is that, after consultations with Member States' experts,
should the Commission consider that a part of a regulation that
is amendable by delegated act requires an amendment, the Commission
can propose this. The Council and the EP then each have the right
to veto the amendments unilaterally, the Council through a Qualified
Majority Vote (QMV), and the EP through a simple majority. Should
this occur, the amendments would fall, but, crucially, the existing
text of that part of the regulation, which has already been agreed
by Council and the EP in the legislative process, would remain
in force.
The elements of each instrument that will be able
to be amended by delegated act are:
"Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI):
annexes containing broad lists of potential areas for intervention
in geographic programmes, thematic programmes, and the Pan-African
Programme. An annex of indicative financial allocations by region
for geographic programmes, and by programme for thematic programmes
may also be amended by delegated act, but only by up to a maximum
of 5% of the initial value. As the very final part of the compromise
on DCI, it was also agreed to allow two key areas of cooperation
— human rights, democracy and good governance, and inclusive
and sustainable growth — to have minimum percentage allocations
that may be amended by delegated act.
"Partnership Instrument (PI),
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR),
Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) and European
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI): an annex containing
very broad thematic priorities can be amended by delegated act.
"One final stumbling block on the issue in the
negotiations was that the EP pushed for a guarantee that these
delegated acts would be used during the period in which the instruments
are in force. They therefore pushed for the validity of the annexes
to be limited to half-way through the period (i.e. until 2017).
This was rejected by the UK and the rest of the Council, as it
would have allowed the EP to halt further implementation of the
instruments at the mid-term if they rejected the delegated acts.
Instead, it was agreed that the Commission would bring delegated
acts to amend the annexes at the mid-term, but that the annexes
would remain in force if those amendments were rejected.
"The government believes that the deal made
at the very last minute on this issue was the best that the Council
could obtain. Allowing the EP to gain a veto over individual
programmes would have shifted decision-making away from Member
States, and could have led to programmes that are sensitive, politically
important, or provide for urgent needs being vetoed by the EP.
"While the government would have preferred to
have no delegated acts, it recognises that, for amending delegated
acts, the alternative would be for the Ordinary Legislative Procedure
to be used for minor amendments to allow for unforeseen needs.
As Council and the EP would be co-legislators for such amendments,
and as the delegated act procedure requires the Commission to
consult with Member States first, we do not consider overall that
the provisions represent a shift in the institutional balance.
However, we believe that the inclusion of percentage allocations
for the two specific thematic areas in DCI went beyond the Presidencies'
negotiating mandate, and set a bad precedent. This was therefore
one of the reasons for the UK voting against the package.
"As we explained in our letter of 16th December
2013, the second reason for the UK voting against the package
was our objection to the inclusion of provisions to allow reflows.
"I have included an annex which contains more
detail on the individual instruments held under scrutiny with
further detail on the negotiations." (which we reproduce).
NEXT STEPS
"The European Parliament agreed the 'Final Compromise
with a view to agreement' at its Plenary on 11 December. The
final texts and translations of the instruments are currently
being finalised by Jurist-linguists, after which the final texts
will be available. The EP will then approve the final texts at
a plenary session in February, with the Council expected to give
its agreement at one of the March Councils. The regulations will
then be considered adopted, and will enter into force the day
after their publication in the Official Journal."
13.11 The detail provided by the Ministers on the
individual instruments is reproduced at the annex to this chapter
of our Report. The agreed figures for each one for 2014-20 are:
| Proposed Regulations
| € billions
|
| Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)
| 19.7 |
| European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)
| 15.4 |
| Pre-accession Instrument (IPA)
| 11.7 |
| Instrument for Security and Peace (IfSP)
| 2.3 |
| European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR)
| 1.3 |
| Partnership Instrument (PI)
| 1.0 |
| Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
| 0.2 |
| Instrument for Greenland
| 0.217 |
| Total | 49.5
|
Conclusion
13.12 As the detailed annex to the Ministers'
letter reveals, a package of instruments that has already been
road-tested and adapted over the past seven years has now been
further improved: a strengthened focus generally on monitoring,
evaluation and reporting of results, with detailed Performance
Indicators; the largest instrument, at €19.7 billion, to
be targeted on the poorest countries; funding under the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to be linked more closely to each "neighbourhood"
partner's progress in political and economic reform, with the
prospect thereby of greater effectiveness and value-for-money;
a more flexible, comprehensive and better structured means to
support accession; an instrument that enables the EU to continue
to react rapidly and flexibly to crises as they arise and be able
to act in countries and on issues where most needed; an instrument
that closely matches UK human rights priorities and which, while
complementing other EU capacities, can be used to intervene without
the agreement of the governments of countries in which it operates,
through social networks, communication platforms, the media and
the press; a modest new instrument (€1 billion: a UK initiative)
to deepen relationships with non-ODA countries on trade, growth,
investment and global challenges such as climate change.
13.13 Like the Government, we would have preferred
to have no delegated acts. However, we agree that, together with
the improvements highlighted by the Ministers in the Regulations
themselves, this is a satisfactory outcome in all the circumstances.
13.14 We are also grateful to them and their officials
for having kept the Committee, and thereby the House, so well-informed
during these lengthy and, at times, difficult negotiations.
13.15 We now clear the Commission Communication,
the Council Regulations and the Council Decision from scrutiny.
Annex to the Ministers' letter containing further
detail on instruments under Heading 4
"Common Implementing Regulation (CIR)
"The CIR provides a common framework of implementing
rules and procedures for the new external financial instruments
(with the exception of the Instrument for Pre-Accession, due to
its own complexities, particularly with regard to cross-border
cooperation programmes). Whereas in the past the implementation
rules for each instrument were contained in individual legislative
texts, they are now codified in a single regulation, ensuring
consistency and representing a significant simplification of the
current fragmented implementing regime. The CIR also embeds
into the implementation of all instruments a number of key principles,
including the requirements to use the most effective, efficient
and simple methods and procedures possible, to use environmental
screening, and consultation of local stakeholders, including civil
society organisations. It also imposes strict limits on
the use of budget support: a clear set of eligibility criteria,
an assessment of the risks and benefits (taking into account countries'
record and progress in democracy, human rights and the rule of
law), and clear conditions against which progress is necessary
before budget support is disbursed.
"The CIR strikes a good balance between the
need to accord the Commission flexibility in implementing the
instruments (for example, to reassign funding without long approval
procedures where a project is not meeting its objectives) and
the need for Member States' to retain oversight of Commission
spending to ensure accountability. The UK sought to limit
the Commission's scope to adopt measures without obtaining Member
States' agreement via management committees, successfully pushing
for the monetary thresholds under which the Commission is empowered
to do so to be reduced (to EUR 5 million and EUR 10 million, for
individual measures and special measures respectively, rather
than EUR 10 million and EUR 30 million). The CIR also enables
the Commission to reassign funds within programmes and adjust
the overall budget for programmes without the agreement of Member
States. The original proposals limited the Commission's
scope to reallocate funding up to 20% of the initial budget, but,
at our insistence, this is now combined with a strict monetary
limit of EUR 10 million to ensure that substantial reallocations
require Member State assent.
"The CIR strengthens the instruments' focus
on monitoring, evaluation and reporting of results. The
Commission must report annually on the instruments, and evaluations
shall be based on OECD principles, will take into account gender
equality, and will be carried out on the basis of "clear,
transparent and, where appropriate, country specific and measurable
indicators." The mid-term review, to be conducted in
2017, will likewise focus on the results achieved, as well as
on financial inputs. The Council and the European Parliament
also have the power to propose that specific evaluations be carried
out. All reports will now be sent to, and discussed in,
Member States' Committees.
"Instrument for Pre-Accession II (IPA II)
"The focus of IPA II remains that of IPA (2007-2013),
which is to support Candidate Countries (Macedonia, Montenegro,
Serbia and Turkey) and Potential Candidate Countries (Albania,
Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo) move towards EU accession.
Iceland remains a Candidate Country but has suspended its accession
negotiations and — unless this situation changes —
will not receive IPA II assistance.
"IPA II builds on the original instrument to
create a more flexible and comprehensive means to support accession.
It is now better structured with the old rigid distinctions between
the IPA's five components replaced by policy areas tailored to
the needs of the beneficiary countries irrespective of their candidate
status. There
is more strategic multi annual programming,
which will be tailored to individual country needs and capacity
and will allow greater flexibility to modify programmes and speed
up implementation. An emphasis on sector programming will increase
coordination of support and improve government ownership. The
IPA tool box will include the possibility to use budget support
wherever appropriate rather than only in "exceptional circumstances".
This is consistent with the way EU financial assistance is managed
in other countries, such as those covered by the European Neighbourhood
Instrument. An important achievement for the UK is the increased
focus on results both through more systematic monitoring and evaluation
within regular programme management and through the introduction
of a performance reserve to reward particular
progress made towards meeting EU membership criteria, and/or the
efficient implementation of pre-accession assistance.
These improvements will be reflected
in the Country Strategy Papers currently under preparation.
"Whilst the core elements of the final IPA II
Regulation are broadly in line with the Commission's original
(December 2011) proposal, the Regulation will no longer be accompanied
by a "Common Strategic Framework" (CSF) due to the European
Parliament's demand that this should take the form of a Delegated
Act. This demand was unacceptable to the UK and other Member
States, who were clear that the CSF should be an Implementing
Act adopted through comitology in the same way as the separate
Country Strategy Papers. The final compromise was to drop the
CSF, include the relevant elements either in the Regulation itself
or in the Country Strategy Papers, and to add to the Regulation
an Annex of indicative programming priorities which could be amended
by delegated act.
"The allocation for IPA II for the period 2014-2020
has been set at €11.699bn.
"Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)
"The DCI — the largest of all the external
instruments — is the EU's primary instrument for delivering
development assistance. In the negotiations on the DCI for 2014-2020,
the UK pushed firmly for the instrument to have a strong poverty
focus. In contrast to the current DCI, the new DCI will be targeted
to the poorest countries, with only Lower and Lower-Middle income
countries with a GDP of less than one percent of global GDP being
automatically eligible for country programmes. Funding can
exceptionally be provided to other countries via bilateral programmes,
but only with the agreement of Member States through committees.
To ensure the most effective use of the funding available, the
instrument now explicitly requires that development assistance
be "differentiated" across recipient countries. This
requires that programme allocations be based not only on a country's
needs and capacity (e.g. to generate or access financial resources
and to absorb development assistance funding), but also its performance
in relation to good governance, gender equality and human rights,
as well as its use of resources. The new DCI also puts emphasis
on the need to ensure aid effectiveness, with programming based
insofar as possible on recipient countries' own development plans
and aimed at supporting accountability.
"As we set out in our previous letter, in the
trilogue negotiations the Presidency successfully blocked the
EP's calls for it to have a role in the programming of the DCI
and other instruments via delegated acts. Under the delegated
acts agreed in the new DCI, the European Parliament will be limited
to being able to veto amendments brought by the Commission to
certain aspects of the Regulation. These areas are explicitly
defined in the Regulation as "non-essential" elements
and include the broad priorities applicable to the geographic,
thematic programmes on "Global Public Goods and Challenges"
(which covers environment and climate change; sustainable energy;
human development; food and nutrition security and sustainable
agriculture; and migration and asylum) and "Civil Society
Organisations and Local Authorities," and a separate Pan-African
programme. The Commission will also be able to amend, via a delegated
act, the indicative financial allocations under the geographic
programmes and the Global Public Goods and Challenges thematic
programme (provided that the initial allocations are not reduced
by more than five percent).
"The allocation for DCI for the period 2014-2020
has been set at €19.7bn.
"Instrument contributing to Security and
Peace (IfSP)
"The proposed new instrument looks very similar
to the current one, its name has changed from instrument for stability
to instrument contributing to security and peace. There is no
increase in the maximum amount permitted for individual Exceptional
Assistance Measures, (i.e. short term measures). This will remain
at €20 million. An upper ceiling of €30 million
was proposed in early discussions. We believe that this ceiling
provides programmes with sufficient resource to be able to achieve
valuable impact in a flexible way, and has been working well under
the current Instrument. Raising this ceiling would not provide
planners with any incentive to factor in cost-effectiveness and
to ensure projects are tightly focussed.
"The maximum duration of an Exceptional Assistance
Measure will remain at 18 months, though this can now be extended
to three years. In the current regulation the extension period
is limited to six months. Extensions would be reported to the
Political and Security Committee (PSC) in advance in order to
provide Member States with an opportunity to assess whether an
extension is necessary in order to consolidate any gains made.
This increased flexibility on extensions seems reasonable to us
as in reality individual Exceptional Assistance Measures often
need to be followed up with further action. Importantly for the
UK, the new Instrument will retain the ability to react rapidly
and flexibly to crises as they arise and will be able to act in
countries and on issues where most needed. The Commission will
provide monthly updates to PSC and report on the Instruments activities
to the European Parliament, but the Parliament will not be consulted
on short term measures, thereby retaining the relatively simple
procedure for accessing funds, or programming.
"The instrument will now be monitored and evaluated
according to detailed Performance Indicators contained in the
Common Implementing Regulations governing all foreign policy instruments
under Heading 4 of the budget. Currently the IfSP is monitored
separately from other Heading 4 instruments. Climate change and
cyber crime are new topics which will be eligible for funding
under article 5 (global threats) — reflecting new trends
in global threats since negotiation of the last instrument. The
Commission put forward a proposal for the High Representative
to be able to spend up to €3 million in situations of extreme
urgency, without recourse to Council. The UK successfully argued
that the involvement of the High Representative in programming
crossed a UK red line on competence grounds, and would reduce
the accountability of the instrument. In line with the current
instrument, the High Representative was not granted this authority.
"The proposal for the new IfS does not contain
any provisions for the use of delegated acts and therefore the
European Parliament has no substantive role to play. Article
3 (short term measures) has been allocated at least 70% of the
budget and Article 4 (long term conflict prevention work) has
9%, leaving 21% for Article 5 (long term — other threats).
We would have liked a slightly higher allocation for Article 5
(22-24%), but one of the EP's main demands was 10% for Article
4 and a compromise was reached in order to resist delegated acts.
Our preference for an increase in Article 5 spending is mainly
due to the potential for EU projects on organised crime and counter
terrorism, with the IfSP the only external instrument that can
fund such activities. We are following up with the Commission,
to ensure that over the following seven years we have maximum
influence over long term projects.
"The allocation for IfSP for the period 2014-2020
has been set at €2.3bn.
"European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)
"The ENI provides funding to the European Neighbourhood
countries, essentially through bilateral, regional and cross border
cooperation programmes, to bring tangible benefits in areas such
as democracy and human rights, the rule of law, good governance
and sustainable development. During negotiations, the UK successfully
pressed, in the face of opposition, for changes to the instrument
which link EU funding more closely with the progress a partner
makes in implementing political and economic reforms. In keeping
with our approach to the 2011 review of the European Neighbourhood
Policy this was a key UK objective as a means of increasing the
effectiveness of EU funding in incentivising such reform.
"The new regulation will be linked to reform
in three ways; baseline allocations to each country in the Neighbourhood
will take into account their commitment and progress on reform;
those baseline allocations can increase or decrease by up to 10%
according to subsequent progress on reform; and 10% of the ENI
budget is put aside as a top up fund for the best performers on
reform. The changes the UK secured, working with like minded Member
States, help to broaden the range of options for responding to
positive and negative trends in Europe's Neighbourhood. The possibilities
for increasing or reducing financial assistance allow the EU to
send political messages of support or concern, while increasing
funds to those engaging seriously on a reform agenda makes those
funds more likely to deliver value for money for the EU taxpayer.
"This represents a significant shift in the
EU's approach to allocating funding in its Neighbourhood. Further
work will be required to help enhance the impact of linking funding
to progress on reform, not least in terms of effective public
messaging by the institutions. We will continue to work on this
with like-minded Member States with whom we advanced this agenda
in negotiations.
"The allocation for ENI for the period 2014-2020
has been set at €15.4bn.
"Partnership Instrument (PI)
"The Partnership Instrument (PI) builds upon
the Instrument for Industrialised Countries (ICI) that operated
in 2007-2013, but, due to its differing and more ambitious scope,
is not a direct replacement. The UK was integral to early discussions
with the Commission on the need for an instrument that is non-ODA,
and has global scope to deepen relationships with non-developing
countries, particularly on trade, growth and investment, and on
global challenges such as climate change. Due to early UK lobbying
and involvement, the Commission's proposal was largely acceptable
in terms of the scope and focus of the instrument.
"There was some initial scepticism about the
instrument, from some Member States and from the European Parliament,
but we successfully worked to raise support for it. This was partly
as a response to the 'graduation' of nineteen countries from the
Development Cooperation Instrument, including emerging economies
such as China, Brazil and India, and the need for increases in
non-development cooperation with them.
"The instrument therefore provides for measures
to be undertaken in four key areas:
— "Supporting EU bilateral and regional
cooperation on challenges of global concern, particularly climate
change
— "Implementing the external dimension
of Europe 2020, the EU's strategy for smart sustainable growth
— "Improving access to partner countries'
markets and boosting opportunities for EU companies.
— "Public diplomacy, people-to-people
contacts and think-tank cooperation.
"This represents a considerable increase in
ambition over the much smaller ICI instrument, with, for the first
time in EU external instruments, a clear focus on the promotion
of the EU's interests, particularly in trade, as well as mutual
interests with partner countries.
"We therefore consider that the PI will be a
flexible, agile instrument, working very much in areas of EU activity
that actively promote UK interests in the world. While the level
of financing will not allow for a step-change in cooperation with
third countries, we do consider it to be sufficient to have a
positive impact in these key areas.
"The allocation for PI for the period 2014-2020
has been set at €0.95bn.
"European Instrument for Democracy and Human
Rights (EIDHR)
"The EIDHR's objectives closely match the UK's
own national human rights priorities, including abolition of the
death penalty, prevention of torture and freedom of expression,
funding projects in countries of concern. The EIDHR can
be used to grant aid where no EU established development cooperation
exists and can intervene without the agreement of the governments
of countries in which it operates (through social networks, communication
platforms, the media and the press). Assistance under EIDHR
complements other tools used to implement EU policies for democracy
and human rights. These range from political dialogue and diplomatic
initiatives to various instruments for financial and technical
cooperation, including the Development Co-operation Instrument
and European Neighbourhood Partners Initiative. It also complements
the more crisis-related interventions of the Instrument for Stability.
"With respect to the new EIDHR, we consider
that the priorities which are amendable by delegated act are already
defined in sufficiently broad terms. As such, our view is that
the delegated power afforded to the EP in this case is a narrow
one, limited only to amending an already exhaustive list of human
rights priorities. We anticipate that its inclusion will have
minimal effect on the operation of the EIDHR.
"The allocation for EIDHR for the period 2014-2020
has been set at €1.3bn.
"Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
(INSC)
"The INSC is part of the framework devised for
the planning of cooperation and provision of assistance aimed
at supporting the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety,
radiation protection and the application of efficient and effective
safeguards of nuclear material in third countries.
"While undoubtedly increasing the ability of
third country states to manage nuclear safety, there are some
doubts among EU Member States, including the UK, as to whether
the instrument is the best way of achieving it. Not least
because the majority of the countries originally identified by
the Commission for programmes of work were emerging civil nuclear
power states — and are therefore in a good position to fund
their own development. Additionally, attention was given
to the Ukraine (for Chernobyl) but as there are other programmes
and revenue streams in place it no longer seems appropriate to
provide the same level of additional assistance through this instrument
as was provided by its predecessors. It was for this reason
the UK successfully argued for the original commission proposal
of the budget of the INSC to be cut by over €250m.
"It is the view of DECC and the Office of Nuclear
Regulation that the projects that remain part of this instrument
are worthwhile and the funding provided is proportionate to the
level of benefits to be gained. That said, to ensure that
this remains the case the instrument has provisions contained
within it that allow Member States to re-consider the programmes
of work to be delivered through the Instrument.
"The allocation for INSC for the period 2014-2020
has been set at €200m.
"Greenland Instrument
"The Greenland Instrument is a revised proposal
for a partnership, between the EU, Greenland and Denmark to facilitate
consultation and policy dialogue in areas such as energy, climate
change and environment, natural resources, maritime transport,
research and innovation and Arctic issues. Greenland is becoming
increasingly important in a geo-political context and the partnership
seeks to expand and diversify Greenland's economy and its range
of co-operation with the EU, objectives the UK would broadly support.
As an observer to the Arctic Council, the UK supports in general
terms the Council's goals in areas such as pollution prevention
agreements and standards, which will require new expertise and
capacity-building in Greenland.
"The allocation for Greenland Instrument for
the period 2014-2020 has been set at €217m."
42 See headnote: HC 83-xxvi (2013-14), chapter 4 (8
January 2014). Back
| 
