19 EU Special Representative for the
Middle East Peace Process
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| Council Decision extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process
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| Legal base | Articles 28, 31(2) and 33 TEU; QMV
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 30 January 2014
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| Previous Committee Reports | HC 83-xxvii (2013-14), chapter 10 (15 January 2014); also see (35061) —: HC 83-vii (2013-14), chapter 15 (26 June 2013); also see (32601) — and (32982) —: HC 428-xlvii (2010-12), chapter 23 (18 January 2012), HC 428-xxxv (2010-12), chapter 4 (7 September 2011), HC 428-xxxiii (2010-12), chapter 5 (13 July 2011) and HC 428-xxvi (2010-12), chapter 4 (11 May 2011)
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| Discussion in Council | January 2014
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared; further information requested (reported to the House on 15 January 2014); further information provided and requested
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Background
19.1 EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) were established
under Article 18 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. They are appointed
by the Council through the legal act of a Council Decision (formerly
a Joint Action) where the Council agrees that an additional EU
presence on the ground is needed to deliver the political objectives
of the Union. Their purpose is to represent the EU in troubled
regions and countries and to play an active part in promoting
the interests and the policies of the EU.
19.2 The substance of the mandate depends on the
political context of the deployment. Some provide, inter alia,
a political backing to an CSDP operation; others focus on carrying
out or contributing to developing an EU policy. Some EUSRs are
resident in their country or region of activity; others work on
a travelling basis from Brussels.
19.3 All EUSRs carry out their duties under the authority
and operational direction of the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR; Baroness Catherine
Ashton). Each is financed out of the CFSP budget. In addition,
Member States also contribute regularly through, for example,
seconding some of the EUSR's staff members.
19.4 After the coming into force of the Treaty of
Lisbon and the establishment of the European External Action Service,
the HR now has the sole right of initiative for the establishment
of EUSRs and also proposes the person to occupy the post. Most
were previously senior national diplomats or active politicians.
The Council continues formally to appoint EUSRs, who report back
through the Political and Security Committee (PSC),[81]
including meeting the PSC on a regular basis.
The EUSR to Middle East Peace Process (MEPP)
19.5 The incumbent, Dr Andreas Reinicke, was appointed
in February 2012: a German diplomat with more than 25 years experience,
who had devoted most of his career to the Middle East with deep
and extensive knowledge about the MEPP.
19.6 The Council Decision that the Committee considered
last June extended Dr Reinicke's mandate from 30 June 2013 until
30 June 2014, with a provision to review developments on the ground
between then and 31 December 2013. At that time the Minister
for Europe (Mr David Lidington) noted that efforts to re-launch
the peace process, led by the United States, were ongoing. Ending
the mandate at this time would, the Minister said, send a contradictory
message.
19.7 Suggesting that it would be wrong to end the
mandate at that point clearly indicated that the question of when
to do so would be uppermost over the following six months. We
presumed that the Minister would inform the Committee of the outcome
of the review, and his views on its findings and recommendations.[82]
19.8 The Council Decision that we considered in January
repealed the previous Council Decision 2013/350/CFSP, and confirmed
that future representation would be reviewed before the end of
the current time-frame for the peace talks, in May 2014. This
was, the Minister for Europe explained, the result of the decision
taken by the PSC on 27 November 2013, at the HR's request, to
repeal the EUSR/MEPP mandate from 1 January 2014 — his roles
and responsibilities then being transferred to Helga Schmidt,
EEAS Deputy Secretary General, acting as the HR's envoy and reporting
directly to Member States through the PSC. The Minister supported
the proposal, judging that this would continue the UK objective
of an active and efficient EU contribution to the ongoing negotiations,
which aimed to achieve a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict: the EU was playing an active role, including through
the December FAC conclusions,[83]
which "put forward an unprecedented package of support in
the form of 'Special Privileged Partnerships' offered to both
parties in the event of a final status agreement".
Our assessment
19.9 The Minister drew attention to the scrutiny
reserve that had been placed on this Council Decision in Brussels.
But, we noted, the Minister was presenting the Committee with
a fait accompli: the substantive decision had already
been taken and implemented, and had come before the Committee
only because a Council Decision was necessary formally to end
this mandate. Moreover, contrary to our clearly-expressed understanding,
we had heard nothing from the Minister since June 2013. We therefore
asked him to explain why he had not previously provided us with
information about the way matters were developing, and why had
it taken him from 27 November 2013 until 6 January 2014 to tell
us about this proposal and say why he now supported it.
19.10 We asked the Minister to comment on reports
in a reputable newspaper[84]
that this proposal was made "in the face of fierce opposition
from the member states" — this because (the article
suggested) the proposal was regarded as prejudging the outcome
of a general review currently underway of EUSR roles. We noted
that we had been in regular correspondence with him on this matter:
the Minister has assured us that this review is focussed on the
guidelines governing the EUSRs' terms and conditions of service;
he would advise us of the outcome, but would not deposit it for
scrutiny prior to adoption. In this instance, we asked the Minister
to confirm that there were no proposals under discussion for the
wholesale integration of EUSR posts into the EEAS — one
consequence being that Member States would no longer be able to
approve the mandate of what were effectively the Council's special
envoys to a variety of trouble spots affecting EU and national
interests, or the job holder.
19.11 We also noted that, at the time of writing,
the prospects for any sort of final settlement by May 2014 were
not encouraging. In any event, we asked the Minister to write
to the Committee, before any decision was taken and no later than
before the Easter recess, to outline what options regarding the
nature of the EU's engagement on the peace process, in the run
up to May 2014, were then under active consideration; and to provide
his assessment of the state of play in the peace talks, and the
implications at that time for EU's longer-term involvement, particularly
in the area of security cooperation (e.g. for the existing and
any further prospective CSDP missions).[85]
The Minister's letter of 30 January 2014
19.12 The Minister says that he will respond to the
broader question on the EU's engagement on the peace process in
more detail in a separate letter as requested before the Easter
recess.
19.13 The Minister then continues thus:
"At present, the EU's engagement on the
MEPP has been focussed on building a positive atmosphere around
the ongoing negotiations. At December's Foreign Affairs Council,
Conclusions were agreed which set out an offer of an "unprecedented
package" of support for both parties in the case of a final
status agreement: an offer which was warmly welcomed by both parties.
At present the EEAS, in close consultation with Member States,
is drawing up ideas for what this package of incentives might
consist of. At the FAC on 20 January the Foreign Secretary encouraged
the EEAS to focus on a small number of major incentives that meet
the needs of both parties, accompanied by a far reaching communications
strategy."
19.14 With regard to the Committee's "process"
questions, the Minister says;
"I understand your concerns about staying
informed as discussions progressed on the EUSR mandate.
Your conclusions of 26 June 2013 stated that you wished to be
updated when the six month review of the mandate took place, before
31 December 2013. If this had been published, I would of course
have informed you at that stage of the outcome and my views on
its findings and recommendations as requested.
"However, the EEAS, taking forward the EUSR
Guidelines Review at the same time, assessed that the roles and
responsibilities of the EUSR to the MEPP could in this case be
effectively taken forward by DSG Helga Schmidt, a senior EEAS
official reporting directly to the Political and Security Committee
(PSC).
"UK Ministers were consulted in late November
on the future of EU representation on the MEPP, and took the view
that we would agree to repeal the mandate, providing there was
a consensus, and the matter would be kept under review. We therefore
agreed with the option put forward by the EEAS on 27 November
when the mandate was considered at the PSC. The Council agreed
that the mandate could be rescinded as long as we returned to
this matter in due course. Given the consensus on the issue,
the formal review of the mandate which would have taken place
in the following month was no longer necessary.
"As the Committee is aware from separate
correspondence, work is beginning in Brussels on the review of
the 2007 Guidelines on the appointment, mandate and financing
of EUSRs. The first discussion of the new EEAS draft EUSR
Guidelines (which came out earlier than anticipated) took place
on 10 January in the PSC, during which the UK underlined the importance
of increasing the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability
of the current EUSR system. Through the revision of the EUSR guidelines
we are working for a greater role for the Council. However, in
the case of the EUSR MEPP as the Council was in agreement with
the EEAS, a decision was taken to terminate the mandate without
the need for undertaking a formal review."
19.15 As to why it took from 27 November until 6
January for the proposal to come before scrutiny, the Minister
says:
"Once the proposal was agreed in principle
at PSC on 27 November, the EEAS drafted the Council Decision which
was then discussed and ultimately agreed at a Relex meeting on
9 December 2013. The final version of the proposal became available
at this point, after which we undertook to provide a detailed
submission to the Committee. The usual ten day deadline from the
deposit of the Council Decision should have been 23 December.
Due to Parliamentary recess from 19 December until 6 January
we were unable to prepare a comprehensive Explanatory Memorandum
before recess. It was therefore submitted in time for the return
from recess at the beginning of the New Year."
19.16 The Minister does not respond to the questions
raised in paragraph 19.10, viz., that this proposal was made "in
the face of fierce opposition from the member states", and
if there were proposals under discussion as part of the review
of EUSR role and responsibilities for the wholesale integration
of EUSR posts into the EEAS.
Conclusion
19.17 The Minister's response on the "process"
issues is unconvincing. The Committee is continually assured
of his commitment to the effective scrutiny of CSDP/CFSP and his
support for the Committee's aim of enhancing the role of Parliament
in monitoring CSDP/CFSP activity. Yet were he and his officials
so minded, we see no reason why the Committee could not have been
informed about the developments at the end of November and then
provided with the formal outcome in time for it to be scrutinised
prior to adoption. The Committee is frequently asked to deal
with matters at very short notice, and gladly does so. Its last
meeting before the Christmas recess was on 18 December 2013:
the final version of the proposal having become available on 9
December 2013, the Minister could have provided an EM in time
for that meeting.
19.18 His failure to respond to the "policy"
questions is equally disappointing. The Minister will be as aware
as we are of the debate around the EUSR's role, and place within
CSDP, ever since the changes wrought by the Lisbon Treaty.[86]
This manifested itself in mid-2013, in the way in which a number
of annual EUSR mandate extensions were handled: the HR essentially
keeping the PSC and thus Member States in the dark until the last
minute before bringing forward a number of proposals that were
widely interpreted as prompted by her vision of the EUSR role
being taken over by the EEAS —thus removing the elements
of control that Member States, who are supposedly in charge of
CSDP/CFSP, currently have.
19.19 Now, in addition to the ending of this mandate:
— on 31 January, it was announced that
the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, Philippe
Lefort, would end his mandate on 31 January 2014. The announcement
included the following:
'I would like to thank Ambassador Lefort for
his hard work, energy, and dedication as co- Chair of the Geneva
International Discussions and as EU Special Representative for
the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia,' said
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy/Vice-President of the Commission Catherine Ashton. 'Philippe
has worked with patience and objectivity to help the parties to
the conflicts resolve their differences, and has earned their
trust. I look to them to place similar trust in his successor.'
"The EU remains firmly committed to conflict
resolution in the South Caucasus, including through its co-chairmanship
of the Geneva International Discussion and its active support
for the OSCE-led Minsk Group peace process.
"The EU will appoint a successor to Philippe
Lefort in the coming weeks to ensure continuity in this vital
role."
— commenting on this development, European
Voice said that "[d]iplomatic sources and others active
in the Caucasus speak of a poor relationship between Ashton and
Lefort"; of Lefort, "who had previously served as ambassador
to Georgia, [having] even bigger problems in communication with
the Georgians"; of Member States feeling "that it was
important to signal support for Georgia's decision to strike political
and trade agreements with the EU in November, as well as for conflict
resolution in the region"; and of "Georgia's ambition
to move closer to the EU [being] seen as leaving it vulnerable
to additional pressure from Russia".[87]
— on 6 February 2014, European Voice
carried news of the resignation of Patricia Flor as the EUSR to
central Asia as of 28 February, four months before her mandate
ends, to return to the German foreign ministry; noting that "the
responsibilities associated with the post, which was created in
2005, will be assumed by officials in the European External Action
Service". The article further notes that, since assuming
her mandate in June 2012, while limited geographically to five
post-Soviet states — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — its significance has grown
"with the looming withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan,
which is a neighbour of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan".[88]
19.20 The situation is thus all the more confusing.
The Minister still does not explain why what he was opposed to
in June made sense in November. As the Centre for European Policy
Studies paper cited in footnote 6 states:
"to withdraw the EUSR before the end of his
agreed mandate at the very moment the peace process has regained
some momentum raises questions about the EU's real commitment
to the peace process, even though the EU is the largest contributor
of financial assistance to that region. Although Ashton has announced
that the EU's seat at the Quartet meetings (comprising the US,
the Russian Federation, the EU and the UN) will be filled by a
highly respected and competent figure (her Deputy Secretary General
for Political Affairs), the visibility and accessibility of the
EU as a foreign policy interlocutor on the ground will suffer,
with the Deputy Secretary General having many other tasks to attend
to."
19.21 More generally, the wider debate around
who performs this "special envoy" function in a post-Lisbon
world is plainly ongoing. We have the strong impression that
either Member States are again being kept in the dark by the HR
and EEAS until the news is broken; or the Minister is aware of
developments that could carry major implications for EU external
action and those charged with promoting and implementing it, whereas
the House has to rely upon press reports and academic studies.
19.22 We therefore ask the Minister:
— to clarify who is to assume the EUSR
roles that have suddenly become vacant; and
— if it is proposed that it should be
someone in the EEAS, to explain how, along with his or her present
responsibilities, he or she will provide the same degree of visibility
and accessibility on the ground as a "free-standing"
EUSR, and how Member States are to retain an appropriate degree
of oversight and control of his or her activities.
19.23 We also again ask the Minister to respond
to our earlier request (c.f. paragraph 19.10 above) and to explain
to us what, more generally, is going on, not just with the guidelines
governing the EUSRs' terms and conditions of service but with
regard to the basic issue of their role and to whom they will
continue to be responsible.
19.24 We would also like to know precisely when
he expects to be able to provide us with details of the outcome
of the review, and what the timing implications then are for this
year's "mandate renewal" round.
19.25 In the meantime, we are also drawing this
chapter of our Report to the attention of the Foreign Affairs
Committee.
81 The committee of ambassador-level officials from
national delegations who, by virtue of article 38 TEU, under the
authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy (HR) and the Council, monitor the international situation
in areas covered by the CFSP and exercise political control and
strategic direction of crisis management operations, as set out
in article 43 TEU. The chair is nominated by the HR. Back
82
For full information, see (35061) -: HC 83-vii (2013-14), chapter
15 (26 June 2013). Back
83
Which are reproduced at the annex to our previous Report: see
HC 83-xxvii (2013-14), chapter 10 (15 January 2014). Back
84
European Voice of 19 December
2013 - 8 January 2014, p.8. Back
85
See HC 83-xxvii (2013-14), chapter 10 (15 January 2014) for full
details. Back
86
For a short review, see the EU Special Representative: A dying
breed?, by Erwan Fouéré, published on 13 December
2013 by the Centre for European Policy Studies (www.ceps.eu/ceps/dld/8748/pdfý). Back
87
See http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/special-envoy-to-the-caucasus-steps-down/79472.aspx. Back
88
See http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/eusr-to-central-asia-resigns/79569.aspx. Back
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