15 EU military operation in the Central
African Republic (EUFOR RCA) and the transfer of prisoners
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| Council Decision on the signing and conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Central African Republic concerning the detailed arrangements for the transfer to the Central African Republic of persons detained by the European Union military operation (EUFOR RCA) in the course of carrying out its mandate, and concerning the guarantees applicable to such persons
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| Legal base | Article 37 TEU in conjunction with Article 218(5) and (6) TFEU; unanimity
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| Documents originated | —
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| Deposited in Parliament | —
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 19 March 2014
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (35827) — and (35828) —:HC 83-xxxv (2013-14) chapter 18 (5 March 2014) and (35747) —: HC-xxxi (2013-14), chapter 14 (5 February 2014)
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Discussion in Council | and HC 83-xxxv (2013-14) chapter 16 (5 March 2014)
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
15.1 The background to Council Decision 2014/73/CFSP
of 10 February 2014, establishing EUFOR RCA, and two subsequent
Council Decisions on launching and on the status in the Central
African Republic of the mission, is set out in our Reports under
reference.[49]
15.2 In sum, Major General Philippe Pontiès
was designated as Operation Commander and Larissa as the EU Head
Quarters, with a draft reference amount for the budget of €39.6
million: EUFOR RCA (which stems from UN Security Council resolution
2134 of 28 January) will provide temporary support, for a period
of up to six-months, to help achieve a secure environment in the
Bangui area. It will consist of up to a Battalion size force to
allow for adequate logistical support and force protection. Within
its area of operations, EUFOR RCA would contribute to international
and regional efforts, i.e., the AU peace-keeping force MISCA,
to protect the populations most at risk and to enable the free
movement of civilians, endeavouring to create the conditions required
in order to provide humanitarian aid for those who need it and
working alongside MISCA where possible to contribute to their
capacity, and also provide some advisory support.
15.3 Via Operation Sangaris, some 1,600 French troops
have been deployed in the CAR since early December on a mission
to stem fighting between predominantly Muslim militants, known
as the ex-Seléka,[50]
and bands of Christian vigilantes, the Anti-balaka.[51]
The French Parliament voted on 25 February to extend indefinitely
the country's military intervention in the CAR and plans to increase
it to 2,000 troops in the coming weeks.
15.4 At the time of our most recent Reports, the
Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) noted that long-term
peace in CAR would require a strong and sustainable constitutional
government. The transitional government in Bangui was working
with the EU towards implementing the political process, including
the holding of free and fair elections by February 2015, to promote
and protect human rights, and to support the stabilisation of
the security situation. Politically, the election of Catherine
Samba-Panza as Head of State of the Transition Government on the
20 January was a positive first step along the path to political
stability.
15.5 So far as EUFOR RCA was concerned, the Minister
acknowledged that the launch of EU military operations could be,
and had previously been, hampered by the time taken to complete
negotiations with local authorities, particularly if local authorities
have limited capacity or effectiveness to respond appropriately.
However engagement with the transitional government in CAR had,
so far, proceeded smoothly. Given the fragile situation in the
capital, the continued instability and the dire humanitarian situation,
the aim was for the Operation to start deploying by the end of
March as a matter of urgency.[52]
Our assessment
15.6 Three months from launch, as the Minister noted,
there will be an assessment by the Political and Security Committee
(PSC)[53] of the Operation's
progress. We presumed that it will be caveated in such a way
that will prevent its being deposited: in which case, we asked
the Minister to provide us with an unclassified summary and his
views on it, and especially on the capacity of the mission to
fulfil its brief in the allotted six months, and in particular
its Key Tasks, which the Minister described thus:
"The key tasks of EUFOR RCA are: stabilisation
through providing a safe and secure environment and safe areas
for vulnerable parts of the population; provision of security
at Bangui airport; supporting the provision of humanitarian assistance;
setting the conditions for handover to MISCA, including capacity
building and logistic support. The duration of the EUFOR mission
is limited to 4-6 months from the establishment of Full Operating
Capability Capability (FOC, which should be reached 30 days after
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is declared). This will provide
enough time to improve security in the area of operations, improve
the stability and freedom of movement for humanitarian actors
within the area of operations, and enable enough time for a transfer
of authority to MISCA before the end date, thus allowing for a
transition period for monitoring and mentoring. The end state
is the handover of EUFOR RCA's area of operations to MISCA within
6 months after the establishment of FOC. The exit strategy is
measured by the OpCdr[54]
against criteria of Security, Stability and MISCA's readiness
to assume responsibility: these will define mission success, although
mission termination is strictly bounded by the mandated end date
(FOC+6 months)."[55]
The draft Council Decision
15.7 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 19 March 2014,
the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) explains that the
Transfer Agreement that will be annexed to this Council Decision
sets out detailed arrangements for the transfer to CAR of persons
detained by the EUFOR RCA in the course of carrying out its mandate,
and outlines the guarantees and human rights assurances applicable
to such persons. It is, he says, the final operational and legal
requirement for ensuring that, once EUFOR RCA is launched, it
will operate as effectively as possible, contributing to a secure
the environment in the Bangui district.
15.8 The Minister notes that the draft Council Decision
on the signing of the transfer agreement is expected to be laid
before an EU Council meeting in the next few weeks.
15.9 He continues as follows:
"The EU hopes to have the Transfer Agreement
in place before the Operation launch. Insufficient force generation
has meant that the Council did not launch the EUFOR CAR CSDP Operation
on 17 March 2014 as we had anticipated. The High Representative
and Operation Commander have appealed to Member States to come
forward with more offers of support to EUFOR CAR, with another
Force Generation Conference likely soon, in order to address the
key shortfalls in logistics (e.g. Strategic air lift) and key
enablers (e.g. intelligence capabilities). However, failing to
agree the Transfer Agreement ahead of the launch will not prejudice
the Operation. EUFOR will still be able to arrest and detain people.
Yet without the Transfer Agreement in place, EUFOR would be forced
to release detained individuals unless: a) they can be transferred
to the French Operation Sangaris or b) judicial arrangements for
individual cases can be made with CAR authorities. The alternative
is to operate under orders not to detain people until a transfer
agreement comes into force, although this could hamper efforts
on the ground. As such, we hope to conclude and agree the Transfer
Agreement as soon as possible to coincide with the Operation launch."
15.10 Finally, the Minister says, having just been
agreed with CAR authorities, the Transfer Agreement will now go
back to the RELEX working group to be agreed before it is seen
by a Council: "We will update you on its progress, along
with the launch of the operation in due course".
The Minister's letter of 19 March 2014
15.11 The Minister begins by thanking the Committee
for "the quick work in clearing the Council decision to launch
Operation EUFOR RCA", and that he wishes to "also pass
on the thanks of EU partners for the timely manner in which your
Committee cleared this".
15.12 The Minister continues as follows:
"Following the initial Force Generation Conference
of 25 February, there have been two more conferences held on the
5 and 13 March. The Operational Commander (OpComdr) and the High
Representative have also written to Member States to request further
contributions. The key shortfalls are infantry units, logistics
(e.g. strategic air lift) and key enablers (e.g. intelligence
capabilities) to be able to launch the operation and reach initial
operating capability (IOC). Due to the current shortfalls, the
OpComdr advised the High Representative and Member States that
there were not enough forces in place to launch the mission for
the target date of 17 March (Foreign Affairs Council). We expect
a further Conference to be announced soon.
"As you know, we have already offered further
C17 support to the French on a bilateral basis. MoD is seeking
more detailed information on the airlift requirements in order
to determine if we are able to support EUFOR. I will update the
Committee in due course (including the final copy of the Council
Decision to launch the Operation).
"While there are signs of some improvement in
the security environment, the situation remains fragile and gaining
an accurate picture continues to prove challenging. Levels of
inter-religious violence and tensions are still high and the grave
humanitarian situation will likely worsen with the onset of the
rainy season. We therefore remain concerned about the situation
in CAR and are clear that a political process leading to a sustainable
constitutional government is the only long-term solution in CAR.
It is key that we continue to support the AU, EU and UN efforts
to increase security to create the environment for the necessary
humanitarian and political improvements.
"The UN Security Council mandated the AU's MISCA
force alongside a French deployment in December 2013 and supporting
this is our immediate focus. However the Secretary General
issued a report earlier this month calling for the immediate authorisation
of a UN Mission, to take over leadership of security efforts from
the AU mission in September. We are considering the recommendations
carefully, including to ensure the international response is correctly
configured and planned to tackle the violence."[56]
Conclusion
15.13 Plainly, though the EU has now gone through
all the stages, if it is still lacking infantry units, strategic
air lift and key enablers such as intelligence capabilities, the
Mission is very much in the balance — notwithstanding the
very disturbing reports from BBC and other correspondents on the
ground about the activities of the Anti-balaka militias.
15.14 In its Council Conclusions, the 17 March
FAC says that it "stresses the need to speed up work on the
preparation of the CSDP-EUFOR CAR operation so that it can be
launched quickly in accordance with the commitments undertaken
by the European Union".[57]
Nevertheless, on Tuesday 18 March, the respected Euractiv
reported that:
— the Foreign Minister of France, Laurent
Fabius said:
"I reminded all my colleagues yesterday
that Europe committed itself and as of yet has not lived up to
its word. I therefore asked them to make more of an effort";
— in a joint communiqué, Fabius,
and Minister of Defence, Jean-Yves Le Drian, called on their counterparts
in Europe to turn words into action, stating that:
"the EU committed itself on 10 February
to deploy a military operation in order to support international
efforts and stabilise the situation in the Central African Republic.
To this day, despite the contribution of some member states, one
cannot but notice that Europe has not done enough", and adding
that:
"if greater efforts are not made soon, the
mission originally planned for next week will not be launched.
The EU must assume its responsibilities in relation to international
security. France calls on its partners to do what it takes."[58]
15.15 We therefore keenly await the Minister's
promised update.
15.16 In the meantime, we now clear the draft
Council Decision on the transfer agreement.
Annex: 17 March 2014 Foreign
Affairs Council Conclusions on the Central African Republic~
"1. The security and humanitarian crisis in
the Central African Republic (CAR) remains a matter of deep concern,
despite the relative stabilisation of the situation in Bangui
and in the areas in which the international forces are deployed.
The European Union (EU) reaffirms the concerns it expressed in
previous Council conclusions on 20 January and 10 February 2014.
It remains concerned about the risk of the Central African conflict
having an effect on the neighbouring countries and calls for the
integrity of the country to be respected. The EU intends to maintain
its mobilisation, in coordination and cooperation with other international
actors, in relation to all dimensions of the crisis, within the
framework of an overall approach comprising actions in the humanitarian
(respecting the principles of humanitarian action), political
and stabilisation spheres and actions to promote development.
"2. The EU remains extremely concerned about
the humanitarian impact of the crisis in the Central African Republic,
which persists despite the regional and international efforts
deployed on the ground. The survival conditions of the population
remain precarious, particularly in the interior of the country
where humanitarian access remains difficult. The EU is particularly
concerned about the security threats to the civil population and
about the consequences, in particular humanitarian, of mass forced
departures of Central Africans and migrants, in particular Muslims,
mainly towards Chad, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the Republic of the Congo. The EU reaffirms its commitment
to the CAR and calls on the international community to increase
its funding for the populations affected by the crisis, both within
the CAR and in the neighbouring countries.
"3. The EU encourages the Central African transitional
authorities to continue the political transition process and carry
on with the preparation of elections. In particular, it urges
the authorities to focus their efforts on combating impunity and
recalls that the perpetrators of violations must answer for their
crimes in court. The EU welcomes the decision of the Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court to initiate a preliminary
examination of the situation in the CAR, which is a party to the
Rome Statute, as well as the work of the International Commission
of Inquiry established by United Nations Security Council Resolution
2127 (2013). The EU calls on the transitional authorities to continue
their efforts to restore the rule of law. To achieve that objective,
it is essential to restore security, re-establish the administration
and introduce rules for economic good governance; interfaith dialogue
and inter-community mediation are also vital. The EU reiterates
its commitment to accompany the transitional authorities along
this path, in cooperation with other international partners. It
welcomes in particular the commitment to stabilising the country
made by the African Union and neighbouring countries at the military,
humanitarian, political and financial levels.
"4. Following the adoption of the Decision of
the Council of the European Union of 10 February 2014 authorising
the establishment of the CSDP military operation EUFOR RCA as
laid down in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2134,
the Council approves the Operations Plan and the Rules of Engagement.
The Council stresses the need to speed up work on the preparation
of the CSDP-EUFOR CAR operation so that it can be launched quickly
in accordance with the commitments undertaken by the European
Union.
"5. By providing temporary support for a maximum
period of six months, this transitional military operation will
contribute to providing a secure environment in the Bangui area,
with a view to handing over to MISCA, the African Union operation,
or to a UN peacekeeping mission.
"6. The EU welcomes the report by the United
Nations Secretary-General of 3 March 2014 (S/2014/142), notably
the recommendation to authorise as soon as possible the deployment
of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, following a request
to that end from the Central African authorities, the aim being,
in particular, to enhance the protection of the civilian population,
to accompany the transition process, including the holding of
elections by February 2015 at the latest, to support the protection
of human rights and international humanitarian rights and the
fight against impunity and to contribute to restoring the essential
functions of the State. The EU underlines the importance of maintaining
financial and logistical support for MISCA until the possible
deployment of a United Nations mission. In this context, it reaffirms
its commitment, financial and otherwise, to MISCA and calls for
the urgent mobilisation of the resources announced at the donors'
conference to support MISCA, organised by the African Union on
1 February 2014."[59]
49 See headnote. Back
50
Séléka was an alliance of rebel militia factions
that overthrew the Central African Republic government on March
24, 2013. Nearly all the members of Séléka are Muslim. Back
51
The term used to refer to the Christian militias formed after
the rise to power of the Seléka; Anti-balaka means "anti-machete"
or "anti-sword" in the local Sango and Mandja languages. Back
52
See our Reports of 5 March under reference for fuller detail. Back
53
The committee of ambassador-level officials from national delegations
who, by virtue of article 38 TEU, under the authority of the High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and
the Council, monitor the international situation in areas covered
by the CFSP and exercise political control and strategic direction
of crisis management operations, as set out in article 43 TEU.
The chair is nominated by the High Representative. Back
54
Operations Commander. Back
55
See headnote: HC 83-xxxv (2013-14), chapter 18 (5 March 2014). Back
56
http://www.euractiv.com/development-policy/eu-mission-central-african-repub-news-534140. Back
57
See the annex to this chapter of our Report for the full Council
Conclusions. Back
58
See http://www.euractiv.com/future-eu/france-frustrated-europe-shortco-news-534215. Back
59
See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141614.pdf. Back
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