Documents considered by the Committee on 26 March 2014 - European Scrutiny Committee Contents


16 EU training of Malian security forces

(35889)

Council Decision on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali)

  
Legal baseArticles 28, 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
DepartmentForeign and Commonwealth Office
Basis of considerationMinister's letter of 3 January 2014 and EM of 21 March 2014
Previous Committee ReportNone: but see (34664) —: HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 17 (3 July 2013) and HC 86-xxxii (2012-13), chapter 14 (13 February 2013); also see (34646): HC 86-xxxi (2012-13), chapter 13 (6 February 2013) and (34550)—: HC 86-xxv (2012-13), chapter 2 (19 December 2012)
Discussion in Council12 February 2013
Committee's assessmentPolitically important
Committee's decisionCleared

Background

16.1 In the words of the current House of Commons Library research paper:

"Mali has been in crisis since March 2012, when the military overthrew the government of Amadou Toumani Touré. Within weeks of the coup, a coalition of separatist Tuareg rebels and militant Islamist armed groups with links to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb pushed the national army out of the north of the country. The coalition split up quickly, leaving the militant Islamists largely in control. A weak and ineffective transitional government has been in existence in the south of the country since April but the north remained beyond its control. In late 2012, it was agreed to create a military intervention force, under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which would attempt to retake the north, but it was not expected to be battle-ready until September 2013. At the same time, political negotiations began to try and draw parts of the rebel coalition into a political process. However, on 9 January 2013, a sudden military push southwards by rebels appeared to open up the possibility that the entire country might fall to them in the near future. This provoked an urgent French military intervention from 11 January onwards to stop the rebel advance and, indeed, roll it back. This is being achieved. However, the rebels are re-grouping and will turn to insurgency.

"Concerns are being raised about the need for French and Malian forces to uphold humanitarian and human rights law during the current military operation in Mali. Malian forces have been accused of serious human rights abuses. As the ECOWAS force, known as AFISMA, assembles and deploys, these concerns will extend to it as well. The agreed EU training mission that has been agreed, along with the UK training initiative for Anglophone troops involved, will need to respond to such concerns. The UK is not currently in a combat role in Mali, although some worry about gradual 'mission creep'."[60]

16.2 The Council Decision establishing EUTM Mali was debated in European Committee B on 16 January.[61] That Council Decision laid down the Mission's parameters: non-involvement in combat operations; the provision to the Malian Armed Forces of training and advice in command and control, logistical chain and human resources, and international humanitarian law, protection of civilians and human rights. EUTM Mali aims at strengthening conditions for a proper political control by legitimate civilian authorities of the Malian Armed Forces. The activities of EUTM Mali are to be conducted in close coordination with other factors involved in the support to the Malian Armed Forces, in particular the UN and ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States). The budget is €12.3 million, to cover its 15 month duration. An extraordinary FAC meeting on the 17 January adopted the Council Decision and thus authorised its establishment.

16.3 The EU's overall political objective is to enable the Malian authorities to: restore constitutional order, supporting a roadmap to free and open elections in 2013; extend the State's authority throughout the country; and tackle the terrorist threat and organised crime. EUTM Mali aims at strengthening conditions for a proper political control by legitimate civilian authorities of the Malian Armed Forces. [62]

16.4 By July 2013, EUTM Mali was approximately 550 strong, comprising:

—  approximately 200 instructors, of which approximately 100 are infantry trainers;

—  150 troops providing force protection, from France (one company), Czech Republic and Spain (one platoon each);

—  150 staff officers and NCOs at the Main Headquarters in Bamako and the Forward Headquarters in Koulikoro, responsible for command and control, liaison with the Malian authorities, medical support and logistics; and

—  a small cell in Brussels responsible for co-ordination between the Mission and the EU apparatus.

16.5 22 Member States have provided personnel. France is by far the largest contributor. The UK is providing 33 military trainers, four HQ staff and one Human Rights trainer.

16.6 As our Reports on EUTM Mali recall, the Committee has long underlined the danger of "mission creep" in all CSDP missions. Here, the element of "mission creep" at this early stage was budgetary: double the original estimate, and clearly the likelihood of more to come. The Committee said that it expected to hear more when the Minister wrote about the mid-term review and asked, when he did so, to provide his assessment of EUTM Mali's achievements-against-benchmarks thus far (c.f. paragraph 17.2 of our most recent Report under reference), of progress towards achieving the EU's overall objectives (c.f. paragraph 16.3 above) and of the likelihood of attaining the planned exit at the end of the 15 month mandate (c.f. paragraph 17.6 of our most recent Report under reference).[63]

The Minister's letter of 3 January 2014

16.7 As part of an update on CSDP in the Sahel, the Minister wrote that UK and other Member States assessed that EUTM Mali had performed well so far. The four battalions trained so far represented approximately half the Malian army's fighting strength. A Strategic Review (issued in November 2013) proposed a two year extension, beyond May 2014, in order to be able to train the remaining battalions, provide follow-up training and step up its advice activity. A Council Decision was expected in late January. The Minister saw merit in extending EUTM accordingly — provided that a clear exit strategy was built into the renewed mandate, in order to enable the Malians to take ownership of their own training and defence sector reform by the end of a second mandate. As proposed, the amended mandate would include (his emphasis):

—  more focused leadership training (of officers and NCOs);

—  follow-up training post-graduation (including training in the Malian army's own barracks); and

—  "train-the-trainer" work, which will permit the training work progressively to be handed over to the Malians themselves.

16.8 Discussions continued in Brussels, including on how the Mission would manage the challenges that were likely to persist, e.g., "shortages of equipment" and "providing the full quota of trainees at the start of each battalion's training".

16.9 Turning to Civilian CSDP in Mali, the Minister noted that UN Security Council Resolution 2100, of 25 April 2013, highlighted the need for work in this area, and the UN Mission in Mali, MINUSMA, has been keen to take advantage of the EU's expertise in security sector reform and capacity-building. So, after "significant engagement" with their heads, the EEAS had proposed a new civilian mission, focussing on the challenges facing the police, gendarmerie and the national guard, with the following objectives:

—  "Restoring and maintaining constitutional and democratic order and conditions for peace;

—  "Extending and maintaining the authority and legitimacy of the State throughout the country; and

—  "Installing national security, ensuring territorial control and protection of the population particularly through strengthening capacity to fight terrorism, organized crime and trafficking."

16.10 The Minister had given this "a cautious welcome" but, "mindful of the need for any new CSDP activity to be effective and represent good value for money", had stressed the need to ensure that any new CSDP mission should:

—  "complement the work of other actors, principally MINUSMA;

—  "have a focused, measureable mandate; be up-front about the potential challenges; have achievable aims and a clear, achievable exit strategy;

—  "prioritise training of officers who will eventually deploy to northern Mali, where the need is greatest;

—  "work closely with the other CSDP Missions to deliver the EU Strategy for the Sahel, with maximum flexibility and deployability of EU assets in the region, sharing good practice, learning lessons and avoiding duplication;

—  "consider early and realistically how it will be staffed."

16.11 The Minister noted that: new planning processes now in place for CSDP Missions entailed the need for two Council Decisions (rather than the previous single Decision) prior to launch; the first was expected in late January. The mission would be launched in late spring 2014. The estimated common-funded cost was £15-20 million per year (UK share 15.2%).

16.12 In its reply of 15 January 2014, the Committee thanked the Minister for his frankness on the experience so far in Mali and the challenges facing EUTM, both actual and prospective; found it reassuring that the UK had been so fully involved; and fully endorsed the Minister's focus on a clear exit strategy. It noted, however, the Kidal incident suggested that EUTM's performance had perhaps not been quite as satisfactory as hoped for;[64] while the shortages of equipment for trainees and of trainees themselves that he expected to persist could clearly threaten the ability of the Malians to assume responsibility at the end of the next mandate. The obvious danger was pressure at the end of the next mandate for a further extension, notwithstanding the sort of necessary amendments to the mandate that the Minister highlighted. There was also a clear and present danger to cost control if, as seemed to be the case, a commercial organisation could hold the mission to ransom in the crucial area of MEDEVAC; the Minister was "encouraging creative solutions", but did not give any examples of what they might be; when a Council Decision was put forward, the Committee would expect his EM to cover these matters fully.

16.13 With regard to the proposed civilian CSDP mission, the Committee felt that obvious danger is that this would turn into another DRC, where the missions there had gone on longer than they should, cost a great deal of money and achieved only limited success. The objectives proposed for the Mali mission appeared to be extremely ambitious, given the present and foreseeable fragility of the country — hence the fear that, once committed, the EU would find itself in another lengthy, expensive, worthy but, in the end, unsustainable endeavour. Though possibly sounding defeatist, the Committee felt it was a consideration that any new proposal needed to acknowledge and deal with at the outset. That the UN and the heads of the three interior security services, and the EEAS, were keen on it, was insufficient. It would therefore be essential that, as a minimum, the mandate fully incorporated the considerations that the Minister had outlined on page four of his letter.

The draft Council Decision

16.14 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 21 March 2014, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) explains that:

—  the draft Council Decision seeks to establish a civilian CSDP mission in support of the Malian security forces, in addition to releasing a proportion of the mission budget to enable further planning;

—  a further Council Decision will be required to formally launch the mission;

—  this first Council Decision and budget covers a period of nine months and will cover the costs of a core team, which will be responsible for setting up the mission in terms of logistics and infrastructure, establish key contacts with the Malian authorities and other partners, particularly the UN Mission, MINUSMA, and gathering the information required for later planning documents including the CONOPS and the OPlan;[65]

—  this new procedure for launching Civilian CSDP missions in two stages has come about partly to bring civilian mission planning in line with military missions but mostly in response to lessons learned from the launch of EUCAP Sahel Niger,[66] EUCAP Nestor[67] and EUAVSEC South Sudan;[68] and

—  the new procedure aims to provide structure and funding to the planning process, to allow the Head of Mission to be involved in planning and start work on the administrative and procedural aspects of mission so that it is ready to start work on the date of mission launch.

16.15 The Minister also says:

"The new CSDP mission to Mali will work to restore and maintain constitutional and democratic order in Mali, and in particular restore and maintain State authority and legitimacy throughout the whole territory of Mali by means of an effective redeployment of its administration. It will work closely with other international actors in Mali such as the UN Mission, MINUSMA."

The Government's view

16.16 After reviewing the background to the crisis and the response of the UN, France and the EU thus far, the Minister says:

RATIONALE

"The crisis in Mali brought into sharp relief the weaknesses in the interior security forces, made up of the Police, Gendarmerie and National Guard. Key failings include poor relations between the authorities and the security forces, the mistrust of the political authorities and the general population, the forces are insufficiently trained and equipped, they lack infrastructure. In addition, the chain of command is not fit for purpose, and human resources management is disorganised. Finally clientelism and corruption is rife resulting in a lack of credibility.

"The new civilian CSDP Mission, once at full operating capacity and officially launched, will aim to strengthen many of these weaknesses. In particular it will provide strategic advice to the three branches of Mali's Interior Security Forces, and more specifically, will aim to provide advice on reorganising the chain of command, legislation, employment conditions, management and training systems. In addition, the mission will provide training to a third of the Gendarmerie and the Police and a quarter of the National Guard, amounting to 4,500 staff, prioritising those expected to work in the north.

DURATION

"The EEAS estimates that the mission will require four years to achieve its objectives. The initial mandate however, will be two years, allowing Member States more control over the mission with an opportunity to amend the mandate if circumstances change on the ground. More information on the activities of the mission will be provided in my subsequent EM to launch the mission, expected to be in 6-9 months time.

AIM AND EXIT STRATEGY

"By the end of the mission, the aim is for the security forces to be better at ensuring public security, they will have greater control over their territory, the penal chain will be more effective, the chain of command will be strengthened and they will operate more effectively. The mission's exit strategy will need to be defined as at the time of the first Strategic Review, but at this stage there is consensus among EU Member States that the Malian government, the EDF, other EU instruments, the UN and bilateral partners will all have a role to play in providing advice at Ministerial level, human resources advice, advice in managing training schools as well as training teacher trainers.

CO-ORDINATION AND COHERENCE WITH OTHER CSDP MISSION AND THE UN

"As you will know, there are already several CSDP missions in the region: EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUBAM Libya.[69] The EEAS has committed to ensure that these missions will work together. They will exchange information with a view to ensuring coherence in the activities as a whole, finding synergies, taking a regional perspective and establishing appropriate mechanisms for coordination. The mission will also collaborate with the EU Delegation in Bamako to ensure coherence and cooperation with other EU instruments.

"The mission will coordinate its activities with the UN mission, MINUSMA. MINUSMA has a broad remit under UNSCR 2100, and will play a role in assisting the national reconciliation process, as well as policing and justice reform and creating conditions for local security forces to return to the north. It also has a section focussing on training security forces personnel to return to the north and advising on reform. Coordination with the new CSDP mission will take the form of regular exchange of information to ensure coherence and staff from each mission embedded in the other to ensure the greatest amount of coordination between the two missions possible."

16.17 The Minister then set out the Financial Implications as follows:

"EUCAP Sahel Mali's preliminary budget will total €5.5 million and will be funded from the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget. The UK contributes a proportion to the pre-agreed CFSP budget, not the individual programmes within it. Funds for EUCAP's budget will be found within existing resources in the CFSP budget.

"The budget will be broken down as follows:

"Personnel Costs: €2,142,702

"Staff will include a Head of Mission, 19 contracted staff to include positions essential to mission set up, such as mission support, procurement, security, legal etc., 11 seconded experts and ten assistants who will be local staff. The costs will include salaries where appropriate, per Diems and insurance. A second phase of deployment of 25 personnel will take place one month before launch so that the mission is at full operational capacity at launch.

"Mission Expenditure: €87,580

"Staff will be expected to travel to Brussels to coordinate with the Institutions involved in mission planning, as well as travel throughout the Sahel to coordinate with EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUBAM Libya, as well as with the EUTM in Mali

"Running Expenditure: €1,468,010

"This heading includes the costs of renting vehicles until the mission's own vehicles arrive from the CSDP Warehouse, office and accommodation costs, communication costs, and security

"Capital Expenditure: €1,557,041

"This includes costs for two armoured vehicles and ten soft skinned vehicles, IT equipment, communications equipment including phones, radio and navigation equipment, furniture, air conditioners and generators for the office and the accommodation, security upgrades and equipment

"Representation: €4,500

"This budget line funds the mission's public facing activities.

"Contingencies: €240,167

"This can only be used with prior written approval of the Commission

"In addition to the core costs funded from the CFSP budget, the UK will be seeking to fund two experts into the core team. The costs for these positions will come from the Conflict Pool and will cost approximately £80,000 each."

16.18 Finally, on the Timetable, the Minister says that the Council Decision will be adopted as soon as possible after clearing scrutiny, noting that:

"The EEAS have asked Member States to consider their plans for seconding staff to the mission as part of the early planning process and the first phase of recruitment for the core team is ongoing, to be deployed at the beginning of May. The core team will assess needs on the ground and prepare the CONOPS, the OPlan and the budget for the first year of the mission, which will officially launch once it has reached full operating capacity by December 2014. Launch will require a second Council Decision to be agreed."

Conclusion

16.19 In his letter at the beginning of the year, the Minister clearly set out his pre-conditions, viz., any new CSDP mission should: complement the work of other actors, principally MINUSMA; have a focused, measureable mandate; be up-front about the potential challenges; have achievable aims and a clear, achievable exit strategy; prioritise training of officers who will eventually deploy to northern Mali, where the need is greatest; work closely with the other CSDP Missions to deliver the EU Strategy for the Sahel, sharing good practice, learning lessons and avoiding duplication; and consider early and realistically how it will be staffed. As such, the mission is still a "work in progress".

16.20 Although the EEAS seems to have stepped back from the very ambitious objectives outlined in the Minister's letter of 3 January, they are nonetheless very challenging, given the starting point with the security forces — poor relations with the authorities and the general population; insufficient training and equipment; a lack of infrastructure; a chain of command not fit for purpose; disorganised human resources management; endemic clientelism and corruption; and a general lack of credibility.

16.21 The aim would accordingly appear to be more realistic: the security forces to be better at ensuring public security, with greater control over their territory, a more effective penal chain, a strengthened chain of command and operating more effectively. Given the starting point, they can hardly fail to be achieved.

16.22 It is already envisaged that this mission will run for at least four years, with an exit strategy that will not be defined until the time of the first Strategic Review, and that the EU will be involved for years thereafter through the EDF and other EU instruments, in providing advice at Ministerial level, human resources advice, advice in managing training schools as well as training teacher trainers. This is very reminiscent of the EU's approach in the Democratic Republic of Congo. There, however, what might be called "Stage 1" lasted a great deal longer than originally envisaged, while "Stage 2" is yet to be initiated.

16.23 The first Strategic Review will thus be of particular importance. However, the Minister does not say when the will take place. Moreover, as he is aware, we have been in extensive and as yet unresolved discussion over our wish to be involved in the scrutiny of such Strategic Reviews, given that they determine the way ahead and that, by the time that the ensuing Council Decisions are submitted for scrutiny, the die is effectively cast.

16.24 For now, as the Minister notes, there will be a second Council Decision in the autumn, prior to the mission's launch. At that stage, as well as demonstrating how the fully fleshed-out Mission will meet his pre-conditions, we hope that the Minister will have more to say about the exit strategy and the sort of timeline and scope that Member States envisage for longer-term EU involvement (and that our discussions on the Committee's involvement in the Strategic Review process will have been resolved to our satisfaction).

16.25 In the meantime, we clear this Council Decision.


60   "The crisis in Mali: current military action and upholding humanitarian law": SN06531 of 23 January 2013; see http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06531. Back

61   The record of the debate is available at Gen Co Deb, European Standing Committee B, 16 January 2013, cols. 3-24, and http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmgeneral/euro/130116/130116s01.htm. Back

62   For the full background and the Committee's earlier consideration, see (34646): HC 86-xxxi (2012-13), chapter 13 (6 February 2013) and (34550)-: HC 86-xxv (2012-13), chapter 2 (19 December 2012). Back

63   See (34664) -: HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 17 (3 July 2013). Back

64   On 28 November 2013, the Elou battalion (the second to be trained) opened fire on a group of civilians in Kidal, three of whom were wounded and, of whom, one subsequently died; the soldiers were among those trained by UK personnel. This was the worst of a number instances, "albeit isolated, when EUTM-trained Malian troops have behaved poorly when engaged in the field, and engaged in looting and the excessive use of force" (the Minister's letter). Back

65   A concept of operations (abbreviated CONOPS, CONOPs, or ConOps) is a document describing the characteristics of a proposed mission; the OPlan is the "operating plan". Back

66   EUCAP SAHEL Niger, the CSDP civilian mission launched at the request of Niger's government in the summer of 2012, is is designed to provide advice and training to help the Nigerien authorities strengthen their framework for combating terrorism and organised crime. See http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1960390/eucap_sahel_factsheet_en_-_april_2013_final.pdf. Back

67   On 16 July 2012, the EU launched EUCAP Nestor, in order to enhance the maritime capacities of five countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean: Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Seychelles and Tanzania. See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-nestor/index_en.htm. Back

68   EUAVSEC South Sudan aims to assist and advise South Sudan to establish the aviation security organisation at the Ministry of Transport and to strengthen aviation security at Juba International Airport. See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/euavsec-south-sudan/index_en.htm. Back

69   EUBAM Libya aims to support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country's borders. See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eubam-libya/index_en.htm. Back


 
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