16 EU training of Malian security forces
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| Council Decision on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali)
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| Legal base | Articles 28, 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 3 January 2014 and EM of 21 March 2014
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| Previous Committee Report | None: but see (34664) —: HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 17 (3 July 2013) and HC 86-xxxii (2012-13), chapter 14 (13 February 2013); also see (34646): HC 86-xxxi (2012-13), chapter 13 (6 February 2013) and (34550)—: HC 86-xxv (2012-13), chapter 2 (19 December 2012)
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| Discussion in Council | 12 February 2013
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
16.1 In the words of the current House of Commons
Library research paper:
"Mali has been in crisis since March 2012, when
the military overthrew the government of Amadou Toumani Touré.
Within weeks of the coup, a coalition of separatist Tuareg rebels
and militant Islamist armed groups with links to Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb pushed the national army out of the north of the
country. The coalition split up quickly, leaving the militant
Islamists largely in control. A weak and ineffective transitional
government has been in existence in the south of the country since
April but the north remained beyond its control. In late 2012,
it was agreed to create a military intervention force, under the
auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
which would attempt to retake the north, but it was not expected
to be battle-ready until September 2013. At the same time, political
negotiations began to try and draw parts of the rebel coalition
into a political process. However, on 9 January 2013, a sudden
military push southwards by rebels appeared to open up the possibility
that the entire country might fall to them in the near future.
This provoked an urgent French military intervention from 11 January
onwards to stop the rebel advance and, indeed, roll it back. This
is being achieved. However, the rebels are re-grouping and will
turn to insurgency.
"Concerns are being raised about the need for
French and Malian forces to uphold humanitarian and human rights
law during the current military operation in Mali. Malian forces
have been accused of serious human rights abuses. As the ECOWAS
force, known as AFISMA, assembles and deploys, these concerns
will extend to it as well. The agreed EU training mission that
has been agreed, along with the UK training initiative for Anglophone
troops involved, will need to respond to such concerns. The UK
is not currently in a combat role in Mali, although some worry
about gradual 'mission creep'."[60]
16.2 The Council Decision establishing EUTM Mali
was debated in European Committee B on 16 January.[61]
That Council Decision laid down the Mission's parameters: non-involvement
in combat operations; the provision to the Malian Armed Forces
of training and advice in command and control, logistical chain
and human resources, and international humanitarian law, protection
of civilians and human rights. EUTM Mali aims at strengthening
conditions for a proper political control by legitimate civilian
authorities of the Malian Armed Forces. The activities of EUTM
Mali are to be conducted in close coordination with other factors
involved in the support to the Malian Armed Forces, in particular
the UN and ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States).
The budget is €12.3 million, to cover its 15 month duration.
An extraordinary FAC meeting on the 17 January adopted the Council
Decision and thus authorised its establishment.
16.3 The EU's overall political objective is to enable
the Malian authorities to: restore constitutional order, supporting
a roadmap to free and open elections in 2013; extend the State's
authority throughout the country; and tackle the terrorist threat
and organised crime. EUTM Mali aims at strengthening conditions
for a proper political control by legitimate civilian authorities
of the Malian Armed Forces. [62]
16.4 By July 2013, EUTM Mali was approximately 550
strong, comprising:
— approximately 200 instructors, of which
approximately 100 are infantry trainers;
— 150 troops providing force protection,
from France (one company), Czech Republic and Spain (one platoon
each);
— 150 staff officers and NCOs at the Main
Headquarters in Bamako and the Forward Headquarters in Koulikoro,
responsible for command and control, liaison with the Malian authorities,
medical support and logistics; and
— a small cell in Brussels responsible
for co-ordination between the Mission and the EU apparatus.
16.5 22 Member States have provided personnel. France
is by far the largest contributor. The UK is providing 33 military
trainers, four HQ staff and one Human Rights trainer.
16.6 As our Reports on EUTM Mali recall, the Committee
has long underlined the danger of "mission creep" in
all CSDP missions. Here, the element of "mission creep"
at this early stage was budgetary: double the original estimate,
and clearly the likelihood of more to come. The Committee said
that it expected to hear more when the Minister wrote about the
mid-term review and asked, when he did so, to provide his assessment
of EUTM Mali's achievements-against-benchmarks thus far (c.f.
paragraph 17.2 of our most recent Report under reference), of
progress towards achieving the EU's overall objectives (c.f. paragraph
16.3 above) and of the likelihood of attaining the planned exit
at the end of the 15 month mandate (c.f. paragraph 17.6 of our
most recent Report under reference).[63]
The Minister's letter of 3 January 2014
16.7 As part of an update on CSDP in the Sahel, the
Minister wrote that UK and other Member States assessed that EUTM
Mali had performed well so far. The four battalions trained so
far represented approximately half the Malian army's fighting
strength. A Strategic Review (issued in November 2013) proposed
a two year extension, beyond May 2014, in order to be able to
train the remaining battalions, provide follow-up training and
step up its advice activity. A Council Decision was expected in
late January. The Minister saw merit in extending EUTM accordingly
— provided that a clear exit strategy was built into the
renewed mandate, in order to enable the Malians to take ownership
of their own training and defence sector reform by the end of
a second mandate. As proposed, the amended mandate would include
(his emphasis):
— more focused leadership training
(of officers and NCOs);
— follow-up training post-graduation
(including training in the Malian army's own barracks); and
— "train-the-trainer"
work, which will permit the training work progressively to be
handed over to the Malians themselves.
16.8 Discussions continued in Brussels, including
on how the Mission would manage the challenges that were likely
to persist, e.g., "shortages of equipment" and
"providing the full quota of trainees at the start
of each battalion's training".
16.9 Turning to Civilian CSDP in Mali, the Minister
noted that UN Security Council Resolution 2100, of 25 April 2013,
highlighted the need for work in this area, and the UN Mission
in Mali, MINUSMA, has been keen to take advantage of the EU's
expertise in security sector reform and capacity-building. So,
after "significant engagement" with their heads, the
EEAS had proposed a new civilian mission, focussing on the challenges
facing the police, gendarmerie and the national guard, with the
following objectives:
— "Restoring and maintaining constitutional
and democratic order and conditions for peace;
— "Extending and maintaining the authority
and legitimacy of the State throughout the country; and
— "Installing national security, ensuring
territorial control and protection of the population particularly
through strengthening capacity to fight terrorism, organized crime
and trafficking."
16.10 The Minister had given this "a cautious
welcome" but, "mindful of the need for any new CSDP
activity to be effective and represent good value for money",
had stressed the need to ensure that any new CSDP mission should:
— "complement the work of other actors,
principally MINUSMA;
— "have a focused, measureable mandate;
be up-front about the potential challenges; have achievable aims
and a clear, achievable exit strategy;
— "prioritise training of officers
who will eventually deploy to northern Mali, where the need is
greatest;
— "work closely with the other CSDP
Missions to deliver the EU Strategy for the Sahel, with maximum
flexibility and deployability of EU assets in the region, sharing
good practice, learning lessons and avoiding duplication;
— "consider early and realistically
how it will be staffed."
16.11 The Minister noted that: new planning processes
now in place for CSDP Missions entailed the need for two Council
Decisions (rather than the previous single Decision) prior to
launch; the first was expected in late January. The mission would
be launched in late spring 2014. The estimated common-funded cost
was £15-20 million per year (UK share 15.2%).
16.12 In its reply of 15 January 2014, the Committee
thanked the Minister for his frankness on the experience so far
in Mali and the challenges facing EUTM, both actual and prospective;
found it reassuring that the UK had been so fully involved; and
fully endorsed the Minister's focus on a clear exit strategy.
It noted, however, the Kidal incident suggested that EUTM's performance
had perhaps not been quite as satisfactory as hoped for;[64]
while the shortages of equipment for trainees and of trainees
themselves that he expected to persist could clearly threaten
the ability of the Malians to assume responsibility at the end
of the next mandate. The obvious danger was pressure at the end
of the next mandate for a further extension, notwithstanding the
sort of necessary amendments to the mandate that the Minister
highlighted. There was also a clear and present danger to cost
control if, as seemed to be the case, a commercial organisation
could hold the mission to ransom in the crucial area of MEDEVAC;
the Minister was "encouraging creative solutions", but
did not give any examples of what they might be; when a Council
Decision was put forward, the Committee would expect his EM to
cover these matters fully.
16.13 With regard to the proposed civilian CSDP mission,
the Committee felt that obvious danger is that this would turn
into another DRC, where the missions there had gone on longer
than they should, cost a great deal of money and achieved only
limited success. The objectives proposed for the Mali mission
appeared to be extremely ambitious, given the present and foreseeable
fragility of the country — hence the fear that, once committed,
the EU would find itself in another lengthy, expensive, worthy
but, in the end, unsustainable endeavour. Though possibly sounding
defeatist, the Committee felt it was a consideration that any
new proposal needed to acknowledge and deal with at the outset.
That the UN and the heads of the three interior security services,
and the EEAS, were keen on it, was insufficient. It would therefore
be essential that, as a minimum, the mandate fully incorporated
the considerations that the Minister had outlined on page four
of his letter.
The draft Council Decision
16.14 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 21 March 2014,
the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) explains that:
— the draft Council Decision seeks to establish
a civilian CSDP mission in support of the Malian security forces,
in addition to releasing a proportion of the mission budget to
enable further planning;
— a further Council Decision will be required
to formally launch the mission;
— this first Council Decision and budget
covers a period of nine months and will cover the costs of a core
team, which will be responsible for setting up the mission in
terms of logistics and infrastructure, establish key contacts
with the Malian authorities and other partners, particularly the
UN Mission, MINUSMA, and gathering the information required for
later planning documents including the CONOPS and the OPlan;[65]
— this new procedure for launching Civilian
CSDP missions in two stages has come about partly to bring civilian
mission planning in line with military missions but mostly in
response to lessons learned from the launch of EUCAP Sahel Niger,[66]
EUCAP Nestor[67] and
EUAVSEC South Sudan;[68]
and
— the new procedure aims to provide structure
and funding to the planning process, to allow the Head of Mission
to be involved in planning and start work on the administrative
and procedural aspects of mission so that it is ready to start
work on the date of mission launch.
16.15 The Minister also says:
"The new CSDP mission to Mali will work to restore
and maintain constitutional and democratic order in Mali, and
in particular restore and maintain State authority and legitimacy
throughout the whole territory of Mali by means of an effective
redeployment of its administration. It will work closely with
other international actors in Mali such as the UN Mission, MINUSMA."
The Government's view
16.16 After reviewing the background to the crisis
and the response of the UN, France and the EU thus far, the Minister
says:
RATIONALE
"The crisis in Mali brought into sharp relief
the weaknesses in the interior security forces, made up of the
Police, Gendarmerie and National Guard. Key failings include poor
relations between the authorities and the security forces, the
mistrust of the political authorities and the general population,
the forces are insufficiently trained and equipped, they lack
infrastructure. In addition, the chain of command is not fit for
purpose, and human resources management is disorganised. Finally
clientelism and corruption is rife resulting in a lack of credibility.
"The new civilian CSDP Mission, once at full
operating capacity and officially launched, will aim to strengthen
many of these weaknesses. In particular it will provide strategic
advice to the three branches of Mali's Interior Security Forces,
and more specifically, will aim to provide advice on reorganising
the chain of command, legislation, employment conditions, management
and training systems. In addition, the mission will provide training
to a third of the Gendarmerie and the Police and a quarter of
the National Guard, amounting to 4,500 staff, prioritising those
expected to work in the north.
DURATION
"The EEAS estimates that the mission will require
four years to achieve its objectives. The initial mandate however,
will be two years, allowing Member States more control over the
mission with an opportunity to amend the mandate if circumstances
change on the ground. More information on the activities of the
mission will be provided in my subsequent EM to launch the mission,
expected to be in 6-9 months time.
AIM AND EXIT STRATEGY
"By the end of the mission, the aim is for the
security forces to be better at ensuring public security, they
will have greater control over their territory, the penal chain
will be more effective, the chain of command will be strengthened
and they will operate more effectively. The mission's exit strategy
will need to be defined as at the time of the first Strategic
Review, but at this stage there is consensus among EU Member States
that the Malian government, the EDF, other EU instruments, the
UN and bilateral partners will all have a role to play in providing
advice at Ministerial level, human resources advice, advice in
managing training schools as well as training teacher trainers.
CO-ORDINATION AND COHERENCE WITH OTHER CSDP MISSION
AND THE UN
"As you will know, there are already several
CSDP missions in the region: EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger and
EUBAM Libya.[69] The
EEAS has committed to ensure that these missions will work together.
They will exchange information with a view to ensuring coherence
in the activities as a whole, finding synergies, taking a regional
perspective and establishing appropriate mechanisms for coordination.
The mission will also collaborate with the EU Delegation in Bamako
to ensure coherence and cooperation with other EU instruments.
"The mission will coordinate its activities
with the UN mission, MINUSMA. MINUSMA has a broad remit under
UNSCR 2100, and will play a role in assisting the national reconciliation
process, as well as policing and justice reform and creating conditions
for local security forces to return to the north. It also has
a section focussing on training security forces personnel to return
to the north and advising on reform. Coordination with the new
CSDP mission will take the form of regular exchange of information
to ensure coherence and staff from each mission embedded in the
other to ensure the greatest amount of coordination between the
two missions possible."
16.17 The Minister then set out the Financial
Implications as follows:
"EUCAP Sahel Mali's preliminary budget will
total €5.5 million and will be funded from the Common Foreign
and Security Policy budget. The UK contributes a proportion to
the pre-agreed CFSP budget, not the individual programmes within
it. Funds for EUCAP's budget will be found within existing resources
in the CFSP budget.
"The budget will be broken down as follows:
"Personnel Costs: €2,142,702
"Staff will include a Head of Mission, 19 contracted
staff to include positions essential to mission set up, such as
mission support, procurement, security, legal etc., 11 seconded
experts and ten assistants who will be local staff. The costs
will include salaries where appropriate, per Diems and insurance.
A second phase of deployment of 25 personnel will take place one
month before launch so that the mission is at full operational
capacity at launch.
"Mission Expenditure: €87,580
"Staff will be expected to travel to Brussels
to coordinate with the Institutions involved in mission planning,
as well as travel throughout the Sahel to coordinate with EUCAP
Sahel Niger and EUBAM Libya, as well as with the EUTM in Mali
"Running Expenditure: €1,468,010
"This heading includes the costs of renting
vehicles until the mission's own vehicles arrive from the CSDP
Warehouse, office and accommodation costs, communication costs,
and security
"Capital Expenditure: €1,557,041
"This includes costs for two armoured vehicles
and ten soft skinned vehicles, IT equipment, communications equipment
including phones, radio and navigation equipment, furniture, air
conditioners and generators for the office and the accommodation,
security upgrades and equipment
"Representation: €4,500
"This budget line funds the mission's public
facing activities.
"Contingencies: €240,167
"This can only be used with prior written approval
of the Commission
"In addition to the core costs funded from the
CFSP budget, the UK will be seeking to fund two experts into the
core team. The costs for these positions will come from the Conflict
Pool and will cost approximately £80,000 each."
16.18 Finally, on the Timetable, the Minister
says that the Council Decision will be adopted as soon as possible
after clearing scrutiny, noting that:
"The EEAS have asked Member States to consider
their plans for seconding staff to the mission as part of the
early planning process and the first phase of recruitment for
the core team is ongoing, to be deployed at the beginning of May.
The core team will assess needs on the ground and prepare the
CONOPS, the OPlan and the budget for the first year of the mission,
which will officially launch once it has reached full operating
capacity by December 2014. Launch will require a second Council
Decision to be agreed."
Conclusion
16.19 In his letter at the beginning of the year,
the Minister clearly set out his pre-conditions, viz., any new
CSDP mission should: complement the work of other actors, principally
MINUSMA; have a focused, measureable mandate; be up-front about
the potential challenges; have achievable aims and a clear, achievable
exit strategy; prioritise training of officers who will eventually
deploy to northern Mali, where the need is greatest; work closely
with the other CSDP Missions to deliver the EU Strategy for the
Sahel, sharing good practice, learning lessons and avoiding duplication;
and consider early and realistically how it will be staffed.
As such, the mission is still a "work in progress".
16.20 Although the EEAS seems to have stepped
back from the very ambitious objectives outlined in the Minister's
letter of 3 January, they are nonetheless very challenging, given
the starting point with the security forces — poor relations
with the authorities and the general population; insufficient
training and equipment; a lack of infrastructure; a chain of command
not fit for purpose; disorganised human resources management;
endemic clientelism and corruption; and a general lack of credibility.
16.21 The aim would accordingly appear to be more
realistic: the security forces to be better at ensuring public
security, with greater control over their territory, a more effective
penal chain, a strengthened chain of command and operating more
effectively. Given the starting point, they can hardly fail to
be achieved.
16.22 It is already envisaged that this mission
will run for at least four years, with an exit strategy that will
not be defined until the time of the first Strategic Review, and
that the EU will be involved for years thereafter through the
EDF and other EU instruments, in providing advice at Ministerial
level, human resources advice, advice in managing training schools
as well as training teacher trainers. This is very reminiscent
of the EU's approach in the Democratic Republic of Congo. There,
however, what might be called "Stage 1" lasted a great
deal longer than originally envisaged, while "Stage 2"
is yet to be initiated.
16.23 The first Strategic Review will thus be
of particular importance. However, the Minister does not say
when the will take place. Moreover, as he is aware, we have been
in extensive and as yet unresolved discussion over our wish to
be involved in the scrutiny of such Strategic Reviews, given that
they determine the way ahead and that, by the time that the ensuing
Council Decisions are submitted for scrutiny, the die is effectively
cast.
16.24 For now, as the Minister notes, there will
be a second Council Decision in the autumn, prior to the mission's
launch. At that stage, as well as demonstrating how the fully
fleshed-out Mission will meet his pre-conditions, we hope that
the Minister will have more to say about the exit strategy and
the sort of timeline and scope that Member States envisage for
longer-term EU involvement (and that our discussions on the Committee's
involvement in the Strategic Review process will have been resolved
to our satisfaction).
16.25 In the meantime, we clear this Council Decision.
60 "The crisis in Mali: current military action
and upholding humanitarian law": SN06531 of 23 January 2013;
see http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06531. Back
61
The record of the debate is available at Gen Co Deb, European
Standing Committee B, 16 January 2013, cols. 3-24, and http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmgeneral/euro/130116/130116s01.htm. Back
62
For the full background and the Committee's earlier consideration,
see (34646): HC 86-xxxi (2012-13), chapter 13 (6 February 2013)
and (34550)-: HC 86-xxv (2012-13), chapter 2 (19 December 2012). Back
63
See (34664) -: HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 17 (3 July 2013). Back
64
On 28 November 2013, the Elou battalion (the second to be trained)
opened fire on a group of civilians in Kidal, three of whom were
wounded and, of whom, one subsequently died; the soldiers were
among those trained by UK personnel. This was the worst of a
number instances, "albeit isolated, when EUTM-trained Malian
troops have behaved poorly when engaged in the field, and engaged
in looting and the excessive use of force" (the Minister's
letter). Back
65
A concept of operations (abbreviated CONOPS, CONOPs,
or ConOps) is a document describing the characteristics
of a proposed mission; the OPlan is the "operating plan". Back
66
EUCAP SAHEL Niger, the CSDP civilian mission launched at the request
of Niger's government in the summer of 2012, is is designed to
provide advice and training to help the Nigerien authorities strengthen
their framework for combating terrorism and organised crime. See
http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1960390/eucap_sahel_factsheet_en_-_april_2013_final.pdf. Back
67
On 16 July 2012, the EU launched EUCAP Nestor, in order to enhance
the maritime capacities of five countries in the Horn of Africa
and the Western Indian Ocean: Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Seychelles
and Tanzania. See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-nestor/index_en.htm. Back
68
EUAVSEC South Sudan aims to assist and advise South Sudan to establish
the aviation security organisation at the Ministry of Transport
and to strengthen aviation security at Juba International Airport.
See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/euavsec-south-sudan/index_en.htm. Back
69
EUBAM Libya aims to support the Libyan authorities in improving
and developing the security of the country's borders. See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eubam-libya/index_en.htm. Back
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